Mediaeval Sources in Translation 42

PETER LOMBARD

THE *SENTENCES*

BOOK 1: The Mystery of the Trinity

Translated by

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This book has been published with the help of a grant
from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences,
through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme,
using funds provided by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, ca. 1100-1160.
The Sentences, book 1 : the mystery of the Trinity / Peter Lombard ; translated by Giulio Silano.

(Mediaeval sources in translation, ISSN 0316-0874 ; 42)
(St. Michael's College mediaeval translations)
Translation of: Sententiarum libri IV, Liber 1.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN-13: 978-0-88844-292-5
ISBN-10: 0-88844-292-0

1. God—Early works to 1800. 2. Trinity—Early works to 1800. 3. Catholic Church—Doctrines—Early works to 1800. 4. Theology—Early works to 1800. I. Silano, Giulio, 1955– II. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. III. Title. IV. Series. V. Series: St. Michael's College mediaeval translations.

B765.P33 S46 2007 231 C2006-907006-7

Second printing, with corrections, 2010

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Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
59 Queen's Park Crescent East
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4

PRINTED IN CANADA

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To Gianmarco

Considerate la vostra semenza:
fatti non foste a viver come bruti,
ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.

(*Inferno*, 26.118-120)

INTRODUCTION

A story that was already old by the end of the Middle Ages had it that there had once been three brothers, born of an adulterous union. Their mother, on her deathbed, confessed her sin, and her confessor, noting its gravity, urged her to much sorrow and penance. The woman acknowledged that adultery is a great sin, but professed an inability to feel compunction, in view of the great good that had come of it, since each of her sons had become a luminary in the Church. The confessor agreed that her sons had done much useful work for the Church, but this had been God's gift; her contribution had been the commission of adultery, and for this she ought to sorrow, or at least she ought to sorrow at her inability to feel sorrow. The three brothers born of this unrepented sin were Peter Comestor, Gratian, and Peter Lombard.[1]

The story is charming. Although there is no literal truth to it, and probably there never was meant to be, it makes important points. The three "brothers" had been twelfth-century contemporaries; acting without institutional authority ("adulterous birth"), they had made signal contributions to the Church, becoming, in turn, "fathers" of the sciences of biblical studies, canon law, and theology. And that there should be relatively little interest in the actual details of their lives was fitting, too, because each of them really stood for a book: Peter Comestor for his *Scholastic History*, Gratian for his *Decretum*, and Peter Lombard for his *Sentences*. From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries and beyond, the study of each of these books would serve to initiate successive generations of practitioners in their respective sciences.

[1]The version of the story followed here is taken from the prefatory material to *Decretum Gratiani* (Venice, 1572). On the development of the legend, see Joseph de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle. Sa préparation lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard; ses rapports avec les initiatives des canonistes. Études, recherches et documents*, 2^nd^ ed. (Bruges: De Tempel, 1948), pp. 214 and 285; see also his magisterial summary of the evidence in, "Pierre Lombard," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris: Librairie L'Etouzey et Ané, 1935), v. 12, pt. 2, cc. 1941-2019, at 1942-1943; there, de Ghellinck reports that, in some versions of the story, the brothers are said to be triplets and their father is reported to have been a bishop or a priest. For a more recent and more sober consideration of the story, see Marcia L. Colish, *Peter Lombard* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 1.16 and n. 5.

The books and their authors mark the emergence of scholars and scholarship to a new position of prominence in the Western Church and Western society. They also mark a growing specialization within scholarship and the development of programs and methods of study suitable to the formation of scholars who no longer benefited from, and were no longer restrained by, participation in the monastic routine. Although they made monastic learning their own, these scholars felt called not to abandon the world, but to change it. Heirs and beneficiaries of the great debates begun by the reformers of the previous century, they turned with glee to the task of bringing out both the doctrinal coherence and the practical application of the Christian intellectual inheritance.[2]

This task was carried out in a great variety of intellectual centres across the breadth of Christian Europe. For the crucial discipline of theology, Paris, in the first half of the twelfth century, seized the preeminence which it was to retain throughout the rest of the Middle Ages and beyond. It was there that, in those years,

> a rapid development brought together a body of independent masters following essentially the same method of elucidating different areas of the learned work of the past, and instructing pupils who would carry on the task of elaborating a complete system of knowledge about Nature and the purpose of God in creating the world; about the varied disciplines which would lead to the redemption of fallen humanity as a result of the Incarnation and the establishment of the Church; and which ultimately would embrace every aspect of the supernatural and natural worlds in the light of the divine purpose and in relation to all aspects of human life.[3]

One of these independent masters was Peter Lombard. He made several signal contributions to this great task, the most lasting of which was the compilation of the *Sentences*. In it, the advances in the disciplined study of the Christian tradition of the previous decades found their most influential deployment.

[2]A brilliant review of these developments is to be found in the valedictory work of Richard W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, v. 1: *Foundations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), and, with notes and additions by Lesley Smith and Benedicta Ward, S.L.G., v. 2: *The Heroic Age* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).

[3]Southern, *The Heroic Age*, p. 4.

The Life

Despite the centrality of Peter Lombard's work in the history of the Western academic tradition, very little is known about his life.[4] His place of origin remains disputed, although his soubriquet makes clear that he was born in Northern Italy, probably in the region of Novara, around the end of the eleventh century. Another charming, but late, story has it that his mother was a washer-woman;[5] these stories say nothing of his father, nor of Peter's early years. It has seemed likely that Peter received his early schooling at the cathedral of Novara and may afterwards have gone to Bologna, but there is no firm evidence of this, or for the suggestion that he may have started a school of theology at the cathedral of Novara or at Lucca.[6]

The earliest unimpeachable reference to Peter occurs in a letter of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, dating perhaps to between 1138 and 1140:

> To the reverend fathers and lords, and our dearest friends, G[ilduin], by God's grace the venerable abbot of St. Victor of Paris, and to his entire holy convent, brother Bernard, called abbot of Clairvaux, sends greetings and our prayers. Of necessity, we must ask for many things, since many things are asked of us, nor can we spare our friends, since we are not spared by others of our friends. The lord bishop of Lucca, our father and friend, has commended to me the venerable man, Peter Lombard, asking that, through our friends, I provide necessary support for him for the brief time during which he will stay in France in order to study. I have already done so, while he was at Rheims. Now that he is in Paris, I trouble you and entrust him to

[4]Brief introductions to Peter Lombard's life are to be found in Southern, *The Heroic Age*, pp. 137-141; Marcia L. Colish, "Peter Lombard," in G.R. Evans, ed., *The Medieval Theologians. An Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 168-183, at 168; Ignatius C. Brady, "Peter Lombard," in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, v. 11 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), pp. 221-222. Fuller presentations of the few facts and many hypotheses concerning Peter's life are to be found in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.15-23; de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 213-221; de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," cc. 1941-1951; Philipp W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 34-42. The fullest discussion of his life, and a most useful collection of the evidence is in Ignatius C. Brady, *Prolegomena*, being t. 1, pt. 1, of his edition of Peter's *Sentences*, namely *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, 3rd rev. ed. (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971).

[5]de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," c. 1942, reports the fourteenth-century stories regarding Peter's mother.

[6]These suppositions are presented by Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 11-12.

your love, asking that it please you to support him for a brief time, namely from now to the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Be well.[7]

This little letter is regarded by Southern as "the most important single document for understanding the origin of the systematizing phase in the development of scholastic theology."[8] This ambitious claim relies on the supposition that the bishop of Lucca who had introduced Peter to Bernard was Odo, who ascended to the episcopate in 1137. It also requires the further supposition that this same Odo had been a student in France and an admirer of the efforts of Anselm of Laon and Hugh of St. Victor to make theology systematic. If this is true, Odo may have been the author of the *Summa sententiarum*, which is widely regarded as a pivotal text in the move toward the systematization of theological thought.[9] In Southern's view, since episcopal responsibilities did not allow Odo to complete the work which he had begun in the *Summa sententiarum*; he had chosen Peter to do so and had sent him to France for that purpose.

Whether it was at Odo's suggestion that Peter first went to Rheims, or whether he was drawn there by the presence of a fellow-Lombard, Lotulph of Novara, Bernard's letter seems to indicate that his stay there was brief. Perhaps it did not take long for Peter to realize that, although Rheims had been an important school in the preceding decades, its day was past, and the torch had definitely been transferred to Paris.[10] Certainly, once Peter came to Paris, all hope that he and his supporters may have entertained

[7]I translate the letter as it is printed by Brady, *Prolegomena*, p. 8; another translation is provided by Southern, *The Heroic Age*, pp. 137-138. In dating the letter, I follow Southern, p. 137; Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 8-9, and Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.16-17, date it to 1134-1136. The difference in dating is important for Southern because the identity of the bishop of Lucca, Peter's patron, depends on it. Southern's view that Odo is the more plausible patron seems elegant.

[8]Southern, *The Heroic Age*, p. 137.

[9]Southern fails to mention, however, that Odo's authorship of the *Summa sententiarum* is by no means widely acknowledged. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 293-295, discussed and rejected Odo's possible authorship of the work; at p. 295, he specifically rejects the conclusions which Southern would draw from Odo's possible patronage of Peter Lombard. For the undoubted importance of the *Summa sententiarum*, see also Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.57-65 and passim.

[10]On the glories of Rheims in those years, see John R. Williams, "The Cathedral School of Reims in the Time of Master Alberic, 1118-1136," *Traditio* 20 (1964), 93-114. On Lotulph and the possibility that his fame may have attracted Peter to Rheims, see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.17. For suggestions that Peter's stay at Rheims, however brief, would have long-lasting effects on some aspects of his teaching, see Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 13-15.

about the sufficiency of a brief stay was destined to evaporate. He would remain there for the rest of his life.

But it was to prove a very fruitful stay. At Peter's coming, Paris was already the foremost centre for reflection on what would come to be called theology, and his introduction to the abbey of St. Victor and its school placed him in a privileged seat of such reflection. Ever after, his works would be marked by his familiarity with the school of St. Victor. The bond seems to have been affective, as well: Peter and his parents are listed in St. Victor's obituary book.[11] But it is difficult to know what specific form Peter's academic activity took since little is known about the structure of studies at this early stage of what would become the University of Paris, or of Peter's role in such studies. But by 1144, a poet in far-off Bavaria could list him as one of the celebrated theological luminaries of the Parisian schools.[12]

Somewhat unusually for a foreign school master, Peter also managed to become fully integrated within the Parisian clergy. By 1145, he appears to have been made a canon of Notre Dame. In 1147, he was a subdeacon, and in 1148, he was one of the experts at a council which Eugenius III held in Rheims. In the early to middle 1150s, he became a deacon, and then archdeacon. It is generally held that, in 1153-1154, Peter accompanied Theobald, bishop of Paris, to the papal court. Then, in 1159, Peter was elected to succeed him. Apart from John of Salisbury, Peter was the only foreigner to become a bishop in the France of his age. He was not bishop of Paris for long, however, since he died on July 21 or 22, 1160.[13]

THE WORKS

That is the substance of what we know of Peter's biography. But there are also the works. On Peter's tombstone, these are listed as the *Sentences* and glosses on the Psalms and on the letters of Paul, which are also, apart from some sermons, Peter's surviving works.[14] The gloss on the Psalms is the earliest; it has been dated to before 1138, and has been characterized

[11]de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," c. 1944; Brady, *Prolegomena*, p. 15 and n. 5.

[12]de Ghellinck (c. 1945) dates the verse in question to 1142-1143; Brady prints the verse and dates it to 1144.

[13]All these dates are given by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.20-22, with perhaps more confidence than they deserve; the evidence on which they are based, and which makes one less than certain of their reliability, is set out by Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 21-45.

[14]For the text of the epitaph, see Brady, *Prolegomena*, p. 43.

as being 'a perpetual commentary' on the Psalms, in which citations of the Fathers and later ecclesiastical writers are brought to bear on each verse. Among the Fathers, Augustine, whether directly or through Cassiodorus, is dominant. It has become customary to say that Peter composed it for his own edification, and not for teaching. What this might mean in the fluid academic situation that prevailed in Peter's lifetime is difficult to say, but it is noteworthy that even this earliest of Peter's works would come to be received as the standard gloss on the Psalms, as would also be the case for his commentary on the Pauline letters. The assertion that the former was not meant to be a teaching book may be borne out by the fact that Peter does not appear to have used it much in his composition of the *Sentences*.[15]

The case is otherwise with Peter's glosses on St. Paul. This work, apparently composed in two redactions, of 1139-1141 and 1155-1158 respectively, reveals an increasing interest on the part of its author in dialectic, and so is taken to be more directly tied to pedagogical activity. This view is confirmed by Lombard's inclusion of sections of his glosses on Paul into his *Sentences,* as well as by the use of sections of the *Sentences* in his later revision of his Pauline work.[16]

Study of Peter as preacher has been impeded by the fact that modern editors have published his sermons under the names of others, but recent lists count about thirty surviving sermons by him. On the basis of this limited sample, his preaching has been judged to be competent, but perhaps too cerebral in tone.[17]

[15]These glosses are found in *Patrologia latina* (Paris: J.P. Migne, 1880), v. 191. For their characterization as a 'perpetual commentary,' see de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," cc. 1951-1953. Whether and, if so, how these glosses contribute to the *Sentences* is disputed; de Ghellinck (cc. 1953-1954) denies that they contribute to the later work, but Colish, *Peter Lombard,* 1.23, suggests that this view may be changing.

[16]These glosses are found in *Patrologia latina* (Paris: J.P. Migne, 1880), vv. 191 and 192. de Ghellinck (cc. 1957-1958) describes them as a direct preparation for the *Sentences*; Colish (1.24-25) sees the relationship as being more reciprocal.

[17]de Ghellinck (c. 1960) goes so far as to say that Peter's sermons are so cold as to be monotonous; he lists the sermons which he knew at cc. 1961-1962. Colish (1.26-27) discusses the sermons and some recent additions to their list; she also attempts a slightly warmer appreciation of them, but concludes, at p. 27, that Peter "resembles a school chaplain, who wants his educated hearers to apply their intelligence to their experience of the liturgy and to the nodal mysteries of the Christian faith that it commemorates." Colish (at pp. 27-30) also summarizes the evidence for other exegetical works which have not survived. A more appreciative evaluation of Peter's preaching is offered by Southern, *The Heroic Age*, pp. 140-141.

THE *SENTENCES* IN THEIR CONTEXT

The work and treasure which would win Peter a place in Dante's Paradise is the *Sentences*.[18] It is, as de Ghellinck so well puts it, one of the paramount achievements of a theological movement that had lasted for almost a century, and one that would mark all subsequent theological teaching.[19]

The composition of the *Sentences* was probably protracted, and may well have occupied most of Peter's teaching activity. Its most ancient manuscript is dated by its scribe to 1158, and its redaction has been variously dated to the early to middle 1150s.[20] In an eloquent prologue, the Lombard sets out the reasons and purposes which have engaged him in this great labour. Given that this is one of the few places in which Peter speaks forthrightly more or less in the first person, it seems worthwhile to pay close attention to it in order to discern what he thought he had achieved in the *Sentences* and for what ends.

But before we examine the prologue, a fundamental methodological question ought to be addressed. It is not uncommon for contemporary scholars to reject prologues as useless and unreliable rhetorical exercises, comprised, as they often are, of *topoi,* or traditional commonplaces, which have little to say that is true or revealing of the author's real skills and intentions.[21] Such a view seems absurdly reductionist. The supply of *topoi* to which a skilled writer can have recourse is large, and the very choice of some commonplaces over others can be instructive. In any case, recourse to such rhetorical devices relies on the view that their validity is widely shared, and so, at the very least, is a witness to what the broad consensus of a specific age regarded as obvious truths. It follows that one ought to approach such statements of intention and achievement with attentiveness.[22]

[18]Dante, at *Paradiso*, 10.106-108, for which see below, n. 23.

[19]"Pierre Lombard," c. 1962.

[20]The various opinions about probable dates of composition are outlined with great lucidity by Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 122-129; see also Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.25.

[21]Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.7, seems to hold such a view, when she states: "... Peter's prologue needs to be read as a *captatio benevolentiae*, an expression of the 'modest author' topos."

[22]Such attentiveness is exemplified by two of the greatest commentators on the *Sentences*, namely Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Bonaventure's comments on the prologue may be read in *S. Bonaventurae Opera theologica selecta* (Florence: Quaracchi, 1934), t. 1, pp. 13-16; Thomas' comments can now be conveniently found in: Roberto Coggi, tr., with an introduction by Inos Biffi, *Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo e testo integrale di Pietro Lombardo* (Bologna: ESD, 2001), v. 1, pp. 124-132.

With an image which Dante was to find powerful 150 years later,[23] Peter describes the *Sentences* as analogous to the offering which the Gospels depict a poor widow as making to the Temple treasury (Prologue, §1, below, p. 3).[24] If Peter stresses his supposed limitations ("poverty") by this evangelical allusion, he also tacitly emphasizes his generosity in offering a seemingly poor work, which, he is certain, Christ will regard more kindly than the more showy donations of other masters. And when the task had proved too demanding, Peter sustained himself with the reflection that, just as the Good Samaritan had promised to repay the innkeeper in whose care he had entrusted the half-dead traveller, so God would reward Peter for his efforts (Prol. §1, p. 3).[25] One wishes that Peter had clarified who, in his reading, is the half-dead traveller; the most likely candidates seem to be Peter's students, and anyone else who would draw profit from the *Sentences*, or from the ministry of those who will have read the book to become more effective in the pastoral care.[26] Dante was right: it was to the Church's treasury that Peter was making an offering of his *Sentences*,[27] just as it was "the zeal for the house of God" (Prol. §1, p. 3) which had allowed him to overcome moments of discouragement in the long effort to complete his work.

Even the brief first paragraph of the prologue to the *Sentences*, upon careful reading, seems to be much more than a conventional profession of humility by means of *topoi*. Peter is making the bold assertion that he has completed a work which had seemed nearly impossible because of its great scope and depth. It has tested its author to the limits, but holds enormous promise for all who have been left half-dead in the Church. Though the form of the work is deceptively poor, its substance is more welcome to Christ than that of any other work of its kind.

[23]Dante, *Paradiso*, 10.107-108: "quel Piero fu che con la povercllа / offerse a Santa Chiesa suo tesoro" [he was that Peter who, with the poor old woman, / offered his treasure to Holy Church], as quoted by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.32, n. 55; my translation.

[24]The story of the poor widow, who won Christ's approval for giving to the Temple treasury all that she had, and not merely excess wealth, like other seemingly more generous donors, is told in Mk. 12, 42-43; Lk. 21, 1-2.

[25]The parable of the Good Samaritan is in Lk. 10.30-35.

[26]This last suggestion is grounded in the remarks regarding the Good Samaritan which Peter makes at the very beginning of each of Books 3 and 4 of the *Sentences*: see *Sententiae in IV libris Distinctae*, t. 2, pp. 21 and 231.

[27]See above, n. 23.

Burning with love for the Church, Peter goes on to assert, he has set out to "protect with the bucklers of David's tower 'our faith against the errors of carnal and brutish men,' or rather, we wish to show that it is already so protected" (Prol. §2, p. 3). This over-arching project to demonstrate how well-protected the Church's faith is carries with it the attempt "to reveal the hidden depths of theological investigations and to convey an understanding of the Church's sacraments" (Prol. §2, p. 3). Peter claims to have been moved to this complex undertaking by his inability "legitimately to resist the desire of our brethren devoted to study, who beg us to assist their praiseworthy studies in Christ with our tongue and pen" (Prol. §2, p. 3).

In his commentary on this part of Peter's prologue, Aquinas points out that the first two paragraphs are meant to elicit the reader's goodwill by setting out the three motivating causes for undertaking this work:

> The first is taken on his own part, namely the desire to be of service in the Church; the second on God's part, namely the promise of reward and help; the third on his neighbour's part, namely the urgency of the requests of his students.[28]

Thomas further points out that David here stands for Christ, David's tower is the faith or the Church, and the bucklers of that tower are the authorities of the saints. And the reason why the faith or the Church is said to be already well-protected, asserts Thomas, is that Peter did not discover the reasons which he sets forth, but compiled those that had already been found by others. This is confirmed, according to Thomas, by Peter's use of the expression 'we have put together' to describe his activity in producing the *Sentences*.[29]

That Peter composed the *Sentences* at the request of his students has not been universally accepted. Peter's profession of his inability "legitimately to resist the desires of our brethren devoted to study" has sometimes been taken to refer to his colleagues.[30] Such a reading—relying on the unlikeli-

[28]Thomas, *Commento alle Sentenze*, p. 124: "Sunt autem tres causae moventes. Prima sumitur ex parte sui, scilicet desiderium proficiendi in Ecclesia; secunda ex parte Dei, scilicet promissio mercedis et auxilii; tertia ex parte proximi, scilicet instantia precum sociorum."

[29]Ibid., p. 126: "Per David significatur Christus: turris eius est fides vel Ecclesia: clypei sunt rationes et auctoritates sanctorum. 'Vel potius munitam ostendere'; quia ipse non invenit rationes, sed potius ab aliis inventas compilavit"; p. 130: "'Compegimus': quia hoc opus est quasi compaginatum ex diversis auctoritatibus."

[30]Cf. Mechtild Dreyer, *Razionalità scientifica e teologia nei secoli XII e XII* (Milan: Jaca Book, 2001), p. 81, as reported by Biffi, "Introduzione," p. 31.

hood of a teacher referring to his students as brethren—betrays an excessively hierarchical understanding of the master-student relationship, which may well fit other periods and contexts, but fails to acknowledge the extent to which, in the twelfth-century schools, that relationship could be an intimate and affectionate one. Aquinas had no difficulty in reading *fratres* as referring to Peter's *socii*, the classic twelfth-century term by which masters refer to their students.[31] And we know that Peter took the requests of his students seriously, since, in 1158-1159, having just completed his massive work, he gave up the opportunity to teach it, and yielded instead to his students' wish to study exegetical works that year.[32]

If I have examined the use of the word 'brethren' in depth, it is because the interpretation of that term will affect how one reads the rest of Peter's prologue and how one views the nature and purposes of the *Sentences*. The reading of *fratres* as colleagues tends to reinforce the view that Peter composed his work in order to respond effectively to challenges to faith inside and outside the schools and the Church.[33] Although the *Sentences*, like so much else that is written by the masters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, can also be used that way, it seems unwarranted and reductive to restrict the work to such instrumental and contingent purposes. Such readings of medieval Christian reflection are not infrequent, and end up reducing the whole rich enterprise to one protracted anti-heretical spasm. Without wishing to minimize the concern with heresy, which has at various times legitimately been a prominent one for Christian teachers and other bearers of Church authority, it also seems important not to appeal to it as the *deus ex machina* which explains all Christian history and reflection upon it. A more pressing and ubiquitous concern must surely have been the effective transmission of the Christian faith and tradition to

[31]See above, n. 28, for Thomas' gloss on *fratres*. Bonaventure, *Opera theologica selecta*, p. 13, refers to Peter's mention of the brethren's request as the compelling and prevailing cause for the composition of the *Sentences* because one has no right to resist the petition of brethren devoted to study, and so must necessarily bend one's neck to it ("In quarta ponit causam compellentem et praevalentem, ibi: 'Non valentes' etc., et haec est petitio fratrum studiosorum, quibus non potest quis iure resistere, sed quodammodo necessario oportet collum subicere"). This passage would not be as rhetorically effective as it is, if Bonaventure did not understand brethren to refer to students, who normally are to bend their own necks before the master.

[32]Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.25.

[33]Such is the view of Mechtild Dreyer, who reads the prologue and Peter's *Sentences* as responding principally to the requirement to strengthen and defend one's faith against the attacks upon it both within and outside the community of faith: Dreyer, *Razionalità scientifica e teologia*, pp. 81-82, reported by Biffi, "Introduzione," p. 31.

each new generation of believers, and particularly of their prospective leaders. This appears to be a potentially more fruitful approach to the history of Christian reflection in general, and Peter's *Sentences* in particular.

With these considerations in mind, we can try to make sense of the next section of Peter's prologue, which consists entirely of an extended citation of Hilary of Poitiers (Prol. §3, pp. 3-4). It opens by noting that all human assertions tend to be met with calumny and envious opposition. The cause of this deplorable state of things resides in the human will. Even wholly truthful statements clash with the wilful desires of others and are impiously resisted or misconstrued. The remedy for this problem is the submission of the will to reason and to the study of doctrine. But the impious pervert the remedy itself because they cut the words of wisdom down to the measure of their own imaginings. They prefer their own opinions and seek to defend them rather than to try to understand the truth. Furthermore, with damnable hypocrisy, they cloak their wilful teaching in the words of truth, so that they may seem pious, even as they impiously teach whatever pleases them. "Eager for controversy, they struggle without restraint against the truth. For there is an unceasing battle between the assertion of the truth and the defense of opinion, for so long as truth remains firm and the will to err persists" (Prol. §3, p. 4).

It is difficult not to wish that Peter had chosen an author less opaque than Hilary to convey the concerns at the heart of his enterprise. And yet it seems clear enough that Peter is using Hilary's text to set out the central drama in any effort to educate or to learn, namely the tension between one's opinions and ambitions and the requirements for self-denial which the transmission and reception of any tradition impose. For both teacher and student, education is, or ought to be, a discipline, but an active discipline. If either participant fails to bring to the exercise existential concerns of his own, then the process is likely to prove sterile or worse. But if these personal concerns are allowed to grow too luxuriantly, they undermine the effort to convey and receive a tradition. We tend to class the problems involved under terms like relevance, bias, or prejudice; more shrewdly and profoundly, Peter identifies the problem as residing in the very nature of our will.

This section of the prologue opens with the harsh chastisement of those who have entirely yielded to the desires of their depraved will and have devised a manner of teaching and being which revolves around the legalistic or Pharisaical insistence that one's desires and the truth are one and the same. But, as the final sentence of the paragraph makes clear, the temptation to do so affects everyone. The risk of confusing truth and one's

own desires has to be run by all. The risk can be minimized, but it cannot be avoided, if education is to occur. It is as a way of minimizing this risk in the course of theological education that the *Sentences* are offered.

The principal way in which it does so is by not putting the author first. Instead, the form of the work privileges "the witnesses of truth established for all eternity, ... the precedents and teaching of our ancestors" (Prol. §4, p. 4). This is its main advantage and utility: that all one needs to engage in what is coming to be called theology has been culled from the previous thousand years and more of Christian reflection and has been made available in one place. Because the positive assertion of the faith enshrined in these witnesses and precedents exposes the falsehood of a deceptive manner of teaching and offers safeguard from the risk of impiety, Peter is freed to speak in the first person, whenever he finds it necessary. The promise and invitation is for the reader to do the same. By mastering the tradition which Peter has so usefully put together, the reader can become a questioner and a participant in the endless process of describing what the Christian tradition has been in the past, what it is in the present, and what it may become in the future.

Our reading of Peter's prologue has suggested a number of things. In deep humility before God, Peter claims to have composed a difficult and important work, whose form may mislead the reader about its greatness and utility. The work has been produced for the sake of the Church, in order to provide a necessary instrument for the education of its prospective ministers and leaders. Experience has shown that such education is risky, as it necessarily must be, since it entails a conversion of the will on the part of teachers and students. But the risk is necessary and manageable, if one has an adequate method to bring to the educational enterprise. The *Sentences* are proposed as the embodiment of such a method because they combine the necessary piety and respect for what has gone before with a balanced conviction about the necessity for freedom and the dignity of the questioner in the present.

The form of the work has indeed proved misleading, not least to modern readers. As a result, one recurring question has concerned whether Peter could be called an author at all, since he seems to be a mere compiler. More recently, the question has taken the form of whether Peter made a contribution at all, let alone an indispensable one, to the formation of systematic theology. In its earlier form, the question was already widespread at the time that Bonaventure wrote his *Summa* on the *Sentences*. Bonaventure's answer to such criticism is that Peter compiled authorities in order to buttress his own arguments, and so is truly an author. His view does not

seem to be shared widely by those who have turned to Peter's work in more recent times.

It must be said that much of the scholarly discussion about the nature of Peter's enterprise, authorship, and originality seems to be beside the point. More often than not, these discussions, like that of Bonaventure himself (who had a better excuse for it), appear to proceed from the vantage-point of the certainties of the mid-thirteenth century. Let it be granted without compunction that Peter's *Sentences* do not bear comparison with the great *summae* of the thirteenth century, if those *summae* are regarded as the standard by which theological achievement is to be measured. But they could not have been written without the *Sentences* and, insofar as they sidestep the problems which had troubled Peter, they may well fail to meet the aims which Peter had regarded as crucial to Christian learning and life. It may at least be wondered whether the eventual and current irrelevance of much theology, even in the life of the Church, is not tied to a turn toward synthesis and an excessive concern with making one's original mark on the discipline in the eyes of one's professional colleagues. These were some of the very pitfalls which Peter's approach was meant to avoid.

The *Sentences* as a Medieval Casebook

It may be that the attempt to understand Peter and his *Sentences* is hindered, if one regards his work as a theology book and examines it by comparison to later theological books, whether medieval or modern. If comparisons must be made, then, perhaps, it might be fruitful to take a legal casebook as a modern analogy that can illuminate the nature and purposes of the *Sentences*. The author of a modern legal casebook is not in doubt about the relevance of his discipline. Since the evidence is all around him that jurisprudence is of crucial importance in the life of his society and culture, he will not spend much time in the exposition of large syntheses and apologies for his work. Nor will he doubt that the task of initiating young people in the mysteries of jurisprudence is one of great dignity. This process of initiation does not aim to have the young person memorize and spout back the author's views, nor is it desirable that the student master 'black letter' law. Indeed, if the author is worth his salt, the student will have some difficulty discerning what the author's view on many subjects may be.

At the core of the casebook will be not the author's desiderata regarding the law, but the authorities. Statute law will have its niche, but pride of place will belong to judicial decisions, largely because these are less clear

and synthetic than statute law and so better exemplify the seemingly contradictory goods that must be balanced in legal reasoning. Deciding which judicial decisions are sufficiently significant and instructive to become the source of legal doctrine is not a straightforward process. It is not simply a matter of the place of the deciding tribunal in the judicial hierarchy, since the decisions of courts of first instance stand more or less on an equal footing with those of the most exalted Supreme Courts. More puzzling still, the opinions of lone losing dissenters can stand next to the unanimous decisions of great tribunals, and sometimes come back to carry the day.

The author of a good casebook is humbly reticent. It is not for him to trumpet his own views on all sorts of legal topics, and yet he claims and exercises the great authority to decide which, of the endless number of judicial decisions that are published every day, have important jurisprudential implications and should be taken to exemplify some issue or problem in the law from whose study students and judges can profit.

Behind this magisterial activity stands the conviction that the law, as it has developed and as it continues to develop, makes sense, at times in a peculiar way all its own. The author of the casebook claims to have grasped the logic of the system and so to be able to discern which decisions, old and new, best exemplify that logic. In the comments which he will intersperse in his casebook, he will strive to make clear the import of each authority and, if his choices are not too eccentric, he will be able to point to other learned persons who share his views regarding its meaning and weight. At times, he may find himself in the minority, or even alone, and then, if he is truly convinced of the soundness of his own position, he will have to let his own voice ring out and make the case that others are wrong and he is right.

If the casebook is any good, the student will become an active participant in the exercise almost immediately. After having introduced the basic attitudes and skills required of those who would engage in legal reasoning, the casebook will present a sufficiently complex and problematic array of views on any given issue that the student will quickly gain some sense of how the current law on some issue has developed, against what other claims, and at the cost of what other possibilities. If the student eventually becomes a legal practitioner, these considerations may move into the background and his attention might focus more narrowly on the law currently in force, but the problem-based approach to issues will remain. As the cultivation of this approach has been the principal aim of education in the law, it will also be appreciated by those who regard legal training as good preparation for social, political, and cultural engagements of all kinds.

To understand how the casebook and the modern jurist might be analogous to the *Sentences* and its readers, let us now turn to a twelfth-century historian named William of Tyre. In the course of writing his *History*, William took the occasion to reflect on his experience as a student in Paris. Among other things, he writes:

> In theology, for six consecutive years, we went to hear a man of singular learning in that science, namely master Peter Lombard, who was afterwards bishop of Paris. The company of the *prudentes* embraces his extant works with veneration and studies them with reverence. Because of his sound teaching, he was a man commendable in every way.[34]

Although the passage could serve as evidence of the strong bonds that could be forged between master and student, we cite it here for its use of the expression *prudentium chorus*.

Prudens is not an obvious epithet to use of a theologian. Although the word can bear the meaning of 'expert,' its most usual application is to legal experts, hence 'jurisprudence' to designate the discipline practised by those who are expert in the law. And yet someone who was thoroughly familiar with Peter and his works found it natural to use the term to refer to those who were able to approach these works with veneration and reverence. It will not perhaps now seem unreasonable to suggest that the formation of such *prudentes* was the aim of Peter's *Sentences*.

The very title of Peter's work can be read to confirm such an aim. 'Sentence' is a term which is at least as rich in meanings in Latin as it is in English. These range from units of language to opinion, sense, meaning, the main purpose of an author, and judicial pronouncements. In its juridical sense, 'sentence' is also linked to the function of the *prudens*. A famous definition by the jurist Gaius, incorporated into Justinian's *Institutions*, reads as follows:

[34]"In theologia autem virum in ea scientia singularem, cuius opera que exstant prudentium chorus cum veneratione amplectitur et colit cum reverentia, virum sana doctrina per omnia commendabilem, magistrum videlicet Petrum Lombardum, qui postea fuit Parisiensis episcopus, annis sex continuis audivimus." These remarks of William's are cited by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.30, n. 47, from R.B.C. Huygens, "Guillaume de Tyr étudiant: un chapitre (XIX, 12) de son 'Histoire' retrouvé," *Latomus* 21 (1962), p. 823. Curiously, Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.30, reads this wonderfully restrained encomium on the part of Peter's former student as praise for a purported 'sane doctrine.'

> The responses of the *prudentes* are the sentences and opinions of those to whom it is allowed to establish laws.[35]

Gaius is describing here the function of the jurisprudents; their responses to consultations constitute sentences which are to be regarded as authentic sources of law.

To entitle a book 'The Sentences of Peter Lombard' is a delightfully ambiguous act. Of course, one does not suppose that Peter would have brazenly chosen such a title; 'Sentences' is his own choice, while the rest was afterwards appended by others. And yet the ambiguity remains: whose sentences are contained in this book? As with our analogy to the law case-book, pride of place obviously belongs to the sentences of the Fathers of the Church. The usage of referring to excerpts from their works by this name was long established,[36] as was the view that such sentences constituted authorities to be regarded as binding.[37] But the book is also full of the sentences of Peter's contemporaries and, of course, of his own. Peter is not hesitant to make clear his disagreement with many of his contemporaries, and to freely use his authority as a master to 'determine' many questions in the manner which he regards as being correct.[38] Indeed, it is in the act of determination that Peter felt most free to speak in his own voice.

In effect, we are faced, in the *Sentences*, with two ranks of *prudentes*, both of whom produce sentences. The first rank is made up of the Fathers of the Church and other writers who have been universally acknowledged to be holy and wise, and so endowed with authority that the very excerpts from their works can be called authorities. Together with the Bible, these authorities constitute the subject matter of theological study. The second rank is made up of school masters who, by receiving from the Church the license to teach, have been given the right to respond in an authoritative

[35]"Responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum, quibus permissum erat iura condere." *Institutiones* 1.2.8.

[36]M.-D. Chenu, O.P., *La théologie au douzième siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), pp. 358-539.

[37]Ibid., pp. 353-357.

[38]In the context of the medieval schools, to determine means to set out a disputed topic in as logical a manner as possible, together with the contrasting views which have been expressed regarding it and the various authorities used to support it; chiefly by means of distinctions, the master then asserts his own view and strives to respond to the difficulties that stand in its way. If he must, he is not unwilling to conclude that his view is more pious; usually, he prefers to argue that it is more compelling because it better accounts for the twists and turns which the tradition has taken over the centuries in the examination of the topic.

manner to questions in those areas in which they are expert. Their sentences are certainly not binding like those of the first set of *prudentes*, and they can freely disagree with each other, but it would be foolhardy, if not impious, to disagree from a view which has become common opinion.

The hierarchy of *prudentes* seems clear, and the second group appears to be firmly subordinate to the first. But things are not so straightforward. Once again, our casebook analogy applies. A casebook author is clearly subordinate to a judge, if it is a question of being vested with public power or of deciding cases. But the judge does not know that that decision which he is writing is a sentence, in the sense relevant here, until the author tells him so by including it in his casebook. Judges publish many decisions, but usually only those selected by the authors of casebooks end up being regarded as interesting and as sources of law. In the same way, Augustine wrote many things, only some of which end up being treated as sentences by Peter and his colleagues. In effect, for all the veneration which the masters show to Augustine, they claim to have a better sense of the theological system than he did, and so they can sift through his voluminous writings to choose the bits which they regard as truly interesting. They may be dwarves and Augustine may be a giant, but they see further for sitting on his shoulders, and so they get to decide what parts of Augustine's writings are of enduring and normative relevance.

This process by which the masters excerpt the works of the Fathers and other universally accepted ecclesiastical writers has sometimes been called defloration because of an earlier custom of referring to gatherings of such excerpts as florilegia or collections of flowers. It is also sometimes described as a process of anthologization. Whatever may have been the aim of earlier collectors, by the later twelfth century, it would be misleading to refer to these excerpts as flowers, or as anthological efforts. As we have seen Peter do in the prologue, they are now called precedents, that is, they are the binding authorities which collectively provide the matter for the normative elaboration of the Christian faith. The masters, in virtue of their expertise and their commission to teach in the Church, claim to be able to identify, from among the enormous mass of material produced by the wise and holy men of old, the bits which are of special significance and which reveal fundamental transitions in the history of Christian self-understanding. The excerpting of Augustine, for example, is not meant to serve as an introduction to Augustine's thought, but to identify the points at which what Augustine had had to say on specific issues had become a turning point in the history of Christian reflection on the mysteries of faith.

This laborious activity of collecting sentences from ancient works and framing new ones of their own occurred in the classrooms of the twelfth-century masters. By observing them at this work, their students became *prudentes* in turn. That is why it makes little sense to separate the work of teaching from the effort to identify and point out the coherence of the Christian tradition. An appreciation of the importance of teaching seems preferable to the view that the undertaking in which the masters were engaged was the elaboration of systematic theology. For one thing, the expression 'systematic theology' is not a twelfth-century term and would make little sense to the masters; for another, it betrays a degree of abstraction quite foreign to them and may lead us to speak too readily of their doctrine rather than of their teaching. The enterprise in which they were engaged was a deeply personal one; if it also became rational, scientific, or whatever else one may wish to call it, it was because these features of their activity were effective in making the tradition alive and relevant to their students and the larger communities whom those students would serve. It was not out of ideological presuppositions that they prized technique, rationality, or dialectic, but because, without these, they would not be offering their students what was required for the lively understanding and reduction to present normativeness of the massive inheritance they had received from earlier times.

The teaching process begins, then, with those excerpts from the Fathers which consensus over time has come to regard as particularly useful for the understanding of certain aspects of the Christian faith. It is these excerpts alone which constitute sentences, or what one might call the *ratio decidendi*, or reason for judgement, in the case of a judicial sentence: whatever else the same Father may have written can, in effect, be regarded as *obiter dicta*; one would still want to read them with reverence and interest, but they do not have the same authority as those statements of theirs which have come to be regarded as sentences.[39] It was open to masters to make bids to revise the established tradition and propose new excerpts to become sentences, but, as with the author of the casebook, this cannot be the

[39]This being our view of the relationship between Peter's work and the works of the Fathers, it is only with great hesitation that we append below a list of translations of some of the works from which Peter's sentences had been originally excerpted for the reader who may be curious about the larger context from which an individual sentence has been taken (see "English translations, in print or on-line, of works cited in Book 1" on p. 263); it would not help to make sense of the *Sentences* to use such a list in order to revise the choices made by Peter and his predecessors.

exercise of mere personal discretion or preference; they must make arguments to support their bids. This, too, is a sign of the wonderfully open-ended, but reasonably disciplined, process by which the past is made to speak in the present. Just how remarkably open-ended the process was is made clear from the fact that, in the decades after Peter, the bid to make new sentences could successfully extend even to the works of Aristotle, Avicenna, and Maimonides.

It has long been posited that one of the problems to which the masters of the twelfth century turned was the resolution of antinomies or contradictions in the texts which they inherited; their attempts to do so are often ridiculed as lacking in historical sense and so creating unnecessary difficulties for this aspect of their enterprise. This seems like a rather simplistic way of posing the problem. If we remember that teaching was the crucial activity of the masters, and if we accept that an effective presentation of the development of Christian doctrine requires that the students re-live the dramatic and problematic character of that development, then the identification of supposed contradictions and arguments about their possible resolution are necessary teaching moments which present the development of doctrine more authentically and serve to make the lesson memorable for the students. If we remember, too, that the fundamental activity of the students, once they leave the school, would be the application of the tradition to contemporary problems, whether in the pulpit, the confessional, or ecclesiastical and other forms of administration, then we can see how the skills acquired and practised in this kind of exercise would prove useful in the dynamic application of doctrine to a great variety of situations. If anything, the problem might have been the insufficiency of antinomies rather than their presence. The expansion of the fund of supposed contradictions is one of the most earnest exercises of the twelfth-century masters, designed to multiply the opportunities for teaching.

It is true that many of these contradictions would have faded away, if the masters had applied a sounder historical judgement to the texts which they were reading. Once again, this assumes that the interest of the masters lay primarily in the resolution of such contradictions, which is not at all an assumption that ought to be made gratuitously. If we return to the example of the lawbook, we know that many judicial decisions could be clarified by reference to the social, cultural, political, and economic concerns of the day. If our concerns are primarily historical, these sorts of considerations will provide us with much more satisfying explanations of the judicial sentence in question. Unfortunately, they will also deprive the sentence of normativeness and of its usefulness in legal education. An historical ap-

proach to normative texts is useful, if one wishes to relativize them, perhaps out of a sense that the weight of precedent has become too stiflingly burdensome to allow for necessary new development. But the risk of such a desacralizing process can only be run when the structures of authority in the community are sufficiently sturdy to withstand the corrosive effects of historical relativization. One of principal achievements of twelfth-century masters is the establishment, often for the first time, of just such structures of authority (e.g. the development of papal authority, reflection on the proper function and activity of the secular state, the definition of the responsibilities of bishop and parish priest, the very role of the judge in the various legal systems which the masters and their students would help to define, etc.). It is not at all clear that the application of sounder historical skills to the examination of authoritative texts would have been helpful in this crucially important process; indeed, it is seems possible that it would have undermined this necessary function of the masters and their students.

THE *SENTENCES*, THEIR STRUCTURE, AND THEIR SUCCESS

The *Sentences* are divided into four books. Book 1 treats of God as Trinity; Book 2 is concerned with creation, the angels, the fall, and grace; Book 3 addresses the reparation of fallen humankind by the Incarnation of the Word, as well as the virtues, vices, and commandments; Book 4 presents the sacraments and the last things. Apart from this division into books, the *Sentences*, as it left Peter's hand, appears only to have been subdivided into chapters and to have contained rubrics. The division into Distinctions was devised in the early thirteenth century in response to the needs of instruction in the schools, and even in the middle of the thirteenth century there was no unanimity on where some of the Distinctions should end and others begin. Additional authorities were occasionally added—some apparently by Peter, others not—in a process of gradual accretion that is not untypical of important school texts.[40] There is, in other words, a certain open-endedness about the work, even in its formal structure, which may be one of the reasons for its success.

[40]The story of each of these subdivisions of the text is told with great clarity by Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 137-144; at p. 144, Brady credits Alexander of Hales with first dividing the text into Distinctions, perhaps between 1223 and 1227. See also Brady, "The Distinctions of Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales," *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965) 90-116.

The more important reason for its influence is its 'middleness' as it attempts to provide balanced syntheses of theological debates which have preceded it. The selection of topics, the reports on the consensus and dissensions of the masters regarding one topic or another, serve as a quick overview of the discipline of theology in one of its most formative periods, and, as we have already remarked, invite the student to become a participant in these debates almost as soon as he begins his studies.[41] The concomitant choice to privilege the sentences, or selections from the Fathers, in part dictated as it may have been by the debates of the dialecticians within the discipline, does also have the effect of moderating the importance of these same dialecticians. In the end, it is the Fathers and the doctors of old who are presented as the yard-stick against which contemporary debates must measure themselves. There is a willingness, too, on Peter's part, to say that some topics will prove resistant to rational investigation.

For all the formal preeminence of the Fathers in the *Sentences*, Peter's selection of their texts does not appear to come from a reading of their texts *ex novo* and in their integrity: that would have been too eccentric. The texts which Peter presents are largely those which the schoolmen have already designated as the significant ones. Abelard's *Sic et non* and Gratian's *Decretum* are two of the great collections mined by the Lombard in his production of his own patristic anthology. This process of composition may have helped in establishing, or keeping, Augustine (together with pseudo-Augustine) as the single most important voice to be heard over and over again; it can be said with some justification that nine-tenths of the *Sentences* consist of Augustinian texts.[42] And this, too, is a mark of the 'middleness' of Peter's work and a reason for its influence.[43] But the great

[41]Illuminating remarks on Peter's 'middleness' are found in de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," cc. 1983-1984, and *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 244-249. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.33-90, brilliantly places these concerns of the Lombard within the theological enterprise of the schools.

[42]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, p. 242.

[43]On all these topics, see de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," cc. 1980-1991. The principal sources used by Peter in the *Sentences* are usefully outlined by Brady, *Prolegomena*, pp. 118-122, as consisting of the following: 1) Peter's own scriptural glosses, particularly those on Paul; 2) some works of Augustine which he knew directly, namely the *Enchiridion*, *Retractationes*, *De diversis quaestionibus 83*, *De doctrina christiana*, probably a florilegium of *De Trinitate*, and the pseudo-Augustinian *De fide ad Petrum*; 3) the Ordinary Gloss on the Bible, particularly the sections on the Prophets and the Gospels; 4) the *Summa sententiarum* and Hugh of St. Victor's *De sacramentis fidei christianae* ; 5) works of Peter Abelard; 6) the *Decretum* and *Panormia* of Ivo of Chartres and the *Decretum* of Gratian, which Peter may have been the first to bring to

est such cause is the usefulness of the work. Even if, despite its author's assertion, it would not quite make recourse to other books unnecessary, it did present a brief and clear summary of Christian doctrine, and it collected in one place most of the texts which everyone had come to regard as crucial in the development of that doctrine. The *Sentences* also presented a very comprehensive collection of the questions which school masters raised, discussed, and settled or failed to settle in their classrooms.[44] Although it may seem to us surprising that a mistrust of indiscreet curiosity should go hand in hand with a profound sense of the open-endedness of the theological enterprise, that is what the book claimed, and that is the reason it was successfully used in the schools for many generations, to the point that the basic theological course of Faculties of Theology almost into the 1960s would still be marked by the division of topics devised in the *Sentences*.[45]

As we do not tire of saying, the early success of the work may also have owed much to Peter's qualities as a teacher and as a man; nebulous as these may be to us, they must have been there to explain the unusual election of an Italian to the bishopric of Paris and the loyalty which Peter enjoyed from his former students even long after his death. And yet the work was not without its opponents and its success was not immediately complete. Although the opposition to the work was probably grounded in differences of opinion as to the best method to teach theology, it found vociferous expression with regard to the orthodoxy of some of Peter's views. In particular, Peter's Christological views came under attack, because of the question of 'whether Christ, according to his being a man, is a person or anything.' The issue of the orthodoxy of Peter's views in this regard became the subject of animated discussion at a very large council held at Tours by Pope Alexander III in 1163. Although no decision was then reached, on 24 December 1164, after convening an assembly at Sens of more, it is said, than 3,000 schoolmen, Pope Alexander published a prohibition of the discussion of 'undisciplined questions in theology,' and he charged the bishop of Paris with seeing that the prohibition was en-

Paris; 7) John of Damascus; 8) Hilary's *De Trinitate* and the *Prognosticon* of Julian of Toledo.

[44]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, p. 244.

[45]de Ghellinck (p. 247) notes that, compared to the theological curriculum which was still normative in Catholic institutions of higher learning in the 1940s, all that was lacking in the *Sentences* was a treatment of true religion and one of the Church and the Roman pontiff.

forced throughout France. Then, on 2 June 1170, he wrote to several French bishops, asking them to stop the propagation of the error that 'Christ, according to his being a man, is not anything.' Alexander renewed the condemnation of this view in 1177, in a letter to the archbishop of Rheims which then made it into the *Decretals* of Gregory IX.[46]

The *Sentences* continued to find enemies throughout the rest of the twelfth century; the enmity culminated with the attack on the orthodoxy of Peter's teaching on the Trinity by Joachim of Fiore. It was this attack which eventually occasioned a most significant triumph for the *Sentences*. The Council Lateran IV, in 1215, was requested to adjudicate the accusation; it declared that it believed and confessed the same Trinitarian faith as Peter Lombard. With such a seal of approval, the work was henceforth unassailable. Although the masters in the schools eventually agreed that some of Peter's positions are not tenable, no further reflection was cast on the orthodoxy of Peter and his work.[47]

The vindication of Peter Lombard's faith at Lateran IV was a resounding confirmation of the pervasive presence which the *Sentences* achieved almost from the moment of their publication. As early as 1158, the work had been copied at Clairvaux and it is known to have been among the holdings of several monastic libraries in the latter half of the twelfth century. As early as the 1160s, the text was glossed and commented on in the schools; it was also soon excerpted, abbreviated, and versified.[48]

Even more striking and important is the fact that, beginning in the 1170s, teachers like Peter of Poitiers start to comment formally on the *Sentences* as an authoritative text, while others, like Peter the Chanter, presuppose a thorough knowledge of the work for an understanding of their own teaching. By the 1260s, the religious orders established chairs to be held by commentators on the *Sentences*, and there is hardly a theologian of note throughout the rest of the Middle Ages who did not write a commentary on the *Sentences*. Its dominance over theological education was to be almost entirely unchallenged until, in the later fifteenth century, the move

[46]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 251-253, and in "Pierre Lombard," cc. 2003-2004. Alexander's letter is in *Decretals* 5.7.7.

[47]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 253-267, and "Pierre Lombard," cc. 2005-2011. On the treatment by later commentators of the untenable propositions of Peter Lombard, see Edward A. Synan, "Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters," *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies*, eds. Armand A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), v. 2, pp. 217-242.

[48]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 267-272; "Pierre Lombard," cc. 2011-2012.

began to substitute Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*—a move which would be far from complete for more than another century. At least nineteen editions of Peter's work were printed before 1500, and dozens more in the course of the next century, while new commentaries on it were still being produced in the eighteenth century. Even when it was replaced as the authoritative text on which lectures were to be based, the book remained the foundation upon which its substitutes had been raised.[49]

All this makes evident the important role which the *Sentences* played in Western intellectual history and its capacity to excite many generations of students and teachers. But it leaves one wondering why the book has received little attention in more recent times, to the point of becoming "one of the least read of the world's great books."[50]

The relative neglect of Lombard's great book has been explained in a variety of ways, ranging from its being a victim of a visceral antipathy toward scholasticism to a lack of creativity on the part of its author.[51] As we have more than hinted already, the reason that seems most plausible is that our view of authorship has changed. We tend to like authors who self-assertively speak in the first person singular and who tell us with some degree of brazenness how original they are. If this becomes what we require in the books we read, then what were regarded as the virtues of works like Peter's (and, indeed, Gratian's) become vices. If we cannot overcome this odd censoriousness of ours, we will not be able to recapture the sense of satisfaction and enjoyment, even of excitement, that could be engendered in so many students over so many centuries by Peter's invitation to become participants in a dialogue that included not only himself, but the best of the interlocutors whom he had been able to find in the whole tradition.

[49]de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique*, pp. 272-277; "Pierre Lombard," cc. 2011-2014. With a happy expression, Southern, *The Heroic Age*, p. 143, calls the *Sentences* "the immovable textbook of a scholastically unified Europe."

[50]David E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard: The Influence of Abelard's Thought in the Early Scholastic Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 263. It may be no consolation to point out that Peter's work has shared the same fate as that of his "brother" Gratian. The *Decretum* perhaps had an even longer run than the *Sentences*, remaining a source of the Church's law until 1917. But of the *Decretum*, too, it might be said that it is "one of the least read of the world's great books."

[51]The different views are canvassed by Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.4-11.

Book 1

It may be helpful to the reader to provide a brief overview of the topics of the first book of the *Sentences*.[52] Book 1 is divided into forty-eight sections known as Distinctions. The bulk of these (2-34) are concerned with God in his transcendence. The person of God the Father is the topic in Distinction 4, that of God the Son in Distinctions 5-9, and that of God the Holy Spirit in Distinctions 10-18. Distinctions 19-34 are concerned with the language that can be used in describing the Trinity as Peter proceeds to outline the relations among the divine persons. The subject of the final Distinctions are the divine attributes as they manifest themselves in God's action toward creatures. An important concern is the careful preservation of God's sovereign freedom in his action toward created beings and the avoidance of any confusion regarding the absolute transcendence of God, despite his graceful self-disclosure in creation and revelation.

The Book opens with Augustine's distinction between things and signs (Dist. 1 c1) and between enjoyment and use (cc2-3). In this brief Distinction, Peter outlines the attitude which ought to govern the study of theology, and perhaps all study. It is to be approached not as an end in itself, but as a means to the eventual enjoyment of God in the communion of saints, since God alone is to be enjoyed for his own sake (c2 n4). The same is true of all created things, apart from persons; human beings are moral ends in themselves, and so they are to be enjoyed, but they ought also to use each other as means to God (c3 n4). The virtues, too, are to be loved for their own sake, but are also to be used to achieve beatitude (c3 n7).

In Distinction 2, Peter begins his exposition of the divine nature. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he decides to begin with the Trinity of persons in God rather than the divine unity (c1 n1). This allows him to introduce immediately the vocabulary of nature, substance, essence, and person, which students will require for an understanding of the complexity of the traditional discussions regarding the nature of God.[53] In this Distinction, Peter also comes closest to making a statement of theological method. To Scripture belongs absolute priority as the source of any knowledge of

[52]The following overview relies on de Ghellinck, "Pierre Lombard," cc. 1969-1970, 1991-1996, and Colish, "Peter Lombard," pp. 170-176. Colish's magisterial effort to read Peter in the context of the schools of his time in her two-volume study, *Peter Lombard*, is an indispensable companion for any serious reader of the *Sentences*. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, may prove friendlier for the non-specialist.

[53]Cf. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.120-121.

God that we may claim; pious human reason has its place in unfolding the meaning of the Scriptures, so long as it does so "with modesty and fear" (c1 nn1 and 3). As we have seen in the prologue, the cultivation of the proper personal attitude is of crucial concern to Peter. People often go astray in their studies because they do not cultivate assiduously a suitably pious and humble attitude toward what they have received by way of personal gifts and cultural inheritance, or they forget the community within which they exercise these gifts on their way to God, who is love. Peter aptly summarizes all these concerns with a text from Augustine which may usefully be taken as an affirmation of Peter's own aim as a teacher, as a code of practice to which he hopes that his students will conform, and as the approach to study which the *Sentences* are meant to exemplify (c1 n3). This wonderfully apposite and elegant text states:

> In case of doubt, I will not be loath to ask; in case of error, I will not be ashamed to learn. And so let whoever hears or reads these things, if he shares my certainty, continue on with me; if he shares my hesitation, continue to search with me; if he acknowledges his error, return to me; if he notes an error of mine, call me back. In this way, we can enter together upon the path of love, moving toward him of whom it is said: *Seek his face always*.[54]

The Fathers of old are described as having written about the Trinity in accord with the method and concerns just outlined (c2), and Augustine provides a charming example of the willingness to consider correction and revision of one's views (c2 n2). This setting of the methodological concerns opens the way to the presentation of the biblical and patristic dossier on the divine Trinity, as Peter sets out the scriptural evidence for the Trinity from the Old and New Testaments as they have been read in the Christian tradition (cc4-5).

After giving Scripture the paramount place in our knowledge of God, in Distinction 3 Peter moves to the ways of knowing God through the rational observation of created things. He invokes St. Paul's authority for the obligation to apply the powers of the mind to creation's proclamation of the existence of the Creator.[55] Independently of Scripture, the human mind was able to know (and in the best of pagans did know) that there is a first cause of all things (c1 n2), that this cause must be the unchangeable source of all being (c1 n3), that it is far better than the hierarchy which creation reveals itself to be (c1 n4), and that it is the first and unchangeable form

[54]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 cc2-3 nn4-5, citing Ps. 104, 4.
[55]Rom. 1, 20, cited in Dist. 3 c1 n1.

which was not itself made, but from which all things were made (c1 n5). Reason, then, is one means of knowing that God is an immutable, single, and uncreated essence who is all-powerful, wise, and good (c1 n6). But if reason can offer powerful indications of the existence and unity of God, it can only discern vestiges of the Trinity of persons in God, so that one must be grateful for the graceful and fuller revelation provided in Scripture (c1 n9). These vestiges, or analogies, of the Trinity include the coexistence in created things of unity, form, and order (c1 nn7-8), and the coexistence in the human mind of memory, intelligence, and love or will (c2).

In light of what was said earlier about a master's ability to make bids to have texts recognized as normative "sentences" which had not been so heretofore, it is perhaps worth noting that Peter exercises this prerogative in the course of his argument here. To the texts usually quoted by his contemporaries regarding the similitude between the divine Trinity and the trinity of memory, intelligence, and will, he adds a further excerpt from Augustine's *De Trinitate* 9.4 (c2 n8), to make the point that these faculties exist in the mind substantially and not merely as accidental attributes.[56] But if Peter has found it necessary to point to the vestiges of the Trinity in creation, he also considers it imperative to remind his students over and over again not to make any confusion between Creator and creatures; in the end, what is most notable is the unlikeness between God and anything to which he may be compared (c3 nn1-7).

The analysis of the analogy between the Trinity and its vestiges in creation serves to introduce the concept that, in God, there are three persons mutually related, and to begin addressing the nature of the three persons in God and the difficult notion that the distinction of persons is only relevant to God's own life (c4).

Since relations among the divine persons, in Peter's view, are the core of the Church's teaching about God, he turns, in Distinction 4, to the question of divine generation. After rejecting clever logicians' tricks that would lead the unwary into silly polytheistic assertions (c1 nn1-2), Peter concludes that the proper way to pose the question is to ask simply whether God the Father begets God the Son; this approach allows him to say that Father and Son are both differentiated and related by their fatherhood and sonship, but in their divine nature they are one (c1 n2).

[56]See the helpful discussion of the nature of the problem in Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.123-124.

Distinction 5 is concerned with the question of whether the Father generated a divine essence, or whether a divine essence generated the Son, or whether a divine essence generated a divine essence, or whether the divine essence neither generated, nor was generated. The answer to all these questions is said to be in the negative because those who raise them fail to understand that the capacity to beget or be begotten applies to the divine persons alone, and not to the divine essence or substance (cc1-3).

Distinction 6 raises the question of whether the Father begets the Son willingly or by necessity (c1 n1). Necessity is obviously to be excluded because God cannot be constrained, but will must be excluded as well because to admit it is also to admit that God's will to beget the Son was accidental and not part of his unchanging nature. In any case, in God will is the same as nature, so the question should not be understood as if it concerned willing in time. The safest and Catholic assertion is to say that sonship in God is by nature, and not by will (c1 nn2-3).

The same question is continued in Distinction 7, under the variant form of whether the Father was able, or willed, to beget the Son and therefore was able, or willed, to do something that the Son was not able, or did not will, to do (c1 n1). Once again, the problem is shown to be a matter of terminology, which is solved if we remember that in God we are not talking about ability and willing as they occur in time, nor are we discussing persons who differ in power (c1 nn2-5). A similar answer is given in a brief discussion of the power to beget and whether it exists in the Son as it does in the Father (c2).

In Distinction 8, Peter discusses the property, unchangeability, and simplicity of the divine essence (cc1-2). As is typical of him, the 'positive' presentation of the subject is quickly followed by clarifications meant to avoid any confusion between Creator and creature. In this instance, God's simplicity and unchangeableness are shown to be wholly other than the mutability and manifold nature of created things (cc2-4).

Having emphasized what the persons of the Trinity have in common, in Distinction 9, Peter turns to what distinguishes them (c1). But first he reaffirms the coeternity of the Son with the Father against the ancient heresies which had held otherwise (cc2-5). Here as elsewhere, he appears to be concerned with cultivating in the students a deep sense of the utter transcendence and ineffability of the divine mysteries (c3 n1). Pedagogically, the intended effect seems to be the inculcation of a modest reticence about what one can say with certainty about these great mysteries; even as the student's grasp of the history of theological reflection becomes more and

more complex and technically accomplished, he is reminded not to let it go to his head, or, perhaps worse, to his mouth (c3 n2).

In Distinction 10, Peter begins his presentation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Peter stands out from among his contemporaries for the attention he devotes to the third person of the Holy Trinity, both in the life of the Trinity and in the action of the divine persons in creation. It has been suggested that this unusual pneumatological concern is linked both to a desire to clarify the soundness of those Western positions on the procession of the Holy Spirit which are rejected by Eastern Christians, and a deep interest in the place of the Spirit in the life of Christians.[57]

The Spirit is presented as the love of the Father and the Son. Although all the persons of the Trinity are love, the Spirit is called love in a special sense as the bond of union of Father and Son flowing, or proceeding, from each toward the other, so that there can be no objection to saying, in the Latin way, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (cc1-2). This double procession of the Spirit from Father and Son then becomes the explicit topic of Distinction 11. After boldly setting out the Latin view (c1 nn1-2), Peter proceeds to outline the Greek objections to it, which rest primarily on the fact that the Council of Nicaea had said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father (c1 n3); Peter magisterially determines that, while the Council forbade teaching that the Spirit does not proceed from the Father, it did not prohibit the addition of the Western assertion that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son (c1 n4). But this legalistic view is not entirely satisfactory, so Peter draws on the testimonies of Eastern Fathers to show that the disagreement between Eastern and Western Christians is formal, and not substantive (c2).

Distinction 12 reiterates the double procession of the Holy Spirit by grappling with authorities that seem to grant a greater role to the Father in this procession; the end result is the reaffirmation of the full consubstantiality of the divine persons, despite their diversity of properties within the divine life (cc1-2).

Distinction 13 asks whether the terms denoting the relationship between Father and Son may also be applied to the Holy Spirit, since both Son and Spirit are said to be of the Father's substance (c1), and since the Son, like the Spirit, is said to proceed (c2). The answer is that the traditional usage is to be retained in describing these relationships because, although both Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, they do so in different ways:

[57]Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.253.

the Son as Son, the Spirit as Gift. These processions strike us as similar, while we are in this life, yet we have warrant to believe that the difference is important, and so we ought to adhere to the traditional expressions (c3). Ever concerned with pedagogy, Peter uses this occasion, too, to remind his students of the transcendence of the object of their studies, which ought to keep them wary of believing that they can say too much. But lest they become sceptical about the relevance of their skills, the Distinction concludes with a clever reconciliation of an apparent discrepancy between "Jerome"[58] and Augustine on whether the Holy Spirit may be called unbegotten. The contradiction is resolved by the neatly technical argument that the two authorities use the same term in different senses, the one with the meaning 'not derived from anyone else,' the other 'not begotten' (c4).

Distinction 14 is also concerned with the double procession of the Holy Spirit, but, in this case, primarily with the Spirit's procession toward humankind rather than in the life of the Trinity itself (c1). The particular concern here is to show that this procession is the work of the whole Trinity and its result is the conferral of grace upon humankind (c1 n2 and c2). Ever anxious to safeguard the absolute freedom of divine initiative, Peter denies that it can be anyone but God who confers the Spirit; even prelates and holy persons can only invoke the conferral, but cannot themselves be said to confer it (c3).

Distinction 15 makes clear that, although the Holy Spirit is said to be given, he participates in his own donation, just as the Son participates in his own incarnation (c1). Once again, Peter's principal concern seems to be to forestall any suggestion that any of the divine persons is in any way less than the others; concurrently, he wants the students to be thoroughly clear that, although Scripture often speaks of one person or the other as acting, it is always God who acts, and divine actions ought always to be considered as trinitarian (cc 3-9).

Distinction 16 addresses the sending of the Holy Spirit in time, both visibly and invisibly. This is akin to the incarnation of the Son (c1 nn1-2), and yet there is a difference. When the Spirit assumes a form in which to appear to humankind, there is no union with the form in which he becomes manifest, as is true in the case of the Son (c1 nn3-5). The usual warning is made that, to speak of the Son as lesser in his having become man should not be taken to reflect an inequality among the divine persons in God (c2).

[58]Actually, Syagrius; see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.260.

Distinction 17 focusses on the sending of the Holy Spirit invisibly, that is, the mission by which the Spirit introduces members of the Church to mutual love and into the life of God (cc1-2). Without this gift, there can be no salvation, since love alone makes salvation possible (c4 n2). Indeed, as Distinction 18 shows, all gifts in the Church have the Spirit as their source (c1). But again, the student must not think that it is the Spirit's effect upon humankind which is important; what always comes first, is of greater interest, and must be safeguarded, is the transcendent relation of the divine persons among themselves (cc2-4). The student will then avoid confusing the divine and human, and will not absorb the one into the other (c5).

With Distinction 18, Peter has completed his teaching on God from the perspective of the divine Trinity; with Distinction 19, he sets out his teaching on the divine nature as such. Throughout his presentation, he continues to cultivate the student's sense of the divine transcendence and to preclude any suggestion that God's revelation and action in creation involves any mutability in the divine perfection. In a narrower pedagogical sense, the section of the *Sentences* which begins here is also more marked by the effort to provide students with a sophisticated theological language.[59] It is as if having been given glimpses and examples of what can be theirs by the pursuit of a demanding discipline, the students are now ready to begin the hard work of mastering its difficult terminology.

The coeternity and equality of the three divine persons are the ostensible topic of Distinction 19 (c1). But the concern seems to be not to affirm the Trinity in such a way that the identity of the divine essence is minimized (cc1-2). God is a loving communion of persons, but this is no limitation on his transcendence and unity.[60]

In Distinction 20, the equality of the divine persons is discussed by reference to power (c1). Ancient heresies had posited that the Father was more powerful than the Son by virtue of having begotten him; because they approached the divine relationship in a human manner, they mistook what refers to an order of nature to denote an inequality of substance (c3). Similar difficulties might arise from the use of expressions such as 'the Father alone,' or 'the Son alone,' and so Distinction 21 is appended to show how the correct use and understanding of these expressions will not mislead as to the unity of the triune God (cc1-3).

[59]On the question of theological language, see Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.91-154, but esp. 126-131, as it regards this particular section of the *Sentences*.

[60]See Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.130.

In Distinction 22, Peter begins a brief treatment of divine names, which will extend over the next several Distinctions. These names, or ways in which God is spoken of in Scripture and tradition, can be grouped into different categories. There are names which are applied to God by analogy, such as splendour, letters of the alphabet, mirror (c1 n2). Some pertain to the divinity in and of itself and to the relations of the divine persons in God, such as the names which denote fatherhood, sonship, procession; others pertain to the one divine essence, and these include names such as eternal, immutable, and simple (c1 n2). To this latter category belong also names which refer to the divine substance as it becomes manifest in time, and these include power, wisdom, truth, goodness (cc3 and 5). Furthermore, of the names which are used of God in time, some are used relatively and are said of all the divine persons, such as lord and creator, while others are not, such as granted, given, sent (c2). Some are used of God in time, but are not used relatively, such as incarnated, made man (c4). The name of trinity is a special case, as it points neither to person, nor to substance, but serves as a collective noun pointing to the plurality of persons in God (c3).

In the history of Christian reflection on the divine nature, the name of person has been of particular interest and has engendered a rich diversity of opinion. Distinction 23 is concerned with presenting the fruits of the long debate over this term. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that, although person is said of God according to the divine substance, yet on the whole it is used in the plural, whereas all other such names are used only in the singular (c1). Once again, Peter seizes the opportunity to inculcate a lesson in humility and to invite his students to bow before the ineffability of the divine mysteries. With Augustine, he concludes that the term person is used in order to avoid having to remain entirely speechless when asked about the Trinity (c1 n3).

The ineffableness of the mysteries involved and the linguistic poverty under which human beings labour may be used to explain why Latins and Greeks seem to differ in the matter at issue. The Latins say one essence or substance and three persons, while the Greeks say three hypostases or substances and one essence (c2 n1). It is notable that, on this issue as on any other in which there seems to be a divergence with the Eastern Christians, Peter entirely avoids polemics. Here, the disagreement serves to reinforce the lesson about the necessary humility which ought to characterize any inquiry into divine matters and the deep awareness of the feebleness of human language before the ineffable (c2 n2). Of course, humility and an awareness of inadequacy are not reasons not to pursue the inquiry, and

what is said feebly ought to be understood intelligently. The stammering assertion of three persons in God is not to be understood as denoting diversity or multiplicity in God, but unity and trinity (c5).

In Distinction 24, Peter speaks mostly in the first person in order to warn against possible misunderstandings of the terms which human speech applies to the divine mysteries. The chief lesson taught here is that much of what sounds like 'positive' language about God is not meant to make assertions, but to exclude other possibilities (c1 n2). For example, the statement that there are three persons in God does not posit diversity or multiplicity; the point of all such plural assertions is to exclude singleness or solitude in God (c1 n5). Similarly, to speak of God, or of the Father, or of the Son as one is merely meant to exclude multiplicity, without presuming to see very far into these ineffable matters (c1 nn2-4). Similar concerns underlie the assertion of trinity, distinction, difference (c1 nn6-10).

In Distinction 25, Peter returns to the problems posed by the use of the term of person, specifically by its use in the plural, which seems to contradict the view that person denotes substance or essence, and to result in the assertion that there are several substances or essences, and so several gods (c1 n1). After citing the various authoritative texts that set out the conundrum (c1 nn2-5), Peter comes to the conclusion that difficulties arise only when one fails to distinguish the context in which the term person is used (c2 n1). He argues that the term has three distinct meanings, namely essence, property, and hypostasis; re-reading the seemingly contradictory texts in this light, he shows how they now can be harmonized (cc2-3). Lest his students might regard his remarks on hypostasis to be his own conjecture, he concludes this Distinction by citing an authority which he takes to support his use of the term (c3 n6).

Because the meaning of the term hypostasis has often been a contentious issue in the Christian tradition, Distinction 26 opens with a reminder of its misuse by heretics in the past and with a warning that it must be used only in its well-established Catholic sense (c1). But this is prefatory to the principal task which this Distinction begins to take up: the definition of the properties of the divine persons. Peter begins by the assertion that these properties "in Scripture are also frequently called notions or relations" (c2 n1). A narrow view of Scripture will have difficulty with this statement. But Peter expects his students to share the conviction that Scripture denotes both the Bible itself and the authoritative commentaries on it by Catholic teachers.

The first properties of the divine persons to be considered are those of begetting, birth, and procession (c2 nn1-2). These properties designate

relations and go to the very heart of why the persons are called Father, Son, Holy Spirit (c2 n3). If these properties are called notions, it is because by them the persons come to be known or distinguished from each other; if they are called relations, it is because the persons are related to each other by them. But any advantage that accrues from the examination of these properties will prove nugatory, if we mistakenly take them to be accidental. False human analogies may lead us to think that begetting, birth, and procession have a beginning; in God, that is not the case. These properties are eternal and immutable (c3).[61]

Distinction 27 raises the possibility that some authorities cited in the previous Distinction contradict each other (c1 nn1-2). The difficulty hinges on whether the statement "the Father is Father" is the same as "the Father begot a Son" (c1 n2). The apparent contradiction is easily resolved by the appropriate paraphrase of one of the authorities (c1 n3), but the question bears fruit in clarifying the distinction between divine names which signify both relation and person (e.g. Father) and those which signify relations alone (e.g. fatherhood) (c2). These latter qualities are not to be attributed to the divine substance (c3).

Names such as Word and image are used of the Son; these, too, are taken relatively and point to the same relation as the term Son (c3 nn3-6). Names such as God, light, wisdom do not denote relation, and yet they are sometimes used relatively when they are applied to only one of the persons (c5).

Distinction 28 provides an extended gloss on the term unbegotten, which tradition applies to the Father. It attributes to the first person of the Trinity a quality other than fatherhood; and yet, like the term Father, the term only has meaning relative to the Son, who is begotten (c1). Terms such as unbegotten are said to be used so as to avoid regarding God as solitary (c3), but they ought not to be used irreligiously, in the manner of ancient heretics (c4).

Distinction 29 concludes the outline of qualities that apply to the persons in themselves with an extended discussion of the term beginning. This term is always used relatively, but denotes a manifold relationship (c1 n1). This is apparent from the application of the term to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but in different senses. The Father is called the beginning of the Son by generation, but of the Holy Spirit by procession (c1 n2). The

[61]Examples of the difference between these qualities as they inhere in God and as they occur in human beings are presented in Dist. 26 cc4-7.

Holy Spirit, on the other hand, is called beginning only in relation to creatures (c2 n1). And yet it is the whole Trinity, and not the Spirit alone, which is the beginning of creatures; the persons are not three beginnings, but one and the same (c2 n2), creatures being here understood to be all things that naturally exist, but not sins (c2 n3).

In Distinction 30, Peter turns to those names which are used of God in time relative to creatures, such as creator, lord, refuge, giver, granted (c1 n1). Again, such names carry with them the danger that God might be thought of as changing because they arise out of changeable circumstances. By a variety of examples, Peter strives to make clear that the changes are only in the creature, and that God is left wholly unchanged (c1 nn2-7).

Distinction 31 asks what it means to affirm that the divine persons are equal, or that the Son is like the Father. The authorities seem to disagree as to whether these terms are relative, as they appear to be, or are used according to substance (c1 n1). Peter's clever answer is that, although the form of the assertion is relative, these expressions are meant to affirm the unity of nature among the divine persons and to deny difference among them (c1 nn2-4). This view is enriched and deepened by an extended consideration of a statement of Hilary's regarding the divine properties and of Augustine's effort to understand Hilary's majestic, if obscure, language (cc2-6). The Distinction concludes with Augustine's beautiful assertion that the Holy Spirit is the love joining Father and Son, "and also us from below" (c6).[62]

This assertion serves also to introduce the first question of Distinction 32, regarding what it means to say that the Father and the Son love through or by means of the Holy Spirit. In God, to be and to love are one and the same; does it then follow that the Father or the Son exists through or by means of the Holy Spirit? (c1 n1). This question turns out to provide one more occasion for the master and his students to agree that they can only stammer before these great mysteries and conclude that Father and Son love by their own essence (c1 nn2-3). A similar question about divine wisdom is answered in much the same way (cc2-6). In both cases, Peter seems to be animated by the concern that the discussion of the distinctive properties of the divine persons not lead students to lose sight of the divine unity.

A similar concern moves the question which opens Distinction 33, i.e. whether the properties of the divine persons are the persons themselves, and so the divine essence (c1 n1). The assertion of identity between quali-

[62]Citing Augustine's *De Trinitate* 15.5.8.

ties and persons seems to be required, if one is to minimize the risk of positing multiplicity in God (c1 n2). And so Catholic faith professes a distinction of persons in unity of essence, the three persons being distinct in their intrinsic qualities from all eternity (c1 nn2-10). As he approaches the end of his discussion of the names and qualities of the divine persons, Peter cannot resist one more warning about the limits of theological inquiry. The warning occurs in the context of asking how the properties can be in the divine persons without determining them; an unusually clear, if ever elegant, Hilary, is quoted to say:

> "I do not know, and I do not ask; and yet I will be consoled. The archangels do not know, the angels have not heard, the ages do not contain it, the Prophet did not perceive it, the Apostle did not inquire into it, the Son himself did not reveal it. And so let painful complaints cease. Let no man believe that he can understand by his own intelligence the mystery of generation. And yet it is to be simply understood that he is Father and Son" and Holy Spirit. "The meaning of words rests within this bound: the Son is from the Father, the only-begotten from the unbegotten, the offspring from the parent, living one from living one; the divine nature is not one thing in the one and another in the other, because they are one thing." Believing this, "begin, advance, persist; and although I know that you will not reach the goal, yet I will rejoice in your progress. For one who pursues infinite things with piety, even though he never attains his end, yet makes progress by the attempt. But do not enter into that secret, nor throw yourself into the mystery of that inconceivable birth, presuming to reach a full understanding of these things; but understand that they are incomprehensible."[63]

If human beings are bounded in what they can know of these sublime things, yet it is a limitation which they share with the angels and archangels. It in no way detracts from their dignity, or from the dignity of their effort to penetrate the mysteries. Although reach and grasp may not coincide, much will be learned and, if the exercise is well done, piety will be increased.

Distinction 34 closes this section of the *Sentences*. It summarizes the doctrine of the identity between persons and nature by presenting ancient debates on the subject and its own synthesis on the relationship of person, substance, essence, hypostasis, so that the student may proceed with this technical vocabulary clarified (cc1-2). In the last part of this Distinction, students are also reminded that their activity in the classroom occurs in

[63]Dist. 33 c2 n1, citing Hilary, *De Trinitate* 2.9-11.

margin to Scripture in the broad sense of the term, and that the right understanding of Scripture is a more pressing goal than the elaboration of grand syntheses. This crucial lesson is inculcated under the guise of asking why, if power, wisdom, goodness are predicated of God according to the divine substance, yet Scripture sometimes applies these names to the persons distinctly, attributing power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit (c3). Peter's answer is that Scripture does this as a protection against human misunderstanding. Applying weak analogies from our own experience of fatherhood and sonship, we might believe the Father to be weaker than the Son by reason of age; the remedy is for Scripture to make clear that the Father is powerful. Similarly, lest we think of the Son as younger, and so less wise, Scripture refers to the Son as wise. And lest our conscience make us fearful of approaching the Spirit, Scripture makes special mention of his goodness (c4).

In Distinction 35, Peter begins to discuss the ways in which God is the cause of creation. Unlike several of his contemporaries, he chooses not to do this primarily under the rubric of divine power or will, but under the topic of divine knowledge.[64] This knowledge or wisdom, in God, is one and simple, but it can be called several other names, such as foreknowledge, disposition, predestination, and providence, according to the effects which it has on creatures (cc1-6). Of these, foreknowledge concerns only future things; disposition regards things to be done; providence concerns the governance of things; predestination regards those to be saved and the good things by which they are freed in this life and crowned in the next. Wisdom, or the knowledge by which God knows himself, comprehends all these and is entirely perfect; in comparison with it, every creature's knowledge is imperfect (cc1–6 n2).

These clear and useful definitions of the various forms of divine knowledge set the stage for a number of questions that share the familiar concern that no mistake be made as to the immutability and perfection of the divine essence. The first of these asks whether God's very being would have been in jeopardy, if there had been no future things. In God, to foreknow and to be are one and the same; would he be, if there were nothing to foreknow? (c7 nn1-3). Peter's answer is that terms such as foreknowledge, disposition, providence refer both to the divine essence and to future things. If there were no future things, God's knowledge of the divine essence would remain, and so his being is in no way dependent on whether or not a tem-

[64]Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.285.

poral order comes, or is to come, into existence (c7 nn4-6). Even if there were nothing to foreknow, God's eternal and immutable knowledge would be the same (c8). Indeed, all things which are, and those which are not, are said to be in God because they are in his knowledge (c9).

But if things are in God's presence or knowledge, are they also in God's essence? In Distinction 36, this question is answered by the suggestion that, although in God to know is to be, God's knowledge extends as well to things other than the divine nature. Just as not all things which are in God's presence are in God's essence (e.g. the saints), so also not all things which are in his knowledge are in his nature (c1). Much less will evil things be said to be in God, since only those things of which God is the author ought properly to be said to be in him, as they are from him and through him, and this is true of good things alone (c2 nn1-2). Furthermore, a distinction ought to be drawn between the things which God knows only through knowledge, such as evil things, and those which he knows also through approbation and good pleasure (c2 nn3-5). And although the expression 'from him, through him, in him' evokes the several persons of the Trinity, it ought to be held piously that all things are from, through, and in each of the persons of the Trinity (cc3-4). But not all things which are from God are also of him; creation is from God, but not of God, because it does not share the divine substance (c5).

Since mention has been made of how things are in God, Distinction 37 raises the question of how God is said to be in things (c1 n1). God is in all things by presence, power, and essence, but without any change or limitation of his own essence; in a more excellent way, God is in holy spirits and souls, dwelling in them through grace. Most excellently, God is in the man Christ by the grace of union (c1 n2). This dwelling of God in creatures is entirely a free gift of divine grace and in no way necessary to God, who is unaffected by it (c3 n1). In the case of those who know him, this indwelling of God can cease, if they choose not to respond in love (c3 n3). Although God is present everywhere and at all times, he is not moved or changed by place and time because he never suffers any change in his qualities (cc5-9).

Returning to the topic of divine foreknowledge, Distinction 38 asks whether God's foreknowledge is the cause of things (c1 nn2-4). The question cannot be answered simply in the affirmative because that would leave God open to the charge of being the cause of evil things (c1 n5). So the answer is to distinguish between knowledge in the sense of awareness, on the one hand, and of good pleasure and disposition, on the other; God's foreknowledge is the cause of things when it is joined to the good pleasure

and disposition of authorship, but he foreknows evil by awareness alone (c1 n8-9). As for contingent actions, which created beings will and bring about, God foreknows them, but does not cause them, nor does he compel anyone to do evil things (c1 n9).

Distinction 39 asks whether God's knowledge may be increased or diminished (c1). The answer is negative because in God to be and to know are one thing. To suggest anything else is to make God subject to the vagaries of time (cc2-3). In effect, here, too, the implicit warning is against anthropomorphizing God. God does not need to keep counting all the lice and gnats in creation to know how many of them there are (c4 n2); to think otherwise is to hold that God knows as human beings do, and so to forget the often repeated lesson in this part of the *Sentences* that the subject of investigation is God, and that he is wholly other than his creatures.

These questions about God's knowledge prepare the ground for the topic which, from the human point of view, is among the most pressing, namely predestination. The questions about the scope and immutability of divine knowledge and foreknowledge acquire a somewhat different weight, from the creature's perspective, when applied to its own eternal fate. The link is made explicit at the end of this Distinction, where foreknowledge, by which God foreknows all future things, both good and evil, is distinguished from predestination, which concerns the goods of salvation and the persons to be saved (c4 nn3-4). Foreknowledge does not cause the things which it knows; by predestination, on the other hand, God grants to the elect what is necessary for salvation. Predestination, then, is the preparation for grace, which cannot occur without foreknowledge; it concerns those to be saved only, and is called election. But foreknowledge without predestination concerns those to be condemned, and it is called reprobation (c4 n4).

Distinction 40 opens with the question of whether any of the predestined may be damned, or any of the reprobated may be saved (c1 n1). In light of what has been said regarding divine foreknowledge and predestination, it follows that the number of the elect is not subject to change (c1 nn2-5). As for reprobation, God foreknows both its occurrence and its punishment, but he only works the second, since the first is due to the person's own iniquity (c2 n1).

The question of merit or deserving with regard to predestination or reprobation is explicitly taken up in Distinction 41; predestination is freely conferred by grace, whereas sin brings about the obstinacy which makes for reprobation (c1). Peter resists tying predestination strictly to merit in order to emphasize the divine sovereignty and the freedom of grace; it is

only by grace that merit can be gained. The convoluted way in which the tradition has come to this conclusion is exemplified by the wavering of Augustine on the question of meriting and deserving (c2). Ultimately, this question, too, calls for pious surrender because "a faithful ignorance is better than a presumptuous knowledge" (c2 n6).

In Distinction 42, Peter turns to the question of God's omnipotence, which he defines as God doing all that he wills, and so he cannot do anything which implies weakness, deficiency, or change (cc1-2). Furthermore, by his omnipotence, God suffers nothing which he does not will, or nothing at all (c3).

Next, Peter moves to refute the view that God can do nothing other than what he does, nor can he omit to do any of the things that he does. This view is argued on the basis that God can do nothing other than what is right and just, and so it would not be right and just for him to do anything else, or to not do what he does (c1 n1). Peter does not necessarily disagree with the substance of this argument, but its form, at the least, seems to him offensive because it suggests that God is constrained to act as he does; in his view, were God to act otherwise than he does, then that, too, would be good and just (c1 n2). Peter's concern with safeguarding God's sovereignty and freedom is expressed even more explicitly in his objection to the use of the word 'ought' with regard to God; any hint that God owes anything to anyone must be avoided like poison (c1 n3).

Distinction 44 broaches one of the more controverted twelfth-century questions regarding the divine nature, namely whether God can do anything better than he does (c1 n1).[65] The argument which Peter rejects runs as follows: God cannot do anything better than he does because, if he could and did not, he would be envious (c1 n2). Peter regards it as obvious that, in some sense, God could do things better than he does them. For example, he could have made human beings incapable of sin. So the answer must be a distinction between the quality of the work and the wisdom of the maker. From the point of view of the creature, God could have done some things better than he does, but it is to be denied that God could do anything by a better or other wisdom (c1 nn3-4). The effect, once more, is to insist on the unbridgeable gap between the divine perfection and the imperfection of the creature.

[65]Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 1.290, terms this "the single most controversial question concerning the divine nature to be agitated in this period."

A final affirmation of the unchanging and absolute nature of the divine omnipotence occurs in response to the question of whether God can always do what he was once able to do. Those who argue in the negative say that God was once able to become incarnate, die, and rise again, which he cannot do now (c2 n1). Peter answers that God, even now, has the power to have become incarnate, to have died, and to have risen again. As with God's knowledge, so with God's power, it is the creature's danger to see it in the light of creaturely limitations and subjection to time and change (c2 nn2-4).

In Distinction 45, Peter begins a discussion of the divine will, which will take him to the conclusion of this first Book of the *Sentences*. Once again, he interjects a warning about the weakness of human understanding in these matters, before proceeding to make the point that, in God, will is said according to essence because in God to be and to will are the same; it follows that, in God, the will is not an affect or a motion, but the divine nature itself (c1). And yet it is not to be said that God is all that he wills, just as he is not everything that he knows (c2). To say that God wills something is to say that the unchangeable God has directed his will to this created and mutable thing, which is subject to it as to its first cause (cc3-4). And so God's will is the first cause of all things that naturally exist, while it itself has no cause because it is eternal (c4 n3).

Peter has set out his view of the nature of the divine will crisply and clearly. But Scripture, in its frequent and varied references to God's will, seems to resist such clarity. To make sense of the apparent confusion, one must remember that, in the scriptural texts, the expression will is used to refer to different things (c5 n1). Although Scripture does not fail to use the term in the proper sense (c5 n2), it also uses it metaphorically in order to denote not God's will as such, but divine precepts, prohibitions, counsel, permission, or operations (c6 n1). Although these are related to the divine will, they are merely its signs, and should not be confused with it (c6 n2). So it is that the signs of God's will can be violated, but God's will cannot be thwarted. So it may be that God does not will that his command be fulfilled, as in the case of Abraham and Isaac, or his prohibition be observed (c7 n2). It is in this space between God's unchanging will and its variable signs that God allows human freedom to operate.

These issues are given further discussion in Distinction 46, under the rubric of permission and operation. These, too, are called God's will, since even evil could not happen, unless God allowed it (c1). This leads to the question of whether God wills that evil things be done (c3 n1). After some subtle disquisitions on the degree to which divine tolerance of evils

is the same as God willing them, and after entertaining arguments that evils are necessary for the creature's exercise of freedom and so that God can draw good from bad (cc3-7), Peter concludes that "God does not will evil things to be done, and yet he does not will that they not be done, nor is he unwilling that they be done. For all that he wills to be done is done; and all that he wills not to be done is not done. But many things are done which he does not will to be done, such as evil things" (c7 n5).

Lest it be thought that such divine tolerance in any way thwarts God's will, Distinction 47 opens with the assertion that God's will concerning man is always fulfilled (c1 n1). The rejection of divine precepts and commands by the creature's free choice is itself a fulfilment of the divine will (c1 n2). And it is just that the person who violates God's will incur punishment (c2).

Distinction 48 closes this first Book of the *Sentences* by setting forth cases where there is tension between the divine and the human will. In its joining of consideration of divine qualities with the conundrum of human moral choices, the Distinction marks an elegant transition to the treatment of creation and man, in the second Book of the *Sentences*. Peter opens this Distinction by positing that sometimes someone, for a good and pious reason, wills other than God does; at other times, evil human will wills what God wills by a good will (c1 n1). An example of the first is a son who wills his ailing father to live, when God wills him to die (c1 n2). The most notable example of the second is the killing of Jesus, which was willed by both God and his killers (c2). With this most challenging instance of the coexistence of divine omnipotence and human freedom, Peter concludes his treatment of the mystery of the Trinity.

THE TRANSLATION

Such, in brief, are the contents of the first Book of Peter's *Sentences*, which is here translated following the text and its divisions as established so magnificently by Ignatius Brady.[66] The translator cannot claim any expertise in medieval theology. But Peter proved attractive in his own right, the desire to learn some medieval theology became strong, and the project to translate the *Sentences* seemed the best way to do so. And it has been

[66]Magistri Petri Lombardi Parisiensis Episcopi, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, t. 1, pt. 2, Liber I et II (Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas: Grottaferrata [Romae], 1971).

fun, even though fear and trembling characterized the experience. Perhaps in consequence, more literalness than might generally be thought to be required characterises this translation.

Translations of the authorities cited by Peter have been gratefully consulted, but it was thought best to translate the same authorities anew in order to avoid missing the changes to which they had been subject in the course of time and to avoid the inconsistencies of vocabulary and style that would have resulted from the use of widely different translations. The notes to the translation use the Latin names for the works cited, and the bibliography provides a list of available translations arranged alphabetically by author and Latin title so that the text of the authority may be found in any translation which reproduces the accepted divisions of the original texts.

To undertake single-handedly the translation of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* was a foolhardy thing to do. It pleases me, by way of excuse and devotion, to invoke here the memory of Fr. Leonard Boyle, O.P., *dominus et magister meus*, who was always ready to encourage such foolhardiness by word and example. It pleases me almost equally to pay pious and grateful respect to the memory of Fr. Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., whose loving labours upon the revisions of the Latin text of the *Sentences* can only evoke grateful admiration; if my link with him, to my sorrow, was not directly personal, I rejoice in the awareness that both of us were beneficiaries of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and of the University of Toronto. My gratitude extends to Fr. Brady's successors at Quaracchi, and in particular to Fr. Romain Georges Mailleux, O.F.M., Director of the Frati Editori di Quaracchi, for the "placet" to translate the *Sentences* from Fr. Brady's edition. It was particularly graceful that Fr. Mailleux, in granting permission, saw fit to congratulate me upon my courage. It would have been more difficult to keep up my courage without the unfailing, unstinting, and fun-filled support of Professor Joseph W. Goering, of St. Michael's College and the University of Toronto; it is most fitting that a friendship whose deep roots lie in our being *consocii* of Fr. Boyle should have flowered to bear even such a fruit as the translation of the *Sentences* and its successful testing as a still lively teaching book in Joe's classes in medieval theology. Thanks must also be expressed to Professor Joseph Boyle, who, in the course of his service as Principal of St. Michael's College, expressed steady and strong encouragement for the project, despite its non-philosophical nature.

Words of gratitude are not sufficient to express the debt of obligation which I have incurred toward the staff of the Department of Publications of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. It is difficult to think of any other publishing enterprise which achieves such consistent excellence on such limited resources. It is delightfully humbling for an author to deal with a publications staff of such dedication and unparalleled competence in the editing of works in medieval studies. At the end of the day, I find it difficult to say with certainty that I have contributed more to this translation than Jean Hoff; with deep assurance, I can say that the work is clearer, sounder, and much more pleasant to read as a result of her own delight in improving the translation by efforts whose generous dedication is entirely unquantifiable. Fred Unwalla's equal delight in producing beautiful books and his unfailing eye for graphic detail are responsible for the attractiveness of the form.

The *Sentences* are divided in four books; I have four children. It seems predestined that, in order of birth, each of the children should suffer the indignity of the dedication of one of the books. Gianmarco, by the obligations of primogeniture, must endure the first such dedication. I bear witness to the world that he has never shown the least interest in the work; it is not his fault if he must bear, too, the unbearable moralizing of Ulysses. Still, I hope that he will find some enjoyment in the matter.

Giulio Silano
St. Michael's College, Toronto
Gaudete Sunday, 2006

Chapter Headings

HERE BEGIN THE CHAPTERS OF THE FIRST BOOK[1]

[DISTINCTION I]
Ch. 1 All teaching concerns things or signs.
2 Of things which are to be enjoyed or used, and of those which enjoy or use.
3 What it means to enjoy or to use.

[DISTINCTION II]
Ch. 1 (4) On trinity and unity.
2 (5) What was the intention of those who have written on the Trinity.
3 (6) What order is to be observed in discussing the Trinity.
4 (7) On the testimonies of the Old Testament by which the mystery of the Trinity is declared.
5 (8) On the testimonies of the New Testament pertaining to the same.

[DISTINCTION III]
Ch. 1 (9) On the knowledge of the Creator through creatures in which a trace of the Trinity appears.
2 (10) On the image and likeness of the Trinity in the human soul.
3 (11) On the likeness of the creating and created trinities.
4 (12) On the unity of the Trinity.

[DISTINCTION IV]
Ch. 1 (13) Whether God the Father generated himself as God.
2 (14) Whether trinity is predicated of the one God, as one God is predicated of the three persons.

[DISTINCTION V]
Ch. 1 (15) Whether the divine essence generated the Son, or was generated from the Father, or whether the Son was born and the Holy Spirit proceeded from it.
2 (16) That the Son is not from nothing, but from something, yet not from matter, as also the Holy Spirit.
3 (17) Why the Word of the Father is called son of his nature.

[DISTINCTION VI]
Ch. 1 (18) Whether the Father begot the Son by his own will or by necessity and whether God may be willing or unwilling.

[DISTINCTION VII]
Ch. 1 (19) Whether the Father was able or willed to beget the Son.
2 (20) Whether the ability to beget the Son is some power in the Father which is not in the Son.

[1]The list of chapter headings translated here is found on pp. 5-18 of t. 1, pt. 2 of the Brady edition of the *Sentences*.

[DISTINCTION VIII]
Ch. 1 (21) On the truth and property of the divine essence.
2 (22) On the unchangeableness of the same.
3 (23) On the simplicity of the same.
4 (24) On the bodily and spiritual creature, how it is manifold and not simple.
5 (25) That God, although he is simple, yet is called in many ways.
6 (26) That God's simplicity is not subject to any predication.
7 (27) That God is not properly called a substance.
8 (28) That in God there is nothing which is not God.

[DISTINCTION IX]
Ch. 1 (29) On the distinction of the three persons.
2 (30) On the coeternity of the Father and the Son.
3 (31) On the ineffable and unintelligible manner of generation.
4 (32) Whether it ought to be said that 'the Son is,' or 'was, forever generated.'
5 (33) On the objections of the heretics who strive to prove that the Son is not coeternal with the Father.

[DISTINCTION X]
Ch. 1 (34) On the Holy Spirit: that he is, and is properly called, the love of the Father and the Son, although there is in the Trinity a love which is the Trinity; similarly, the Word is properly called wisdom, and yet the whole Trinity is called wisdom.
2 (35) That the same terms can be taken both specifically and universally.
3 (36) That just as the Holy Spirit is common to Father and Son, so he has a common name proper to himself.

[DISTINCTION XI]
Ch. 1 (37) That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son; yet the Greeks deny he proceeds from the Son.
2 (38) On the agreement of Greeks and Latins as to the meaning, and their disagreement as to the words.

[DISTINCTION XII]
Ch. 1 (39) Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds more properly or more fully from the Father than from the Son.
2 (40) That the Holy Spirit is principally and properly said to proceed from the Father.

[DISTINCTION XIII]
Ch. 1 (41) Why the Holy Spirit, although he is of the Father's substance, is not called begotten, but only proceeding.
2 (42) Why is the Son said to proceed, when the Holy Spirit is not said to be begotten.
3 (43) That a mortal cannot distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.
4 (44) Whether the Holy Spirit is to be called unbegotten, since he is not begotten.

[DISTINCTION XIV]
Ch. 1 (45) On the twofold procession of the Holy Spirit, temporal and eternal.
2 (46) That not only the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given, but also God the Holy Spirit himself is given and sent to men.
3 (47) Whether holy men can give the Holy Spirit.

[DISTINCTION XV]
Ch. 1 (48) That the Holy Spirit is given by himself, and the Son is sent from himself.
2 (49) How the sending of each is to be understood.
3 (50) That the Son too was sent by the Holy Spirit.
4 (51) That the Son is given also by himself.
5 (52) How: 'I did not come from myself' is to be understood.

6 (53) Whether the Son is sent only once, or often.
7 (54) On the two ways in which the Son is sent.
8 (55) That in one way he is sent once, and in another way often; and in one way he is said to be sent into the world, and in another way not.
9 (56) Why the Father is not said to be sent.
10 (57) That the Son and the Holy Spirit are not, as it were, less than the Father because they are sent.

[DISTINCTION XVI]
Ch. 1 (58) On the sending of the Holy Spirit, which occurs in two ways: visibly and invisibly.
2 (59) That the Son, according to his having become man, is not only less than the Father, but also than the Holy Spirit.

[DISTINCTION XVII]
Ch. 1 (60) That the Holy Spirit is the love by which we love God and neighbour.
2 (61) That brotherly love is God, and not the Father or the Son, but only the Holy Spirit.
3 (62) That when we say: 'God is charity,' we do not mean he is its cause, as in the phrase: 'You are my patience and my hope.'
4 (63) How the Holy Spirit is sent or given to us.
5 (64) Whether the Holy Spirit is increased in a person, and is had or given to a greater or lesser degree, and whether he is given to one who already has him and to one who does not.
6 (65) That some say that the Holy Spirit is not the love by which we love God and neighbour.

[DISTINCTION XVIII]
Ch. 1 (66) Whether it is to be granted that the gifts are given through the gift.
2 (67) Whether it is for the same reason that the Holy Spirit is called gift as that by which he is called grant or donation.
3 (68) That just as the Son by being born took not only being Son, but also that he be essence, so also the Holy Spirit by proceeding took not only being gift, but also that he be essence.
4 (69) That the Holy Spirit is called gift and grant according to the two aforementioned modes of procession: according to his being gift, he is referred to the Father; according to his being grant, [he is referred] to the one who gave and to those to whom he is given.
5 (70) Whether the Son, since he is given to us, may also be called 'ours,' like the Holy Spirit.
6 (71) Whether the Holy Spirit may be referred to himself.

[DISTINCTION XIX]
Ch. 1 (72) On the equality of the three persons.
2 (73) That eternity, greatness, and power in God are one, although they seem diverse.
3 (74) That none of the persons surpasses another by greatness, because one person is not greater than another, nor are two something greater than one, nor three than two or one.
4 (75) How the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in both.
5 (76) That none of the persons is a part of the Trinity.
6 (77) Why the three persons are said to be most highly one thing.
7 (78) When we say that the three persons are one essence, we do not predicate it as genus [made up] of species, nor as species [made up] of individuals, because es-

sence is not a genus and person is not a species, nor is essence a species and the persons are not individuals.
8 (79) That the three persons are not called one essence according to material cause.
9 (80) Nor are the three persons said to be one essence as three men [are said to be] of one nature.
10 (81) Whether the three persons, which are distinguished by their properties, differ in number.
11 (82) Why the three persons together are not something greater than one.
12 (83) That God is not to be called triple, but threefold.

[DISTINCTION XX]
Ch. 1 (84) That any one of the persons does not excel another in power.
2 (85) That the Son is not less powerful than the Father.
3 (86) On the objections of the heretics to this, and the Catholic responses.

[DISTINCTION XXI]
Ch. 1 (87) How it can be said 'the Father alone,' or 'the Son alone,' or 'the Holy Spirit alone,' since they are inseparable.
2 (88) Whether it may be said: 'the Father alone is God,' or 'the Son alone is God,' or 'the Holy Spirit alone is God,' or 'the Father is the only God,' 'the Son is the only God,' 'the Holy Spirit is the only God.'
3 (89) How we say 'the Trinity is God alone,' although it is with holy spirits and souls.

[DISTINCTION XXII]
Ch. 1 (90) On the difference of the names which we use in speaking of God.
2 (91) On those [names] which are suitable for God temporally, and are used relatively.
3 (92) On this name which is 'trinity.'
4 (93) On those [names] which are suitable for God in time, and are not used relatively.
5 (94) On those [names] which properly pertain to the several persons, and on those which signify the unity of essence.

[DISTINCTION XXIII]
Ch. 1 (95) Of the name 'person': that it is said according to substance, yet on the whole it is taken in the plural and not in the singular.
2 (96) By what necessity do the Latins say 'three persons' and the Greeks 'three hypostases or substances.'
3 (97) Why we do not say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three gods, as [we do] three persons.
4 (98) Why do we not say three essences, as [we do] three persons.
5 (99) That in the Trinity there is no diversity or singleness or solitude, but unity and trinity, and distinction and identity.
6 (100) That God is not to be called manifold.

[DISTINCTION XXIV]
Ch. 1 (101) What is meant by these names: one, two or two things, three or three things, threefold or trinity, several or plurality, distinction or distinct, when we use them in speaking of God.

[DISTINCTION XXV]
Ch. 1 (102) What is signified by this term 'person' in the plural number, namely when we say 'persons.'
2 (103) Of the threefold meaning of this term 'person' in the Trinity.
3 (104) In what sense we say that one is the person of the Father, and another of the Son; or that the Father is one in person, the Son another.

[DISTINCTION XXVI]
Ch. 1 (105) On this name 'hypostasis.'
2 (106) On the properties of the persons, and on their relative names.
3 (107) That not everything that is said of God is said according to substance; for some things are said according to relation, and yet nothing according to accident.
4 (108) Why it is said to be proper to the Only-begotten that he is Son of God, when men are also sons of God.
5 (109) That man is called son of the Trinity, and the Trinity the father of men.
6 (110) That the Holy Spirit is called gift by the same property by which he is called 'holy spirit,' and in either way he is [so] called relative to the Father or the Son.
7 (111) Whether the Father, the Trinity itself, or the Son may be called 'holy spirit.'
8 (112) That not all things which are spoken of relatively correspond reciprocally to the terms for them.

[DISTINCTION XXVII]
Ch. 1 (113) Which are those properties by which the persons are distinguished.
2 (114) That it is not entirely the same to say that something 'is a father' and that it 'has generated' or 'has a son.'
3 (115) That properties determine the hypostases, not the substance, that is, the nature.
4 (116) On the general rule as to those things that are called in respect to themselves and to those things that are called relatively.
5 (117) Whether 'God from God,' and suchlike, is said according to substance.

[DISTINCTION XXVIII]
Ch. 1 (118) That there are not only three properties of the persons.
2 (119) Whether the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-son, as he is called unbegotten.
3 (120) On the property denoted by unbegotten.
4 (121) The response of Ambrose against the Arians concerning unbegotten.
5 (122) Whether it is different to be Father and to be Son.
6 (123) Whether the wisdom is called begotten according to relation, or to substance.
7 (124) On image.

[DISTINCTION XXIX]
Ch. 1 (125) On beginning.
2 (126) That the Father is the beginning from eternity, and so is the Son, but not the Holy Spirit.
3 (127) How the Father is the beginning of the Son, and he and the Son the beginning of the Holy Spirit.
4 (128) Whether it is by the same notion that Father and Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit.

[DISTINCTION XXX]
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2 (130) Whether the Holy Spirit is called granted or given relative to himself, since he gives himself.

[DISTINCTION XXXI]
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2 (132) On the sentence of St. Hilary by which he shows the properties of the persons in the Trinity.
3 (133) Why unity is attributed to the Father.

4 (134) Why Father and Son are said to be 'one thing' or 'one God,' but not [simply] 'one.'
5 (135) Why equality is said to be in the Son.
6 (136) Why the concord or joining of the two is said to be in the Holy Spirit.

[DISTINCTION XXXII]
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2 (138) Whether the Father is wise by the wisdom which he generated.
3 (139) Whether the Son is wise by himself or through himself.
4 (140) Whether there is only one wisdom of the Father.
5 (141) Just as in the Trinity there is the love which is the Trinity, and yet the Holy Spirit is a love which is not the Trinity, but there are not two loves, the same is also the case of wisdom.
6 (142) Why the Father is not called wise by the wisdom which he generated, as he is said to love by the love which proceeds from him.

[DISTINCTION XXXIII]
Ch. 1 (143) Whether the properties of the persons are the persons themselves or the divine *ousia*.
2 (144) How the properties can be in God's nature without determining it.

[DISTINCTION XXXIV]
Ch. 1 (145) On the words of Hilary by which, according to the depraved understanding of some, he seems to say that the divine nature and a thing of [that] nature are not the same, and that it is not the same to be God and that which is of God.
2 (146) Whether we may say 'one God of three persons' as we say 'one essence of three persons,' and 'three persons of one God' as 'three persons of one essence.'
3 (147) That power, wisdom, goodness in Scripture are sometimes referred to the persons distinctly.
4 (148) Why power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit, since there is only one power, wisdom, goodness of the three.
5 (149) On this term, *homousion*, where [its usage] is confirmed, and what it means.

[DISTINCTION XXXV]
Ch. 1 (150) On God's knowledge and foreknowledge, providence, disposition and predestination.
2 (151) Of what does God have foreknowledge or foresight.
3 (152) Of what disposition.
4 (153) Of what predestination.
5 (154) Of what providence.
6 (155) Of what wisdom or knowledge.
7 (156) Whether foreknowledge or disposition or predestination could have been in God, if there had been no future things.
8 (157) That God's knowledge is of temporal and eternal things.
9 (158) How all things are said to be in God, and [all is] life in him.

[DISTINCTION XXXVI]
Ch. 1 (159) Whether all things are to be said to be in God's essence, as they are said to be in God's cognition or presence.
2 (160) By what reason good things are said to be in God, but not evil ones.
3 (161) Whether it is the same for all things to be from God, and through him, and in him.
4 (162) That all things are from each of the three and through each and in each.

5 (163) That not all things which are from God are also of him.

[DISTINCTION XXXVII]
Ch. 1 (164) In what ways God is said to be in things.
2 (165) That God does not dwell everywhere that he is, but the converse is true.
3 (166) Where was God before there was a creature.
4 (167) That God, although he is present in all things by essence, yet is not polluted by the uncleanness of things.
5 (168) That God, although he is in every place and time, yet is not in a place, nor is he moved in place or time.
6 (169) In what ways something is said to be local or circumscribable.
7 (170) What it means to change according to time.
8 (171) Whether created spirits are local and circumscribable.
9 (172) That God is everywhere without local motion.

[DISTINCTION XXXVIII]
Ch. 1 (173) Whether God's knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of things, or vice versa.
2 (174) Whether God's foreknowledge is fallible.

[DISTINCTION XXXIX]
Ch. 1 (175) Whether God's knowledge can be increased or diminished, or be changed in some way.
2 (176) Whether God can know or foreknow something newly or in time.
3 (177) Whether God can know more things than he knows.
4 (178) That God always and simultaneously knows all things.

[DISTINCTION XL]
Ch. 1 (179) Whether any of the predestined may be damned, or any of the reprobated be saved.
2 (180) What is God's reprobation, and in what subjects it is considered, and what is the effect of predestination.

[DISTINCTION XLI]
Ch. 1 (181) Whether there is any deserving of obduracy or mercy.
2 (182) On various opinions of some carnal men regarding this.
3 (183) Whether what God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and foreknows, and always knew and foreknew.

[DISTINCTION XLII]
Ch. 1 (184) On the omnipotence of God: why is he called omnipotent, since we can do many things which he cannot do.
2 (185) How God is said to be able to do all things.
3 (186) That God's omnipotence is considered according to two aspects.

[DISTINCTION XLIII]
Ch. 1 (187) Attack against those who say that God is able to do nothing other than what he wills and does.

[DISTINCTION XLIV]
Ch. 1 (188) Whether God can do anything better than he does, or in another or better way.
2 (189) Whether God can always do all that he was once able to do.

[DISTINCTION XLV]
Ch. 1 (190) On the will of God, which is the essence of God, and on its signs.

2 (191) That although it is the same for God to will and to be, yet God cannot be said to be all things which he wills.
3 (192) On the sense of these expressions: God knows, or God wills; [also,] God knows all things, or wills something.
4 (193) That God's will is the most highly good cause of all things that naturally are, and no cause for it is to be sought because it is the first and highest cause of all things.
5 (194) In what ways God's will is taken.
6 (195) That precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, operation are sometimes understood by the term will.
7 (196) Whether God wills that all do what he commands, or avoid doing what he prohibits.

[DISTINCTION XLVI]
Ch. 1 (197) That God's will, which is God himself, can never be made void.
2 (198) How is that text to be understood: *I willed to gather your children, and you did not will it*, and the other: *Who wills all men to be saved.*
3 (199) Whether evil things are done by God's will, or against his will.
4 (200) How that statement of Augustine: "It is good for evil things to be done," is to be understood.
5 (201) On the manifold acception of good.
6 (202) That evils are of help to all.
7 (203) That the cause by which man is made worse is not in God.

[DISTINCTION XLVII]
Ch. 1 (204) How the will of God concerning man is always fulfilled, whithersoever he may turn.
2 (205) In what sense some things are said to be done against God's will.
3 (206) Why God commands all to do good and avoid evil, when he does not will this to be fulfilled by all.

[DISTINCTION XLVIII]
Ch. 1 (207) That at times man by good will wills otherwise than God does, and at times by evil will he wills what God wills.
2 (208) That God's good will is fulfilled by the evil wills of men.
3 (209) Whether it pleased holy men that Christ suffer and die.
4 (210) Whether we ought to will the sufferings of the saints.

The *Sentences*, Book 1

The Mystery of the Trinity

PROLOGUE

1. Wishing, with the poor widow, to give something to the Lord's treasury out of our penury and poverty,[1] we have dared to scale the difficult heights and to undertake a work beyond our strength. We have grounded our confidence of completion and the reward for our labour in the Good Samaritan,[2] who, after giving two silver pieces for the care of the man left half-dead, promised to repay all the expenses of the caregiver, who might have to spend more. The truthfulness of the one making that promise delights us, but the immensity of the work terrifies us; the desire to make progress spurs us on, but the weakness of failure discourages us, and only the zeal for the house of God overcomes it.[3]

2. Burning with that zeal, we have striven to protect with the bucklers of David's tower[4] "our faith against the errors of carnal and brutish men";[5] or rather, we wish to show that it is already so protected. We have also attempted to reveal the hidden depths of theological investigations and to convey an understanding of the Church's sacraments, with whatever little intelligence is ours, because "we were not able rightfully to resist the desires of our brethren devoted to study, who begged us to assist their praiseworthy studies in Christ with our tongue and pen; the love of Christ is the driver of these two yoked together in us."[6]

3. We do not doubt "that all human speech has always been subject to the calumny and opposition of the envious because, when the movements of our wills dissent, so too does the understanding of our spirits. Then, even though every word be perfect with regard to truth, yet, as others think or prefer it to be otherwise, the error of impiety may resist a truth which one does not understand or which one finds displeasing, and a wilful envy may result. This is what *the god of this world works in those children of unbelief*[7] who do not submit their will to reason, nor apply themselves to the study of doctrine. Instead, they strive to make the words of wisdom fit what they have dreamed up; they follow not the reason of truth, but of what

[1]Cf. Mk. 12, 42-43; Lk. 21, 1-2.
[2]Cf. Lk. 10, 33-35.
[3]Cf. Ps. 68, 10, and Jn. 2, 17.
[4]Cant. 4, 4
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 3, prol. n1.
[6]Ibid., bk 3, prol. n1.
[7]2 Cor. 4, 4; Eph. 2, 2.

pleases them. Their evil will incites such people not to an understanding of the truth, but to the defense of what has pleased them; they do not desire to be taught the truth, but turn their ears away from it and toward fables.[8] Their pursuit consists more in seeking what pleases them, than what ought to be taught; instead of desiring the latter, they fit their teaching to what they desire. They find *a semblance of wisdom in superstition*,[9] because a lying hypocrisy follows defection from faith,[10] so that the piety which their conscience has lost may be retained at least in their words. But they make impious even their false piety by all manner of lying words, scheming to corrupt the sanctity of the faith by the teaching of false doctrine, inflicting upon others the itching of their own ears[11] under the new dogma of their own desire. Eager for controversy, they struggle without restraint against the truth. For there is an unceasing battle between the assertion of the truth and the defense of opinion, for so long as truth remains firm and the will to err persists."[12]

4. Wishing to cast down the assembly of such people, which is hateful to God,[13] and to stop up their mouths, so that they may not be able to spread the poison of their own malice to others, and in order to put the light of truth on the lamp-stand,[14] we have, with God's aid, put together with much labour and sweat a volume from the witnesses of truth established for all eternity,[15] and divided it in four books. Here you will find the precedents and teaching of our ancestors. Here, by the sincere profession of the Lord's faith, we have denounced the falsehood of a poisonous doctrine. Embracing an approach to showing the truth without incurring the danger of professing impiety, we have pursued a moderate middle course between the two. And if in some places our voice has rung out a little loudly, it has not transgressed the bounds set by our forefathers.[16]

5. "And so this work should seem superfluous neither to the lazy, nor to the very learned, since it is necessary to many who are not lazy and to many who are not learned and, among these, even to myself."[17] In this brief volume, we have brought together the sentences of the Fathers and the testimonies apposite to them, so that one who seeks them shall find it unnecessary to rifle through numerous books, when this brief collection

[8]Cf. 2 Tim. 4, 4.
[9]Col. 2, 23.
[10]1 Tim. 4, 1-2.
[11]2 Tim. 4, 3.
[12]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 10, nn1-2.
[13]Cf. Ps. 25, 5.
[14]Mt. 5, 15.
[15]Cf. Ps. 118, 152.
[16]Cf. Prov. 22, 28.
[17]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 3, prol., n1.

effortlessly offers him what he seeks. But in this treatise, "I desire not only a pious reader, but also a free corrector, especially where a deep question of truth is discussed, as to which one would wish as many proposers of solutions as there are objectors!"[18] And in order that one may more easily find what one seeks, we have set out the titles under which the chapters of each book are distinguished.[19]

HERE ENDS THE PROLOGUE

HERE BEGINS THE FIRST BOOK

The Mystery of the Trinity

DISTINCTION I

Chapter 1

1. ALL TEACHING CONCERNS THINGS OR SIGNS. With diligent investigation, we have pondered over and over again the contents of the Old and New Law; by God's prevenient grace, it has become clear to us that the study of the sacred page is principally concerned with things or with signs. For as the renowned teacher Augustine says in his book, *On Christian Doctrine*, "all teaching is either about things or about signs. But even things are learned through signs. 'Things' here properly designates whatever is not used to designate something; but 'signs' designates whatever is used in signifying."[1]—But among these, there are some whose exclusive use consists in signifying, and not in conferring justification, that is, they are such that we only use them in order to signify something else, as is the case with some sacraments of the Law. There are others which not only signify, but also confer what may be of interior aid, as is the case with the sacraments of the Gospel.—"From which it is clearly understood what is meant here by signs, namely those things which are used to signify something else. It follows that every sign is also a thing because," as Augustine says in the same book, "whatever is not a thing is nothing at all;

[18]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 3, prol., n1.
[19]A translation of the chapter headings is found on pp. li-lviii.

[1]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c2 n2.

but it is not conversely the case that every thing is a sign"[2] if it is not used to signify something else.

2. And whenever the studious and modest speculation of theologians attend to these matters, it will note that divine Scripture observes the aforementioned form in its teaching.

3. Since under God's guidance we wish to make a beginning toward some understanding of divine things, we need to discuss these matters. "And we will first discuss things, and afterwards signs."[3]

Chapter 2

1. HE TREATS OF THINGS GENERALLY. As Augustine says in the same place, "in the case of things, we must consider that there are some things which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, and yet others which enjoy and use. Those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed. Those things which are to be used help and, as it were, support us in our efforts toward blessedness, so that we may be able to attain and adhere to those things which make us blessed."[4]

2. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ENJOY AND USE. "We," and the holy angels, "are the things which enjoy and use, placed, as it were, between the two other types of things."[5]

3. THE MEANING OF ENJOYING AND USING. "To enjoy is to adhere in love to some thing for its own sake; but to use is to apply whatever comes into one's hand in order to obtain that which is to be enjoyed. To do otherwise is to engage in abuse, and not in use, because an unlawful use must be termed an abuse or a perverse use."[6]

4. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE ENJOYED. "The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But this very Trinity is a most high thing and common to all who enjoy it, if it ought to be labelled a thing at all, and not the cause of all things, if it may even be termed a cause. Indeed, it is not easy to find a name that suitably fits such an excellence, except that it is better to say that this Trinity is the one God."[7]

5. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE TO BE USED. As for the things which are to be used, they are the world and the things created in it. Hence Augustine in the same book: "This world is to be used, not enjoyed, so that *the*

[2]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c2 n2.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid., bk 1 c3 n3.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ibid., bk 1 c4 n4.
[7]Ibid., bk 1 c5 n5.

invisible things of God may be clearly seen, having been understood through the things which are made,[8] that is, so that eternal things may be comprehended from temporal ones."[9] Also, in the same book: "Among all things, those alone are to be enjoyed which are eternal and unchangeable; as for the rest, they are to be used so that one may come to the full enjoyment of the former."[10] Hence Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book 10: "We enjoy the things that we know, in which the will finds delight for their own sake and comes to rest; but we use those things which we refer to another thing that is to be enjoyed."[11]

Chapter 3

1. ALSO, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENJOYMENT AND USE EXPLAINED IN ANOTHER WAY. But it is to be noted that the same Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book 10, taking use and enjoyment in another sense from the above, says as follows: "To use is to place something in the power of the will; but to enjoy is to use with the joy, no longer of hope, but of the thing itself. And so everyone who enjoys also uses, because he places something in the power of the will with delight as the end. But not everyone who uses also enjoys, if he has desired the thing which he places in the power of the will not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else."[1]—And note that Augustine seems to say that only they enjoy who rejoice in the thing, and no longer in hope. And so it seems that in this life we do not enjoy, but only use, since we rejoice in hope, although it was said above that to enjoy is "to adhere in love to some thing for its own sake,"[2] as even in this life many come to adhere to God.

2. DETERMINATION OF THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION. We determine this apparent contradiction by saying that we enjoy both here and in the future, but there we will do so properly, perfectly, and fully, because there we shall see clearly that which we enjoy. But here, while we walk in hope,[3] we do indeed enjoy, but not so fully. Hence, *On the Trinity*, in book 10: "We enjoy the things that we know in which the will rests."[4] The same [Augustine], in the book, *On Christian Doctrine*, says: "The angels are already happy in the enjoyment of him whom we also desire to enjoy; and

[8]Rom. 1, 20.
[9]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c4 n4.
[10]Ibid., bk 1 c22 n20.
[11]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 10 c10 n13.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 10 c11 n17.
[2]Dist. 1 c2 n3.
[3]Cf. 2 Cor. 5, 7.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 10 c10 n13.

the more we enjoy him already in this life, even if *through a glass darkly*,[5] the more tolerably do we endure our pilgrimage, and the more ardently do we desire to come to its end."[6]

ANOTHER DETERMINATION. It may also be said that one who already enjoys in this life not only has the joy of hope, but also of the thing itself, because he already delights in that which he loves, and so he already has the thing itself to a certain degree.

3. And so it is clear that we ought to enjoy, not use, God. As Augustine says, "you enjoy him by whom you shall be made blessed, and in whom you place your hope of being able to attain blessedness."[7] Concerning this, he says in his book, *On Christian Doctrine*: "We say that we enjoy that which we love for its own sake, and that we are to enjoy only that by which we are made blessed; all other things are to be used."[8]—But frequently, "to enjoy is used in the sense of using with delight. For when the thing which we love is present, it also brings delight with it. And if you should pass through this delight, and make it a means to that in which you are to rest permanently, you would be using it; it would be inaccurate and improper to say that you would be enjoying it. But if you were to adhere to it and remain in it, placing in it the summit of your joy, then truly and properly you could be said to enjoy it. But this is not to be done, except in the case of that Trinity, that is, the highest and unchangeable good."[9]

4. WHETHER HUMAN BEINGS ARE TO BE USED OR ENJOYED. Since human beings, who enjoy and use other things, are things of some sort, the question arises "whether they are to enjoy or to use themselves, or both." Augustine answers in the following terms in the book, *On Christian Doctrine*: "If man is to be loved for his own sake, we enjoy him; if for the sake of something else, we use him. But it seems to me that he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, then a blessed life is built on it; even the hope of such a life gives consolation already in this present time. But hope is not to be placed in man, because one who does so is *accursed*.[10] And if you examine the issue clearly, no one ought to enjoy his own self, because he is not to love himself for his own sake, but for the sake of that which he is to enjoy [i.e. God]."[11]

[5] 1 Cor. 13, 12.
[6] Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c30 n31.
[7] Ibid., bk 1 c33 n37.
[8] Ibid., bk 1 c31 n34.
[9] Ibid., bk 1 c33 n37.
[10] Cf. Jer. 17, 5.
[11] Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c22 nn20-21.

5. But what the Apostle says, speaking to Philemon, seems contrary to this: *And so, brother, let me have joy of you in the Lord.*[12] Augustine resolves this as follows: "If he had said only *let me have joy of you*, and had not added *in the Lord*, he would have seemed to find the end and hope of his delight in him; but by that addition, he made clear that he placed his end and found his joy in the Lord."[13] As the same Augustine says: "When you have joy of a man in God, you are enjoying God rather than man."[14]

6. HERE THE QUESTION IS POSED WHETHER GOD ENJOYS OR USES US. Since God loves us, as Scripture frequently asserts,[15] which "repeatedly commends his love toward us,"[16] Augustine asks how God loves us, whether by use or by enjoyment.—And he proceeds as follows: "If he enjoys us, then he needs the good which we can do, which no sane man would conclude. For the Prophet says: *You are in no need of my goods.*[17] Indeed, any good we may have either is God himself, or comes from him. It follows that he does not enjoy, but uses, us. For if he neither enjoys, nor uses us, I cannot find how he loves us. But neither does he use us in the same manner in which we use other things. In using things, we refer them back to the enjoyment of God's goodness; but God refers his use of ourselves back to his own goodness. For he has mercy on us because of his own goodness; we have mercy on each other because of God's goodness. He has mercy on us so that we may enjoy him; we have mercy on each other in order to enjoy him. For when we show mercy to someone and are mindful of him, we do so for that person's benefit, and we bear that in mind; but we also, as a consequence, achieve something useful for ourselves, because God does not leave unrewarded the mercy which we extend to others. But the highest reward is this: that we should enjoy God." Also, "because God is good, we exist, and insofar as we exist, we are good. Furthermore, because God is also just, we are not evil with impunity, and insofar as we are evil, so much also is our existence lessened. It follows that the use which God makes of us has reference not to God's utility, but to our own, and has reference only to his goodness."[18]

7. WHETHER THE VIRTUES ARE TO BE USED OR ENJOYED. Here we must consider whether the virtues are to be used or enjoyed.—It seems to some that they are to be used and not enjoyed. And they confirm this by the authority of Augustine who, as has been stated above, says that "nothing is

[12]Phil. 1, 20.
[13]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c33 n37.
[14]Ibid.
[15]Cf. Jn. 3, 16; 1 Jn. 4, 9-16.
[16]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c 30, n33.
[17]Ps. 15, 2.
[18]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 cc 30-32, nn33-35.

to be enjoyed, except the Trinity, that is, the highest and unchangeable good."[19]—They also say that, for that reason, the virtues are not to be enjoyed because they are not to be loved for their own sake, but for that of eternal beatitude; however, that which is to be enjoyed is to be loved for its own sake.—As for the point that the virtues are not to be loved for their own sake, but only for that of beatitude, they prove it by the authority of Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book 13, where he said, in opposition to some others: "Perhaps the virtues, which we love only for the sake of beatitude, are bold enough to convince us not to love beatitude itself. If they do so, we cease to love them, since we do not love that for whose sole sake we loved them."[20] And so, by these words, Augustine seems to show that the virtues are not to be loved for their own sake, but only for that of beatitude. If this is indeed the case, then the virtues are not to be enjoyed.

8. But to others the opposite seems true, namely that the virtues are to be enjoyed because they are to be sought and loved for their own sake. And they support this by the authority of Ambrose, who comments on that place of the Epistle to the Galatians, *But the fruits of the spirit are love, joy, peace, patience*, etc.,[21] saying: "He does not call these works, but fruits, because they are to be sought for their own sake."[22] But if they are to be sought for their own sake, then they are to be loved for their own sake.

9. Wishing to remove the seeming contradiction of these authorities, we say that the virtues are to be sought and loved for their own sake, and yet only for the sake of beatitude. They are to be loved for their own sake, because they delight those who possess them with a sincere and holy delight and give birth in them to a spiritual joy. However, we are not to stop here; we must climb higher. Do not let the course of love end here, nor let this be the limit of delight, but let this joy be related to that highest good, to which alone we must adhere wholly, because it alone is to be loved for its own sake and nothing is to be sought beyond it, since it is the highest end.—And so Augustine says that we love the virtues for the sake of beatitude alone, not because we do not love them for their own sake, but because we refer our very love of them to that highest good, to which alone we are to adhere and in which we are to remain and place the summit of our joy.[23] And so it follows that the virtues are not to be enjoyed.

[19]Above, Dist. 1 c3 n3.
[20]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 13 c8 n11.
[21]Gal. 5, 22.
[22]I.e., Ambrosiaster, on Gal. 5, 22, but much of the text cited here is from Lombard's own *Gloss*.
[23]Above, Dist. 1 c3 n7.

10. But someone will say: "To enjoy is to adhere in love to some thing for its own sake," as has been said earlier;[24] if the virtues are to be loved for their own sake, then they are also to be enjoyed.—To which we say: In that description, when it is said 'for its own sake,' 'alone' is to be understood, so that it would be loved for its own sake alone, and would not be referred to another thing, but one's end would be placed there, as Augustine shows in what was said above:[25] "If you were to adhere to it and remain in it, finding in it the summit of your joy, then truly and properly you could be said to enjoy it. But this is not to be done, except in the case of that Trinity, that is, the highest and unchangeable good."—And so the virtues are to be used, and through them the highest good is to be enjoyed. We speak in the same way of a good will, which is why Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 10: "It is through the will that we enjoy."[26] In the same way, we have joy through the virtues, not in them, except perhaps in the case of some virtue which is God, such as love, which will be discussed later.[27]

11. EPILOGUE. "Of all that has been said since we began our discussion of things severally, this is the summation":[28] that some things are to be enjoyed, others to be used, and yet others enjoy and use. Among those which are to be used, there are even some through which we come to joy, such as the virtues and powers of the spirit, which are natural goods. Before we treat of signs, we must discuss all of these, and first the things which are to be enjoyed, namely the holy and undivided Trinity.

DISTINCTION II

Chapter 1 (4)

1. THE MYSTERY OF TRINITY AND UNITY. And so, as Augustine says, *On the Trinity,* book 1, this is to be held with true and pious faith, that "the Trinity is the one and only and true God, namely Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. And this Trinity is said, believed, and understood to be of one and the same substance, or essence, which is the highest good discerned by the most purified minds. For the weak sharpness of the human mind is not fixed in this highest light without being cleansed through the justice of faith."[1]

[24]Above, Dist. 1 c2 n3.
[25]Above, Dist. 1 c3 n3.
[26]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 10 c10 n13.
[27]Below, in Dist. 17.
[28]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c35 n39.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c2 n4.

2. The same [Augustine] in the same place: "I do not approve what I said in a prayer: 'God, who willed that none but the pure should know the truth';[2] for it can be answered that even many who are not pure know many truths."[3]

3. Therefore, this highest and most excellent of topics is to be approached with modesty and fear, and we must extend a most attentive and devout hearing "when investigating the unity of the Trinity, namely of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, because with regard to no other matter is error more dangerous, inquiry so charged with effort, or discovery more fruitful."[4]—And so let each person who hears and reads what is said concerning the ineffable and inaccessible light[5] of the Godhead see to it that he imitates and keeps what the venerable teacher Augustine says concerning himself in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "In case of doubt, I will not be loath to ask; in case of error, I will not be ashamed to learn. And so let whoever hears or reads these things, if he shares my certainty, continue on with me; if he shares my hesitation, continue to search with me; if he acknowledges his error, return to me; if he notes an error of mine, call me back. In this way, we can enter together upon the path of love, moving toward him of whom it is said: *Seek his face always*."[6,7]

Chapter 2 (5)

1. WHAT WAS THE INTENTION OF THOSE WRITING ON THE TRINITY. As Augustine says in that same book, "all those Catholic authors who have treated of the Trinity, who is God, intended to teach the following: that, in accordance with the Scriptures, the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are of one substance and are one God in inseparable equality," so that there is unity in essence and a plurality in persons. "And so they are not three gods, but one God, even though the Father has begotten the Son, and so the Son is not the one who is the Father; and the Son has been begotten of the Father, and so the Father is not the one who is the Son; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and the Son, coequal with both and belonging to the unity of the Trinity."[1]

[2]Augustine, *Soliloquia*, bk 1 c1 n2.
[3]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c4 n2.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c3 n5.
[5]Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 16.
[6]Ps. 104, 4.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 cc 2-3 nn4-5.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c4 n7.

2. Augustine, in the book of *Retractations*: "Where I said of the Father and the Son: 'The one who begets and the one who is begotten is one,'[2] I ought to have said, 'they are one,' as the Truth himself plainly attests when he says: *I and the Father are one*."[3,4]

3. As Augustine says in his book *On Faith to Peter*, "Let us hold that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are naturally one God, where the Son is not the same as the Father, nor the Father the same as the Son, nor the Father or the Son the same as the Holy Spirit. For one is the essence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, which the Greeks call 'homousion,' in which the Father is not one thing, and the Son another, and the Holy Spirit yet another, although personally the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit yet another."[5]

Chapter 3 (6)

WHAT ORDER IS TO BE OBSERVED IN TREATING OF THE TRINITY. As Augustine teaches in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "First, we must demonstrate in accordance with the authorities of the holy Scriptures whether the faith holds as we say. Then, we must proceed against verbose rationalizers, who are more proud than able," in order to defend and assert our faith by Catholic reasons and suitable analogies. By our reply to their enquiries, we will instruct the meek more fully; as for the others, "if they should be unable to find what they seek, they ought to blame more their own minds than truth itself, or our presentation of it."[1]

Chapter 4 (7)

1. THE TESTIMONIES OF THE SAINTS CONCERNING THE TRINITY. Let us now set forth the authorities of the Old and New Testament by which is demonstrated the truth of the divine unity and trinity. First, here are the very first words of the Law, in which Moses says: *Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God, he is one God*;[1] also: *I am the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt; you shall not have other gods besides me*.[2] And so here is signified the unity of the divine nature. As Ambrose says in *On the Trinity*,

[2]Augustine, *Soliloquia*, bk 1 c4 n4.
[3]Jn. 10, 30.
[4]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c4 n3.
[5]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n5.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c2 n4.

[1]Deut. 6, 4.
[2]Ex. 20, 2-3.

book 1: "For God and Lord is a name of nature and a name of power."[3] Also, elsewhere, God, speaking to Moses, says: *I am who am, and if they ask my name, go to them and say: He who is sent me to you.*[4] And by saying *I am*, not *We are*, and *He who is*, not *We who are*, he declared most explicitly that there is only one God.—Also, in the song of Exodus, we read: *The Lord, all-powerful is his name*;[5] it does not say *Lords*, wishing to point out the unity.

2. In Genesis, the Lord shows at once the plurality of persons and the unity of nature by saying: *Let us make man in our image and likeness.*[6] By saying *Let us make* and *our*, he shows the plurality of persons, but by saying *image*, he shows the unity of essence. For as Augustine says in the book *On Faith to Peter*, "if there were only one person in that nature of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, he would not say *Let us make man in our image and likeness.*[7] For when he says, *image*, he shows that there is one nature in whose image man is made; but when he says *our*, he shows that the same God is not one person, but several."[8]

3. HE PLAINLY SHOWS THAT IN THE TRINITY THERE IS NEITHER SOLITUDE, NOR DIVERSITY, NOR SINGULARITY, BUT LIKENESS. Hilary too, in book 3, *On the Trinity*, says that by these words it is signified that in the Trinity there is neither diversity, nor singularity, nor solitude, but likeness and plurality or distinction, for he says: "He who said *Let us make man in our image and likeness*[9] shows that there are others similar to himself, when he says *our image and likeness*. For an image does not exist in isolation and a likeness is not relative to self alone; nor does the likeness of one to another allow any admixture of diversity in the two."[10] Also, the same [Hilary], in book 4: "He wished this expression to be understood more absolutely not to be referred to himself alone, by saying *Let us make man in our image and likeness.*[11] The profession of partnership took away the notion of his singularity, for there cannot be a partnership in the case of a solitary; again, neither does the solitude of a solitary bear *Let us make*, nor does one say *our* of that which is extraneous to oneself. Each of these expressions, namely *Let us make* and *our*, does not allow that he be solitary and one and the same, nor does it signify another who is different from himself. *Let me make* and *my* suit a solitary; but it is suitable for one who is not a solitary

[3]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c1 n7.
[4]Ex. 3, 14.
[5]Ex. 15, 3.
[6]Gen. 1, 26.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n5.
[9]Gen. 1, 26.
[10]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 n23.
[11]Gen. 1, 26.

to say *Let us make* and *our*. Each of these expressions indicates not only that he is not solitary, but also that he is neither different, nor diverse. We must confess, then, that he is neither solitary, nor diverse. And so we find that God made man in an image and likeness common to himself and to God. It follows that the identification of a maker does not admit the notion of solitude, and the work of making that same image and likeness does not allow a diversity of the Godhead."[12]

4. WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD FROM THESE WORDS. In these words, Hilary wished the plurality of persons to be understood by the term 'partnership.' By this term of 'partnership' or plurality, he signified that something was being denied, not asserted. For when a plurality or partnership of persons is mentioned, solitude or singularity is negated. When we say that there are several persons, we mean that there is not only one. And so Hilary, in his desire to have these things understood subtly and soundly, says: "The profession of partnership took away the notion of his singularity"; he does not say: 'it posited something.' In the same way, when we speak of three persons, we take away singularity and solitude. We then mean that the Father is not alone, nor is the Son alone, nor is the Holy Spirit alone, and that there is not only the Father and the Son, nor only the Father and the Holy Spirit, nor only the Son and the Holy Spirit.—This will be treated more fully below,[13] when it will also be shown how the three persons are said to be alike, and whether there is in any way a diversity or difference among them.

5. HE RETURNS TO HIS EARLIER TOPIC IN ORDER TO PRODUCE SOME OTHER AUTHORITIES. Let us now return to our topic and adduce other authorities of the Saints to show the plurality of persons and the unity of the divine essence.—Moses says: *In the beginning, God created heaven and earth*;[14] by *God*, he signifies the Father, and by *the beginning* the Son. And what we term *God*, the Hebrew truth calls *Elohim*, which is the plural form of the singular *El*. The fact that *El*, which means God, is not used, and *Elohim*, which can be translated as gods or judges, is used instead, is related to the plurality of persons.—It pertains to the same point that the devil said through the serpent: *You shall be like gods*,[15] for which in Hebrew *Elohim* is used, as if to say: You shall be like the divine persons.

6. David was the greatest of prophets and kings, and preferred his own understanding above all others, saying: *I have understood more than the elders*.[16] He too shows the unity of the divine nature, saying: *His name is*

[12]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 nn17-18.
[13]In Dist. 23-24, 31, and 34.
[14]Gen. 1, 1.
[15]Gen. 3, 5.
[16]Ps. 118, 100.

the Lord;[17] he does not say *Lords*.—Elsewhere, he also shows both God's unity and eternity, and says, as if speaking for God: *Israel, if you should listen to me, there will be no new God among you, nor shall you worship an alien God.*[18] As Ambrose says in book 1 *On the Trinity*: "One of these signifies the eternity, the other the unity, of the same substance, so that we should not believe the Son or the Holy Spirit to be either posterior to the Father, or of another Godhead. For if either the Son or the Holy Spirit is later than the Father, he is new; and if he is not of the same Godhead, he is alien. But he is not later because he is not new, and he is not alien because he was born of the Father,"[19] that is, the Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father.

7. And elsewhere, introducing the distinction of persons, he says: *By the Lord's word, the heavens were made firm and all their power came from the spirit of his mouth.*[20] And in another place, he even says: *May God, our God, bless us; may God bless us, and may all the ends of the earth fear him.*[21] For this threefold confession of *God* expresses the trinity of persons; but by adding the singular *him*, he reveals the unity of essence.—Isaias too says that he heard the Seraphim proclaiming: *Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God.*[22] By the three-fold repetition of *holy*, he indicates the trinity; by adding *the Lord God*, he points out the unity of essence.

8. Also, David plainly indicates the eternal begetting of the Son and, as if speaking in the person of the Son, says: *The Lord said to me: You are my Son; today I have begotten you.*[23] Of this ineffable generation, Isaias says: *Who shall recount his generation?*[24]—The Son's eternity with the Father is also shown in the book of Wisdom, where Wisdom speaks as follows: *The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways, before he had made anything in the beginning. From eternity I was ordained, before the earth was made. The depths did not exist, and I was already conceived; before the springs, the mountains, or the hills, I was brought forth. When the earth and the hinges upon which it would rest were yet unmade, and when he prepared the heavens, I was present. When he set down the foundations of the earth, I was with him, gathering all things together and delighting in each day, as I played before him.*[25] Here is an explicit testimony about the eternal begetting by which Wisdom itself recounts that it was conceived

[17]Ps. 67, 5.
[18]Ps. 80, 9-10.
[19]I.e., Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c11 n68.
[20]Ps. 32, 6.
[21]Ps. 66, 7-8.
[22]Is. 6, 3.
[23]Ps. 2, 7.
[24]Is. 53, 8.
[25]Prov. 8, 22-30.

and brought forth, or begotten, before the world, and it exists eternally with the Father.—The same [Wisdom] also says elsewhere: *I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before any creature.*[26] And the prophet Micheas indicates both the eternal generation of the Word and the temporal one from Mary, saying: *And you, Bethlehem of Ephrata, are small among the thousands of Juda: from you will come forth the one who is to be the ruler in Israel; and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.*[27]

9. SPECIAL TESTIMONIES CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT. Concerning the Holy Spirit, we also have explicit evidence in the Old Testament. For in Genesis, we read: *The Spirit of the Lord was hovering over the waters.*[28] And David says: *Where shall I go from your Spirit?*[29] And in the book of Wisdom, it is said: *For the holy Spirit of discipline flees fraud: for the Spirit of wisdom is kindly.*[30] And Isaias too says: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me*, etc.[31]

Chapter 5 (8)

1. THE TESTIMONIES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. After the testimonies of the Old Testament concerning our faith in the holy trinity and unity, let us now approach the authorities of the New Testament. In this way, truth can be known *in the midst of two animals*;[1] and *with tongs* can be taken *from the altar the coal*[2] with which the mouths of the faithful may be touched.

2. And the Lord Christ plainly indicates the unity of the divine essence and the trinity of persons, saying to the Apostles: *Go, baptize all the nations, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.*[3] As Ambrose says in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "He said specifically *in the name*, and not 'in the names,'" so that the unity of the essence should be shown; by adding the three names, he made clear that there are three persons.And as Ambrose says in the same book: "He also says: *I and the Father are one.*[4] He said *one*, so that there should be no differentiation of power or nature; but he added *are*, so that you can know the Father and the Son, namely that the perfect Father may be believed to have begotten the

[26]Eccli. 24, 5.
[27]Mich. 5, 2.
[28]Gen. 1, 2.
[29]Ps. 138, 7.
[30]Wis. 1, 5-6.
[31]Is. 61, 1.

[1]Cf. Hab. 3, 2.
[2]Cf. Is. 6, 6.
[3]Mt. 28, 19.
[4]Jn. 10, 30.

perfect Son, and that the Father and the Son are one, not in confusion, but in unity of nature."[5]

3. John too says in the canonical Epistle: *There are three who shall give witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one.*[6] The same [John] says at the beginning of his Gospel: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,*[7] where he manifestly shows that the Son was always and eternally with the Father, as one with another.

4. The Apostle also manifestly differentiates the Trinity, saying: *He sent the Spirit of the Son into our hearts*;[8] and elsewhere: *And if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus lives in you*, etc.[9]—Also, he elsewhere most evidently commends the trinity and unity, saying: *Because all things are from him, and through him, and in him, to him be glory.*[10] As Augustine says in his book *On the Trinity*, "He says *from him* for the Father; he says *through him* for the Son; and *in him* for the Holy Spirit. And because he does not say *from them, through them, and in them*, nor does he say *glory be to them*, but *to him*, he indicates that this trinity is one Lord God."[11]

5. But since almost every single syllable of the New Testament fully agrees in indicating this ineffable truth of unity and trinity, we will cease from introducing testimonies concerning this matter. Insofar as our infirmity is able, let us now show the same to be the case by reasons and suitable analogies.

DISTINCTION III

Chapter 1 (9)

1. HERE HE BEGINS TO SHOW HOW THE CREATOR COULD BE KNOWN THROUGH CREATED THINGS. For the Apostle says that *the invisible things of God, as also his eternal power and divinity, are perceived by a creature of the world, having been understood through the things which are made.*[1] By *a creature of the world*, man is meant because of the excellence by

[5]Cf. Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c1 nn8-9.
[6]1 Jn. 5, 7.
[7]Jn. 1, 1.
[8]Gal. 4, 6.
[9]Rom. 8, 11.
[10]Rom. 11, 36.
[11]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c6 n12. Although the text as quoted reflects Augustine's sense, it is taken from Lombard's own *Gloss*.

[1]Rom. 1, 20.

which he stands above all other creatures, or due to the commonality which he shares with each creature. Thus, man was able to perceive, or did even perceive, by the understanding of his mind, *the invisible things of God through the things which are made*, that is, through visible and invisible creatures. For he was assisted by two things, namely nature, which was rational, and by the works which God had done in order that the truth should become manifest to man. Hence, the Apostle says that *God revealed to them*,[2] namely when he made the works in which the mark of the maker shines forth in some manner.

2. FIRST REASON OR MODE BY WHICH GOD COULD BE KNOWN. As Ambrose says, "God, who is invisible by nature, in order to be knowable to visible creatures, made a work which in its own visibility revealed its maker. In this way, the uncertain could be known through the certain, and he who had done what was impossible for man to do should be believed to be God of all."[3] And so they were able to know or did know that, beyond each creature, there was the one who had made what no creature is able to make or destroy. Let any creature come forth which can make such a heaven or such an earth, and I will say that it is God. But since no creature can make such things, it is evident that the one who made them is above all creatures. By this means, the human mind was able to know that he is God.

3. SECOND REASON BY WHICH GOD COULD BE KNOWN, OR MODE IN WHICH THEY DID KNOW HIM. They could also, or did indeed, know God's truth in another way by the guidance of reason. For as Augustine says in his book *On the City of God*, "the highest philosophers perceived that no body is God, and so they went beyond all bodies in their search for God. They also perceived that whatever is changeable is not the most high God and the principle of all things, and so they went beyond every soul and changeable spirit. Then they perceived that all which is changeable cannot be apart from him who unchangeably and simply is. And so they understood both that he made all things and could not himself have been made by anyone."[4]

4. THIRD REASON OR MODE. They also considered that whatever exists in substances is either a body or a spirit, that it is better for something to be a spirit than a body, but that he is far better who made both spirit and body.

5. FOURTH MODE OR REASON. They also understood that the form of the body is perceptible and the form of the spirit intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible form to the perceptible one. We call those things perceptible which can be sensed with the body's sight and touch; the intelligible things are those which can be understood by the mind's insight.

[2]Rom. 1, 19.
[3]I.e., Ambrosiaster, on Rom. 1, 19.
[4]Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, bk 8 c6

And as by their insight they perceived that the body and the spirit were more or less beautiful in form, and that these would become nothing at all if they were to lack all form, they saw that there is something by which these things were given form. That is the first and unchangeable form, and therefore incomparable, and so they most rightly believed that this was the principle of things, which was not itself made and from which all things were made."[5]

6. God's truth, then, could be known in these several ways. God is a single and simple essence which does not consist in any diversity of parts or accidents. But the Apostle says in the plural, *the invisible things of God*, because God's truth is known in several ways *through the things which are made*.[6] Indeed, from the perpetuity of creatures, the Creator is understood to be eternal; from the greatness of creatures, all-powerful; from their order and disposition, wise; from his governance over them, good. And all these things pertain to showing the unity of the Godhead.

7. HOW A VESTIGE OF THE TRINITY APPEARS IN CREATURES. Now it remains to show whether it may have been possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of the Trinity through those things which are made. Concerning this, Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "It is fitting that, when we regard the Creator by our intellect *through those things which are made*,[7] we understand the Trinity. For a vestige of the Trinity appears in creatures. (UNDERSTAND THIS TO APPLY TO SUBSTANCES!) Indeed, these things which have been made by divine art show in themselves a certain unity, a form, and an order. For each of these created things is some one specific thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls; it is also formed in some form, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the teachings or skills of souls; and it seeks or preserves a certain order, as are weights and locations of bodies and loves or delights of souls. And so a vestige of the Trinity shines forth in creatures. For in that Trinity is the highest origin of all things, and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight."[8]

8. As Augustine shows in his book *On True Religion*, the highest origin is understood to be God the Father, from whom are all things and from whom [proceed] the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son, namely "the truth of the Father, in no part dissimilar from him, whom we venerate with and in the same Father. It is the form of all things which are made by the one and to the one are referred. Yet all these things would not be made by the Father through the Son, nor

[5]Augustine *De civitate Dei*, bk 8 c6.
[6]Rom. 1, 20.
[7]Cf. Ibid.
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n12.

would they be safe within their bounds, if God were not most highly good, suffering no envy of any nature which could take goodness from him. And he granted perseverance in that goodness to one nature as much as it willed, and to another as much as it was able. This latter goodness is understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. Hence, it is fitting for us to honour and hold this same Gift of God as equally unchangeable with the Father and the Son.—Thus, by our consideration of creatures, we perceive the Trinity to be of one substance, namely the one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit in whom we are; also, the beginning to which we return, and the form to which we conform, and the grace by which we can become reconciled; also, the one by whose act we are created, and his likeness through which we are reformed into unity, and the peace in which we cleave to unity; also, God who said *Let there be*,[9] and the Word through whom all that exists substantially and naturally *was made*,[10] and the Gift of his benignity by which it pleased him that whatever had been made by him through the Word, and had been reconciled to its maker, should not perish."[11]

9. And so it has been shown how the image of the Trinity in some measure is revealed in creatures. But a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity cannot and could not be had by a contemplation of creatures, without the revelation of doctrine or inner inspiration. So it was that those ancient philosophers saw the truth as if through a shadow and from a distance, lacking in insight into the Trinity, as was the case with Pharaoh's magicians in the third plague.[12] And yet we are aided in our faith in invisible things through those things which were made.

Chapter 2 (10)

1. How there is an image of the Trinity in the soul. But now we have come to the debated point of where one may find the image of the Trinity in the human mind, which has known or can know God. For as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 14, "although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, yet his image, 'than which nothing is better,' is to be sought and found in our mind, since our nature has nothing better than that. For in the mind itself, even before it becomes a partaker of God, his image is to be found. And even if the mind should become deformed by the loss of partaking in God, yet the divine image remains in it. For by this very fact

[9]Gen. 1, 3 and 6.
[10]Cf. Jn. 1, 1-3.
[11]Augustine, *De vera religione*, c55 n113.
[12]Cf. Ex. 8, 18.

is the mind an image of God: that it is capable of God and can partake of him."[1] And so let us now seek in the mind the Trinity which is God.

2. HE SHOWS THAT THERE ARE THREE THINGS IN THE SOUL WHICH ARE SPOKEN OF RELATIVELY AND ARE EQUAL, NAMELY MEMORY, INTELLIGENCE, AND LOVE. "But see, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself. If we discern this, we discover a trinity; this is not yet God, but an image of God."[2] For here appears a certain trinity of memory, intelligence, and love. "And so let us most particularly discuss these three things: memory, intelligence, and will."[3]

3. A MOST SUBTLE CONSIDERATION AND A FITTING SIMILITUDE. As Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 10, "these three things are not three lives, but one life; not three minds, but one mind and one essence. But memory is so called in respect to something, and similarly intelligence and will or love are so called in respect to something. Life, however, is so called in respect to itself, and so also mind and essence. These three, then, are one insofar as they are one life, one mind, one essence. And whatever else is said of them severally in respect to themselves, even if it is said of all of them, yet it is not said in the plural, but in the singular. But they are three by that same reason by which they are referred reciprocally to each other."[4]

4. HOW THEY ARE EQUAL BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL AND ENTIRELY CONTAINED BY EACH OF THEM. "Also, they are equal not only each to each, but also each to all, otherwise they could not contain each other as they do. Indeed, each is contained by each and all by each."—HERE HE SHOWS HOW ALL ARE CONTAINED BY EACH. "For I remember that I have memory and intelligence and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will to will and to remember and to understand."—HERE HOW MEMORY ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL THREE. "And I remember concurrently my whole memory and intelligence and will. For whatever I do not remember of my memory is not in my memory, for nothing is as much in memory as memory itself, and so I remember it all. Also, I know myself to understand whatever I understand, and I know myself to will whatever I will; but I remember whatever I know. And so I remember my whole intelligence and my whole will."—HOW INTELLIGENCE ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL THREE. "Similarly, when I understand these three, I understand all of them at once. For there is no intelligible thing which I do not understand, except for what I do not know; but I neither remember nor will what I do

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 14 c8 n11.
[2]Ibid., bk 14 c8 n11.
[3]Ibid., bk 10 c11 n17.
[4]Ibid., bk 10 c11 n18.

not know. It follows that I neither remember nor will whatever intelligible thing I do not understand. It also follows that I understand whatever intelligible thing I remember and will."—HOW THE WILL ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL THREE. "My will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory while I make use of all that I understand and remember. And so, since all of them in their entirety are mutually contained by each, they are each severally equal to each severally, as also each severally in its entirety to all together in their entirety; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence."[5]

5. And so the human mind is an image, if an unequal one, of that highest Unity and Trinity in which there is one essence and three persons.[6]—But the mind here is taken to stand for the spirit itself, in which there is that image of the Trinity. As Augustine says, properly speaking, the mind itself is not the soul, but (as is often said) only its most excellent part.[7]—It is also to be noted that memory is not only of absent and past things, but also of present ones, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 14;[8] otherwise it would not comprehend itself.

6. IT IS ASKED IN WHAT SENSE THOSE THREE ARE SAID TO BE ONE AND ONE ESSENCE. Here is to be diligently examined in what sense is to be taken what was said above,[9] that those three, namely memory, intelligence, and will, are one, one mind, one essence. This does not appear to be true according to the proper sense of words. For the mind, or the rational spirit, is a spiritual and incorporeal essence. But those three are natural properties or powers of the mind itself, and differ among themselves because the memory is neither the intelligence nor the will, and the intelligence is not the will or love.

7. ALSO, THAT THESE ARE ALSO SPOKEN OF RELATIVELY WITH REGARD TO EACH OTHER. And these three also refer to themselves, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 9: "For the mind cannot love," or remember, "itself, unless it also knows itself; for how can it love," or remember, "what it does not know?"[10] "In a marvellous manner, these three things are inseparable from each other; and each of them severally and all of them together are one essence, since they are even spoken of relatively with regard to each other."[11]

[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 10 c11 n18.
[6]Cf. Ibid., bk 10, c12 n19.
[7]Cf. Ibid., bk 15 c7 n11.
[8]Ibid., bk 14 c11 n14.
[9]At the end of n4.
[10]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 c3 n3.
[11]Ibid., bk 9 c5 n8.

8. HERE THE QUESTION POSED ABOVE IS RESOLVED, NAMELY HOW THESE THREE CAN BE CALLED ONE. But we must now examine how these three can be termed one substance. This is so because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, and not as accidents in subjects, which can be present or absent. Hence, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 9: "We become aware, if we are at all able to perceive, that these exist in the spirit substantially, not as though in a subject like colour in the body because, even if these are spoken of relatively in regard to each other, yet they exist severally in their own substance."[12] This is the sense from which those three are said to be one or one substance.

9. As Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "Anyone with a lively intuition perceives that these three have been divinely and naturally established in the mind, and also how great a thing it is in the mind whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, gazed upon, and desired: it is remembered through memory, contemplated through intelligence, and embraced through love. Assuredly, one here discovers the image of that most high Trinity."[13]

Chapter 3 (11)

1. THAT THERE IS A DISSIMILITUDE IN THAT SIMILITUDE. "And yet let him beware lest he so compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like it; whatever be the likeness between the two, let him also discern the great dissimilitude."[1]—FIRST DISSIMILITUDE. "This can be briefly shown. The same person, through those three things, remembers, understands, loves; the person is neither memory, nor intelligence, nor love, but has all three. It is the one person who has these three things, but he is not these three. But in the simplicity of that most high nature which is God, although there is only one God, yet there are three persons, Father and Son and Holy Spirit,"[2] and these three are one God. "And so the Trinity itself is one thing, and the Trinity's image in something else is another. Because of that image, even that in which these three are found, namely man, is called an image. In the same way, both the canvas and the picture on it are called an image, but the canvas is called an image because of the picture which is on it."[3]—A SECOND DISSIMILITUDE. "Moreover, this image, which is man endowed with those three things, is one person; that Trinity, on the other hand, is not one person, but three persons:

[12]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 c4 n5.
[13]Ibid., bk 15 c20 n39.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c20 n39.
[2]Ibid., bk 15 c22 n42.
[3]Ibid., bk 15 c23 n43.

the Son's Father, the Father's Son, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. (BEWARE: THEY ARE NOT ONLY THREE PERSONS OF ONE GOD, BUT ALSO ONE GOD!) And so in this image of the Trinity, these three things are not one man, but one man's; but in that most high Trinity, whose image this is, they are not three things of the one God, but are one God; and they are three persons, not one."[4] "For those three things are not a man; they are of a man or in a man. But can we say that the Trinity is in God in such a way that it is something which belongs to God, but is not itself God?"[5] Far be it from us to believe so! Therefore, let us say that there is an image of the Trinity in our mind, but that it is flimsy and partial; it bears a likeness to the most high Trinity only insofar as it is mostly dissimilar from it.

2. As Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 14, it is to be noted that "this trinity of the mind is God's image not only because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember and understand and love him by whom it was made."[6]

3. ANOTHER MARK OF THE TRINITY IN THE SOUL, NAMELY MIND, KNOWLEDGE, AND LOVE. The trinity in the soul, which is an image of the most high and ineffable Trinity, can also be distinguished in another way and by other terms. For as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 9, "the mind and its knowledge and love are three things. For the mind knows and loves itself, nor can it love itself unless it has come to know itself. The mind and its knowledge are two things; similarly, the mind and its love are two things. Thus, as the mind knows and loves itself, there is still a trinity, namely of mind, love, and knowledge."[7] And the mind is here understood not as the soul, but as that which is most excellent in the soul.

4. HOW THESE ARE SAID TO BE ONE. These three things, even though they are mutually distinct, yet are said to be one because they exist substantially in the spirit.

5. WHY THE MIND IS TAKEN TO STAND FOR THE FATHER, KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SON, LOVE FOR THE HOLY SPIRIT. And the mind is, as it were, the parent, while its knowledge is, as it were, its offspring: "For the mind, as it comes to know itself, begets knowledge of itself and is the sole parent of its knowledge."[8] The third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself and knowledge, when the mind, coming to know itself, loves itself; indeed, it could not love itself, if it did not know itself. It also loves its offspring,

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c23 n43.
[5]Ibid., bk 15 c7 n11.
[6]Ibid., bk 14 c12 n15.
[7]Cf. Ibid., bk 9 cc 4, 3, 5.
[8]Ibid., bk 9 c12 n18.

which it finds pleasing, namely its knowledge; and so love is an embrace of parent and offspring.

6. THAT KNOWLEDGE IS NOT LESS THAN MIND, NOR LOVE THAN EITHER OF THE OTHERS. "Nor is the offspring less than the parent, as the mind knows itself to the measure of its own being; nor is love less than the parent and its offspring, that is, than mind and knowledge, as the mind loves itself to the measure of its own knowledge and being."[9]

7. THAT THESE THREE THINGS EXIST IN THEMSELVES. "These three things also exist severally in themselves, because the loving mind is in love, and love is in the lover's knowledge, and knowledge is in the mind that knows."[10] And this is how some vestige of the Trinity appears in these three things.

8. HOW THE MIND PROGRESSES THROUGH THESE THINGS TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. And so the rational mind, considering these three things and the one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator, and sees the unity in trinity and the trinity in unity. For it understands that there is one God, one essence, one principle. For it understands that, if there were two, either both would be insufficient, or the second superfluous. This is the case because, if something were to be lacking to the one which the other had, the highest perfection would not be found there; but if nothing were to be lacking to the one which the other had, and since all things would already be found in the one, the other would be superfluous. Thus, it understood that there is one God, one maker of all things. And it saw that such a God, without wisdom, would be as if an empty thing; and so it understood him to have wisdom, which was generated from him; and because it loves its own wisdom, it understood also that love was there.

Chapter 4 (12)

CONCERNING THE UNITY OF THE MOST HIGH TRINITY. In accordance with this consideration, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 9, "let us believe that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God, maker and ruler of all creatures; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son, but a trinity of mutually related persons."[1] For as he says in the book *On Faith to Peter*, one is the nature or essence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but not one person: "For if there were one person, as there is one essence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, it would not truthfully be

[9]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 c12 n18.
[10]Ibid., bk 9 c5 n8.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 c1 n1.

called a trinity. Or again, it might indeed be a true trinity, but that trinity would not be one God, if, just as the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished from each other by a property of their persons, they would also be divided by a diversity of their natures. But the faith of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles preaches that the one God is a Trinity."[2] "And in that holy Trinity there is one God the Father, who alone in his essence begot the one Son from himself; and one Son, who alone in his essence is born of the one Father; and one Holy Spirit, who alone in his essence proceeds from the Father and the Son. One person cannot do all this, namely beget itself, and be born of itself, and proceed from itself."[3] For as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 1, "there is nothing that begets itself into existence."[4]

DISTINCTION IV

Chapter 1 (13)

1. HERE IT IS ASKED WHETHER IT IS TO BE GRANTED THAT GOD GENERATED HIMSELF. Here arises a very necessary question. We know, and it is true beyond doubt, that God the Father begot the Son; so it is asked whether it is to be granted that God generated God. For if God generated God, it seems that either God generated himself as God, or another. But if he generated another God, then there is not only one God; but if God generated himself, then a thing has generated itself.—SOLUTION. In response to this, we say that it may well be granted, as is in accordance with the Catholic faith, that the one generated the one, and that God generated God, because God the Father begot God the Son. In the *Creed*, too, it is written: "Light from light, true God from true God."[1]—But as to that which is added, 'therefore God generated himself or another God,' we say that neither is to be granted. That he did not generate another God is manifest because there is only one God. Augustine shows that he did not generate himself, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, saying: "As for those who think that it is in God's power to generate himself, they err the more because not only is it not so in the case of God, but it is not so even in the case of a spiritual or bodily creature. For there is not a thing which generates itself into existence."[2] And so it is not to be believed or said that God generated himself.

[3]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c 1 n4.
[3]Ibid., c 1 n6.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c 1 n1.

[1]Constantinopolitan Creed, liturgical version.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c 1 n1.

2. A SECOND QUESTION ON THE SAME SUBJECT. But some garrulous rationalizers[3] object, saying: If God the Father generated God, either he generated God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. If he generated God who is not God the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father; and so there is not only one God. But if he generated God who is God the Father, then he generated himself.— RESPONSE. We respond to this by determining the proposition in which they put this forth: 'If God the Father generated God, then he begot either God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father.' For this can be understood either well or evilly; and so a response is to be made in these terms: 'God the Father generated God who is the Father himself' is a false conclusion; we grant the other, namely 'he generated God who is not God the Father.' But he did not 'generate another God,' nor is the one who was generated another God than the Father, but one God with the Father.—But if it is added: 'He generated God who is not God the Father;'; we make a logical distinction, because this can be understood in two ways: 'he generated God, who is not God the Father,' namely God the Son, and the Son is not the Father, who is God; this sense is true. But if it is understood in this way: 'he generated God, who is not God the Father,' that is, who is not that God who is the Father, then this sense is false. For one and the same God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and conversely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one God.

Chapter 2 (14)

1. THE OPINION OF SOME WHO SAY THAT THE THREE PERSONS ARE ONE GOD, ONE SUBSTANCE, BUT NOT CONVERSELY, THAT ONE GOD OR ONE SUBSTANCE IS THREE PERSONS. But some adversaries of the truth grant that Father and Son and Holy Spirit, or the three persons, are one God and one substance, and yet they refuse to grant that the one God or one substance is three persons. They say that the divine substance is predicated of the three persons, not the three persons of the divine substance.

2. HE ADDUCES AUTHORITIES AGAINST THEM. But the Catholic faith holds and preaches both that the three persons are one God, one substance or essence or divine nature, and that the one God or divine essence is three persons. And so Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, says as follows: "Rightly is God himself, the Trinity, understood to be *blessed and alone in dominion*."[1,2] See how he expressly says 'God himself, the Trinity' in order to show that God himself is the Trinity, and the Trinity is God him-

[3]Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c2 n4.

[1]Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 15.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c6 n11.

self.—Also, in the same place, he says: "In those words of the Apostle," in which, speaking of the coming of Christ, Paul says, *Whom he will show to be blessed and alone in dominion, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality*, etc.,[3] "neither is the Father specifically named, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, but the *blessed and alone in dominion*, that is, the one and only true God, who is the Trinity itself."[4] And so he here expressly states that the one and only true God is the Trinity itself; and if the one God is the Trinity, then the one God is three persons.

3. Also, in book 5, *On the Trinity*: "We say that the same most high Trinity is not three gods, but one God."[5] Also, in the book *On Faith to Peter*, in expounding the Creed: "It suffices for the Christian to believe the cause of all created things, visible and invisible, to be none other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and true God. There is no nature which is not God or from God, and he is the Trinity, namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit."[6] Also, Augustine in the sermon *On Faith*: "We believe in one God, and that there is one Trinity of the divine name."[7] The same [Augustine], in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "We say that the only God is the Trinity itself."[8] And so by these and many other authorities, it is clearly shown that we must say and grant that the one God is Trinity, and the one substance three persons; and conversely, the Trinity is said to be the one God, and the three persons are said to be one substance.

4. HE RETURNS TO THE EARLIER QUESTION, NAMELY WHETHER GOD THE FATHER GENERATED HIMSELF AS GOD OR AN OTHER GOD. Now let us return to the earlier question, where it was asked whether God the Father generated himself as God, or another God. To which we say that neither of these is to be granted.—But Augustine says, in his letter *To Maximinus*, that God the Father generated himself as an other; these are his words: "The Father, in order to have the Son from himself, did not diminish himself, but so generated an other self from himself that he remained entirely in himself, and yet was as great in the Son as he is alone."[9]— This may be understood as follows: that is, he generated an other from himself, and not at all an other God, but an other person; or he generated an other self, that is, he generated an other, who is also what he is. Indeed, although the Father is other than the Son, yet he is not another thing, but one thing.

[3]1 Tim. 6, 15-16.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c6 n10.
[5]Ibid., bk 5 c8 n9.
[6]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c9.
[7]*Sermo 233 (De fide catholica)*, n1
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c7 n9.
[9]More correctly, from the correspondence of Alypius and Augustine, *Epistola* 170, n5.

DISTINCTION V

Chapter 1 (15)

1. HERE IT IS ASKED WHETHER THE FATHER GENERATED A DIVINE ESSENCE, OR WHETHER AN ESSENCE GENERATED THE SON, OR AN ESSENCE GENERATED AN ESSENCE, OR WHETHER IT NEITHER GENERATED NOR WAS GENERATED. After these matters, it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Father generated a divine essence, or that a divine essence generated the Son, or that an essence generated an essence, or whether the divine essence neither generated at all, nor was generated.—In consensus with Catholic expounders, we say regarding this that neither did the Father generate a divine essence, nor did a divine essence generate the Son, nor did a divine essence generate an essence. And here by the term 'essence' we understand the divine nature, which is common to the three persons and is whole in each of them.

2. FIRST REASON WHY THIS IS SO. Therefore, it is not to be said that the Father generated a divine essence because, if the Father were said to have generated a divine essence, the divine essence would be spoken of relatively to the Father, or would be posited as a relative term. But if it were spoken of relatively, or posited as a relative term, it would not indicate an essence. For as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 5, "what is asserted relatively does not indicate substance."[1]

3. SECOND [REASON]. Also, since God the Father is divine essence, if he were to be the begetter of it, he would also be the begetter of that which he himself is, and so the same thing would be generating itself, which Augustine denies, as we have shown above.[2]

4. THIRD AND BETTER REASON. Also, if the Father is the begetter of the divine essence, since by the same divine essence he both is and is God, it follows that, by that which he begets, he both is and is God. And so it also follows that it is not that which is begotten by the Father that is God, but it is the Father, by that which he begets, who both is and is God. And if this is so, the begetter is not the cause for the begotten both to be and to be God, but the begotten for the begetter.—By a similar argument, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, Augustine proves that the Father is not wise by the wisdom which he generated; if he is wise by virtue of it, he also is by virtue of it: "For in God it is the same thing to be and to be wise. But if there it is the same thing to be and to be wise, the Father is not wise by the wisdom which he has generated. For what else do we say when we say that 'for

[1] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c7 n8.
[2] Above, Dist. 4 c1 n1.

him to be and to be wise is the same,' if not that 'he is because he is wise'? It follows that the same cause which causes him to be wise also causes him to be. Thus, if the wisdom which he has generated causes him to be wise, it also causes him to be. But no one would ever say that the wisdom generated by the Father is the cause of the Father's being. For what is more senseless?"[3] And so it follows that, if the Father generated the essence by which he is, the essence which he generated is the cause of his being. Therefore, he did not generate the essence by which he is. Augustine says: "In that simplicity, because to be wise is not other than to be, wisdom is there the same as essence."[4] For that reason, we say the same thing about essence as about wisdom. For just as he did not beget the wisdom by which he is wise, he did not beget the essence by which he is. For just as he is wise by wisdom and powerful by power, so too he is by essence; each of the former, wisdom and power, is the same as essence. From the aforegoing, it is clear that the Father did not generate the divine essence.

5. AN OBJECTION SEEMS TO BE MADE TO THIS. Augustine seems to state the contrary to this in the book, *On Faith to Peter*, saying: "When God begot the Word, he begot that which he himself is; and it was not from nothing, nor from some already made and established matter, but from himself that he begot that which he himself is."[5] Also: "God the Father willed and was able to reveal himself most truly to the souls which would come to know him; to reveal himself, he begot that which the begetter himself is."[6] And so he plainly states with these words that God the Father generated that which he himself is. But that which he is is nothing other than the divine essence; and so it seems that he generated the divine essence.—To this, we respond by saying that those words are to be understood in the following sense: 'The Father generated from himself that which he himself is,' that is, the Son, who is that which the Father is. Indeed, that which the Father is, the Son also is; but he who is the Father is not also he who is the Son.

6. HE ADDRESSES THE OTHER PARTS OF THE QUESTION. In the same way, it is not to be asserted that the divine essence generated the Son because, since the Son is the divine essence, the Son would already be the thing from which he is generated; and so the same thing would generate itself.—And so we also say that the divine essence did not generate an essence. Since the divine essence is one and the highest thing, if the divine essence generated an essence, then the same thing generated itself, which is not at all possible.

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c1 n2.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Augustine, *De fide et symbolo*, c3 n4.
[6]Ibid.

But the Father alone begot the Son, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

7. SOME STATEMENTS THAT APPEAR TO BE CONTRARY TO THE FOREGOING. But what Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 7, appears to be contrary to the foregoing. He states: "For God, to be is the same as to be wise, and so the Father and the Son are together one wisdom because they are one essence; and they are severally wisdom from wisdom, as essence from essence."[7] Thus, by these words, Augustine plainly says that wisdom is from wisdom and essence from essence, by which he seems to mean that wisdom generated wisdom, and essence generated essence.—The same [Augustine], in the book *On Faith to Peter*, says: "Believe Christ, the Son of God and one person of the Trinity, to be true God; believe it in such a way that you do not doubt his divinity to be born from the Father's nature."[8] Here he seems to say that the Son's nature is born from the Father's nature.—The same [Augustine], in *On the Trinity*, book 15, also says: "The Son is called counsel of counsel and will of will, as substance of substance, wisdom of wisdom."[9] And here he seems to say that substance is generated from substance and wisdom from wisdom.

8. DETERMINATION OF THE APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS. But we determine these in the following manner: 'Wisdom is from wisdom and substance from substance,' that is, the Son, who is wisdom and substance, is from the Father, who is the same substance and wisdom; and the Son, who is divinity, is born from the Father, who is divine nature. To speak more explicitly, we say that the Son, who is wisdom, is from the Father, who is wisdom; we also say that the Son, who is substance, is begotten of the Father and from the Father, who is substance.—Augustine shows that the matter is to be understood in this sense, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, saying: "The Father himself is wisdom, and the Son is called the Father's wisdom in the same way as he is called the Father's light, that is, in the same way as light from light, but both one light; so is to be understood wisdom from wisdom, but both one wisdom and one essence."[10] Also: "For that reason, Christ is called the power and wisdom of God[11] because he himself is power and wisdom from the Father, who is power and wisdom, just as he is light from the Father, who is light, and he is the source of life with the Father, who is the source of life. And so the Son, who is wisdom, is from the Father, who is wisdom, just as the Son, who is light, is from the Father, who is light, and God the Son is from God the Father in such manner that

[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 cc1-2 nn2-3.
[8]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c2 n15.
[9]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c20 n38.
[10]Ibid., bk 7 c1 n2.
[11]Cf. 1 Cor. 1, 24.

each singularly is light, each singularly God, and each singularly wisdom, and together they are one light, one God, one wisdom."[12] By these words, Augustine clearly reveals in what sense are to be taken the earlier words and others like them, namely when we say: substance from substance, or substance generated substance.

9. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION TO THE PRECEDING EXPLANATION. But what Hilary says in book 4, *On the Trinity,* appears to be contrary to this: "The Son has nothing, except his birth, and the veneration of glory of the begotten is in honour of the begetter."[13] And since the Son has an essence, for the divine essence is entirely in him, it seems that the divine essence itself is born.—The same [Hilary] says in book 5: "What is born of God cannot not have that nature from which it comes. For nothing other than God exists in that which draws its existence from none other than God."[14] And so he says here that what is born of God comes from his nature; from those words and the ones before, it appears that God's nature both was begotten and begot.—THAT GOD'S NATURE, WHILE REMAINING IN ITS OWN FORM, TOOK ON THE FORM OF BODILY NATURE AND INFIRMITY. He says the same more plainly, in *On the Trinity*, book 9: "We profess that the only-begotten God, while remaining in the form of God, remained in the nature of God. We do not let the unity of the form of a servant flow back into the nature of the divine unity; nor again do we teach that the Father is in the Son bodily, but that the nature which was begotten from the Father was of the same kind as the Father's own, and possessed by nature the same nature which begot it. While remaining in the form of the nature which begot it, this nature took on the form of bodily nature and infirmity. For God's nature did not cease to be [in Christ], but the divine nature, while abiding in him, had taken on the humility of earthly birth and exercised its proper power in the guise of the humility which had been assumed."[15] Note that he plainly states here that the nature begot, was begotten, and took on a nature, which is denied by many.—Also, in the same place: "Or is it an insult to the only-begotten God to have the unbegotten God as Father, since the only-begotten birth from the unbegotten Father subsists in the only-begotten nature?"[16] See how he here asserts an only-begotten nature.

10. HOW THE AFOREGOING WORDS OF HILARY ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. But because he wants these words to be well understood, the same Hilary says in book 4: "The meaning of words is to be derived from the causes for speaking, because it is the word which is subject to the thing and not the

[12]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c3 n4.
[13]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n10.
[14]Ibid., bk 5 n37.
[15]Ibid., bk 9 n51.
[16]Ibid., bk 9 n53.

thing to the word."[17] These words can be understood as follows: 'The Son has nothing, except his birth,' that is to say, according to his being God, he has nothing except what he took by birth, and by birth he received the Father's nature subsisting in himself.

11. HE CONFIRMS THE EXPLANATION BY THE WORDS OF THE SAME [HILARY]. Hence, the same Hilary adds in book 5: "The begotten has the same nature as the begetter, but in such a way that the one who is born is not the one who has begotten, for how will he be the same, since he has been begotten? But the substance of the begotten consists in entirely the same things as the substance of the begetter, because the one begotten does not have any other origin. It follows that whatever from the one subsists in the other is not referred to anything else. And so, in the begetting of the Son, the unchangeable God who begets the unchangeable God follows, if I may say so, his own nature. And the unchangeable God perfectly born of the unchangeable God does not forsake his own nature. Let us then understand that God's nature subsists in him, since God is in God, nor is there any other God than he who is God, because he is God and God is in him."[18] In these terms, the truth of the nature of God the Father is taught to be in God the Son, since the God who is God is understood to be in him. For the one is in the one, and the one is from the one.

12: WE READ: THE FATHER BEGOT THE SON FROM HIS OWN SUBSTANCE AND THE SON IS OF THE FATHER'S SUBSTANCE. It is also said, and it is frequently read in the sacred Scriptures, that the Father begot the Son from his own substance. And so Augustine says, in the book *On Faith to Peter*: "God the Father, generated from no other God, from his beginningless nature once generated God the Son, equal to himself, and coeternal by the same divinity by which he is himself naturally eternal."[19] And so Augustine asserts that the Son was generated from the Father's nature. For indeed, the nature of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one. It follows that, if the Son is generated from the Father's nature, he is generated from the nature of the Son and the Holy Spirit, indeed from the nature of the three persons.

13. The same Augustine also says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, that Christ is the son of the Father's substance, generated from the Father's substance. In discussing the following sentence of the Apostle concerning God the Father, *Who snatched us from the power of darkness and brought us into the kingdom of the Son of his love*,[20] Augustine says: "The phrase, *of the Son of his love*, is to be understood as meaning nothing else than of his beloved Son, than of the Son of his substance. For the Father's love, which

[17]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n14.
[18]Ibid., bk 5 n37.
[19]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c2 n10.
[20]Col. 1, 13.

exists in his ineffably simple nature, is nothing else than his very nature and substance, as we have often said and do not hesitate to say again and again. Thus, the *Son of his love* is none other than the one who is begotten from his substance."[21] Note that here Augustine asserts plainly that the Son is begotten from the substance of the Father, and is the Son of the substance of the Father.

14. The same Augustine also asserts that God's substance begot the Son and the Son is begotten of the Father's substance, in *Against the Heretic Maximinus*, book 2, saying: "Full of carnal thoughts, you do not believe that God's substance can generate the Son of itself, without suffering what the substance of the flesh suffers when it engenders. *You are in error, knowing neither the Scriptures, nor the power of God.*[22] In no way do you hold him to be the true Son of God, if you deny that he is born from the substance of the Father. For indeed, he was not first the Son of man, who was afterwards made Son of God by God's gift, born from God by grace and not by nature. Or perhaps, even if he was not Son of man, yet he was some other creature, and was changed into the Son of God by God's aid? But he is neither of these, and so either he is born from nothing, or from some substance. But lest we should believe that you hold the Son of God to come from nothing, you have affirmed that you do not say that the Son of God comes from nothing. Then he comes from some substance. And if not from the Father's substance, then do tell us from which one. But you cannot find any. Do not hesitate, then, to confess with us that the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, is from the Father's substance."[23]

15. The same [Augustine] in the same place: "Both of us read: *So that we may be in his true Son*,[24] Jesus Christ. Tell us, then, whether this true Son of God, who is distinguished by a certain property from those who are sons by grace, is from some substance or from none. You say: 'I do not say from none, lest I say from nothing.' Then he is from some substance. I ask, from which? If he is not from the Father's substance, seek you another. If you do not find another, acknowledge that he is from the Father's substance, and confess that the Son is *homousion* [of one substance] with the Father."[25]

16. The same [Augustine], in the same place: "I confess that God the Father begot entirely without corruption, but he begot that which he himself is. I also say what is to be frequently repeated: either the Son of God is born of a certain substance, or of none. If of none, then he is born of nothing, which you do not assert. But if he is born of a certain substance,

[21]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n37.
[22]Mt. 22, 29.
[23]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2. c14 n2.
[24]1 Jn. 5, 20.
[25]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n3.

and yet not the Father's substance, then he is not a true Son. But if from the Father's substance, then the Father and the Son are of one and the same substance."[26] "You do not wish the Son to be begotten from the Father's substance, but you grant that he does not come from nothing or from some matter, but that he is from the Father. Neither do you see that one who comes neither from nothing nor from some other thing, but from God, must of necessity come from God's substance. He must also be that which is God, from whom he is, that is, he is God born from God; because he was not other before, but he is a nature coeternal with God."[27]

17. SUMMARIZING THE AFOREGOING [WORDS], HE REVEALS IN WHAT SENSE THEY ARE TO BE TAKEN. From the aforegoing [words], it appears to be suggested that the divine substance begot the Son, and that the Son was begotten from the Father's substance, and that he is from God and a coeternal nature, and that the Father begot that which he himself is. But that which he is himself is the divine essence; and so it may be believed that the divine essence has generated.—These words disturb us strongly. I would prefer to hear from others how they are to be understood, rather than set down my own explanation. But so that I may speak without prejudice and temerity, these words may be taken in this sense: 'He is from God and a coeternal nature,' that is, the Son, who is coeternal with the Father, is from the Father, so that he is in the same nature with him, or of the same nature.—Augustine, in the same place, confirms this sense, by adding something, almost by way of explanation, to what he had already said. For after saying, 'He is from God and a coeternal nature,' he added: "The Son is nothing other than that from which he is, that is, he is of one and the same substance."[28] Afterwards, in the same book *Against Maximinus*, he reveals more plainly that such a meaning is to be drawn from the foregoing words, saying: "This Trinity is of one and the same substance, because the Son is not from some matter or from nothing, but from that from which he is begotten. And the Holy Spirit also is not from some matter or from nothing, but from that from which he proceeds."[29] And so by these words he plainly shows that the reason for saying that 'the Son is from the Father's substance' is that he was generated from the Father, so that he is of the same substance with him; and 'the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son' because he proceeds from both, so that he is of the same substance.

[26]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n4.
[27]Ibid., bk 2 c14 n2.
[28]Ibid.
[29]Ibid.

Chapter 2 (16)

1. THAT NEITHER THE SON NOR THE HOLY SPIRIT IS FROM NOTHING; EACH IS FROM SOMETHING, BUT NOT FROM MATTER. It is also shown from those words that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not from nothing; they are from something, but not from matter. Thus, Hilary too says, in *On the Trinity*, book 12: "The only-begotten God, by his birth, bears witness to the Father as his source; by being born of him who exists eternally, he was not from nothing; and because he was born before time, he precedes all thought by his birth."[1,2] Here it is plainly asserted that the Son is not born from nothing.

2. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is also not to be said to be or proceed from nothing, Because 'the Son is born of the Father's substance,'[3] that is, is from the Father, with whom he is of the same substance and is the same substance, in the same sense is also to be taken the phrase: 'The Father generated that which he himself is,'[4] that is, the Son, who is the same as the Father.—Augustine makes clear that this is how this must be understood, saying, in *Against Maximinus*, book 1: "The Father generated that which he is: otherwise, if the Son is not that which the Father is, he is not a true Son."[5]

3. Also, 'the substance of God generated the Son,'[6] that is, the Father, who is substance, generated the Son, who is the same substance and of the same substance.—Augustine shows that this is to be understood in this way, saying to Maximinus: "When you say, 'The spirit generated the spirit,' say instead: The spirit generated a spirit of the same nature or substance. Also, when you say, 'God generated God,' say instead: God generated God of the same nature or substance. If you say and believe this, then you will no longer be accused of anything in this regard."[7] And by these words he reveals how the aforegoing are to be understood.

4. Similarly, 'the Son is born from the Father's substance,' or 'the Father begot the Son from his nature or essence,'[8] that is, from himself, nature and essence, he begot the Son of the same essence and nature, and who is the same essence and nature. Expound in the same way that phrase: 'the Son of the substance of the Father,'[9] that is, the Son of the Father's substance,

[1]Cf. Is. 53, 8.
[2]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n25.
[3]Cf. Augustine, *De fide et symbolo*, c4 n6; see above, c1 nn12-16.
[4]Cf. Augustine, or Fulgentius, above, c1 nn5-7 and 9.
[5]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 1 c18.
[6]Cf. above, c1 n14.
[7]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c15 n3.
[8]Cf. above, c1 nn12-14.
[9]Above, c1 n13.

that is, [of the Father] who is substance, with whom the Son is the same substance because the Son is consubstantial with the Father.—And this meaning is supported by the words of Augustine, saying, in *On the Trinity*, book 7: "We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons from the same essence, as if essence there were one thing and person another."[10] By these words, he shows that it is not to be said that person is from essence, except in the sense stated above.—This meaning is also confirmed by what the same [Augustine] says in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "As our knowledge is unlike God's knowledge, so our word, which comes from our knowledge, is unlike God's Word, which is born from the Father's essence. And the same is true as if I were to say: from the Father's knowledge, from the Father's wisdom; or, what is even more explicit: from the essence which is the Father, from the knowledge which is the Father, from the wisdom which is the Father."[11] From this understanding, "the Word of God the Father, the only-begotten Son, who is in all things like and equal to the Father, is rightly called God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence from essence: because he is entirely that which the Father is, and yet he is not the Father, since the one is Son and the other Father."[12]

Chapter 3 (17)

WHY THE WORD OF THE FATHER IS CALLED A SON OF HIS NATURE. That is why the one and only-begotten of God is called son by nature, because he is of the same nature and is the same nature with the Father. Hence, Hilary, speaking of Christ in the book *On the Trinity*, says: "He is son by nature because he has the same nature as the one who begot him."[1]

DISTINCTION VI

Chapter 1 (18)

1. WHETHER THE FATHER BEGOT THE SON BY HIS OWN WILL OR BY NECESSITY AND WHETHER GOD MAY BE WILLING OR UNWILLING. Moreover, it is usual to ask whether the Father begot the Son by his own will or by necessity. Concerning this, Orosius speaks as follows to Augustine: "Did

[10]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.
[11]Ibid., bk 15 c13 n22.
[12]Ibid., bk 15 c14 n23.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 n37.

the Father beget the Son by his own will, or by necessity? Neither by will, nor by necessity, because there is no necessity in God; his will cannot precede his wisdom."[1] For this reason, Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "And the sophistry of Eunomius, from which the Eunomian heretics have arisen, is laughable. Since he could not understand and did not wish to believe that the only-begotten Word of God is son of God by nature, that is, begotten from the Father's substance, he said that he was not the son of God's nature or substance, but the son of God's will. By this, he wished to assert that God's will to beget the Son was accidental, just as we sometimes will something which we did not will before. But it is for this very reason that our nature is understood to be changeable; far be it from us to believe that the same is true of God."[2]

2. THE CATHOLIC'S RESPONSE. And so let us say that the Word of God is son of God by nature, not by will. This is Augustine's teaching in *On the Trinity*, book 15, where he commends the response of a certain Catholic to a heretic, saying: "It was truly an insightful answer that someone made to a heretic who had most craftily asked him whether God had generated the Son willingly or unwillingly. If he had said, 'unwillingly,' it would have followed most absurdly that God was miserable; but if he had said 'willingly,' then the heretic would immediately have achieved the conclusion which he desired, namely that the Son is not the son of God's nature, but of his will. But the other, with great presence of mind, asked him in turn whether God the Father is God willingly or unwillingly. If the heretic answered 'unwillingly,' great absurdity and misery would follow, which it is a great insanity to believe of God; but if he said 'willingly,' the response would be made to him: then the Father too is God by his own will, not by nature. And so what remained but that the heretic should be silent, realizing that he was bound by his own question into an insoluble knot?"[3] From the aforegoing, it is taught that it is not to be granted that God is God by will or necessity, nor willingly or unwillingly; nor that he begot the Son by will or necessity, nor willingly or unwillingly.

3. AN OBJECTION AGAINST THE AFOREGOING. But against this, an objection is made in these terms: God's will is God's nature or essence because in God it is not one thing to be and another to will; thus, as the essence of the three persons is one, so also the will is one. But if God is God by nature, he is also God by will; and if the Word of God is son of God by nature, he is also son of God by will.—RESPONSE. But it is easy to refute this. For the knowledge or foreknowledge of God, by which he knows or foreknows good and evil events, is the divine nature or essence; and

[1] *Dialogus quaest. 65*, q. 7.
[2] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c20 n38.
[3] Ibid.

predestination, or his will, is the same divine essence; nor in God is it one thing to know or will, and another to be. And although God's knowledge and his will are one and the same, still not all that is said of his will is also said of his knowledge, and vice versa. Nor does God will by his own will all that he knows by his knowledge, since by his knowledge he knows both good and evil events, but by his will he only wills the good ones. Assuredly, God's knowledge and foreknowledge is of both good and evil things, but his will and predestination is only of the good ones, and yet in God knowledge and will are one and the same, as also are foreknowledge and predestination. Thus, although the nature and will of God are one, yet it is said that the Father generated the Son by nature, not by will, and that he is God by nature, not by will.

4. HOW THOSE WORDS ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD: THE FATHER IS GOD NEITHER WILLINGLY NOR UNWILLINGLY, AND HE BEGOT THE SON NEITHER WILLINGLY NOR UNWILLINGLY. As for the above words, by which it is prudently said that God the Father is God neither willingly nor unwillingly, and that he begot the Son neither willingly nor unwillingly, whether by will or necessity, it seems to me that they are to be taken in such a sense that we would understand the will to be preceding or concomitant, as Eunomius understood it. For he is not God by a preceding or efficient will, or willing [before] being God; nor did he beget the Son by a preceding or concomitant will, nor did he beget the Son by willing before begetting. And yet he was willing when he begot, just as he was powerful, good, wise, and suchlike, when he begot. For if the Father is said to have been wise and good when he begot the Son, why not also willing? For just as it is the same for God to be willing as to be God, so it is the same to be wise as to be God.And so let us say that the Father, as he was wise when he generated the Son, so was he also willing, but not by a preceding or concomitant will. Augustine manifests and confirms this meaning by commenting on the Epistle to the Ephesians: "Concerning the Son of God, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ, it is written that *he was always*[4] with the Father, and never did a paternal will precede his existence. And so he is Son by nature."[5]

5. Hilary, in the book *On the Synod*: "Holy Church anathematizes those who say that the Son of God has his being from non-existent things, and also those who say that the Father begot the Son neither by counsel nor by will."[6]—Also: "Anyone who says that the Son was born with the Father unwilling is to be anathema. For the Father was not compelled against his will, nor was he unwillingly induced by a necessity of nature, to generate

[4]Cf. Eccli. 1, 1.
[5]Rather, Jerome on Eph. 1, 5.
[6]Hilary, *De synodo*, n34.

the Son. But as soon as he willed, outside time and impassibly, he showed forth the only-begotten of himself."[7]

DISTINCTION VII

Chapter 1 (19)

1. HERE IT IS ASKED WHETHER THE FATHER WAS ABLE, OR WILLED, TO BEGET THE SON. Here it is usual for some to ask whether the Father was able, or willed, to beget the Son. For they say that, if he was able or willed to beget the Son, then he was able to do, or willed, something which the Son neither was able to do, nor willed, since the Son neither was able, nor willed, to beget the Son.—We respond to this subtlety with ease: To be able or to will to beget the Son is not to be able to do or to will something subject to will or to power; and yet it is a kind of power or will, namely to be able or will to beget the Son. And so the meaning of the expression used above is to be distinguished. To be able or willing to beget the Son is to be able to do or to will something; but the begetting of the Son is not one of the things which are subject to the divine power and will; nor is it something among or concerning all things, but it is above and before all things. For the Father did not will and was not able to do anything before he begot; similarly, he did not exist before he begot because he was from all eternity and he begot from all eternity.—We can also see this from an analogy: the Father can be Father and wills to be Father, but the Son is neither able nor willing to be Father, therefore the Father can be or wills to be something which the Son cannot be or does not will to be. But this does not follow because to be Father is not [the same as] to be something, as will be shown below.[1]

2. HE SETS OUT SOME WORDS OF AUGUSTINE BY WHICH HE WHO HEARS THEM CAN BE SHAKEN. But we are strongly shaken by what Augustine says in *Against Maximinus*, book 1. Maximinus asserted that the Father is more powerful than the Son because he begot a Son who is God the Creator, but the Son did not do so. He also said that the Father was more powerful than the Son because he was able to beget, but the Son was not.—Responding to this, Augustine seems to assert that the Son was also able to beget; wishing to show that the Father was not more powerful than the Son, he said: "Far be it that the Father be more powerful than the Son, as you think, because the Father begot the Creator while the Son did not beget the Creator. It is not that he could not do so, but that it was not fitting that he

[7]Hilary, *De synodo*, n58.

[1]Dist. 28 c5.

should do so."[2]—Note and diligently attend to these words: 'It is not that he could not do so, but that it was not fitting that he should do so.' He seems to say that the Son was able to beget, but it was not fitting that he should do so; and so the Son was able to do what it was not fitting that he should do. Augustine explains why it was not fitting by adding: "For divine generation would be without measure, if the Son who had been generated had generated a grandson to the Father; this grandson, if he failed to generate a great-grandson to his grandfather, would be called powerless by your wonderful wisdom. In the same way, if he failed to generate a grandson to his own father and a great-grandson to his own grandfather, he would not be acknowledged to be all-powerful by you. The series of generation would never be complete, if there was always one being born of another; nor would anyone ever complete it, if one was not sufficient. And so the All-powerful begot by nature, and did not make, the all-powerful Son of the Father."[3]

3. AN OBJECTION AGAINST AUGUSTINE'S WORDS ABOVE. But it does not seem to some that this can stand, namely that the Son was able to beget. For if the Son was able to beget, he could be father; and if he could be father, then he could be father of himself, or of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit, or of another. But he could not be father of another because no other always existed; nor of the Father, because the Father is unbegotten and not subject to birth; nor of himself, because no thing can generate itself;[4] nor of the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit was not able to be born. For if the Holy Spirit was able to be born, then he was able to be the Son, and so he could be changeable.

4. HERE IT IS ASKED HOW THESE WORDS ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. And so how shall that phrase be taken which is set out above: 'For it is not that he could not generate, but that it was not fitting that he should do so,' as if to say: he could do so, but it was not fitting? It is not clear to us how we can show this is true, and so it should rather be passed over in silence, except that I am compelled to say something about this by the pressure of questioners.

5. HERE IS REVEALED IN WHAT SENSE THESE WORDS ARE TO BE TAKEN. Therefore: 'For it is not that he could not do so, but that it was not fitting that he should do so,' may be understood as follows: that is, it was not because of his powerlessness that the Son did not generate, but because it was not fitting for him to do so, just as God the Son is not God the Father, and yet this is not because of his powerlessness. For similarly the Father is

[2]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c12 n3.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Cf. above, Dist. 3 c4.

not the Son, nor is this because of the Father's powerlessness. But Maximinus, the bishop of the Arians, asks: What, then, is the reason why the Father cannot be the Son, or the Son cannot be the Father? Not at all because of powerlessness, but the Father is Father from the property of generation, by which it is fitting that he should not be Son; and the Son is Son by the property of birth, by which it is fitting that he should not be Father. A fuller discussion of these properties will be presented below.[5]

Chapter 2 (20)

1. WHETHER THE FATHER BY NATURE HAS THE POWER TO BEGET THE SON, AND WHETHER THIS IS A POWER WHICH IS IN THE SON. Also, it is asked by some whether the Father by nature has the power to beget the Son, and whether this is a power which is in the Son.—To which we say that the Father is not able to do so, except by nature, for his power is his nature or essence.

2. But, they say, if he is able to beget, then he has the power of begetting; but the Son does not have the power of begetting, if he is not able to beget; and so the Father has a power which the Son does not have.—It does not follow. For the Son has exactly the same power as the Father; by this power, the Father was able to beget, and the Son was able to be begotten. For the same power is in the Son, by which he could be begotten, as is in the Father, by which he could beget.

3. But an objection is made against this: to be able to beget is one thing, to be able to be begotten is another, for it is one thing to beget and another to be begotten.—Here a distinction is to be drawn: for if by saying, 'it is one thing to be able to beget, and another to be able to be begotten,' you mean one power by which the Father is able to beget, and another power by which the Son is able to be begotten, then this is a false understanding. But if you say that the Father can have one property or notion by which he is the begetter, and the Son can have another by which he is the begotten, then this is a true understanding. For the Father has one property, by which he is the Father; the Son has another, by which he is the Son.

4. HOW THE STATEMENT: THE SON HAS OR DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER OF BEGETTING IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD. In the same way, there are two possible understandings of the statement: the Son does not have the power of begetting, which the Father has. For if it is said, 'the Son does not have the same power of begetting as the Father,' that is, by which he is able to beget, that is, so that he may have begotten or may beget like the Father, this is true. But if it is understood in this way: he does not have the power

[5]In Dist. 26-28.

by which he is able to be begotten, or to have been begotten, by which same power the Father is able to have begotten or to beget, then this is false. As it is said: the Father has a power by which he can be Father, but the Son does not have a power by which he can be Father; and vice versa: the Son has a power by which he can be Son, but the Father does not have a power by which he can be Son. Does the Father then have some power which the Son does not have, and vice versa? Far be it! For one and the same is the power of the Father by which he can be Father, and of the Son by which he can be Son. And so also one and the same is the will by which the Father wills to be Father, not Son, and the Son wills to be Son, not Father. And one and the same is the will of the Son by which he wills himself to have been begotten, and the Father to have begotten him, and the will of the Father by which he wills himself to have been the begetter, and the Son to have been the begotten.

DISTINCTION VIII

Chapter 1 (21)

1. CONCERNING THE PROPERTY AND UNCHANGEABILITY AND SIMPLICITY OF GOD'S ESSENCE. Now we must turn to the truth, or property, and the unchangeability and simplicity of the divine nature, or substance, or essence.

2. Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "And God is without doubt a substance, or, if it is better said, an essence, which the Greeks call *usia*. For just as wisdom is so called from being wise, and just as knowledge is so called from knowing, so essence is so called from being (*esse*). And who is more than he who said to his servant Moses: *I am that I am*, and *You shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you*?"[1,2]

3. He is truly and properly called essence whose essence does not know past or future. Hence, Jerome, writing to Marcella, says: "God alone, who has no beginning, truly preserved the name of essence; by comparison to him who truly is because he is unchangeable, things which are changeable are almost as if they are not. For whatever thing we can say 'was' about, no longer is, and whatever we can say 'will be' about, is not yet. God alone, on the other hand, is, who does not know 'used to be' or 'will be.' Thus, God alone truly is, by comparison with whose essence, our being is as if it is not."[3]

[1]Ex. 3, 14.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c2 n3; see also *De civitate Dei*, bk 12 c2.
[3]Cf. Jerome, *Epistola* 15 (to Damasus) n4.

4. QUESTION AS TO HOW JEROME'S WORDS ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. Here we must diligently consider how Jerome's words are to be understood, namely "God alone is and does not know 'used to be,'" as if it were not possible to say of God 'was' or 'will be,' but only 'is.' But we find that it has been frequently written of God, *He was from all eternity*, *He was always*, and *He will be always*,[4] and suchlike. And so it seems that 'was,' or 'is,' or 'will be,' is not to be used unqualifiedly of God. For if 'was' alone were to be used, it might be thought that he had ceased to be; if 'is' alone were to be used, it might be thought that he had not always been, but that his being had had a beginning; if 'will be' alone were used, it might be thought that he was not now. And so let it be said that he always was, is, and will be, so that it may be understood that he neither began, nor ceased, nor ceases, nor will cease to be.

5. Augustine speaks of this [in his treatise] *On John* and says: "It is proper to say 'is' concerning an eternal thing, but we think it good to say 'was' and 'will be.' 'Was' because it never ceased; 'will be' because it will never be lacking; 'is' because it always is. It did not pass away, like that which is not permanent; it will not arise, like that which did not previously exist. For as our speech changes according to times, verbs of any tense are truly spoken of him who at no time will be found lacking. And so it is not strange if Truth, speaking of the Spirit of truth, said in the future tense: *Whatever he will hear, he will utter. He will hear*,[5] namely from the one from whom he proceeds. For him, to hear is to know, as also to be. Therefore, from the source of his essence comes also hearing or knowledge, which is nothing other than essence. And so he said *he will hear* of that which he has heard and hears, that is, of that which he always did, does, and will know."[6] See how Augustine says here that verbs of any tense are spoken of God, but properly 'is.'

6. HERE HE MAKES CLEAR HOW THE WORDS ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. And so what Jerome says is to be understood as follows: has not known 'used to be' or 'will be,' but only 'to be,' that is, when we say of God that he was or will be, it is not to be understood that he ceased to be, or will be in the future, but that he simply exists, without any temporal movement. Although different tenses of the verb 'to be' are used of God, such as 'was,' 'will be,' 'is,' 'used to be,' yet they do not distinguish temporal movements, that is, past or future, or past imperfect and past perfect, or the past more than the perfect, but indicate simply the essence or existence of the divinity.

[4]Cf. Prov. 8, 23; Eccli. 1, 1; Ps. 89, 2.
[5]Jn. 16, 13.
[6]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 99 nn4-5.

7. And so God alone is properly called essence or being. Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says: "To be is not an accident in God, but a subsisting truth, and a permanent cause, and an inherent and natural property of his nature."[7]

Chapter 2 (22)

1. HERE ON UNCHANGEABLENESS. The essence of the one God is also properly called unchangeable because it neither does, nor can, change. Hence, Augustine, in *On the Trinity,* book 5: "Other essences or substances are subject to accidents which produce in them changes, whether great or small. In God, nothing like this can occur. And so only the substance or essence which is God is unchangeable, to whom being most fittingly and truly pertains. For whatever is changed does not preserve its own being; and whatever can be changed, even if it is not, nevertheless can cease to be what it was. And so that alone which not only is not changed, but also cannot at all be changed, is most truly said to be,"[1] and this is the substance of Father and Son and Holy Spirit. And so the Apostle, speaking of God, says: *Who alone has immortality.*[2]

2. WHAT IS THE TRUE IMMORTALITY WHICH EXISTS IN THE CREATOR ALONE. For as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 1, "since the soul in some fashion is said to be and is immortal, he would not say *alone has immortality*, unless true immortality consists in unchangeableness, which no creature can have, because it is the Creator's alone."[3] And so James says: *With whom there is no change or shadow of swerving*;[4] and David: *You will change them, and they shall be changed; but you are the same.*[5] And Augustine, *On Genesis*, says that God does not move through places or times, but the creature moves through both.[6] To move through times is to change according to affections. But God cannot change according to place or affection, for as he said through the Prophet: *I am God, and I do not change.*[7] He alone is unchangeable, and so he alone is rightly said to have immortality.

3. As Augustine says, *Against Maximinus*: "For in any changeable nature, change itself is a kind of death, because it brings it about that something which used to be in that nature no longer is. And so even the

[7]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n11.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c2 n3.
[2]1 Tim. 6, 16.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c1 n2.
[4]James 1, 17.
[5]Ps. 101, 27-28.
[6]Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 8 c20 n39.
[7]Mal. 3, 6.

human soul, which is said to be immortal because it never ceases to live in some manner proper to it, nevertheless has some sort of death proper to it. For if it used to live justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was sinful and becomes justified, it dies to sin. Let me pass over its other changes, of which it would be too long to speak. The nature of celestial beings was also able to die, since it was able to sin. For even angels sinned and became demons, whose chief is the devil. But even those who did not sin were able to do so. And if it is granted to any rational creature no longer to be able to sin, this is not of its own nature, but by God's grace. And so it is *God alone*, as the Apostle says, who *has immortality,*[8] who, not by another's grace, but by his own nature, neither could, nor can, suffer any change, and never was, nor will ever be, able to sin by any change."[9]

4. Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "And so, although it is difficult, it is necessary to know and contemplate the substance of God which, without suffering any change of its own, makes changeable things and, without any temporal movement of its own, creates temporal things."[10] And so the essence of the divinity alone, which establishes all other natures without itself suffering change, is truly and properly unchangeable.

Chapter 3 (23)

HERE ON SIMPLICITY.—WHY THE CREATURE IS MANIFOLD AND NOT SIMPLE. The same substance alone is properly and truly simple in which there is no diversity or change or multiplicity of parts, or accidents, or of any other forms. In order to understand how that substance is simple, as Augustine teaches you in *On the Trinity*, book 6, "first consider why each creature is manifold and not at all truly simple."[1] And so first [let us consider] the bodily creature and then the spiritual one.

Chapter 4 (24)

1. HERE HE SHOWS WHY THE BODILY CREATURE IS MANIFOLD. "The bodily creature is surely made up of parts, so that one finds there greater and smaller parts, and the whole is greater than any of its parts. And in each body, size is one thing, colour another, and shape yet another. For even with a diminished size, colour and shape may remain the same, and shape

[8]1 Tim. 6, 16.
[9]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c12 n2.
[10]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c1 n3.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c6 n8.

and size may remain the same, despite a change of colour. And this proves that the nature of the body is manifold, and not at all simple."[1]

2. HERE HE SHOWS HOW THE SPIRITUAL CREATURE IS MANIFOLD AND NOT SIMPLE. "As for the spiritual creature, such as the soul, it is simple in comparison to the body; but if it is not compared to the body, then it is manifold and not simple. It is said to be simple with respect to the body because bulkwise it is not diffused through space, but in each body it is whole in the whole body and also whole in each of the body's parts. And so, when something which the soul can feel happens even in the smallest part of the body, even though it does not happen in the body in its entirety, the entire soul feels it, because the thing does not escape the notice of the soul in its entirety. And yet true simplicity is not to be found even in the soul itself. For as it is one thing to be skilful, another to be indolent, another to be insightful, another to be mindful, and since desire is one thing, fear another, joy another, and sadness another, and since these and innumerable other such things can be found in the soul's nature, some of them without the others, and some more or less than others, it is clear that this nature is not simple, but manifold. For nothing simple is changeable; but every creature is changeable,"[2] therefore no creature is truly simple.

3. "But God, although he is called in many ways, yet is truly and most highly simple. Thus, he is called great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else it does not seem unworthy to say of him. But his greatness is the same as his wisdom, for he is great in power, and not in bulk. And his goodness is the same as his wisdom and greatness and truth, and in him it is not one thing to be blessed and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or simply to be."[3]

Chapter 5 (25)

HOW GOD, ALTHOUGH HE IS SIMPLE, YET IS CALLED IN MANY WAYS. Here it is to be diligently noted why, although Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, yet he says that God is called in many ways.—But he does not say this because of a diversity of accidents or parts, but due to the diversity and multitude of names which are used about God. Although the names are manifold, yet they signify one thing, namely the divine nature. For these names are not to be taken in the same way when they are applied to that unchangeable and eternal substance, which is incomparably simpler than the human spirit, as when they are applied to creatures.—Hence Augustine,

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c6 n8.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid., bk 6 c7.

in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "For God, to be is the same as to be strong or to be wise, or as any other thing which can be affirmed concerning this simple multiplicity, or this manifold simplicity, in order to signify his substance. But for the human spirit, to be is not the same as to be strong, or to be prudent, or just, for a spirit can exist and have none of these virtues."[1]

Chapter 6 (26)

GOD'S SIMPLICITY IS SUCH THAT IT IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY PREDICATION. In *On the Trinity*, book 5, Augustine shows that in the nature of the Godhead there is no diversity of accidents and no changeableness whatever, but a perfect simplicity. He says: "Insofar as we can, let us understand God to be good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, fixed in the first rank without position, containing all things without grasp, in his entirety everywhere without place, eternal without time, maker of all changeable things without himself changing, and suffering nothing. Whoever conceives of God in this way, although he cannot yet find all that God is, nevertheless let him exercise pious care, insofar as he may, not to think anything of him that he is not."[1] Note that, if you consider it subtly, you will see clearly from what is said above that those predicates of the dialectical art are not at all suitable for God's nature, which is subject to no accidents.

Chapter 7 (27)

THAT GOD IS NOT PROPERLY CALLED A SUBSTANCE AND IT IS MOST IMPROPER TO DO SO. Hence, God is not properly called a substance, as Augustine shows in *On the Trinity*, book 7: "Just as God is called essence from the fact that he is being, so from the fact that he is subsistence, we call him substance, if it is worthy to say that God subsists. For this term is properly applied to those things in which, as in a subject, are to be found those attributes which we describe as being in a certain subject, such as colour and shape in a body. For the body subsists, and so is a substance. It follows that changeable things, but not simple ones, are properly called substances. But if God subsists in such a way that he may properly be called a substance, then something is in him, as if in a subject, and he is not simple. But it is gravely impious to say that God subsists and is the subject of his own goodness, and that that goodness is not a substance, or rather an essence, and that God is not himself his own goodness, but that it is to be found in him as in a subject. And so it is clearly seen that it is an improper

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c4 n6.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c1 n2.

usage to call God a substance, so that he may be understood by a term more common than that of essence. This latter term is truly and properly applied to God, so that perhaps it is fitting to call God alone an essence. For he alone truly is because he is unchangeable."[1]

Chapter 8 (28)

1. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING WHICH IS NOT GOD. The simplicity and purity of this essence is such that there is nothing in it which is not itself, and the one who possesses and what is possessed is the same. Hence, Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says: "God, who is life, is not composed of many parts, nor is he who is power made of weak elements, nor is he who is light mixed with any shadow, nor is he who is spirit shaped by disparate elements. All that is in him is one."[1]—The same [Hilary], in *On the Trinity*, book 8: "Unlike human beings, God is not a composite being so that in him there is no difference between what is possessed by him and he who possesses. But all that he is is life, namely a perfect and infinite nature, and not composed of disparate elements, but the same life permeating the whole."[2]—Concerning this same matter, Boethius, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, says: "For this reason, this is truly one in which there is no number and there is nothing else in it other than what is; for it cannot become a subject."[3]—And Augustine too, in the book *On Faith to Peter*, says: "In God's substance, there is nothing which is not substance, as if in it substance were one thing and whatever is accidental to substance another thing; whereas whatever can be perceived in it is substance. And indeed, these things can be said and it is easy to believe them, but they cannot at all be seen, except with a pure heart."[4]—The same [Augustine], in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "Each quality is possessed in the nature of each of the three so that he who possesses is also what is being possessed, as an unchangeable and simple substance."[5] Hence Isidore says: "God is called simple either because he does not lose what he possesses, or because he is not one thing and what is in him another thing."[6]

2. And although the divine nature is of such great simplicity and purity, yet there is in it a trinity of persons. Hence Augustine says, in *On the City of God*, book 11: "We do not call the nature of the highest good simple because the Father alone exists in it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 cc4-5 nn9-10.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n27.
[2]Ibid., bk 8 n43.
[3]Boethius, *Opusc. 1: De sancta Trinitate*, c2.
[4]Augustine, *De fide et symbolo*, c9 n20.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n28.
[6]Isidore, *Sententiae*, I c1 n6; *Etymologiae*, VII, c1 n26.

alone, as the Sabellians thought, namely that the Trinity is merely nominal, without the existence of persons. But it is called simple because it is what it possesses, except that each person is named relative to another, but is not the other. For it is true that the Father has a Son, in relation to whom he is named, yet he is not the Son; and the Son has a Father, yet he himself is not the Father. But in what is said in regard to himself, apart from his relation to the other, he is what he possesses. Thus, in having life, he is called alive with regard to himself, and he is the very life which is in him. It is for this reason that this nature is called simple, because there is no distinction between the one who possesses and the thing which is possessed, as is the case in all other things. For the liquid's container is not the liquid, and the body is not its colour, and the soul is not wisdom."[7]

3. See how, according to the ability of our debility, we have pointed out how great is the sameness, how great the unity, unchangeableness, simplicity, and purity of the divine substance.

DISTINCTION IX

Chapter 1 (29)

ON THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS. Now let us proceed to the distinction of persons. Augustine teaches in the book *On Faith to Peter*: "And so let us hold the Father and Son and Holy Spirit to be one God by nature, and yet that the Father is not the same as the one who is the Son, nor is the Son the same as the one who is the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the same as he who is the Father or the Son. For the essence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one, in which the Father is not one thing, and the Son another, and the Holy Spirit yet another, although in regard to person the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit yet another."[1]

Chapter 2 (30)

1. HERE ON THE COETERNITY OF THE SON WITH THE FATHER. For the Son is begotten of the Father, and thus is another; but the Father did not exist earlier than the Son, because the three persons are coeternal with each other.

2. THE ARGUMENT OF THE ARIANS. But a heretic speaks against this, as Ambrose reports in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "Whatever is born has a

[7]Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, bk 11 c10 nn1-2.

[1]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n5.

beginning; and so, because he is a son, he has a beginning and began to be. This was uttered by the mouth of heretics."[1] For as Augustine recalled in *On the Trinity*, book 6, "Arius himself is reported to have said: If he is a son, he was born; if he was born, there was a time when the son was not."[2]

3. THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE OF AUGUSTINE. He who says this, "does not understand that even to have been born is eternal in God, so that the Son is coeternal with the Father. In the same way, the light which issues and spreads from fire is coeval with it and would be coeternal, if the fire were eternal."[3]

4. AUGUSTINE'S OBJECTION AGAINST THE HERETIC. Also, Augustine says: "If the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God, and God has never been without his power and wisdom, the Son is coeternal with God the Father. But the Apostle says that *Christ* is *the power of God and the wisdom of God*.[4] Thus, either there never was a time when the Son was not, or at some time God did not have his power and wisdom, which it is senseless to assert."[5] For it is clear that God always had wisdom, and so he always had the Son.

5. AMBROSE'S RESPONSE TO THE SAME, STRENGTHENED BY AUTHORITY. Ambrose responds in the following manner to the same Arian question: "I confess that the Son is begotten; the rest [of what they say] is impious, and I avoid it with horror."[6] "To cite only one text from among many, it is written in the Old Testament: *Before me, there was no other God, and there shall be none after me*.[7] Who is it that says this, the Father or the Son? If the Son, he says: *Before me, there was no other God*; if the Father, he says: *After me, there shall be none*. The one has none before him, the other none after him."[8]

6. AMBROSE USES REASON AGAINST THE HERETIC. "For it is equally the case that the Father is known in the Son and the Son in the Father.[9] For whenever you mention the Father, you have also spoken of the Son, because no one is a father to his own self. And when you name the Son, you also acknowledge the Father, because no one is a son to his own self. And so neither can the Son be without the Father, nor the Father without the Son. And so the Father is always, and so is the Son."[10]

[1]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c11 n73.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c1 n1.
[3]Ibid.
[4]1 Cor. 1, 24.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c1 n1.
[6]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c11 n73.
[7]Is. 43, 10.
[8]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c8 n55.
[9]Cf. Jn. 14, 9-10.
[10]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c8 n55.

7. AMBROSE'S ATTACK AGAINST THE HERETIC. Also: "So, tell me, heretic, was there ever a time when the all-powerful God was not the Father, and yet was God? For if he began to be the Father, then he was first God and afterwards became the Father. But then, how is God unchangeable? For if he was first God and afterwards the Father, surely he has been changed by the addition of begetting. But may God preserve us from this insanity."[11] "He always had his wisdom, and so he always had the Son."[12]

Chapter 3 (31)

1. IT IS INEFFABLE HOW HE MAY BE SON, AND NOT HAVE THE FATHER [EXIST] BEFORE HIM, JUST AS THE MANNER OF HIS BEGETTING IS INEFFABLE AND UNINTELLIGIBLE. Ambrose says: "But you ask of me how, if he be the Son, he does not have the Father [exist] before him? But I similarly ask of you how you believe the Son to have been begotten? For it is impossible for me to understand the secret of this begetting. The mind fails, the voice is silent, and not only mine, but also that of angels. This matter is above the Powers, and above the Angels, and above the Cherubim, and above the Seraphim, and above all understanding, because it is written: *The peace of Christ is above all understanding.*[1] And if the peace of Christ is above all understanding, how can such a begetting not be above all understanding? Therefore, cover your mouth with your hand, because it is not lawful to search the highest mysteries.[2] It is lawful to know that he is begotten, but not to discuss the manner of his begetting. It is not lawful for me to deny the former, but I am afraid to investigate the latter."[3] For that begetting is ineffable; hence Isaias: *Who shall recount his generation?*[4]

2. SOME PRESUME TO DISCUSS THE PROCESS OF THAT GENERATION. But there are some who, with excessive trust in their own intelligence, say that that generation can be understood, and other such things. They [claim to] follow that text of Jerome, *On Ecclesiastes*: "In sacred Scripture, *who* is very often used to denote not what is impossible, but what is difficult, as in the text: *Who shall recount his generation*?"[5,6] But Jerome did not mean by this that the Son's eternal generation can be fully understood or explained by any mortal, but only that it is possible to understand or say something

[11]Cf. Ibid., bk 1 c9 nn58-60.
[12]Ibid., bk 1 c10 n62.

[1]Phil. 4, 7.
[2]Cf. Eccli. 3, 22.
[3]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c10 nn64-65.
[4]Is. 53, 8.
[5]Is. 53, 8.
[6]Jerome, *In Ecclesiasten*, c3, 21.

concerning it. Nevertheless, some take this text to apply to Christ's generation in time.

Chapter 4 (32)

1. WHETHER IT OUGHT TO BE SAID THAT 'THE SON IS FOREVER GENERATED' OR 'WAS FOREVER GENERATED.' Since the Son's generation from the Father is eternal, and so has neither beginning nor end, it may now be asked whether we ought to say: The Son is forever generated, or was forever generated, or will forever be generated.

2. Concerning this, Gregory on Job says: "Jesus, Lord and God, insofar as he is the power and wisdom of God,[1] was born of the Father before all time, or better, because he neither began nor ceased to be born, let us more truly say 'was forever born.' For we cannot say 'is forever being born,' lest he seem to be imperfect. Indeed, in order that he may be known to be both eternal and perfect, let us say both forever and born, seeing that 'born' pertains to his perfection and 'forever' to his eternity. And yet, even by our use of 'perfect,' we depart much from the enunciation of the truth of the matter, because whatever is not made cannot properly be said to be perfected. It is with stammers that we sing out,[2] as best we can, the high things of God; and "the Lord, with words of condescension toward our weakness, says: *Be perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect.*"[3,4]

3. Augustine addresses this question of the begetting of the Son in his comments on that phrase of the psalm: *Today I have begotten you.*[5] He says: "The term *today* may also designate that day on which Christ was born according to the flesh. But because *today* indicates the present, and in eternity there is neither something that is past, as if it had ceased to be, nor something that is future, as if it did not yet exist, but only the present, because whatever is eternal always is, that is why *today* is more divinely applied to the eternal begetting of the wisdom of God."[6] Note that, by these words, Augustine clearly shows that the begetting of the Son always is; it neither ceased to be, nor is in the future, because it is eternal. That is why he said *I have begotten*, lest it be thought to be a new thing, in other words, lest it be thought to have had a beginning; he said *today* lest the begetting be thought to be past.—From these words of the Prophet, as John Chrysos-

[1]Cf. 1 Cor. 1, 24.
[2]Cf. Gregory, *Moralia*, 5 c36 n66.
[3]Mt. 5, 48.
[4]Gregory, *Moralia*, 29 c1.
[5]Ps. 2, 7.
[6]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 2, 7, n6.

tom says, "nothing else is manifested than the fact that the Son is forever generated from the very essence of the Father."[7]

4. ORIGEN APPEARS TO CONTRADICT THIS, FOR HE SAYS THAT THE SON IS ALWAYS BEING GENERATED OF THE FATHER. But Origen, commenting on Jeremias, says that the Son is always being generated from the Father; he says: "Our Saviour is the wisdom of God; but wisdom is the splendour of eternal light; it follows that our Saviour is the splendour of brilliance. But splendour is not born only once, and then ceases; as often as the light arises from which the splendour emanates, so often does also the splendour of brilliance arise. It follows that the Saviour is forever being born. That is why he says in the book of Wisdom: *Before all the hills, he generates me*, and not, as some wrongly read, *has generated me*."[8,9] By these words, Origen plainly shows that it may well, indeed must, be said: 'The Son is forever being born'; but this is contrary to Gregory's earlier statement, namely "We cannot say: he is forever being born."[10]

5. Augustine discusses the ever born in his book *84 Questions*. He says: "It is better to say 'forever born' than 'who is forever being born,' because one who is forever being born is not yet born, and he never is or will be born if he is always being born. For it is one thing to be being born and another to be born, and by this he is never the Son if he is never born. But he is the Son because he is born; because he is forever the Son, he is forever born."[11]

6. HE EXPOUNDS THE EARLIER WORDS OF GREGORY LEST THERE BE THOUGHT TO BE CONTRADICTION AMONG THE DOCTORS. But lest such great authors should appear to contradict each other on such a great matter, let us interpret those words of Gregory with benignity. He says: "The Lord Jesus was born of the Father before all time, or better, because he neither began nor ceased to be born, let us more truly say: 'was forever born.'"[12]—QUESTION REGARDING GREGORY'S WORDS. But why is this statement said to be truer, namely that the Son was forever born, than the other, namely that he was born of the Father before all time? For a sincere and Catholic faith holds and preaches both the former and the latter.—HERE HE RESOLVES THE ISSUE. And so why does he say, 'Let us more truly say,' when each is equally true? Except because he wanted it to be understood that the one expresses and clarifies the truth more than the other. For by these words, the door is shut to the wiles of the heretics, to whom it is shown that

[7]John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, hom. 2 n4.
[8]Prov. 8, 25.
[9]Origen, *In Ieremiam*, hom. 9 n4.
[10]See above, n2.
[11]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 37.
[12]Above, in n2.

Christ's begetting according to his divinity is perfect, without beginning and without end. For the truth is not always made entirely clear by such expressions as 'The Son was born of the Father before all time,' or 'The Son is forever born of the Father.' And so Gregory says that "we cannot say: 'is forever born,'" at least not as fittingly or aptly for an explanation of the truth. Nevertheless, the expression can be used, if it is understood well. For the Son is forever being born of the Father, as Origen says, not because the generation is being repeated each day, but because it always is. Thus, 'he is forever being born,' that is, his birth is eternal.

7. FROM HILARY'S WORDS, HE CONFIRMS THAT THE SON IS ALWAYS GENERATED. Hilary too says that the Son is born from the Father; in *On the Trinity*, book 7, he asserts: "He is the living God and the power of the eternal nature is of the living God; whatever is born from him with the mystery of his knowledge could not be other than living. For in saying, *As the living Father has sent me, I also live through the Father*,[13] he taught that it is through the living Father that there is life in himself."[14] Note that you have here that the Son is born from the Father.—Also, in the same place: "When Christ says, *As the Father has life in himself, so he has also given to the Son to have life in himself*,[15] he gives testimony that all that lives in him is from the living God. That a living God was born from a living God means that his birth was complete without a new nature [coming into being]. For there is nothing new when a living God is generated by a living God because it does not come from nothing. And life which takes its birth from life, because of the unity of nature and the mystery of perfect birth, must necessarily live in the living God and have the life of the living God in itself."[16] Note that here you have that the living Son is generated from the living God.—(TAKE NOTE: ALL THAT IS IN GOD LIVES.) Also, in the same place: "All that is in God lives, for God is life, and from life nothing can come except what is living, and this birth is not by derivation, but by power. And so, since all that he is lives, and since all that is born from him is power, the Son receives birth and not change."[17] And here he says that he is born.—Also, in book 9: "The Father grants to the Son to be as great as himself. By the mystery of his birth, the Father imparts to him the image of his own unbegottenness, even as he begets the Son from himself in his own form."[18] Here he says that the Father begets the Son.

[13]Jn. 6, 58.
[14]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n27.
[15]Jn. 5, 26.
[16]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n27.
[17]Ibid., bk 7 n28.
[18]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 n54.

8. HE BRIEFLY TEACHES WHAT IS TO BE GRANTED CONCERNING THIS ISSUE. And so let us say that the Son was born from the Father before all time, and is forever being born from the Father, but, more fittingly, is forever born. We also confess the Son to be from all eternity and coeternal with the Father, that is, with his author. Indeed, the Father, by his generation, is the Son's author, as will be shown below.[19] And so, as the Father is eternal, so is the Son also eternal, but the Father without, while the Son with, an author, because the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten.—And as Hilary says, in *On the Trinity*, book 12, "it is one thing to be forever eternal, without author, but another to be coeternal with the Father, that is, with the author. For where the Father is the author, there is also a birth [and where this author is eternal, the birth is also eternal,] for, as a birth follows from its author, so a birth from an eternal author is eternal. Whatever exists always is also eternal; but it does not follow that everything which is eternal is also unbegotten because whatever is born from all eternity has the character of eternal generation; but whatever is not born has the character of eternal unbegottenness. But if whatever is born from all eternity is not born as itself eternal, it follows that the Father will not be an eternal author. If any part of eternity were lacking to the one who has been born from the eternal Father from all eternity, then it would clearly be the case that the same lack could exist in the author. For if begetting pertains to the begetter endlessly, then to be begotten also pertains to the one who is begotten endlessly. And sense does not allow that we posit some middle thing between God the Son's being begotten and God the Father's begetting. The birth is in the begetting and the begetting in the birth because the one cannot be without the other, and so both occur simultaneously and without any interval between them."[20]

Chapter 5 (33)

1. THE ARGUMENT OF THE HERETIC. "But the heretic will say: Everything that is born did not always exist, because it is born in order to exist."[1]

2. THE RESPONSE OF HILARY. "No one doubts that, among human beings, whatever is born at some time did not exist. But it is one thing to be born from that which was not, and another thing to be born from that which always is. In the first case, the father did not always exist, nor is he always a father; and one who is not always a father did not always beget. But when there is always a father, there is also always a son. And if it is always a property of God the Father that he is forever Father, it must necessarily be

[19]Dist. 13 c4.
[20]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n21.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n22.

always a property of the Son that he is forever Son. And how will it fit with our understanding that he should not always have been, whose property it is always to be what he has been born?"[2]—"And so we confess that the only-begotten God was born, but he was born from before all time; neither did he exist before he was born, nor was he born before he existed. For the birth of something which already exists is not a birth, but a self-wrought change by birth. But this exceeds human understanding and worldly intelligence; the reason of human intelligence does not comprehend this, but it is the profession of a faithful prudence."[3]

DISTINCTION X

Chapter 1 (34)

1. CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND IT IS SAID FIRST THAT HE IS THE LOVE OF THE FATHER AND THE SON. After our discussion of the Son's eternity, "let us now treat of the Holy Spirit, insofar as our gracious God allows us to see into this subject."

2. The Holy Spirit is the love or charity or affection of the Father and the Son. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "The Holy Spirit is neither of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but of both; and so the Spirit suggests to us the common love by which the Father and the Son mutually love one another."[1]

3. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS PROPERLY CALLED LOVE, AND YET THE TRINITY IS LOVE. But in the canonical Epistle, John says: *God is love*.[2] "He did not say: *the Holy Spirit is love*; had he said so, the statement would be more precise, and not a small part of our question would be settled. But because he said: *God is love*, the matter is uncertain, and we must ask whether God the Father is love, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, or whether God the Trinity itself, because that Trinity is not three gods, but one God."[3]

4. JUST AS THE WORD OF GOD IS PROPERLY CALLED WISDOM, AND YET THE WHOLE TRINITY IS CALLED WISDOM, SO ALSO THE HOLY SPIRIT IS PROPERLY CALLED LOVE, AND YET FATHER AND SON AND HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED LOVE. In the same book, Augustine discusses the issue in the following terms: "I do not know why, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit is called wisdom, and all together one wisdom and not three, one

[2]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 nn22-23.
[3]Ibid., bk 12 nn26 and 30.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n27.
[2]1 Jn. 4, 16.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 nn27-28.

cannot also call Father and Son and Holy Spirit love, and all together one love. And so let no one hold that we do anything unfitting by calling the Holy Spirit love, because both God the Father and God the Son can be called love," just as "the Word of God is properly called the wisdom of God, even as the Father and the Holy Spirit is wisdom. Therefore, if one of these three is specifically to be called love, who more fittingly than the Holy Spirit? namely, that, in that simple and highest nature, substance is not one thing and love another, but the substance itself is love, and the love itself is substance, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit, and yet the Holy Spirit is properly called love."[4]See how by these words Augustine plainly shows that, in the Trinity, love is sometimes ascribed to the substance, which is common to the three persons and is entire in each of them, and sometimes especially to the person of the Holy Spirit. In the same way, the wisdom of God is sometimes interpreted as the divine substance and sometimes properly as the Son. And we find that this is done in the case of many other attributes.

Chapter 2 (35)

1. BY MEANS OF EXAMPLES, HE CONFIRMS THAT THE SAME TERMS CAN BE TAKEN BOTH PROPERLY AND UNIVERSALLY. "For it can be taught by many examples that many names of things are used both universally and specifically by application to particular things. Thus, by the term of 'Law' at times are meant all the utterances of the Old Covenant, but at other times that which was given through Moses is specifically called the Law." Many other examples abound, but "length of speech is to be avoided with regard to a clear issue."[1] "And just as we specifically call the one Word of God by the name of wisdom, even though universally the Holy Spirit and the Father is that same wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is properly called by the name of love, even though universally love is also the Father and the Son."[2]

2. HE SETS FORTH AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT FOR PROPERLY CALLING THE SON WISDOM. "But the Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son of God, is plainly called the wisdom of God by the mouth of the Apostle saying: *Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.*"[3,4]

3. HE SEEKS A TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND DISCOVERS WHERE HE IS CALLED LOVE. "We find where the Holy Spirit is called love if we take a close look at the words of the Apostle John. After he had

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 nn28, 30, 29, 30.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n30.
[2]Ibid., bk 15 c17 n31.
[3]1 Cor. 1, 24.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.

said, *Let us love one another, because love is from God*, he added: *And everyone who loves is born of God, because God is love.*[5] Here he has shown that he has called that love God which he has said to be *from God*; and so love is God from God. But since both the Son is born from God the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, the question is deservedly put as to which of these two we more rightly take to be called love. For the Father alone is God in such a way as not to be from God, and so the love which is God in such a way that it is God from God is not the Father himself, but either the Son or the Holy Spirit. But in the lines that follow, after John had mentioned God's love by which he *loves us*, and on this account had said in exhortation, *let us love one another* in such a way that *God may abide*[6] in us,—because, that is, he had called God love, —immediately wishing to state something more explicitly on this subject, he said: *By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit.*[7] See how the Holy Spirit, of whom he has given us, makes us abide in God and him in us. But this is what love does. And so he is God that is love. And note that it is God the Holy Spirit, proceeding from God, who is signified when we read: *God is love* and *Love is from God.*"[8]—See how by these words Augustine plainly asserts that the Holy Spirit is the love of Father and Son. Indeed, his discussion above has gone so far as to seem to assert not only that the Holy Spirit is the love of Father and Son by which they love themselves mutually and us, but also the love by which we love God. But whether he is the love by which we love God will be explained below.[9]

4. HE RETURNS TO SHOW WHAT HE HAD PROPOSED, NAMELY THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THE LOVE BY WHICH THE FATHER IS LOVED BY THE SON, AND THE SON BY THE FATHER. But now let us attend to what we had started to show, namely that the Holy Spirit is the affection or love of Father and Son, namely the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father.—Concerning this, Jerome on Psalm 14 says: "The Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but the love which the Father has toward the Son and the Son toward the Father."[10]

5. HERE IS MADE CLEAR WHAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS. Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, also says: "The Son is in all things equal to the Father, and he is of one and the same substance [with him]. And so the Holy Spirit is also in the same unity and equality. For whether it is a question of the unity,

[5]1 Jn. 4, 7-8.
[6]1 Jn. 4, 10-11.
[7]1 Jn. 4, 13.
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.
[9]Dist. 17.
[10]*Breviarium in Ps.* 17.

or of the holiness, or of the love of the first two persons, it is clear that it is not one of these two who is the one by whom the two are joined, or by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves the one who has begotten him, and that these two persons exist, not by participation, but by their own essence, not by the gift of any superior, but by their own [gift], *preserving the unity of spirit in the bond of peace*."[11,12] See how you have here that it is by the Holy Spirit that the Son is loved by the Father and the Father by the Son, and by whom these two preserve the unity of peace.—As Augustine says in the same place, "The Holy Spirit, then, whatever it may be, is something common to the Father and the Son: but that communion is consubstantial and coeternal. And if this may fittingly be called a friendship, let it be so called; but it is more aptly called love. It is also a substance because God is a substance and *God is love*.[13] And so there are three and no more: the one loving the other who is from him, and the one loving the other from whom he is, and the love itself. And if the last is nothing, how is God love? If it is not a substance, how is God a substance?"[14]

Chapter 3 (36)

THAT JUST AS THE HOLY SPIRIT IS COMMON TO THE FATHER AND THE SON, SO HE HAS A COMMON NAME PROPER [TO HIMSELF]. Here it is to be noted that, just as the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is especially called love, which is the union of Father and Son, so he properly has a name which is in some way suitable to Father and Son in common. Hence Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "If the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father ineffably demonstrates the communion of these two persons, what is more fitting than that that spirit which is common to both is specifically called love? Indeed, it is more sensible to believe and understand that it is not the Holy Spirit alone who is love in that Trinity; and yet, because of what we have said, it is not without reason that the Holy Spirit in particular is called love. Just as in the Trinity he is not alone in being spirit, or holy, because both the Father and the Son are both spirit and holy, and yet it is not without reason that this person is called the Holy Spirit. For he who is common to the other two is properly called that which the other two are called commonly. Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, it follows that the Son is not the Son of the Father alone, but also of the Holy Spirit. For the Apostle says of God the Father,

[11]Cf. Eph. 4, 3.
[12]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 cc4-5 nn6-7.
[13]1 Jn. 4, 16.
[14]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c5 n7.

He has brought us into the kingdom of the Son of his love.[1] Therefore, if there is no love in that Trinity other than the Holy Spirit, the Son is also the Son of the Holy Spirit. But because this is most absurd, we must conclude that the Holy Spirit is not the only love to be found there, but for the reasons which we have sufficiently outlined, he is properly so called."[2]

DISTINCTION XI

Chapter 1 (37)

1. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON. Here, it must be stated that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, and proceeds from the Father and the Son; which many heretics have denied.

2. And that he proceeds from both "is proved by many testimonies of divine utterances."[1] For the Apostle says: *God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts.*[2] See, here he is called the Spirit of the Son. And also: *But he who does not have the Spirit of Christ cannot belong to him.*[3] And the Son himself says of the Holy Spirit in the Gospel: *Whom I send to you from the Father.*[4]—"And he is called Spirit of the Father when we read: *If the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead dwells in you.*"[5,6] And Christ himself says: *For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you.*[7] And in another place: *Whom the Father will send in my name.*[8] And elsewhere, the same Son says of the Holy Spirit: *He proceeds from the Father.*[9] By these and many other authorities, it is shown that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

3. THAT THE GREEKS DO NOT GRANT THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE SON. But the Greeks say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and not from the Son.—FIRST REASON WHY THEY SAY THIS. And they say this because Truth, in the Gospel which contains the whole of faith, speaking of the procession of the Holy Spirit, names the Father

[1]Col. 1, 13.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n37.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26.
[2]Gal. 4, 6.
[3]Rom. 8, 9.
[4]Jn. 15, 26.
[5]Rom. 8, 11.
[6]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n1.
[7]Mt. 10, 20.
[8]Jn. 14, 26.
[9]Jn. 15, 26.

alone and says: *The Spirit who proceeds from the Father.*[10]—SECOND REASON. And also because in the principal Councils which were held in their parts, Creeds were approved, to which were appended anathemas declaring it unlawful for anyone to teach or preach concerning faith in the Trinity anything other than what was there contained. And since in those Creeds the Spirit is remembered as proceeding from the Father, and not from the Son, they say that whoever adds procession from the Son incurs anathema; and so they argue that we have incurred anathema.—THIRD REASON. To confirm their opinion and provide evidence of our condemnation, they additionally speak of the Symbol of faith which, in accordance with the tradition of the said Councils, Leo III had transcribed at Rome on a silver tablet, that was placed behind the altar of blessed Paul, and which he left to posterity, as he says, for the sake of love and the safeguarding of the orthodox faith. In that Creed, the Father alone is mentioned in regard to the procession of the Spirit, in these words: "And the Holy Spirit, lord and giver of life, proceeding from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified," etc.[11] This is the Creed which is sung at Mass; it was proclaimed at the Council of Nicaea, and at its conclusion it was added: "Whoever should teach or preach otherwise, let him be anathema."[12] And so the Greeks say that we have incurred anathema because we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, which is not contained there. For in the phrase which we use there, "who proceeds from the Father and the Son," something else has been added by the Latins, namely "and the Son."

4. RESPONSE IN WHICH THE ABOVE ARE DETERMINED. But we determine the above words in the following manner: 'Whoever should teach or preach otherwise,' that is, whoever should teach the contrary or preach in a contrary manner, let him be anathema. 'Otherwise,' therefore, was used for 'the opposite,' as the Apostle did in the Epistle to the Galatians: *If anyone should evangelize otherwise*, that is, to the contrary, *let him be anathema.*[13] He does not say: *If anyone should add [anything else]*, "for," as Augustine says, "if he had said so, he would have prejudged himself, since he desired to come among some of those to whom he was writing, such as the Thessalonians, in order to supply what was lacking in their faith.[14] But one who supplies adds what was missing, and does not take away what was already there. He who transgresses the rule of faith does not progress in the way, but deviates from it."[15]—ANOTHER RESPONSE. As to the objection

[10]Jn. 15, 26.
[11]Constantinopolitan Creed.
[12]Ibid.
[13]Gal. 1, 8.
[14]Cf. 1 Thess. 3, 10.
[15]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 98 n7.

which they make from the Gospel, we respond as follows: Although in that text Truth says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, he does not add *alone*, and so he does not deny that the Spirit proceeds also from himself.[16] But he names the Father alone, "because he usually refers to the Father even that which is his own,"[17] because he has it from the Father.

Chapter 2 (38)

1. THAT THE GREEKS AGREE WITH US AS TO THE MEANING, EVEN THOUGH THEY DIFFER IN REGARD TO THE WORDS. But it is to be known that the Greeks confess the Holy Spirit to be of the Son, just as he is of the Father, because the Apostle too says: *The Spirit of the Son*,[1] and Truth affirms in the Gospel: *The Spirit of truth*.[2] But since for the Holy Spirit to be of the Father and of the Son is nothing else than to be from the Father and the Son, in this too they seem to agree in the same understanding of faith with us, even though they disagree as to the words.

2. BY AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS OF THE GREEKS, HE SHOWS THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS ALSO FROM THE SON. And so it is that some of their Catholic teachers, understanding that the meaning of the above words, by which the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Son and be of the Son, is one and the same, have professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. Hence, Athanasius, in the *Symbol of Faith*: "The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."[3] See, he plainly says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

3. Didymus, too, their greatest teacher, in the book *On the Holy Spirit*, says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: "The Saviour, who is Truth, says: *For he will not speak from his own self*,[4] that is, not without me, nor without my authority or the Father's, because he is inseparable from me and from the Father's will, because he is not from himself; he is from the Father and me. For this very thing, that he is and speaks, comes to him from the Father and me."[5] Also: "The Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of truth and the Spirit of wisdom, cannot hear from the Son's speech anything he does not know because he is the very thing which is being spoken by the

[16]Cf. Jn. 15, 26.
[17]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c27 n48.

[1]Gal. 4, 6.
[2]Jn. 16, 13.
[3]Athanasian Creed.
[4]Jn. 16, 13.
[5]Didymus, *De Spiritu sancto*, n34.

Son, namely God proceeding from God, the Spirit of truth proceeding from Truth, the consoler emanating from consolation."[6]

4. Also, Bishop Cyril, in the *Epistle* addressed to Nestorius, says: "The Spirit is understood *per se* according to his being the Spirit and not the Son, and yet he is not alien from the Son. For he is called the Spirit of truth, and flows from him as also from the Father."[7]

5. John Chrysostom, too, in a homily *On the Exposition of the Creed*, speaks as follows: "This is the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son, who shares out his gifts *as he wills*."[8,9] The same, in another homily: "The Holy Spirit is to be believed to be of the Father and of the Son. We say that this Holy Spirit is coequal to the Father and the Son and proceeds from the Father and the Son. Believe this, lest *evil talk corrupt good customs*."[10,11]—See how we have clear testimonies from the teachers of the Greeks by which it is shown that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. And so *let every tongue confess*[12] that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

DISTINCTION XII

Chapter 1 (39)

1. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FIRST OR MORE FULLY FROM THE FATHER THAN FROM THE SON. Also, the question is raised whether, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he proceeded earlier or more fully from the Father than from the Son.

2. THE ARGUMENT OF THE HERETIC. This is what the heretic attempts to show, saying: "If the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father, either he proceeded when the Son was already born, or before the Son was born. If he proceeded after the Son was already born, then the Son was born before the Holy Spirit could proceed; therefore the birth of the Son had preceded the procession of the Holy Spirit. But if he proceeded from the Father while the Son was not yet begotten, the Spirit proceeded before the Son had been begotten."

[6]Ibid.
[7]Cyril, *Epistola 17.*
[8]Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 11.
[9]John Mediocris, bishop of Naples, *Sermones XXXI*, sermon 26.
[10]1 Cor. 15, 33.
[11]John Mediocris, *Sermones XXXI*, sermon 27.
[12]Cf. Phil. 2, 11.

3. THE RESPONSE OF AUGUSTINE TO THE FIRST QUESTION, NAMELY WHETHER THE SPIRIT PROCEEDED EARLIER FROM THE FATHER THAN FROM THE SON. To these and similar questions, which are more labourious than fruitful, Augustine provides a response in *On the Trinity*, book 15, saying: "In that highest Trinity, which is God, there are no intervals of time by which it may be shown, or at least asked, whether the Son was first born of the Father, and afterwards the Holy Spirit proceeded from both of them."[1] "Can we therefore ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or whether the Spirit had not yet proceeded and, after the birth of the Son, proceeded from both? It is absolutely impossible to raise such questions where nothing is begun in time in order to be completed at a later time. And so let him who can understand the begetting of the Son from the Father outside time also understand the procession of the Holy Spirit from both outside time."[2] See how by these words is resolved that question concerning whether the Holy Spirit had proceeded earlier from the Father than from the Son.

Chapter 2 (40)

1. HERE IS ADDRESSED THE SECOND QUESTION, NAMELY WHETHER THE SPIRIT HAD PROCEEDED MORE FULLY OR MORE FROM THE FATHER THAN FROM THE SON. Now we must address the question posed second, namely whether the Holy Spirit proceeds more fully or to a greater extent from the Father than from the Son.—To which we say that, just as he does not proceed earlier from the Father than from the Son, so he does not proceed more or more fully from the Father than from the Son.

2. THAT AUGUSTINE SAYS THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS PRINCIPALLY FROM THE FATHER. Nevertheless Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father: "But it is not without reason that in this Trinity none but the Son is called the Word of God, and none but the Holy Spirit [is called] the Gift of God, and none but God the Father alone is the one from whom the Word is generated and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds."[1] See how you have heard that the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from the Father.

3. IN WHAT SENSE HE SAID THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS PRINCIPALLY FROM THE FATHER. But lest this should trouble you, he immediately makes clear in what sense he said this, adding: "I added 'principally' for this reason: because we find that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son;

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n45.
[2]Ibid., bk 15 c26 n47.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n29.

but this too the Father gave to the Son, not as to one who already existed, and did not yet have this. But whatever he gave to the only-begotten Word, he gave it in the begetting. He so generated him that the common Gift should also proceed from him, and the Holy Spirit should be the spirit of both."[2]— See how he himself explained how the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father: not because he proceeds earlier or to a greater extent from the Father than from the Son, but that, as he proceeds from the Son, this too the Son has from the Father.

4. IN THE SAME SENSE, THE HOLY SPIRIT IS SAID TO PROCEED PROPERLY FROM THE FATHER. In the same sense, the Spirit is also said to proceed properly from the Father. Hence Jerome, in the *Exposition of the Catholic Faith and the Nicene Creed*, says: "We believe in the Holy Spirit, who properly proceeds from the Father."[3] Also: "We find in Scripture that the Holy Spirit is true God and properly from the Father."[4] And also: "The Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit properly and truly from the Father."[5] See how he plainly says that the Holy Spirit properly is from the Father and properly proceeds from the Father.—But this is not to be understood as if the Holy Spirit proceeded earlier or more fully from the Father than from the Son, but in the sense that the Father has this from himself and not from another, namely that the Holy Spirit be and proceed from him; but the Son has this not from himself, but from the Father, namely that the Holy Spirit be and proceed from him.

5. IN THE SAME SENSE, THE HOLY SPIRIT IS SAID TO BE AND TO BE SENT FROM THE FATHER THROUGH THE SON. It is perhaps also in this sense that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent from the Father through the Son, and to be from the Father through the Son. Hence Hilary, speaking to God the Father about the Holy Spirit and the Son, in *On the Trinity*, book 12, says: "In your Holy Spirit, who comes from you and is sent through him."[6] Also: "The Only-begotten, who was born of you from before all times, abides, so that your Holy Spirit is from you through him. And even if I cannot perceive this with my comprehension, yet I hold it in my consciousness, for in your spiritual matters I am obtuse."[7]—Also, in the same place: "Preserve, I beg you, this pious faith of mine, so that I may always hold fast to what I professed in the Creed of my rebirth: namely, that I may adore you, the Father, together with your Son, and that I may also be deserving of your Holy Spirit, who is from you through your Only-begotten."[8] See how he

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n29.
[3]Jerome, *Epistola 17*, n1.
[4]Ibid., n3.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n55.
[7]Ibid., bk 12 n56.
[8]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n57.

plainly says that the Holy Spirit both is sent and is from the Father through the Son.—This is not to be understood as if the Spirit were or were sent by the Father through the Son as an inferior, but that he is from the Father and the Son, and is sent by both; but the Son has this from the Father: that the Holy Spirit is and is sent from him. This is what Hilary meant to signify, making a distinction in his language to show that authority resides in the Father. That is also what Truth, showing the Father to be the author of the procession by which the Spirit proceeds from the Son, said in the Gospel: *He proceeds from the Father*,[9] even though the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

6. AUGUSTINE, IN *ON THE TRINITY*, BOOK 15. QUESTION AS TO WHY THE SON SAID CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT: HE PROCEEDS FROM THE FATHER, EVEN THOUGH HE PROCEEDS FROM BOTH. Hence Augustine asks: "If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, why did the Son say: *He proceeds from the Father*?[10] (SOLUTION.) Why do you think he did so, unless because he usually ascribes even what is his own to the Father, from whom he himself is, as he says: *My teaching is not my own, but of him who sent me*?[11] (SIMILAR TYPE OF ARGUMENT.) If his teaching, which he nevertheless said is not his own but the Father's, is understood here, how much more it is to be understood that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him there, where he says: *He proceeds from the Father*, so that he might not say, 'he does not proceed from me'? It is from the Father that the Son has his divine being, for he is God from God; from the same Father, the Son has that the Holy Spirit proceed from him too. And it is also from the Father that the Holy Spirit has his procession also from the Son as he proceeds from the Father."[12]—"Therefore, let him who can understand in that which the Son says, *As the Father has life in himself, he has also given to the Son to have life in himself*,[13] not that the Father gave life to the Son already existing without life, but that the Father so begot the Son outside time that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting him is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave it. Let him also understand that, just as the Father has in himself the procession of the Holy Spirit from him, he also gave to the Son that the same Holy Spirit proceed also from him, and both outside all time. Therefore that 'the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father' is said so as to be understood that he also proceeds from the Son, and that the Son's being is from the Father. For if the Son has all that he has from the Father, it is also from the Father that the

[9]Jn. 15, 26.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Jn. 7, 16.
[12]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c27 n48.
[13]Jn. 5, 26.

Holy Spirit proceed also from him belongs to the Son. But let no one conceive of times before or after, because there are no such things there."[14]

DISTINCTION XIII

Chapter 1 (41)

WHY THE HOLY SPIRIT, ALTHOUGH HE IS OF THE FATHER'S SUBSTANCE, IS NOT CALLED BEGOTTEN OR SON, BUT IS ONLY SAID TO PROCEED. It is next to be considered, insofar as the matter may be understood by such as we are, although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is of the Father's substance, why he is not said to be born, but rather to proceed, and why he is not called son.—Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, shows why the Holy Spirit is neither called, nor is, born, and so is not son. He says: "If the Holy Spirit were called son, he would be called the son of both, which is most absurd. For no one is a son of two persons except of a father and mother; far be it from us to suspect any such thing between God the Father and God the Son."[15] "Only with the greatest absurdity would he be called son of both," that is, of Father and Son; "for he would be called the son of both if both had generated him, which is abhorrent to the comprehension of all rational persons. And so he is not generated from both, but proceeds from both and is the Spirit of both."[16] By these words, it is shown why the Holy Spirit, although he is from the Father, yet is not called begotten or son.

Chapter 2 (42)

SINCE THE SPIRIT IS NOT CALLED BEGOTTEN, WHY IS THE SON SAID TO PROCEED. Since the Holy Spirit is not called begotten, but only proceeding, it is usual to ask why the Son is not only called begotten, but also proceeding, as he himself says in the Gospel of John: *I have proceeded* or *come out from God, and have come into the world.*[1] And so it is not the Holy Spirit alone who proceeds from the Father, but also the Son.—To which we say that, although both proceed from the Father, they do so in dissimilar ways. As Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father not as one who is born, but as one who is given,"[2] or as a

[14]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n47.
[15]Ibid., bk 15 c27 n48.
[16]Ibid., bk 15 c26 n47.

[1]Jn. 8, 42.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.

gift; but the Son *proceeded* by being born and *came out* as one begotten, "and by this it becomes as clear as possible why the Holy Spirit is not also son, even though he also comes from the Father. And so he is not called son because neither was he born, like the Only-begotten, nor was he made, so that he might by God's grace be born to adoption[3] like ourselves."[4]

Chapter 3 (43)

1. THAT WE ARE NOT ABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE GENERATION OF THE SON AND THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. But while we are in this life, we are not able to distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.

2. THE QUESTION OF MAXIMINUS. Hence Augustine, responding to Maximinus' reiteration of the above question, namely why the Holy Spirit is not called son, since he is of the Father's substance, said: "You ask me why, if the Son is of the Father's substance, and the Holy Spirit is also of the Father's substance, the one is a son and the other is not a son."[1]

3. AUGUSTINE'S RESPONSE.—THAT THE FATHER IS THE AUTHOR OF THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. "I give you a reply, whether or not you can grasp it. The Son is from the Father, as is the Holy Spirit also, but the former is begotten and the latter proceeds. That is why the former is Son of the Father, from whom he is begotten, but the Spirit is of both because he proceeds from both. And thus, in speaking of the Spirit, the Son says, *He proceeds from the Father*,[2] because the Father is the author of his procession; the same Father generated the Son and, in begetting him, also granted to him that the Holy Spirit proceed also from him. Indeed, if the Holy Spirit did not also proceed from him, he would not say to the disciples: *Receive the Holy Spirit*,[3] and would not give him to them by the act of blowing his breath over them, so signifying plainly by the blowing the procession from himself of the one whom he was hiddenly conferring on them by his breath. And if the Spirit were born not only from the Father, nor only from the Son, but from both, he would undoubtedly be called son of both. It follows that, since he is not at all son of both, it was not fitting that he be born from both; and so he is the Spirit of both because he proceeds from both."[4]

4. HERE HE SAYS THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE TWO THINGS. "As to the difference between being born and proceeding,

[3]Cf. Gal. 4, 5-7.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.

[1]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n1.
[2]Jn. 15, 26.
[3]Jn. 20, 22.
[4]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n1.

who can explain it with regard to that most excellent nature? Not all that proceeds is born, although all that is born proceeds; in the same way, not every two-footed creature is a man, although every man is a two-footed creature. This much I do know. But I do not know how, and am neither able, nor sufficient, to distinguish between that generation and this procession. This is the case because both of them are ineffable, as the Prophet says speaking of the Son: *Who shall recount his generation?*[5] In the same way, it is most truly said of the Holy Spirit, Who shall recount his procession? Let it therefore suffice for us that the Son is not from himself, but from him of whom he is born. The Holy Spirit is not from himself, but from him from whom he proceeds, and, as we have already shown, he proceeds from both."[6]

5. On the topic of the Holy Spirit, we have already sufficiently engaged in disputation above[7] regarding how he is from God, but is not a son, because we read that he is from God by procession, and not by birth.

Chapter 4 (44)

1. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS TO BE CALLED UNBEGOTTEN. It must now be considered, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten, whether he ought to be called unbegotten.

2. As to this, we say that the Holy Spirit is not to be called either begotten or unbegotten. Hence Augustine, *To Orosius*, says: "A sure faith declares the Holy Spirit to be neither begotten, nor unbegotten. If we call him 'unbegotten,' we will seem to affirm [that there are] two fathers; but if 'begotten,' we are guilty of believing in two sons."[1]—For as the Son alone is called begotten, so the Father alone is called unbegotten, because he is not from anyone else. Hence, Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "The Father alone is not from anyone else, and so he alone is called unbegotten, not in the Scriptures, but in the usage of those who discuss such things and try to express themselves as best they can on such a great subject. The Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father and from both in common. And so, although we do not call the Holy Spirit begotten, yet we do not dare to call him unbegotten, lest by such words someone believe that there are two fathers in that Trinity, or two who are not from anyone else."[2] See how by these

[5]Is. 53, 8.
[6]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n1.
[7]In cc. 1-2.

[1]Augustine, *Dialogus quaest. 65*, q. 2.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n47.

words he manifestly shows that the Holy Spirit is to be called neither begotten nor unbegotten.

3. BUT JEROME CALLS THE HOLY SPIRIT UNBEGOTTEN, WHICH APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO THE AFOREGOING. And yet Jerome, in the *Rules of Definitions against the Heretics*, calls the Holy Spirit unbegotten in these words: "The Holy Spirit is not the Father, but he is unbegotten and uncreated. He is not the Father because he is of the Father and in the Father. From the Father, he has procession, but not birth. But he is not the Son, because he is not begotten."[3] And so by these words the Holy Spirit is said to be unbegotten, which appears to be contrary to the above words of Augustine.

4. DETERMINATION: HE SAYS THAT THEY USE [THESE TERMS] IN DIFFERENT SENSES. But in order to resolve this apparent contradiction, we say that Jerome took the term unbegotten in one sense, and Augustine in another. For Augustine understands 'unbegotten' in the sense of him or that which is not from another; in this sense, it is said only of the Father. But Jerome understands 'unbegotten' to mean one who is not begotten, and in this sense it can be said of the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten.

5. FROM JEROME'S OWN WORDS, HE SHOWS IN WHAT SENSE JEROME CALLED THE HOLY SPIRIT UNBEGOTTEN. That Jerome himself understood the term in this sense is shown in his own words, which he uses in the same treatise, drawing the following distinction: "All which exists is either unbegotten, or begotten, or made."[4] THIS DISTINCTION IS TO BE DILIGENTLY NOTED.—"And so there is what is neither born, nor made; and there is what is born and not made. And there is what is neither born, nor made; and there is what is made and not born. And there is what is made and born and re-born; and there is what is made and born, but not re-born. Now let us show a case of each of the above. What is neither born nor made is the Father, for he is not from anyone else. What is born and not made is the Son, who was begotten of the Father, not made. And again what is neither born nor made is the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father. As for what is made and not born, this is heaven and all other insensible things. What is made and born and re-born is man. And as for what is made and born, but not re-born, these are the animals."[5]—See how by these words Jerome shows that he takes 'unbegotten' to mean 'one who is not begotten.' For otherwise the above distinction would not be true, when it states 'all which exists either is unbegotten, or begotten, or made.'

[3]Rather, Bishop Syagrius, *Regulae definitionum contra haereticos prolatae*, n8.
[4]Ibid., nn1-2.
[5]Ibid.

And in the development of this distinction, he everywhere uses 'not born' in the place of 'unbegotten.'

DISTINCTION XIV

Chapter 1 (45)

1. THAT THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A DOUBLE ONE. Moreover, it is to be diligently noted that the procession of the Holy Spirit is a double one: namely an eternal one, which is ineffable and by which he proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son; and a temporal one, by which he proceeds from the Father and the Son to sanctify the creature. And just as from eternity he proceeds jointly and simultaneously from the Father and the Son, so also in time he proceeds jointly and simultaneously from both to the creature; he does not proceed separately from the Father to the Son and then from the Son to the creature. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father to the Son and then from the Son to sanctify the creature; he proceeds simultaneously from both, although it was the Father who gave to the Son that the Spirit proceed also from him as from the Father."[1]

2. SPECIFIC TREATMENT OF THE PROCESSION IN TIME. As to the procession in time, in his homily on the first Sunday after the Ascension, Bede speaks in these terms: "When the grace of the Spirit is given to men, undoubtedly the Spirit is sent from the Father, and he is also sent from the Son; as he proceeds from the Father, he also proceeds from the Son, because his sending and procession are the same."[2] By these words, he plainly shows that the granting of the grace of the Holy Spirit is called procession or sending of the same. But as a granting or giving can only occur in time, it follows that this procession or sending is a temporal one.—It is at this temporal procession of the Spirit that Augustine hints in *On the Trinity*, book 15, when he says that the Holy Spirit proceeded from Christ when the latter, after his resurrection, breathed over the disciples: "When Christ had risen from the dead and appeared to the disciples, he breathed over them and said: *Receive the Holy Spirit*,[3] in order to show that the Spirit proceeds also from him. And the Spirit is that *power* which *went out from him and healed all*,[4] as we read in the Gospel."[5] And in order to show that this

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c27 n48.
[2]Bede, *Homiliae*, bk 2 hom. 10.
[3]Jn. 20, 22.
[4]Lk. 6, 19.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n45.

procession of the Holy Spirit is nothing else than a granting or giving of the same Spirit, he adds: "After his resurrection, the Lord Jesus twice gave them the Holy Spirit: once on earth, for the love of neighbour; and again from heaven, for the love of God"; "because it is by that Gift that *the love* by which we love God and neighbour *is poured into our hearts*."[6]"[7]

Chapter 2 (46)

1. SOME SAY THAT IT IS NOT THE HOLY SPIRIT WHO IS GIVEN, BUT HIS GIFTS. But there are some who say that it is not God the Holy Spirit himself who is given, but his gifts, which are not [the same as] the Spirit himself. According to them, the Holy Spirit is said to be given when his grace, which is not the Spirit himself, is given to a man. And they say that this is what Bede meant in the text above,[1] where he says that the Holy Spirit proceeds when his grace is given to men, although it is not he himself who is given, but his grace.

2. THAT THE SAME HOLY SPIRIT WHO IS GOD IS GIVEN AND SENT. But Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, plainly shows that the very Holy Spirit who is God and the third person of the Trinity is given. He says: "We must not doubt that the same Holy Spirit was given when Jesus breathed, of whom he immediately says: *Go, baptize all nations in the name of Father and Son and Holy Spirit*.[2] He is also the same who was sent from heaven on the day of Pentecost.[3] How then is he not God, who sends the Holy Spirit? On the contrary, how great a God is he who gives God?"[4] See, he says plainly here that the Holy Spirit himself, namely God, is given to men by Father and Son.

3. Ambrose, in *On the Holy Spirit*, book 1, shows plainly that the very Holy Spirit who is God and the third person of the Trinity is given to us and infused and flows into our minds. He says: "Although there are said to be many spirits, because we read *Who makes his angels spirits*,[5] yet there is only one Spirit of God. Therefore, both Apostles and Prophets received that one and the same Spirit; as even the Vessel of election says, *we have drunk the one Spirit*,[6] him who, as it were, cannot be divided, but is infused into souls and flows into the senses in order to quench the burning

[6]Cf. Rom. 5, 5.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n46.

[1]Above, c1 n2.
[2]Mt. 28, 19.
[3]Cf. Acts 2, 1-4.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n46.
[5]Ps. 103, 4.
[6]Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 13.

of the world's thirst. And this Holy Spirit is not of the substance of bodily creatures, nor of the substance of invisible ones."[7] By these words, he plainly asserts that the Holy Spirit himself, which is not a creature, is infused in our minds.

4. Also in the same place: "Every creature is changeable, but the Holy Spirit is not capable of change."[8] "Why would I hesitate to say that the Holy Spirit is also given, since it is written: *The love of God is poured forth into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us*?"[9,10] "And although he is inaccessible by nature,[11] yet, because of his goodness, he can be received by us, filling all things with his power, and yet only shared in by the just, simple in substance, rich in virtues, present to each, sharing himself out to each, and whole everywhere."[12] "This uncircumscribed and infinite Holy Spirit infused the senses of each of the disciples separately, and nothing can deceive him. Angels were sent to a few, but the Holy Spirit was poured out upon the nations. Who then would doubt that what is simultaneously poured upon many, and is not seen, must be divine?"[13] "It is the one Holy Spirit who was given to all the Apostles, even though they were not together."[14] And here Ambrose says plainly that the Holy Spirit, who is a simple substance, since he is one, is given to many.

5. This same point, namely, that the Holy Spirit, who is equal to the Son, is given to men, may also be construed from another authoritative text. For Augustine, in *On the Words of the Apostle*, says: "*The love of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us*.[15] By whom is he given? By him who *gave gifts to men*.[16] What gifts? The Holy Spirit, who gives such a gift as he is himself. Great is his mercy: he gives a gift equal to himself, because his gift is the Holy Spirit."[17]

6. By these and many other authorities, it is plainly shown that the Holy Spirit, who is equal to Father and Son, is given to us. But he is not less than the Father and Son on that account; hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, says: "And the Holy Spirit is not to be thought less, because the Father and the Son sent him."[18]

[7]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto,* bk 1 cc4-5 nn60-62.
[8]Ibid., bk 1 c5 n64.
[9]Rom. 5, 5.
[10]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto,* bk 1 c5 n66.
[11]Cf. 1 Tim. 6, 16.
[12]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto,* bk 1 c5 n72.
[13]Ibid., bk 1 c7 n82.
[14]Ibid., bk 1 c7 n81.
[15]Rom. 5, 5.
[16]Eph. 4, 8.
[17]Augustine, *Sermo 128* c2 n4.
[18]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c21 n32.

Chapter 3 (47)

1. WHETHER HOLY MEN WHO ARE PRELATES IN THE CHURCH GIVE OR CAN GIVE THE HOLY SPIRIT. Here it is asked whether even holy men give or can give the Holy Spirit to others.

2. FIRST, HE SHOWS HERE THAT THE SPIRIT IS NOT GIVEN [BY THEM]. If they give him to others, since his giving has earlier been called procession, then it seems that the Holy Spirit proceeds from, or is sent by, them. But the Creator does not proceed from, or is not sent by, a creature; it must follow that they do not and cannot give the Holy Spirit.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "None of the disciples of Christ gave the Holy Spirit. They prayed that the Spirit would come upon those over whom they lay their hands,[1] but they did not themselves give him. The Church even now preserves this custom in its prelates. Finally, even Simon Magus, offering his money to the Apostles, does not say: *Give me this power*, that I may give the Holy Spirit, but he says: *that on whomever I will impose my hands, he will receive the Holy Spirit.*[2] And Scripture did not say earlier: And Simon, seeing that the Apostles gave the Holy Spirit; instead, it said: *And Simon, seeing that the Holy Spirit is given by the imposition of the hands of the Apostles.*"[3,4] And so, by these words, Augustine shows that neither the Apostles, nor the other prelates of the Church, gave or give the Holy Spirit.

3. HERE HE TEACHES THAT THEY CANNOT GIVE THE HOLY SPIRIT. What is more, in the same book, he also teaches that they cannot give [the Holy Spirit], adding: "Concerning Christ, it is written that he received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit and poured forth [the same Spirit];[5] in this, each of his natures is revealed, namely human and divine: he received as man and poured forth as God. As for us, we are able in some small manner to receive this gift, but cannot in any way pour it forth over others; in order for this to be done, we invoke over them God, by whom it is done."[6] By these words, he says expressly that we cannot pour forth over, or give to, others the Holy Spirit.

4. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION. But what the Apostle says to the Galatians concerning himself: *Who gave you the Spirit, and works powerful things in your midst*,[7] seems to contradict this. Here he clearly says that he

[1]Cf. Acts 8, 15.
[2]Acts 8, 19.
[3]Acts 8, 18.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n46.
[5]Cf. Acts 2, 23.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n46.
[7]Gal. 3, 5.

had given the Spirit.—DETERMINATION. But it is to be understood that the Apostle did not say this because he had the power and authority to give the Spirit, but because he had the ministry through which the Holy Spirit was given by God. For as Augustine says in his commentary on the same text, "the faith had been preached to them by the Apostle, and in this preaching they felt the coming and presence of the Holy Spirit. Similarly, at that time, in the newness of the invitation to faith, the presence of the Holy Spirit also was manifested by sensible miracles, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles."[8,9] Here, he plainly shows how the Apostle had given the Holy Spirit to them: not at all by sending the Spirit over them, but by preaching to them the faith of Christ. Upon their receiving that faith, the presence of the Holy Spirit in them was made manifest by some visible signs. It follows that men, however holy they may be, cannot give the Holy Spirit.

DISTINCTION XV

Chapter 1 (48)

1. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GIVEN BY HIMSELF. Here it must be considered, since the Holy Spirit is given to men by Father and Son, which is for him to proceed or to be sent by both in time, whether he is also given by himself. If he is given by himself, then he proceeds or is sent from himself.

2. To which we say that the Holy Spirit is both God and the gift or grant; and so he both gives and is given. He gives insofar as he is God, and he is given insofar as he is gift. But since the gift or conferral of the Holy Spirit is an operation of God, and it is a joint and undivided operation of the three persons, it follows that the Holy Spirit is given not only by Father and Son, but also by his own self.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says that the Holy Spirit gives himself. He states: "As the body of flesh is nothing else than flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing else than the Holy Spirit. Insofar, then, as he is given to those to whom he is given, he is the gift of God. But in himself he is God, even if he is given to no one, because he was God, coeternal with Father and Son, before he was given to anyone. And he is not less than the others because they give and he is given. For he is given as the gift of God in such a way that as God he gives even himself. For it cannot be said that it is not in his power, of whom it is

[8]Cf. Acts 2, 2-3.
[9]Augustine, *In Epistolam ad Galatas,* n20.

said: *The Spirit blows where he wills.*"[1,2] See how he plainly says that the Holy Spirit gives himself.

3. For if the Holy Spirit cannot give himself, and the Father and Son can give him, then Father and Son can do something which the Holy Spirit cannot do. Also, if Father and Son give the Holy Spirit, but he does not, then Father and Son do something which the Holy Spirit does not do; it follows that the Holy Spirit gives himself. But if he gives himself, then he both proceeds and is sent from himself. And this is entirely true. Indeed, the temporal procession or sending of the Holy Spirit is the giving of himself and it is an operation of God. And so the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally from himself, and is sent from himself, because he is given by himself.

4. IT IS NOT STRANGE IF THE HOLY SPIRIT IS SAID TO BE SENT OR PROCEED FROM HIMSELF, BECAUSE THE SON IS ALSO SAID TO BE SENT BY HIMSELF. But do not find it strange that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent or proceed from himself, since Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, says of the Son of God too that he was sent not only by the Father, but also by his own self and by the Holy Spirit. He says this while addressing the question of how the Son or the Holy Spirit were sent, since as God each is everywhere.[3] —For indeed, of each of them, Augustine says, we read that he is sent. For of the Holy Spirit, we read: *Whom the Father will send in my name*;[4] and also: *If I go, I will send him to you.*[5] And the Son says of himself: *I came out from the Father and came into the world.*[6] And the Apostle says: *God sent his Son.*[7]—In the Prophet, it is written, as if God were speaking: *I fill heaven and earth.*[8] And so God is everywhere; it follows that the Son is everywhere, and the Holy Spirit is also everywhere. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit were sent thither to that place where they already were.

Chapter 2 (49)

HOW THE SENDING OF EACH IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD. Augustine, in the same place, says: "And so we must investigate how the sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is to be understood. For of the Father alone do we never read that he was sent,"[1] but only the Son and the Holy Spirit.—And first let

[1]Jn. 3, 8.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n36.
[3]Ibid., bk 2 c5 n7.
[4]Jn. 14, 26.
[5]Jn. 16, 7.
[6]Jn. 16, 28.
[7]Gal. 4, 4.
[8]Jer. 23, 24.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n8.

us see how the Son is sent: "The Apostle says: *God sent his Son, made of a woman*,[2] where he sufficiently shows that the Son was sent by the very fact of being made of a woman. Thus, he could not be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit because the Father is understood to have sent him when he made him of a woman; he certainly did not do this without the Holy Spirit."[3] See how here he says that the Son was sent by Father and Holy Spirit.

Chapter 3 (50)

BY AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS, HE CONFIRMS THAT THE SON WAS SENT BY THE HOLY SPIRIT. And the fact that the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit is confirmed by authoritative texts, as Augustine says in the same place.[1] Christ himself says through Isaias: *Now the Lord and his Spirit sent me*.[2] Concerning this, Ambrose, in *On the Holy Spirit*, book 2, says as follows: "Who is it who says: *The Lord and his Spirit sent me*, except he who comes from the Father in order to save sinners," that is, Christ? "So both Father and Spirit sent the Son."[3]—The same [Ambrose], in the same place: "He was given by the Father, as Isaias says: *A child is born to us and a son is given to us*.[4] He is given to us, I make bold to say, also by the Spirit, because he has been sent also by the Spirit."[5] "For the Son of God says: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me; he has sent me to preach the Gospel to the poor, to proclaim liberty to captives*, etc.[6] And after reading [this passage] from the book of Isaias, he says in the Gospel: *Today, this Scripture has been completed in your hearing*,[7] so as to signify that it had been spoken of himself."[8] "And rightly did he say *upon me* because, as the son of man, he was both anointed and sent to preach the Gospel";[9] "for according to his divinity, the Spirit is not upon Christ, but in Christ."[10] See how, by these words, Ambrose shows that the Son is sent and given to us not by the Father alone, but also by the Holy Spirit.

[2]Gal. 4, 4.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n8.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n8 .
[2]Is. 48, 16.
[3]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c1 nn7-8.
[4]Is. 9, 6.
[5]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c2 n9.
[6]Lk. 4, 18-19.
[7]Lk. 4, 21.
[8]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c1 nn1-2.
[9]Ibid., bk 3 c1 n2.
[10]Ibid., bk 3 c1 n6.

Chapter 4 (51)

1. THAT THE SON IS GIVEN ALSO BY HIMSELF.—AMBROSE. Then he shows that the Son is given also by himself, speaking in the following terms in the same book: "Although the Prophet did not define by whom the Son was given, he is shown to have been given by grace of the Trinity, so that the Son himself also gave [himself]."[1] Note that he says here that the Son gave himself because the Trinity gave him. If the Son was given by himself, then he was sent from himself and proceeded from himself, and this is entirely true, and must be granted, because his sending is a divine operation.

2. THAT THE SON IS SENT BY HIMSELF. Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, affirms that the Son is sent by himself, saying: "Perhaps someone may compel us to say that the Son was sent also by himself, because Mary's conceiving and giving birth is the work of the Trinity. But, that someone says, how did the Father send him, if he sent himself? I respond by asking this person to tell me how the Father sanctified him, if he sanctified himself? For the Lord states both, saying: *When the Father sanctified and sent me into this world*;[2] and elsewhere: *For their sake, I sanctify myself.*[3] I also ask how the Father delivered him up, if he delivered up himself? For we read both.[4] If that person is thoroughly wise, I believe that he will answer: because the will of Father and Son is one and their operation is inseparable. Let him also understand that the incarnation and birth from the Virgin, in which the Son is understood to be sent, occurred inseparably by one and the same operation of Father and Son, and without the exclusion of the Holy Spirit. And so the Son himself has been sent from Father and Son because it was the work of the Father and his Word that he should be sent, that is, that he should appear to men in the flesh. For he was not sent by changing place, because *he was in the world.*[5] And so the Father, who is invisible, together with the Son, who is invisible with him, is said to have sent the Son by making him visible. If the Son were made visible in such a way that he had ceased to be invisible with the Father, that is, if the invisible substance of the Word had changed and had become transformed when it passed into the visible creature, the Son would be understood to have been sent by the Father in such a way that he was only sent, without being found at the same time to be sending with the Father. But since *the form of a slave* was taken in such a way that *the form of God*[6] remained unchanged, it is manifest that the Father and Son, without appearing, produced that which

[1]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c2 n9.
[2]Jn. 10, 36
[3]Jn. 17, 19.
[4]Cf. Rom. 8, 32, Gal. 2, 20.
[5]Cf. Jn. 1, 10.
[6]Phil. 2, 6-7.

was to appear in the Son, that is, it is from the invisible Father with the invisible Son that the same Son is sent in visible form."[7]

3. SUMMARY OF WHAT MAY BE CONCLUDED FROM THE ABOVE. From the above, it is plainly shown that the Son was sent from the Father, the Holy Spirit, and his own self, and what his sending is, namely the incarnation, that is, that he was made man, by which he appeared in visible form. This is the joint work of Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

Chapter 5 (52)

QUESTION AS TO WHY HE SAYS: I DID NOT COME FROM MYSELF. But an objection is made to this: If the Son is sent from himself, why then does he say: *I did not come from myself*?[1]—SOLUTION. Augustine responds to this, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, saying that this was said "according to the form of a slave, according to which he did not work that he should be sent,"[2] that is, he did not work the incarnation [according to this form], but according to the form of God.

Chapter 6 (53)

WHETHER THE SON IS SENT ONLY ONCE OR OFTEN. Here it is asked whether the Son was sent only once, or is he sent often. For if the sending of the Son himself is the incarnation alone, since he only became flesh once, then he seems to have been sent only once. But if he is sent often, then there is a sending of the Son which is other than the incarnation. But what is it? Is his eternal birth to be called his sending, or are we also to seek some other sending?

Chapter 7 (54)

THAT THE SON IS SAID TO BE SENT IN TWO WAYS. With regard to this, we say that the Son is said to be sent in two ways, apart from that eternal birth which is ineffable, according to which also he may be said to be sent, as it seems to some; but according to that, he is better and more truly called begotten. Apart from that, he is said to be sent in two ways, namely either when he took on flesh and appeared visibly in the world, or when he so *passes into holy souls*[1] as to be perceived and known by them.—Augustine plainly distinguishes these two kinds of sending in *On the Trinity*, book 4,

[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n9.

[1]Jn. 7, 28; 8, 42.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n9.

[1]Cf. Wis. 7, 27.

saying: "It is not by virtue of being born of the Father that the Son is said to be sent, but either because he, Word made flesh, appeared to this world, and so he says: *I came out from the Father and came into the world*;[2] or because in time he is perceived by one's mind, as it was said of Wisdom: *Send her from your holy heavens and from the seat of your greatness, so that she may be with me and labour with me*,[3] that is, may teach me to work. And he is sent to each when he is known and perceived by each, insofar as he can be known and perceived according to the capacity of a rational soul which is either progressing toward God, or is already perfect in God."[4]

Chapter 8 (55)

1. THAT IN ONE WAY HE IS SENT ONCE, AND IN ANOTHER WAY OFTEN; AND IN ONE WAY IN ORDER TO BE MAN, AND IN ANOTHER WAY IN ORDER TO BE WITH MAN. Note that two ways of the Son's being sent have been distinguished. According to one, the Son of God is sent only once; according to the other, he has been sent often and is sent every day. For, according to one, he was sent to become man, which was done only once; but according to the other, he is sent in order to be with man, and in this way he is sent every day to the saints, and was sent even before the incarnation to all the saints who were before, and also to the angels.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, speaking of the Son, that is, of the Wisdom of the Father, says: "Wisdom is sent in one way in order to be with man, but she was sent in another way in order to be man. *For she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God and prophets*,[1] as she also fills the holy angels. But when *the fullness of time had come*,[2] she was sent neither to fill the angels, nor to be an angel, nor to be with men or in men, as she had been before in the Fathers and the Prophets, but so that the Word itself should become flesh, that is, a man."[3]

2. THAT, ACCORDING TO ONE WAY, HE IS SAID TO BE SENT INTO THE WORLD, BUT NOT ACCORDING TO THE OTHER. Moreover, it is to be noted that, as the Son is sent in two ways, he is said to be sent into the world according to one way, but not according to the other. He is said to be sent into the world by the first, in which he became visible to the world. Hence Augustine, in the same book, says: "When he is perceived in time by one's

[2]Jn. 16, 28.
[3]Wis. 9, 10.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 nn28 and 27.

[1]Wis. 7, 27.
[2]Cf. Gal. 4, 4.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 n27.

mind, he is said to be sent, but not into this world. For he does not appear sensibly, that is, he is not present to the bodily senses. Indeed, when we grasp something eternal by our mind, we too are not in this world; and the spirits of all the just, even when they are still living in the flesh, are not in this world insofar as they taste divine things."[4] From the above, it is manifest that, apart from his ineffable birth, the Son is sent in two ways, namely when he appeared visibly, or when he is perceived invisibly by the mind.

Chapter 9 (56)

WHY THE FATHER IS NOT SAID TO BE SENT LIKE THE SON, WHEN HE IS KNOWN BY SOMEONE. Here it is asked why the Father is not said to be sent like the Son, when he is known by someone in time.—To which we say that in him is the authority of the beginning, so that he, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit, has none from whom he may be. As Augustine says in the same book: "For the Father is the beginning of the whole divinity or, if it is better said, of the whole deity,"[1] because he is the beginning of the Son and the Holy Spirit. For as Augustine says in the same book, "even if God the Father had wished to appear visibly through some subject creature, it would still be most absurd for him to be said to be sent from the Son, whom he begot, or from the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from him."[2] It is fitting that the one who appeared in the flesh is said to be sent, and that he who did not appear in it is said to have sent.

Chapter 10 (57)

SOME HAVE HELD THAT THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE LESS THAN THE FATHER BECAUSE THEY ARE SAID TO BE SENT. Therefore some heretics have held that, since the Father, unlike the Son and the Holy Spirit, is not sent, the Father is greater and the Son and the Holy Spirit lesser, and the Father, as the greater, sent each of them as the lesser.—Augustine reproves this in *On the Trinity*, book 4, saying against them: "But the Son is not to be thought less because he is sent by the Father; and neither is the Holy Spirit less because both Father and Son sent him. These terms are understood to occur in the Scriptures either on account of the visible creature, or rather for the commendation of [the Father's role as the beginning], and not for

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 n28.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 n29.
[2]Ibid., bk 4 c21 n32.

any inequality or disparity or unlikeness of substance."[1] And so the Father is not said to have sent the Son and the Holy Spirit because he is greater and they are lesser, but especially for the commendation of the authority of [the Father's role as] the beginning, and because he did not, as they did, appear in a visible creature. See how it has been shown what the sending of the Son is and in what ways he is sent.

DISTINCTION XVI

Chapter 1 (58)

1. ON THE SENDING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, WHICH OCCURS IN TWO WAYS, VISIBLY AND INVISIBLY. Now, concerning the Holy Spirit, apart from that ineffable and eternal procession by which he proceeds from Father and Son and not from himself, we must consider what is his procession in time, which is called sending or giving.—To which we say that, as the Son is said to be sent in two ways—the one by which he appeared visibly, and the other by which he is invisibly perceived in chaste minds—so also the Holy Spirit is said to proceed or to be sent or given from Father and Son and his own self in two ways: visibly in the one, invisibly in the other. For he was given by the sign of a visible creature, as on the day of Pentecost and at other times; and he is given invisibly every day by entering the minds of the faithful.

2. FIRST, OF THAT MODE OF SENDING WHICH OCCURS VISIBLY. And first let us deal with that mode of sending which occurs in visible form.— Concerning this, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, speaks in this manner: "It is easy for us to understand why it is also said of the Holy Spirit that he is sent. For in time some form of creature was made through which the Holy Spirit might be shown visibly. So it was when he descended on the Lord himself in the bodily form of a dove,[1] and also when on the day of Pentecost a sudden sound came from heaven as of a rushing wind, and cloven tongues as of fire appeared to the Apostles and came to rest on each of them.[2] This operation made visible, and offered to the gaze of mortal people, is called the sending of the Holy Spirit, not that his very substance appeared in which he is invisible and unchangeable like the Father and the Son, but that the hearts of men, moved by these outward appearances, might be converted by the temporal manifestation of him who comes to

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c21 n32.

[1]Cf. Mt. 3, 16.
[2]Cf. Acts 2, 2-4.

them to the hidden eternity of the ever present [Spirit]."[3] See how, by these words, Augustine makes manifest that manner of sending which is shown visibly, even though the Spirit himself is not seen in his true nature. He was not in those creatures more than in other ones, but for another purpose. For he was in those creatures so that, through their coming to men, he might be shown to be in those very men to whom those creatures came. For the Holy Spirit did not then come to, or descend upon, men by a temporal movement, but the spiritual and invisible infusion of the Holy Spirit was signified through the temporal movement of a creature. To speak more plainly, by that manner of sending the Holy Spirit in a bodily form, the spiritual and interior sending or giving of the Holy Spirit is indicated, and this we must now discuss.

3. SINCE THE SON IS LESS THAN THE FATHER ACCORDING TO THE CREATED FORM IN WHICH HE APPEARED, WHY IT IS NOT THE SAME WITH THE HOLY SPIRIT. But first it must be asked, since the Son is said to be less than the Father according to his sending, by which he appeared in a created form, why is the Holy Spirit not said in like manner to be less than the Father, since he too appeared in a created form.

4. PROOF CONCERNING THE SON. Concerning the Son, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, plainly shows that he is less than the Father according to the form in which he appeared when he was sent. He says: "*God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law*,[4] made, and therefore little, and sent because he was made. Let us then profess that he who is made is lesser, and insofar lesser as he was made, and insofar made as he was sent."[5] Behold, you have that the Son, insofar as he is sent, that is, made, is less than the Father.

5. WHY IT IS NOT SO WITH THE HOLY SPIRIT. Why then is the Holy Spirit not called less than the Father, since he also took on a creature in which he appeared? Because the Spirit took on the creature in which he appeared in one way, the Son in another; the Son took it by union, but not so the Spirit. For the Son took on human form so as to become a man; but the Holy Spirit did not take on the form of a dove so as to become a dove.—Concerning this, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, speaks in the following terms: "And so it is nowhere written that God the Father is greater than the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit less than the Father, because the creature in which the Holy Spirit appeared was not taken in the same way as the son of man was taken; in the latter form the person of God's very Word was presented, not so that he might have the Word of God, like other holy wise men, but

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c5 n10.
[4]Gal. 4, 4.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c19 n26.

that he was the very Word. For it is one thing for the Word to be in the flesh, and another for the Word to be flesh; that is, it is one thing for the Word to be in man, and another for the Word to be a man. For flesh is used for man where it is said: *The Word was made flesh.*[6] And so the creature in which the Holy Spirit appeared was not taken in the same way as that flesh and human form was taken from the Virgin Mary. The Spirit did not beatify the dove or that wind or that fire, nor join them to himself in unity of person for all eternity."[7]—From the above, it is plainly shown in what sense the Son is called less than the Father, and why the Son is called less than the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not.

Chapter 2 (59)

1. THAT THE SON, ACCORDING TO HIS HAVING BECOME MAN, IS NOT ONLY LESS THAN THE FATHER, BUT ALSO THAN THE HOLY SPIRIT AND EVEN THAN HIS OWN SELF. But it is to be noted that the Son, according to his having become man, is not only called less than the Father, but also than the Holy Spirit and even than his own self.

2. Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, shows that the Son, according to the form of a slave, is called less than his own self. He says: "Men have erred by transferring what is said of Christ as man to his substance, which is eternal, as in that which the Lord himself says: *The Father is greater than me.*[1] But Truth says this because of the form of a slave, according to which the Son is less than his own self. For how could he not have become even less than himself, who *emptied himself by taking the form of a slave*?[2] For he did not take the form of a slave in such a way that he lost the form of God, in which he was equal to the Father. Therefore, in the form of God, the Only-begotten of the Father is equal to the Father; in the form of a slave, he is even less than his own self. And so it is not unworthily that Scripture says both, namely that the Son is equal to the Father, and that the Father is greater than the Son: the former is understood by reason of the form of God, the latter by reason of the form of a slave."[3]

3. Concerning this same matter, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, he says: "The Son of God is equal to the Father according to the form of God in which he is, and less than the Father according to the form of a slave which he took. In the latter, he was found to be less not only than the Father, but also [less]

[6]Jn. 1, 14.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c6 n11.

[1]Jn. 14, 28.
[2]Phil. 2, 7.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c7 n14.

than the Holy Spirit and even than his own self."[4] As the same [Augustine] says in the book *Against Maximinus*: "Because of which, he was made less not only than the Father, but also than himself and the Holy Spirit, and even *was made a little lower than the angels*."[5,6] As the same [Augustine] says, in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "And so the Son of God is equal to God the Father in nature, less in his state, that is, in the form of a slave which he took."[7]— By these authorities, the Son is plainly shown to be less than the Father and himself and the Holy Spirit according to the form of a slave.

4. HILARY [SAYS] OTHERWISE, NAMELY THAT THE FATHER IS GREATER, AND YET THE SON IS NOT LESS. Hilary appears to say that the Father is greater than the Son, and yet the Son is not less than the Father. For the Father is called greater by reason of authority because in him is the authority of begetting, according to which the Son says: *The Father is greater than me*;[8] and the Apostle: *He gave him the name which is above all names*.[9] For in saying, *The Father is greater than me*, it is as if he said: *He gave me the name*. Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 9, says: "If, then, the Father is greater by the authority of the giver, is the Son less by acknowledgement of the gift? The giver is greater, but the receiver to whom it has been given to be one [with the giver] is not less. For he says: *I and the Father are one*.[10] If it is not given to Jesus that he should be confessed to be *in the glory of God the Father*,[11] he is less than the Father; but if it is given to him to be in the same glory in which the Father is, you have in the authority of the giver that he is greater, and in the confession of the one who is given that the two are one. And so the Father is greater, and clearly greater than the one to whom he grants that he may be all that he himself is; to whom he imparts by the mystery of birth to be the image of his own unbegottenness, and whom he begets from himself in his own form."[12] You have heard, O reader, what Hilary says concerning this; wherever you come across his words, note them with diligence and interpret them with piety.

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 c1 n2.
[5]Cf. Heb. 2, 9.
[6]Alypius and Augustine, *Epistola 170*, n9; cf. *Contra Maximinum*, bk 1 c8.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c7 n14.
[8]Jn. 14, 28.
[9]Phil. 2, 9.
[10]Jn. 10, 30.
[11]Cf. Phil. 2, 11.
[12]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 n54.

DISTINCTION XVII

Chapter 1 (60)

1. ON THE SENDING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT BY WHICH HE IS SENT INVISIBLY. Let us now proceed to set out the sending of the Holy Spirit, by which he is invisibly sent into the hearts of the faithful. For the same Holy Spirit, who is God and the third person in the Trinity, as has been shown above,[1] proceeds in time from the Father and the Son and his own self, that is, is sent and given to the faithful. But we must consider what the sending or giving is, or rather how it occurs.

2. A CERTAIN PREMISE IS MADE WHICH IS NECESSARY TO THIS CONSIDERATION, NAMELY THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THE LOVE BY WHICH WE LOVE GOD AND NEIGHBOUR. In order that this may be taught more intelligibly and perceived more fully, a certain premise must be made which is very necessary to this end. It has been said above,[2] and it has been shown by sacred authorities, that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son by which they love each other and us. It must be added to this that the very same Holy Spirit is the love or charity by which we love God and neighbour. When this charity is in us, so that it makes us love God and neighbour, then the Holy Spirit is said to be sent or given to us; and whoever loves the very love by which he loves his neighbour, in that very thing loves God, because that very love is God,[3] that is, the Holy Spirit.

3. BY AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS, HE CONFIRMS THIS TO BE THE CASE. Lest in such a great matter we should appear to interject anything of our own, let us confirm by sacred authorities what has been said above.— Concerning this, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 8, says: "He who loves his neighbour must necessarily love that love itself above all else. For *God is love*;[4] it follows that he love God above all else."[5]—Also, in the same place: "*God is love*, as the Apostle John says.[6] To what end, then, do we go and run to the heights of heaven and the depths of the earth, seeking him who is with us, if we wish to be with him? Let no one say: I do not know what to love. Let him love his brother, and love love itself. For he knows the love by which he loves more than [he knows] the brother whom he loves. And so he can already know God more than his brother; know him more because he is more present, more deeply within himself, more certain.

[1]Above, Dist. 14 cc1-2 and Dist. 15 c1.
[2]Dist. 10.
[3]Cf. 1 Jn. 4, 8; 4, 16.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c7 n10.
[6]1 Jn. 4, 8; 4, 16.

Embrace God who is love, and embrace God in love. Love is the very thing which conjoins all the good angels and all God's servants in the bond of holiness. For the more holy we are and the more emptied of the swelling of pride, the more we are filled with love; and with what is he filled who is full of love, if not with God?"[7] By these words, Augustine sufficiently shows that the very love by which we love God and neighbour is God.

4. But in the same book, he states this even more plainly, by adding: "Let us attend to how much the Apostle John commends brotherly love: *He who loves his brother remains in the light and there is no scandal in him.*[8] It is manifest that he has placed the perfection of justice in brotherly love, because one in whom there is no scandal is indeed perfect. And yet he seems to have remained silent regarding the love of God, which he would never have done if he had not wanted it to be understood that God is in that very brotherly love. For in the same Epistle, a little later, he says this most plainly: *Most beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God; and everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love, does not know God, because God is love.*[9] This passage declares sufficiently plainly that this same brotherly love (for brotherly love is that by which we love one another) is declared by such great authority," namely John's, "to be not only from God, but also to be God. Therefore, when we love our brother from love, we love our brother from God; nor is it possible that we should not love that same love above all by which we love our brother, because *God is love.*"[10,11] Also: "He who does not love his brother is not in love; and he who is not in love is not in God, because *God is love.*"[12,13] See how he has said most plainly that brotherly love is God.

Chapter 2 (61)

THAT BROTHERLY LOVE, ALTHOUGH IT IS GOD, IS NOT THE FATHER OR THE SON, BUT ONLY THE HOLY SPIRIT. But although brotherly love is God, it is not the Father or the Son, but only the Holy Spirit, who is properly [and specifically] called love or charity in the Trinity.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "If among God's gifts there is none greater than love, and if no gift of God is greater than the Holy Spirit, what follows more compellingly than that he himself is the love which is called both God and

[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 cc7-8 nn11-12.
[8]1 Jn. 2, 10.
[9]1 Jn. 4, 7-8.
[10]1 Jn. 4, 8.
[11]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c8 n12.
[12]1 Jn. 4, 8.
[13]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c8 n12.

of God?"[1] "For John says: *Love is from God*; and a little later: *God is love*. Here he makes clear that he had called the same love *God* which he said to be *from God*.[2] Therefore God from God is love."[3] Also, in the same: "John, wishing to speak more plainly of this matter, said: *By this do we know that we remain in him and he in us, that he has given us of his Spirit*.[4] Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom he has given us, makes us remain in God and God in us; this is what love does; and so he is God who is love; and so he is the one who is signified when we read: *God is love*."[5,6] From this, it appears that the Holy Spirit is charity.

Chapter 3 (62)

THAT WHEN WE SAY, GOD IS CHARITY, WE DO NOT MEAN THAT HE IS ITS CAUSE, AS IN THE PHRASE: YOU ARE MY PATIENCE AND MY HOPE. But lest someone perhaps may say that we say, *God is charity*, in order to express a cause, namely that charity is from God, and is not God himself, just as God is said to be our patience and our hope: not that he is these things, but that they are from him, Augustine comes to our aid, showing that the former, unlike the latter, is not said to express a cause. In *On the Trinity*, book 15, he speaks as follows: "We are not about to say that charity is called God not because charity itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God, as it is said to God: *You are my patience*.[1] For the latter is not at all said in the sense that our patience is the substance of God, but because it comes to us from God; and so we read elsewhere: *My patience is from him*.[2] The words themselves of the Scriptures easily reject this interpretation, for *You are my patience* is of the same kind as *O Lord, my hope*[3] and *My God, my mercy*,[4] and many similar texts. It is not said, *O Lord, my charity*, or, *You are my charity*, or, *God, my charity*, but it is said: *God is charity*,[5] in the same way in which it is said: *God is spirit*.[6] Whoever does not make this distinction, let him seek understanding from God and not an explanation from us, for we are not

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n37.
[2]Cf. 1 Jn. 4, 7-8.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.
[4]Cf. 1 Jn. 4, 13.
[5]1 Jn. 4, 8.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.

[1]Ps. 70, 5.
[2]Ps. 61, 6.
[3]Ps. 90, 9.
[4]Ps. 58, 18.
[5]1 Jn. 4, 8; 4, 16.
[6]Jn. 4, 24.

able to say anything more clearly. *God* then *is charity*."[7,8] From the above, he makes it clear that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God and neighbour, and so it is easier for us to show how the Holy Spirit is sent or given to us.

Chapter 4 (63)

1. HOW THE HOLY SPIRIT IS SENT OR GIVEN TO US. Accordingly, he is said to be sent or given when he is in us in such a manner as to make us love God and neighbour, by which we remain in God and God in us.—Hence Augustine, hinting at this mode of sending, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "God the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God, when given to man, inflames him to love God and neighbour, and he himself is love. For man has no other source for the love of God, except from God."[1] See how the Holy Spirit is given or sent to us, insofar as he is called grant or gift.

2. HERE IT IS [MORE PLAINLY] NOTED HOW THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GIVEN. In the same book, Augustine commends this gift and explains more plainly how it is given. He says: "As the Apostle says: *The love of God is poured in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us*.[2] There is nothing more excellent than this gift of God; it is this alone which distinguishes the children of the kingdom from those of perdition. Other gifts are given as well by the Holy Spirit, but they profit nothing without charity. Therefore, unless the Holy Spirit is given to each so as to make him a lover of God and neighbour, he is not moved from the left hand to the right.[3] Nor is the Holy Spirit properly called a gift, except on account of love, and whoever does not have this, even *if he speak all tongues, and have prophecy and all knowledge and all faith, and have shared out all his wealth and given his body to be burned, it shall profit him nothing*.[4] What great good is this, then, without which even such goods cannot bring someone to eternal life! For it is this love or charity (for both are terms for the same thing) that leads to the kingdom. Therefore, the love which is from God and is God is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom God who is charity is poured in our hearts and through which charity the whole Trinity dwells in us. Therefore most rightly the Holy Spirit, although he is God, is also called *the gift of God*.[5] And what are we properly to understand by this

[7]1 Jn. 4, 8; 4, 16.
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 nn27-28.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.
[2]Rom. 5, 5.
[3]Cf. Mt. 25.31-33.
[4]Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 1-3.
[5]Cf. Acts 8, 20.

gift, except that charity which leads to God and without which any other gift of God does not lead to God?"[6]

3. HE PRESENTS A SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE AUTHORITY. See how here is made clear what was said above, namely that charity is the Holy Spirit and the most excellent gift, and how this gift, that is, the Holy Spirit, is given to us, namely when he is so imparted to one, that is, exists in one, in such a way that he makes one a lover of God and neighbour. When he does this, then he is said to be given or sent to someone, and the latter is then properly said to have the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 5 (64)

1. WHETHER IT IS TO BE GRANTED THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE INCREASED IN A PERSON AND BE HAD OR GIVEN TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE. If the Holy Spirit is charity, and since charity may increase and diminish in a person and be had to a greater or lesser extent at different times, here it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Holy Spirit may increase or diminish in a person, and be had to a greater or lesser degree. For if he increases in a person and is given or had to a greater or lesser degree, then he appears to be changeable. But God is entirely unchangeable. It seems, then, that either the Holy Spirit is not charity, or charity does not increase or diminish in a person.

2. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GIVEN TO ONE WHO ALREADY HAS [HIM] AND TO ONE WHO DOES NOT. Also, charity is given both to one who does not have it so that he may have it, and to one who does have it so that he may have it more fully.[1] If the Holy Spirit is charity, then he is given both to one who does not have him, and to one who already has him so that he may have him more fully. But how is he given to one who does not have him since, as God, he is already fully everywhere and in all creatures? And how is he given or had more fully without change on his part?

3. RESPONSE TO THE FIRST QUESTION. To these, we respond by saying that the Holy Spirit or charity is entirely unchangeable, nor is he increased or decreased in himself, nor does he receive more or less in himself, but he is increased or diminished in a person, or better, for a person, and is given or had to a greater or lesser extent, just as God is said to be magnified and exalted in us who yet in himself is neither magnified nor exalted. Hence the Prophet: *A man will come to the depth of his heart, and God shall be exalted.*[2] An authority on this text says: "God becomes greater not in himself,

[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 cc17-18, nn31-32.

[1]Cf. Jn. 10, 10.
[2]Ps. 63, 7-8.

but in the heart of man."[3] And so the Holy Spirit is given to man, and, once given, is given more fully, that is, is increased, and is had to a greater or lesser degree, and yet remains unchangeable.

4. RESPONSE TO THE SECOND [QUESTION]. And although he is fully everywhere and in every creature, yet there are many who do not have him. For not all in whom he is have the Holy Spirit, otherwise even irrational creatures would have the Holy Spirit, which the piety of faith does not admit.

5. HE CONFIRMS BOTH RESPONSES BY AUTHORITY. In order that what we have said should be made more certain, we confirm it by authority. Augustine, in his [treatise] *On John [14.15-17]*, shows that the Holy Spirit is received to a greater or lesser degree, and is increased in a person, and is given to one who does not have him, and is increased in one who already has him. He says: "It is clear that without the Holy Spirit we cannot love Christ and keep his commandments; and the less we receive him, the less are we able to do these things; and the more amply we receive him, the more amply can we do them. Accordingly, the promise is not empty, not only for one who does not have him, but also for one who does: to one who does not have him, that he may have him; to one who already has him, that he may have him more fully. For if he were not possessed less amply by one and more amply by another, the holy Eliseus would not have said to the holy Elias: *Let the Spirit who is in you be in me in a double measure*."[4]

6. In the book of Kings, as follows: *Elias said to Eliseus: Ask what you will and I will do it for you before I am taken away from you. And Eliseus said: I beseech you that your spirit be double in me.*[5] Which is there expounded as follows: "Elias was excellently powerful in prophetic spirit and the working of miracles: Eliseus, then, asked to be granted to himself the two-fold grace which he knew to be present in his teacher. And so it is evident that the disciple was not asking to be greater than his master."[6]

7. "But to Christ, who is the Son of God, *the Spirit was not given by measure*.[7] And it is not without the grace of the Holy Spirit that *the man Christ is the mediator of God and men*.[8] For the fact that the only-begotten Son is equal to the Father is not [a matter] of grace, but of nature; the fact that the human person was assumed in the unity of the person of the Only-begotten is [a matter] of grace, not of nature. But to others, he is given by

[3]Ordinary gloss to Ps. 63, 7-8.
[4]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 74 n2.
[5]4 Kings 2, 9.
[6]Ordinary gloss on 4 Kings 2, 9; see also Mt. 10, 24.
[7]Jn. 3, 34.
[8]1 Tim. 2, 5.

measure, and what is given is increased, until the proper measure is filled in each according to the manner of that person's own perfection."[9]

8. See how you have it explicitly here that the Holy Spirit is given or received to a greater or lesser degree, and that what is given to a person is increased, and that he is given both to those who already have him and to those who do not because the Holy Spirit is love, which is given to one who does not have it and is increased and progresses in one who already has it. But to speak more truly and properly, it is man who progresses in love, and sometimes regresses; and then love itself is said to progress or regress, even though it neither progresses nor regresses in itself, because it is God. Hence Augustine, in homily 9 *On the Epistle of John*, says: "Let each one test what progress charity has made in him, or rather how much progress he has made in charity. For if charity is God, it neither progresses, nor regresses. And so charity is said to progress in you because you progress in it."[10] See how the statement that the Holy Spirit 'is increased in us,' is to be understood, namely, that we progress in him; similarly with other assertions of this kind.

Chapter 6 (65)

1. THAT SOME SAY THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS NOT THE LOVE BY WHICH WE LOVE GOD AND NEIGHBOUR. It was said above[1] that the Holy Spirit is the charity of Father and Son by which they love each other and us, and that he is also the charity which is poured in our hearts to love God and neighbour. All Catholics grant one of these, namely that the Holy Spirit is the charity of Father and Son; but that he is also the charity by which we love God and neighbour is denied by many. For they say: If the Holy Spirit is both the charity of Father and Son and our own, then the charity by which God loves us is the same as that by which we love him. But the authorities of the Saints appear to deny this.

2. THE AUTHORITIES WHICH SEEM TO FAVOUR THEIR VIEW. For Augustine, in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, says: "What is the source of love, if not the same as that of faith, that is, the Holy Spirit? For love would not be in us, if it were not poured in our hearts by the Spirit.[2] But the charity of God which is said to be poured in our hearts is not that by which he loves us, but that by which he makes us lovers of himself. Similarly, that by which we are made just by his gift is called *justice of God*, and that by which he saves us is *the Lord's salvation*, and that by which he makes us

[9]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 74 n3.
[10]Augustine, *In I Ioannis*, tr. 9 n2.

[1]Dist. 10 c1, and here above, cc1-3.
[2]Cf. Rom. 5, 5.

faithful is *the faith of Christ.*"[3,4] By these words seems to be shown a distinction between the charity by which God loves and that by which we love. And as our justice is called God's, not because he himself is just by it, but because he makes us just by it, and similarly with faith and salvation, so that charity which is in us is called God's, not because he loves by it, but because he makes us love by it.—Concerning this, too, the same Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "When the Apostle John remembered the love of God, it was not that by which we love him, but that by which *he loved us and sent his Son to free us from sin*,"[5] etc.[6] See how he here seems manifestly to distinguish the love by which we love God from that by which he loves us.

3. HE BEGINS TO ARGUE FROM THE WORDS OF THE AUTHORITIES. And so, they say, if the Holy Spirit is the love by which God loves and by which we love, love is twofold, or rather it is two different things, which is absurd and far from the truth. And so he is not the love by which we love, but only the one by which God loves.

4. RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE ASSERTIONS AND DETERMINATION OF THE AUTHORITIES. We respond to these and determine the words of the aforesaid authorities in this way: The charity of God said to be poured in our hearts is not that by which he loves us, but that by which he makes us love, etc. By these words, there is no division between the charity by which God loves, nor is that by which we love shown to be distinct from it, but rather, since it is one and the same charity and is called the very charity of God, it is shown in Scripture that it is called 'the charity of God' for a variety of causes and reasons. For it is called 'the charity of God' either because God loves us by it, or because he makes us lovers of him by it. — DETERMINATION OF THE FIRST AUTHORITY. And so, when *the charity of God* is said by the Apostle to be poured *in our hearts*,[7] it is not called the charity of God insofar as he loves us by it, but insofar as he makes us love by it: that is, it is not thus called 'charity of God' because God loves us by it, but because he makes us lovers of him by it. And he shows that it may be called 'charity of God' by reason of the fact that he makes us love by it, by analogy with a similar mode of expression: "Just as that which makes us just is called 'justice of God,' so that by which he saves us is called 'the Lord's salvation,' and that by which he makes us faithful is called 'the faith of Christ.'"[8] —DETERMINATION OF THE SECOND.

[3]Cf. 2 Cor 5, 21.
[4]Augustine, *De spiritu et littera,* c32 n56.
[5]Cf. 1 Jn. 4, 10.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c17 n31.
[7]Cf. Rom. 5, 5.
[8]Augustine, above, n2.

We explain similarly the other authority, where Augustine says that the love of God is to be remembered not insofar as we love him, but insofar as he loved us, as if to say: he remembers the love of God, not according to the fact that we love God by it, but according to the fact that he loves us by it.

5. THEY MAKE ANOTHER OBJECTION. But there is something else, they say, which is even more pressing. For Augustine said above that love is from the Holy Spirit, from whom is also faith.[9] But just as faith is not the Holy Spirit from whom it is, so neither is charity. For how can charity be the Holy Spirit, if it is from him? For if it is from him and he is it, then the Spirit is from his own self.—RESPONSE. To which we say: the Holy Spirit is not from his own self, and yet he is also given to us from his own self, as has been said above.[10] For the Holy Spirit gives himself to us; and in this sense it is said that charity is from him, namely in us; and yet it is the Holy Spirit himself. But faith is from the Holy Spirit, and it is not the Holy Spirit, because it is only a gift or a grant, and not the very God who gives.

6. THAT THEY ALSO ADDUCE OTHER REASONS AND AUTHORITIES TO PROVE THE SAME POINT. They also adduce other reasons to show the same point, namely that charity is not the Holy Spirit, because charity is an affection of the mind and a movement of the spirit. But the Holy Spirit is not an affection of the spirit or a movement of the mind because the Holy Spirit is unchangeable and uncreated, and so is not charity.—THAT CHARITY IS A MOVEMENT OR AFFECTION OF THE SPIRIT. They confirm by authorities that charity is an affection of the spirit and a movement of the mind. For Augustine says, in *On Christian Doctrine*, book 3: "I call charity the movement of the spirit toward enjoying God for himself, and oneself and one's neighbour for the sake of God."[11] The same [Augustine] in the book *On the Customs of the Catholic Church*, commenting on that saying of the Apostle, *Neither death nor life shall be able to separate us from the charity of God*,[12] says: "What is here called the charity of God is the power which is the most righteous affection of our spirit which unites us to God,"[13] by which we love him. See how by these words it is expressed that charity is an affection and movement of the spirit, and so it seems that it is not the Holy Spirit.

7. RESPONSE DETERMINING THE AUTHORITIES. To which we say that this was said in the following sense: just as God is said to be our hope and our

[9]Above, n2.
[10]Dist. 15 c1.
[11]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana,* bk 3 c10 n16.
[12]Rom. 8, 38-39.
[13]Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae,* bk 1 c11 n19.

patience[14] because he makes us hope and be patient, so charity is said to be a movement or affection of the spirit because by it our spirit is moved and drawn to loving God. And you will not be surprised if charity, although it is the Holy Spirit, is called a movement of the mind since even in the book of Wisdom it is said of the Spirit of wisdom, which *reaches from end to end*, that he is an act which is *mobile, certain, unstained.*[15] But this is not said because Wisdom is something mobile or some act, but because it reaches all things in its immovability, not by a local motion, but in such a way that it is always everywhere and is never kept enclosed. In a similar way, therefore, charity is called a movement of the spirit: not because it is itself a motion or affection or power of the spirit, but because through it, as if it were a power, the mind is drawn and moved.

8. But if charity is the Holy Spirit, who *works in each as he wills*,[16] since through him the human mind is drawn and moved to believing or hoping and suchlike, just as it is to loving, why is charity not also called a movement or affection of the mind to believing or hoping, as to loving?—To which it may well be answered that charity, namely the Holy Spirit, works the other acts and movements of the virtues by means of the virtues whose acts they are: thus, the act of faith, that is, to believe, by means of faith; and the act of hope, that is, to hope, by means of hope, for charity works the said acts by faith and hope. But it works the act of loving, that is, to love, by itself alone and not by means of any other virtue. And so it works this act otherwise than [it works] the other acts of virtues; and so Scripture speaks differently of this act than the others because it attributes this one especially to charity.

9. And so charity is truly the Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine, treating the above-mentioned sentence of the Apostle in the same book, says that charity is the good than which there is none better, and by this he signifies that it is God, saying: "If nothing separates us from his love, what can be not only better, but also more certain than this good?"[17] See how he says that nothing is better than charity. And so charity is the Holy Spirit, who is God and the gift or grant of God. He shares out the gifts to each of the faithful, nor is he himself divided, but is given undivided to each. Hence Augustine, commenting on John's statement that the Spirit is given to Christ *not by measure*,[18] says: "To others, there is a sharing out, not of the Spirit himself, but of his gifts."

[14]Cf. Ps. 70, 5.
[15]Wis. 8, 1 and 7, 22.
[16]1 Cor. 12, 11.
[17]Augustine, *De moribus Ecclesiae catholicae,* bk 1 c11 n18.
[18]Cf. Jn. 3, 34.

DISTINCTION XVIII

Chapter 1 (66)

WHETHER IT IS TO BE GRANTED THAT THE GIFTS ARE GIVEN THROUGH THE GIFT. Here it is asked, since the Holy Spirit, through whom the gifts are shared out, is himself a gift, whether it is to be granted that the gifts are shared out and granted through the gift.—To which we say that specific gifts are given to individuals through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, and all who are good have him in common. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "By the gift, which is the Holy Spirit [given] in common to all the members of Christ, many other gifts, which are specific to each one, are shared out. For individuals do not have all the gifts, but some have some, and others have others, although all have the gift itself, that is, the Holy Spirit, by whom that which is proper to each is shared out."[19] He plainly says that gifts are given by the gift.

Chapter 2 (67)

1. WHETHER IT IS FOR THE SAME REASON THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED GIFT AND GRANT OR DONATION. Moreover, it is to be considered with diligence, since the Holy Spirit is called gift and grant, whether each of the names is fitting for him for the same reason.

2. WHY IT SEEMS TO BE SO. It does indeed appear to be so. For as it is the same for the Holy Spirit to be given and to be granted, it appears that it is for the same reason that the Holy Spirit is called grant and gift. This appears to be what Augustine means in *On the Trinity*, book 15, when he says: "The Holy Spirit is the gift of God insofar as he is granted to those to whom he is granted; in himself, he is God, even if he is granted to no one."[1] See how he says plainly that the Holy Spirit is called gift because he is granted.— But if he is only called gift because he is granted, he was not a gift from eternity, because he is not granted, except in time.

3. RESPONSE: WHY THE HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED GRANTED OR DONATED. To which we say that the Holy Spirit is called gift and grant or donation; but he is called grant or donation only because he is granted or given, which occurs only in time.—HERE WHY [HE IS CALLED] GIFT. However, he is not called gift only because he is given, but from a property which he had from eternity; hence, he was gift also from eternity. For he was eternally gift, not because he would be given, but because he proceeded from

[19]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n34.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c19 n36.

Father and Son. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 4: "For just as to be born for the Son means to be from the Father, so to be the gift of God for the Holy Spirit is to proceed from Father and Son."[2] Here it is plainly shown that the Holy Spirit is gift because he proceeds from Father and Son, just as the Son is from the Father because he is born from him.

4. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE SON AND FOR THE HOLY SPIRIT TO BE FROM THE FATHER. For it is not the same for the Son to be from the Father as for the Holy Spirit, that is, the Son is not said to be from the Father by the same property by which the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father. The Son is said to be from the Father because he is generated from him; but the Holy Spirit is said to be from Father and Son because the Spirit is the gift of Father and Son, that is, because he proceeds from both.

5. THE HOLY SPIRIT IS SO CALLED BECAUSE HE IS GIFT, AND HE IS CALLED GIFT BECAUSE HE PROCEEDS. For the Holy Spirit is so called because he is gift, and is called gift because he proceeds. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "The Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity, but is understood to be in the Trinity, insofar as he is properly called Holy Spirit, he is so called relatively, since he is referred to both Father and Son, because the Holy Spirit is the spirit of both Father and Son. But the relation itself is not apparent in this name; it is apparent when he is called gift of God: for he is the gift of Father and Son because he proceeds from the Father and the Son."[3] See how by these words it is plainly shown that it is by the same relation that he is called Holy Spirit and gift, but gift because he proceeds from Father and Son. And so the property by which he is called Holy Spirit or gift is the procession itself, of which we will treat more fully later,[4] together with the other properties.

6. AUGUSTINE: THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT FOREVER PROCEEDS. But since he proceeded from both from eternity, and was gift from eternity, the Holy Spirit is not called gift only because he is given, since he was gift before he was given.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "The Holy Spirit forever proceeds, and not in time, but from eternity. But because he proceeded in such manner that he was capable of being given, he was already gift even before there was anyone to whom he might be given. For gift means one thing and grant another. Indeed, a gift can be such even before it is given; but a grant, unless it is actually handed over, cannot at all be called such."[5] "And so the Spirit is a gift eternally, but he is granted in time."[6] By these words, it is plainly shown that, as the Holy Spirit proceeds

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 n29.
[3]Ibid., bk 5 c11 n12.
[4]Dist. 26 cc6-7.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c15 n16.
[6]Ibid.

from eternity, so he is gift from eternity, not because he is given from the Father to the Son or from the Son to the Father, but because he proceeded as forever capable of being given from eternity.

7. IT IS ASKED TO WHOM HE WAS CAPABLE OF BEING GIVEN [AND HOW HE WAS SO CAPABLE DIFFERENTLY FROM THE SON]. But it is asked to whom he was capable of being given, whether to the Father and Son, or only to us who did not yet exist. For if he was not capable of being given to Father and Son, but only to us, and he was gift because he proceeded while so capable, then it seems that by the same reasoning the Son would be forever gift because he too proceeded from the Father from eternity capable of being given to us in time, for we read also of the Son that *he was given to us*.[7]—To which we reply that the Holy Spirit proceeded capable of being given to us alone, and not to Father or Son, just as he was given to us alone. The Son was truly given to us, and he proceeded eternally from the Father not merely as capable of being given, but as begotten who might also be given. And so he proceeded as both begotten and capable of being given; but the Holy Spirit does not proceed as begotten, but only as gift. But he was always gift, not just because he was capable of being given, but because he proceeded from both and was capable of being given. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "By the very fact that God was going to give him, he was already gift even before he was given,"[8] and therefore capable of being given. But he was capable of being given in a different way than the Son, for he was given differently and proceeded differently than the Son. For the procession of the Son is generation or birth; but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not birth. However, each of them is ineffable.

Chapter 3 (68)

1. THAT JUST AS THE SON BY BEING BORN TOOK NOT ONLY BEING SON, BUT ALSO THAT HE BE ESSENCE, SO ALSO THE HOLY SPIRIT BY PROCEEDING TOOK NOT ONLY BEING GIFT, BUT ALSO THAT HE BE ESSENCE. And it is to be noted that, just as the Son by being born took not only being Son, but also that he be entirely and that he be substance itself, so also the Holy Spirit, by proceeding from Father and Son, took not only being Holy Spirit or gift, but also that he be entirely and that he be substance. And he did not take this from the fact of being given because, since he is not given except in time, if he possessed this from the fact of being given, he would only have taken being in time.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "By being born, the Son not only has that he be Son, but also that he be

[7]Cf. Is. 9, 6.
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c15 n16.

entirely. And so it is asked whether the Holy Spirit, by being given, has not only that he be gift, but that he be entirely. But if he has no being except in being given, that is, if he does not have being except by the fact of being given, just as the Son by being born has not only that he be Son, which is said relatively, but that he be substance itself entirely, then how was the Holy Spirit already substance itself, since he could not be given before there was someone to whom he might be given?"[1] It follows that it is not by being given, but by proceeding, that he has that he be gift and that he be essence; just as it is not by being given, but by being born that the Son takes not only that he be Son, but that he be essence. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, says: "Just as generation from the Father, without mutability of nature, gives to the Son essence without beginning of time, so procession from both, without any mutability of nature, gives to the Holy Spirit essence without any beginning of time."[2]

2. QUESTION: FROM THE ABOVE, IT SEEMS THAT THE SON IS NOT ONLY SON BY BEING BORN, BUT ALSO GOD OR ESSENCE, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT [IS GOD OR ESSENCE] BY PROCESSION. Here a question arises: By being born, the Son has not only that he be Son, but that he be essence, and the Holy Spirit, by proceeding, has not only that he be gift, but that he be essence. It follows that the Son is essence by birth, and the Holy Spirit is essence by procession, although it is said elsewhere that the Father is not Father by virtue of being God, the Son is not Son by virtue of being God, and the Holy Spirit is not gift by virtue of being God;[3] because, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 7, "by these names, their relations are expressed, not their essence."[4] We will treat this more fully later.[5]— RESPONSE. Responding briefly to this, we say that the Son is not essence by birth, but only Son; and the Holy Spirit is not essence by procession, but only gift; and yet each of them, one by being born and the other by proceeding, took that he be essence. As Hilary says, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, the Son "is not God by partition, or extension, or derivation from God, but by the power of a nature, by means of a birth, he exists in a nature which is one with itself";[6] and by the power of this nature the Holy Spirit, by procession, subsists in the same nature.

3. HE EXPOUNDS THE WORDS OF HILARY. This may be understood as follows: From the Father, who is unbegotten power, the Son has his nature by birth, that is, by being born, and the Holy Spirit has the same nature by

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c15 n16.
[2]Ibid., bk 15 c26 n47.
[3]Cf. Ibid., bk 7 c6 n11, and below Dist. 23 c1 n2.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c2 n3.
[5]Dist. 22-27.
[6]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 n37.

procession, that is, by proceeding.—HE CONFIRMS HIS EXPLANATION THROUGH THE WORDS OF HILARY. Hence the very same [Hilary], speaking more plainly, reveals what he meant by adding: "Whatever is born of God cannot not have the same nature from which it has come forth; what takes its existence from nothing but God cannot exist as anything other than God."[7] See, by these words is revealed how that phrase is to be taken: "Generation from the Father gives essence to the Son; and procession from both gives essence to the Holy Spirit":[8] not that one is Son by essence and the other is Holy Spirit by essence, but rather by a personal property, and that the one by being born, the other by proceeding, has the same entire essence which is in the Father.

Chapter 4 (69)

1. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED GIFT AND GRANT ACCORDING TO THE TWO AFOREMENTIONED MODES OF PROCESSION. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the Holy Spirit is eternally gift, and temporally grant or donation. From this appears that distinction of a two-fold procession of which we treated above.[1] For according to one procession, he is called donation or grant, and he is called gift according to the other procession.

2. ACCORDING TO HIS BEING GIFT, HE IS REFERRED TO FATHER AND SON; ACCORDING TO HIS BEING GRANT, [HE IS REFERRED BOTH] TO THE ONE WHO GAVE AND TO THOSE TO WHOM HE GAVE. And according to his being eternally a gift, he is referred to Father and Son; but according to his being called grant or donation, he is referred both to the one who gave and to those to whom he is given; and he is said to be of the one who gives, and of those to whom he is given.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "Whatever is given is referred both to the one who gave and to those to whom he gave it. And so the Holy Spirit is not only called the Father's and the Son's, who gave him, but he is also called ours, who received him. The Spirit then is both of God, who has given him, and ours who have received him."[2]

3. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED OURS IN ONE WAY, AND OUR NATURAL SPIRIT [IS CALLED OURS] IN ANOTHER WAY. "He is not that spirit of ours by which we exist, because the spirit *of a man is that which is in him*,[3] although even that spirit which is called *of a man* is one which we have also received; but the one is called ours in one way, the other in a different

[7]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 n37.
[8]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c26 n47.

[1]Dist. 14 c1.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.
[3]Cf. 1 Cor. 2, 11.

way. For we have received the one in order to be, but we have received the other in order to be saints."[4]—Scripture shows that the Holy Spirit is called ours: "For it was written of John [the Baptist] that he would come *in the spirit of Elias*:[5] see, this is called the spirit of Elias, namely the Holy Spirit whom Elias had received. And the Lord says to Moses: *I will take of your spirit and I shall give it to them*,[6] that is, I shall give to them of the Holy Spirit whom I already gave to you,"[7] and see, here he is called the spirit of Moses. And so it is clear that the Holy Spirit is called our spirit, namely because he is given to us, and assuredly given so that we might be saints; but the created spirit is given in order that we might be.

Chapter 5 (70)

1. WHETHER THE SON, SINCE HE IS GIVEN TO US, MAY ALSO BE CALLED OURS, LIKE THE HOLY SPIRIT. Here it is asked whether the Son also, since he has been given to us, is called or can be called ours.—To which we say that the Son is called our bread, our redeemer, and suchlike; but he is not called our Son, because he is called Son only in relation to the one who generated him; and so he cannot be called our Son, but only the Father's. But insofar as he is called given, like the Holy Spirit, he is referred both to the one who gave him and to those to whom he was given.

2. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS NOT CALLED OUR HOLY SPIRIT, BUT OUR SPIRIT. And although, in accordance with Scripture, as was said above,[1] he is called our Spirit, or your Spirit, or another's, as was said of Moses and Elias, yet in Scripture it is never said: our Holy Spirit, or yours, or another's, but only our Spirit, or your Spirit, or another's because Holy Spirit is said in the same way as gift, and both these expressions are used relatively to the Father and the Son, and this by an eternal relation. And if at times he is called our gift, gift is taken to mean granted or given [to us]. But when gift is taken to mean the same as Holy Spirit, he is called the gift of the Father and Son alone, not of man. Similarly, the Son, under this title, cannot be called ours, as if he were to be called our Son, just as the Holy Spirit cannot be called ours. And yet 'our bread' is said of the Son, and 'our Spirit' of the Spirit: the one is our bread because he restores us when he is given to us; the other is our Spirit because he is breathed into us by Father and Son, and blows in us as he wills.[2] Hence Augustine, in

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.
[5]Cf. Lk. 1, 17.
[6]Num. 11, 17.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.

[1]Above, c4 n3.
[2]Cf. Jn. 3, 8; 1 Cor. 12, 11.

On the Trinity, book 5, says: "What is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when he is called Son; and so he is the Father's Son and not ours. And yet we say *give us our bread*,[3] just as we say our Spirit."[4]

Chapter 6 (71)

1. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT MAY BE REFERRED TO HIMSELF. After these matters, it is asked whether the Holy Spirit may be referred to himself. For it seems that this can be proven from what has been said above.[1] For if what is given is referred to him who gives and to him to whom it is given, and the Holy Spirit is given by himself, as has been said earlier,[2] then he is referred to himself.

2. THIS QUESTION IS NOT RESOLVED HERE, BUT IS DEFERRED UNTIL LATER. We defer the determination of this question for later, until our treatment of those things which are said of God relatively in time,[3] among which are contained granted and given.

DISTINCTION XIX

Chapter 1 (72)

HERE ON THE EQUALITY OF THE THREE PERSONS. After having indicated, in accordance with the littleness of our power, the coeternity of the three persons, now it remains that we say something about the equality of the same. For the Catholic faith asserts that, as they are coeternal, the three persons are also coequal.[1] For the Son is equal in all things to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son. Augustine briefly explains how equality is to be understood; in his book, *On Faith to Peter*, he teaches: "None of these either precedes another in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power because, insofar as the unity of the divine nature is concerned, the Father is not anterior to or greater than the Son and Holy Spirit, nor the Son than the Holy Spirit. For the existence of the Son from the Father's nature is eternal and without beginning, and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the nature of the Father and the Son is eternal and without beginning. It follows from this that we rightly believe

[3]Cf. Mt. 6, 11; Lk. 11, 3.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.

[1]Dist. 15 c1.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Dist. 30 c2.

[1]Athanasian Creed.

and call these three one God, because entirely one is the eternity, one is the immensity, one naturally is the divinity of the three persons."[2] See how Augustine has briefly pointed out in what the equality of the three persons consists, namely that one does not excel another in either eternity, or greatness, or might.

Chapter 2 (73)

1. THAT ETERNITY, GREATNESS, AND MIGHT IN GOD ARE ONE THING, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE POSITED AS IF THEY WERE DIVERSE. And although these things are enumerated as if they were diverse things, yet in God they are one and the same thing, namely the simple and incommutable divine essence.

2. THAT GREATNESS IS THE ESSENCE OF GOD. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 7: "He is not great by one thing and God by another, but he is great insofar as he is God, because for him it is not one thing to be great and another to be God. For his greatness is the same as his might, and his essence is the same as his greatness."[1] And so the Father and the Son are simultaneously one essence and one greatness.

3. THAT THE MIGHT OF GOD IS GOD. Also in the same way, the might of God is the divine essence. Hence Augustine, in *Confessions*, book 7: "The will and might of God is God himself."[2]

4. THAT THE ETERNITY OF GOD IS GOD. The eternity of God is also the divine essence. Augustine shows this [in his comments] on that passage of the Psalm, *In the generation of the generations, your years*,[3] by saying: "There is a generation of generations which does not pass away and is gathered together from all generations, that is, the saints. In that generation, there shall be the years of God which do not pass away, that is, the eternity of God. For the years of God are not one thing and God himself another, but the years of God is the eternity of God. But this eternity is the very substance of God, which contains nothing changeable."[4]

5. And so let us hold most firmly that this is one and the same thing, that is, the divine essence and God's eternity, might, and greatness; nevertheless Scripture was accustomed to posit these and similar things almost as if they were distinct. Augustine has briefly summed up the equality of

[2]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n4.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c1 n1.
[2]Augustine, *Confessiones*, bk 7 c4 n6.
[3]Ps. 101, 25.
[4]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 101, 25, serm. 2, nn10-12.

the three persons in these words: "Because one surpasses another neither in eternity, nor in greatness, nor in might."[5]

6. HE TREATED ETERNITY ABOVE. That none of the three persons surpasses another in eternity has been shown above, where the coeternity of the three persons was introduced.[6]

Chapter 3 (74)

1. HERE ON GREATNESS, THAT NONE OF THE PERSONS SURPASSES [THE OTHERS] BY IT. And so now it remains to show that one does not surpass another in greatness and might; and first, let us examine the issue of greatness.

2. THAT ONE PERSON IS NOT GREATER THAN ANOTHER, NOR ARE TWO SOMETHING GREATER THAN ONE, NOR THREE THAN TWO OR ONE. And it is to be understood that the Father is not greater than the Son, nor the Father or the Son greater than the Holy Spirit; nor are two persons together something greater than one, nor three together something greater than two; nor is the [divine] essence greater in three than in two, or in two than in one, because the entire essence is in each of the persons.[1] Hence John of Damascus says: "We confess the whole nature of the Godhead to be perfectly in each of the hypostases, that is, persons; it is whole in the Father, whole in the Son, whole in the Holy Spirit; and so the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, and the Holy Spirit is perfect God."[2]

Chapter 4 (75)

1. HOW THE FATHER IS SAID TO BE IN THE SON, AND THE SON IN THE FATHER, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT IN BOTH, AND EACH IN EACH OF THE OTHERS. And so it is that the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in both, and each in each of the others. Hence Augustine in the book *On Faith to Peter*: "Because of natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and in the Son. Because of the unity of the divine nature, none of the persons is outside any of them."[1] See how he here manifests somewhat (for such a great mystery cannot fully be unfolded by a human being) in what sense each of the persons is said to be totally in the others.

[5]Above, c1.
[6]Dist. 9.

[1]Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n12.
[2]John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, bk 3 c6.

[1]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n4.

2. And so also Hilary, pursuing these matters more deeply in *On the Trinity*, book 3, says: "The Lord's words, not without cause, bring uncertainty to many by saying: *I am in the Father and the Father is in me.*[2] For the nature of human intelligence does not grasp the meaning of this statement, nor will human comparison provide any adequate example for divine things. But it is possible for God to be that which is unintelligible to man. What is meant by *I am in the Father and the Father is in me* is to be grasped and understood accordingly; but if we are able to understand this as it is, the knowledge of divine truth brings about that which is thought to be impossible to happen by the nature of things."[3] "For the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father, the plenitude of divinity is perfect in each."[4] "Because the plenitude of divinity is in the Son: whatever is in the Father, this also is in the Son; whatever is in the unbegotten, this also in the one begotten. The one is from the other and both are one":[5] "namely, that the one who is has nothing which is not also in the one from whom he is."[6] "They are not two in one, but one in the other; what is in both is not different,"[7] and "according to our faith, both are united, but they are not confused; we confess neither that both are the same, nor that they are different, for the nativity neither allows God born of God to be the same, nor to be something else."[8] "And so we confess the same likeness of might and plenitude of divinity in both, because Truth says: *I am in the Father and the Father is in me.*[9] For the Son received everything from the Father."[10] "If he received only a part of his begetter, then neither is perfect: for something is missing from him from whom the Son came forth, nor will there be plenitude in him who comes into being from a portion [of another]. And so neither is perfect, if the begetter loses his plenitude and the begotten does not acquire it."[11]

3. "And so let us profess that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, God in God," as the same Hilary says, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, "not by a double joining of harmonious kinds, nor by the nature of a larger substance ingrafted on another, but by the united likeness of nature, by the birth of a living nature from a living nature: while the reality does not change, while birth causes no degeneration of the nature of God, while no

[2]Jn. 14, 10-11.
[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 n1.
[4]Ibid., bk 3 n23.
[5]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, n4.
[6]Ibid., n23.
[7]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, n4.
[8]Ibid., bk 1 n17.
[9]Jn. 14, 10-11.
[10]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 n23.
[11]Ibid., n8.

other thing than God is born from God, while in these there is nothing new, nothing alien, nothing separable."[12] See by these words, insofar as human weakness allows, in what sense Christ said that he is in the Father and the Father is in him.

4. In the same sense, too, the Holy Spirit is understood to be in both [Father and Son] and each of the persons in each, namely because the same plenitude of divinity and united likeness of nature is in each of them. Because the divine nature is not greater in any of these persons, but these three persons are of one undifferentiated nature. And so each is said to be in each, as was said earlier.

5. Hence Ambrose, opening up to us the meaning of the above words, [commenting] on the second Epistle to the Corinthians, says: "By this the Father is known to be in the Son and the Son in the Father, because their substance is one: for unity is to be found where there is no diversity."[13] —See, by the testimonies of three illustrious men, namely Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose, concurring in the same view by the revelation of the Holy Spirit who speaks in them, is shown (although as if *through a mirror and in a confused reflection*[14]) to those who piously wish to believe, how the statement that the Father is in the Son, or the Son in the Father, or the Holy Spirit in both is to be taken.

6. HE RETURNS TO WHAT HE HAD BEGUN, NAMELY THAT ONE DOES NOT SURPASS ANOTHER IN GREATNESS. But let us now return to our main point and follow up on what we began, showing that none of the three persons surpasses another in greatness, because none is greater than the others, nor are two [of them] something greater than one, nor three than two; "nor is God greater than each of them, because each of them is perfect, nor is there anything by which that perfection may increase."[15]

Chapters 5-6 (76-77)

1. THAT NONE OF THE PERSONS IS A PART OF THE TRINITY. Nor is any of the three persons a part of God or of the divine essence, because each of them is truly and fully God and is the whole and full divine essence; and so none of these persons is a part in the Trinity.

2. AUGUSTINE SETS FORTH A HERETIC'S OPINION AND RESPONDS TO IT. Hence Augustine, *Against Maximinus the Heretic*, book 2, speaks as follows: "You hold that God the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit

[12]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 nn39 and 38.
[13]I.e., Ambrosiaster, on 2 Cor. 5, 19.
[14]Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 12.
[15]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c8 n9.

cannot be one God: for you fear lest the Father be a part of the one God who would be three parts. Have no fear: for there is no division of parts in the unity of the divinity. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one God: that is, this same Trinity is one God."[1]—"And so, you say, God the Father is a part of God. Far be it! For the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three persons; because they are of one substance, these three are one, and they are most highly one where there is no diversity of natures and none of wills. For if they were one by nature, but were not one by con-sent [of the will], they would not be most highly one; but if they were disparate in nature, they would not be one. And so these three, who are one because of the ineffable joining of the divinity by which they are ineffably united, is one God. Therefore each one of these three cannot be a part of the Trinity. In the Trinity, which is God, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God; and these three together are one God. Nor is one of them a third part of this Trinity; nor are two of them something greater than one, nor are all together something greater than each, because their greatness is spiritual, and not corporeal. *Let him who can grasp this, grasp it*;[2] as for him who cannot, let him believe it and pray that he may understand what he believes. For what is said through the Prophet is true: *Unless you have believed, you will not understand.*"[3,4] By these words, he plainly shows that there is no difference in the greatness of the three persons.

3. ARGUMENT OF AUGUSTINE AGAINST THE HERETIC, BY WHICH HE SHOWS THAT THE FATHER AND THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE NOT PARTS IN THE TRINITY. Also, in the same place: "You have said that the one God is not composed of parts, and you want this to be understood of the Father. You say that he is a single unbegotten power. And yet you seem to note many things in this single power, since you say: God begot God, the good begot the good, the wise one a wise one, the merciful one a merciful one, the mighty one a mighty one. Are goodness and wisdom and mercy and might, then, parts of the one power, which you have said is simple? If you say: they are parts, then a simple power is made up of parts; and this simple power, according to your definition, is one God: therefore you say that God is composed of parts. I do not say it, you reply. And so there are no parts. If, then, in the one person of the Father you find what seem to be many things, and do not find parts because it is one simple power, how much more are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one God because of their undivided divinity? And [how much more] are they

[1]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c10 n1.
[2]Mt. 19, 12.
[3]Is. 7, 9 (Septuagint).
[4]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c10 n2.

three persons because of the property of each? And [how much more] are they not parts of the one God because of the perfection of each? The Father is power, the Son is power, the Holy Spirit is power. In this, you speak the truth. But because you do not wish that the power begotten of a power and the power proceeding from a power have the same nature, then you speak falsely and say this contrary to right and Catholic faith."[5] By these words, it is plainly taught that those three persons are not parts of God or of the divine essence, and that none of them is to be called a part of the Trinity, nor one greater than the others.

Chapter 7 (78)

1. WHEN WE SAY THAT THE THREE PERSONS ARE ONE ESSENCE, WE DO NOT PREDICATE IT AS GENUS [MADE UP] OF SPECIES, NOR AS SPECIES [MADE UP] OF INDIVIDUALS, BECAUSE ESSENCE IS NOT A GENUS AND THE PERSONS ARE NOT A SPECIES, NOR IS THE ESSENCE A SPECIES AND THE PERSONS INDIVIDUALS. Here it is to be added that such is the equality of the three persons and so undifferentiated their greatness that, when we say that the three persons are one essence or substance, we do not predicate it as a genus [made up] of species, or as species [made up] of individuals. For the divine essence is not a genus, the three persons are not a species; neither is the divine essence a species, nor are the three persons individuals.

2. FIRST, HE PROVES THAT THE STATEMENT IS NOT MADE AS A GENUS [MADE UP] OF SPECIES. Augustine plainly demonstrates this with credible and irrefutable reasons; in *On the Trinity*, book 7, he speaks as follows: "If essence is the genus, and person is the species, as some feel, then they ought to be called three substances as they are called three persons, just as, since animal is a genus and horse is a species, three horses are called three horses and also three animals. For in that case species is not spoken of in the plural and genus in the singular, as if to say: three horses are one animal, but as they are called three horses by a special term, so they are called three animals by a general term."[1] And so, since we confess that the three persons are one essence and not three essences, and that three horses are called three animals and not one, it is clear that a genus is not signified by the term of 'essence,' nor a species by the term of 'person.'

3. HERE HE PROVES THAT THE STATEMENT IS NOT MADE AS A SPECIES [MADE UP] OF INDIVIDUALS. "But if they say that a species is not signified by the term of 'person,' but something singular and individual, and a species is to be understood by the term of 'essence,' so that a person is not so

[5]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c10 n3.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.

called as in 'man,' but as in saying 'this man,' as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or anyone else who could also be singled out with a finger: the same reasoning will similarly defeat them too. For just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so also [they are called] three men and three animals. Why, then, are Father and Son and Holy Spirit, if we discuss such things according to genus and species and individual, not also called three essences as [they are called] three persons?"[2]

4. HE PROVES THE SAME POINT IN ANOTHER WAY. Also in another way, Augustine proves the same point, namely that the divine essence is not a genus, nor the persons a species; and the essence is not a species and the persons are not individuals. He says: "A single essence has no species, just as a single animal has no species. Therefore Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not three species of a single essence: and so the divine essence is not a genus. But neither is the divine essence a species, and the persons are not individuals, as man is a species and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are individuals. For if essence is a species, like man, then just as we do not say that Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac are one man, so we will not say that the three persons are one essence. And so we do not use these terms according to genus and species."[3]

Chapter 8 (79)

NEITHER ARE THE THREE PERSONS CALLED ONE ESSENCE ACCORDING TO MATERIAL CAUSE. It is also to be noted that the divine essence is not the material cause of the three persons, as Augustine teaches in the same place: "The three persons may be called one essence according to their common and identical matter, just as if three statues were made from the same gold, we would call the three statues one gold. And yet we do not so speak of the Trinity, that is, the three persons, one essence and one God, as if they were three things subsisting from the same matter. For among equal statues, there is more gold in three statues together than in one alone, and there is less gold in one than in two. But in that essence of the Trinity, such is in no way the case."[1] And so it is not according to material cause that we say that the three persons are one essence, as the three statues are said to be one gold.

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.
[3]Ibid.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.

Chapter 9 (80)

1. NOR ARE THE THREE PERSONS SAID TO BE ONE ESSENCE AS THREE MEN ARE SAID TO BE ONE NATURE OR OF ONE NATURE. To these, it must also be added that, as Augustine says in the same place, we do not say that the three persons are one essence or of one essence, "as we say that the nature of any three human beings of the same sex, the same disposition of body, and the same spirit is one, or that they are of one nature. For in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man, as we also said was the case with the statues. But in God it is not so: for the Father and Son together is not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but those three persons together are equal to one of them."[1]

2. From the aforegoing,[2] it is manifest that the three persons are called divine essence neither according to material cause, as the three statues one gold; nor according to likeness of temperament, as the three men of one nature; nor as a genus is predicated of species or a species of individuals, that is, the thing containing of the things contained, the greater of lesser things.

3. SOME SEEMING OBJECTIONS TO THE AFOREGOING. But some things which Catholic commentators on sacred Scripture have handed down in their writings seem to contradict these statements. In these works, they seem to signify that the divine essence is something common and universal, like a species, but the three persons are three particulars, or three individuals differing in number.—Whence John of Damascus, great among the Greek doctors, in a book which he wrote on the Trinity and that Pope Eugenius had translated: "Common and universal things are predicated of the particulars that are subject to them. And so substance is common, but hypostasis, that is, person, is particular. But a particular is so called not because it has a part of the nature, but is particular in number, like an atom, that is, an individual. (ATTEND WITH CARE!) For the hypostases are said to differ in number, and not in nature."[3] —Also, in the same place: "Substance signifies a common and collective species of persons who are similar in species (*homoideon hypostaseon*), such as God, man; but hypostasis denotes an individual, namely Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul,"[4] and suchlike.—See how he says plainly that substance is a universal, but hypostasis a particular; and that God is a species, like man, and that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are individuals, like Peter and Paul, and that they

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.
[2]This summarizes n1 and cc7-8.
[3]John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, bk 3 c6.
[4]Ibid., bk 3 c4.

differ in number. These words seem to wholly contradict the opinion of Augustine stated above. And so what shall we say to this?

4. HE SAYS THAT THE WORDS OF AUGUSTINE ARE TO BE HELD. We can and must certainly say this, that the words which Augustine has handed down to us above are to be held without any hesitation.

5. THAT JOHN'S WORDS CAN BE RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD, AND HE SHOWS HOW. As for the words said here, although on the surface they appear to state something alien to the faith, yet they are capable of a right understanding, but they certainly require a very pious reader and interpreter. In the explanation of these words, I would prefer to listen to others in silence than to give occasion for detraction to the ill-intentioned by my speech.

6. IN WHAT SENSE HE SAID THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF GOD IS A SPECIES OR UNIVERSAL AND THE PERSONS ARE INDIVIDUALS. And yet it seems to me that they may be taken as follows: When he says 'substance is common and hypostasis is particular,' he does not take these terms, when applied to God, in the same way as they are taken in philosophical teaching, but he has spoken by analogy to what the philosophers say: just as in their usage what is predicated of many is called common or universal, and what [is predicated] of one only is called a particular or individual, so here the divine essence is called universal because it is said of all the persons together and of each severally, but each single one of the persons is called a particular because it is not predicated of the others in common, nor of each of the others severally. And so it is by likeness of predication that he called the substance a universal and the persons particulars or individuals. —For this identical reason, he also said that the divine essence is "a common and collective species of persons similar in species." For just as the species 'man' is predicated of individual men, as of Peter and Paul and others, and these do not differ, but agree, in species, so God is predicated of the three persons, who do not differ in divinity, but agree in all things. And so John, pondering this likeness between eternal and temporal things, applied to eternal things the terms of 'universality' and 'particularity,' which properly pertain to temporal things. But Augustine, concluding that the unlikeness between the above-mentioned things was greater than the likeness, refused to apply the above terms to the excellence of the Trinity.

Chapter 10 (81)

1. IN WHAT SENSE HE SAID THAT THE PERSONS DIFFER IN NUMBER. As for John's other statement, that 'the hypostases differ in number, not in nature,' insofar as he says that they 'do not differ in nature,' he speaks most truly and presents no difficulty. But care is to be exercised in interpreting his assertion that 'they differ in number.' For things are said to differ in number in diverse ways.

2. IN WHAT WAYS A THING IS SAID TO DIFFER IN NUMBER, AND ACCORDING TO WHICH WAY THIS CAN APPLY TO THE PERSONS. For some things are said to differ in number when they differ in such a way that this thing is not that one, nor anything which is that one or is in that one, as Socrates and Plato and suchlike differ from each other. These are called individuals or particulars among the philosophers, and the three persons cannot be said to differ in number in this way.—Things are also said to differ in number which, in enumeration or computation, are not added to each other, but are distinguished from each other, as when, in speaking of some things, we say: one, two, three. It was perhaps in this way that John said that the hypostases, that is, the persons, differ in number. For we can say: the Father is one, and Father and Son are two, and Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three; and also: this person is one, and this one and that one are two, and this one and that one and the other are three. But it is more fitting that those three persons be said to be distinguished only by their properties. Their distinction by their properties will be treated below.[1]

3. But now let us return to what we had begun, repeating what has already been said, so "that what is repeated frequently may be known more familiarly."[2]

Chapter 11 (82)

1. THAT ONE PERSON IS NOT GREATER THAN ANOTHER, NOR THREE TOGETHER THAN ONE, AND HE SHOWS THIS BY A CATHOLIC REASONING. And so, as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 8, it is to be known that "there is such an equality in the Trinity that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but neither are Father and Son together something greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is each individual person something less than the Trinity itself."[1]—That such is the case is to be demonstrated in some other way, if it is possible. As Augustine says in the same place: "Therefore, insofar as the Creator himself assists us, let us consider how in this Trinity two or three persons are not something greater than one of them."[2]

2. HE ADDUCES A MOST SUBTLE REASON TO SHOW THAT THIS IS THE CASE. "What there [i.e. in the Trinity] is called great is not great from anything other than the fact that it truly is, because there greatness is truth itself and truth is essence, and so nothing is greater there which is not truer. But Father and Son together are not truer than the Father alone or

[1]In Dist. 26.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c1 n1.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c1 n1.
[2]Ibid.

the Son; and so both together are not something greater than each of them alone. And because also the Holy Spirit equally truly has being, it follows that Father and Son together are not something greater than he, because they do not have being more truly than he does."[3]

3. ALSO, HE PROVES THE SAME THING IN ANOTHER WAY. Also: "In the essence of truth, to be and to be true are the same thing, and to be and to be great are also the same; and so to be great and to be true are the same. Therefore, whatever is equally true there, it is also equally great; and so whatever does not have more truth there, does not have more greatness. But whatever is not truer does not have more truth; but one person [of the Trinity] is not truer than another, or two than one, or three together than one of them alone; and so one of them does not have more truth than another, or three together than one of them alone. And so it follows that the Trinity itself is not something greater than each of the persons in it, but is as great as each of the persons severally. For where truth itself is greatness, no one is greater there who is not truer."[4]—See how in a suitable manner and by a Catholic reasoning, it has been shown how the greatness of the three persons is undifferentiated because one is not greater than another, nor two than one, nor are three together something greater than each of them severally.

Chapter 12 (83)

1. THAT GOD IS NOT TO BE CALLED TRIPLE, BUT THREEFOLD. Moreover, although God is called threefold, yet he is not to be called triple; for there is no tripleness, where there is the highest unity and an undifferentiated equality.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, says: "God is not to be reputed triple because he is Trinity, otherwise the Father alone, or the Son alone, would be less than Father and Son together."[1] "And so, since the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as Father and Son and Holy Spirit together, in no way is God to be called triple. For the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit is not more greatly God than each of them singly, because there is nothing by which that perfection may increase. But the Father and Son and Holy Spirit is perfect, and each of them is perfect God; and so he is to be called Trinity rather than triple."[2]

2. THAT IT IS NOT THE SAME IN CORPOREAL THINGS AS IN THE TRINITY. "In corporeal things, one is not as much as three together, and two things

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 c1 n2.
[4]Ibid., bk 8 c1 n2.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c7 n9.
[2]Ibid., bk 6 c8 n9.

are more than one. But in the highest Trinity, one person is as much as three together, and two are as much as one. And they are infinite in themselves,"[3] because *there is no end of their greatness*.[4] And by this, what we said above[5] has been made clear, namely "how they are each in each and all in each, and each in all and all in all, and one is in all and one is all."[6] —Note that we have sufficiently shown how no person in the Trinity surpasses any other in greatness.

DISTINCTION XX

Chapter 1 (84)

1. AFTER SHOWING THAT ONE OF THE PERSONS DOES NOT SURPASS ANOTHER IN GREATNESS, NOW HE SHOWS THAT ONE DOES NOT EXCEL ANOTHER IN MIGHT. Now it remains to show how none of these persons excels another in might so that, just as the greatness of the three is one and undifferentiated, so also let it be shown that the might of the three is one and undifferentiated.

2. And so it is to be known that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, nor the Son or Father than the Holy Spirit. Nor do two or three of them together have greater power than one of them alone because Father and Son together cannot do more than the Holy Spirit can do alone. Nor can these three together do more than any single one of them because the omnipotence which the Father has, the Son also took by being born and the Holy Spirit by proceeding.—Augustine plausibly presented a view to this effect with reasons and authorities in the book *Against Maximinus*, who used to say that the Father is better and more powerful than the Son.[1]

Chapter 2 (85)

THAT THE SON IS NOT LESS POWERFUL THAN THE FATHER. Augustine says: "He who said: *All that the Father has is also mine*,[1] has nothing less than the Father, for if he has something less in might than the Father, then he does not have *all* that the Father has. But he has *all* that the Father has; and so he has as much might as the Father." "Therefore he is equal

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n12.
[4]Cf. Ps. 144, 3.
[5]Above, c. 4.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n12.

[1]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 cc12-18.

[1]Jn. 16, 15.

to the Father": "for the one who received cannot be unequal to the one who gave."[2]

Chapter 3 (86)

1. HERE HE SETS OUT THE FALSE TRADITION OF THE HERETICS. "With regard to might, you feel that the Son is powerful, but that the Father is more powerful, so that, according to your doctrine, a powerful one was well able to generate another powerful one, but the All-powerful could not generate an All-powerful one. And so the Father has an omnipotence which the Son does not have; but if this is so, then what the Son says is false: *All that the Father has is mine.*"[1,2]

2. THE HERETIC PROFESSED A TRUTH FROM WHICH HE PROCEEDED TO [MAKE] FALSE DEDUCTIONS. "But, you say, the Father did not receive might from anyone, but the Son did so from the Father. We too profess that the Son received his might from him of whom he was born powerful, and that no one gave might to the Father because no one generated him. For it was by generation that the Father gave might to the Son, and also all that he has in his own substance he gave by generation to the one whom he begot of his substance."[3]

3. A QUESTION OF AUGUSTINE WHICH HEMS IN THE HERETIC. "But it is asked whether the Father has given to the Son a might equal to or less than his own. If equal, then he is understood to have generated one who is not only powerful, but all-powerful; but if a lesser might, then how is *all* that the Father has also the Son's? If the Father's omnipotence is not the Son's, then undoubtedly not *all* which the Father has is also the Son's."[4] But *all* is the Son's; and so the Father's omnipotence is also the Son's; and so the Father is not more powerful than the Son.

4. HE PROVES IN ANOTHER WAY THAT THE SON IS EQUAL TO THE FATHER. Also, against Maximinus, he proves in another way that the Son is equal to the Father, saying as follows: "You say that the Father begot a Son who was less than himself, by which you do injury also to the Father who, if he begot an only Son who was less [than himself], either could not, or would not beget an equal."[5] "But if you say that he would not, then you

[2]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 nn7 and 9.

[1]Jn. 16, 15.
[2]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c12 n1.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid., bk 2 c19 n4 .

have called him envious; but if he could not, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?"[6]

5. IF THE FATHER WOULD NOT OR COULD NOT GENERATE A SON WHO WAS EQUAL, THEN HE IS FOUND TO BE EITHER WEAK OR ENVIOUS. "Evidently, the whole question comes down to this: God the Father either could not or would not generate a Son who was equal to himself. If he could not, then he is found to be weak; if he would not, then envious. But each of these is false; and so the Son is a true equal to the Father."[7] Therefore the Father begot a Son equal to himself, and from each and to each proceeds the Holy Spirit, who is their equal. Augustine says against the same [Maximinus]: "If the Father was able to generate his full form in his only Son, and yet did not beget a full form, but a lesser one, you are compelled to call the Father envious."[8] And so he begot a Son fully God and equal to himself.

6. BY AN ANALOGY, HE SHOWS THAT THE FATHER DID NOT BEGET THE SON AS LESSER. He shows that this is the case by a human analogy, saying: "A human father, if he had been able, would have generated a son equal to himself. And so who will dare to say that the All-powerful could not do this? I also add that, if a man could, he would generate a son who was greater and better than himself; but nothing can be greater or better than God."[9] "Why, then, did God not generate a Son equal to himself, as you say, since the passage of years was not necessary for the equality to be fulfilled, nor did he lack omnipotence? Or perhaps he would not? But then—far be it!—he is envious. But he is not envious, and so he generated his equal."[10] "And so let us believe that the Son is equal to him."[11]

7. HE SETS FORTH THE OPINION OF THE HERETIC IN ORDER TO DESTROY IT. "But perhaps you will say: the Father is greater than the Son by the very fact that, being unbegotten of anyone, yet he begot his equal. To which I will quickly answer: Indeed, and so the Father is not greater than the Son, since he begot his equal. For the question of origin is this: who is from whom; but the question of equality is: what and how great is he."[12] Which is to say: The question by which it is asked who is from whom pertains to origin, but the question by which it is asked what and how great one is pertains to equality. Nor is it the case that, when the Son is said to be begotten of the Father, "an inequality of substance is shown, but rather

[6]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c7.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ibid., bk 2 c15 n1.
[9]Ibid., bk 2 c18 n3.
[10]Ibid., bk 2 c15 n5.
[11]Ibid., bk 2 c18 n3.
[12]Ibid.

the order of nature: not that the one is prior to the other, but that the one is from the other."[13] It does not follow from the fact that the Father begot and the Son was begotten or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, that equality or inequality exists there, because it is not according to this that a person [of the Trinity] is said to be the equal or unequal of another.

8. See how, "as briefly as we were able, the equality of the Trinity and the one and identical substance has been demonstrated"[14] in the above,[15] namely, how any one of the three persons does not excel any other in eternity, greatness, or might.

DISTINCTION XXI

Chapter 1 (87)

1. IT IS ASKED HOW IT CAN BE SAID: THE FATHER ALONE, OR THE SON ALONE, OR THE HOLY SPIRIT ALONE, SINCE THEY ARE INSEPARABLE. Here arises a question which has its root in what has been said earlier.[1] For it has been said above that the Father alone, the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as the three together, and that two or three persons together are not something greater than one alone. And so Augustine asks, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, "how such things can be said rightly, since neither the Father is alone, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, but the Son is with the Father, and the Father with the Son, and the Holy Spirit with both always and inseparably; for these three persons are inseparable."[2]

2. RESPONSE OF AUGUSTINE. To which Augustine, in the same place, replies as follows: "We say the Father alone, not because he is separated from the Son" or the Holy Spirit, but in saying this we signify that "the latter together with him are not the Father."[3] For the Father alone is father: which is not said because he is alone, that is, without the Son or the Holy Spirit, but by this the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded from participation in fatherhood. In the same way, in saying: the Son alone is son, or the Holy Spirit alone is a holy spirit, the Son is not divided from the Father or the Holy Spirit from both, but the Father and the Holy Spirit are excluded from participation in the property of sonship, and the Father and the Son from participation in the property of proceeding. —And so, when it is said:

[13]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n8.
[14]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c9 n10.
[15]Dist. 9, Dist. 19, and here.

[1]Dist. 19 c12 n1.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c7 n9.
[3]Ibid.

'the Father alone is as great as those three together,' by saying 'alone,' the Father is not separated from the others; but this is the sense: The Father alone, that is, the Father, who is father in a way not shared by Son and Holy Spirit, is as great, etc. Understand in a similar sense the expressions 'the Son alone' or 'the Holy Spirit alone.' As Augustine says in the same place: "Therefore the Father is called alone because none but he is a father there";[4] and 'Son alone,' because none but he is a son there; and 'Holy Spirit alone' because none but he is a holy spirit there.

Chapter 2 (88)

1. WHETHER IT MAY BE SAID: THE FATHER ALONE IS GOD, THE SON ALONE IS GOD, THE HOLY SPIRIT ALONE IS GOD, OR THE FATHER IS THE ONLY GOD, THE SON IS THE ONLY GOD, THE HOLY SPIRIT IS THE ONLY GOD. After these, it is asked whether, as it is said: the Father alone is father, or the Son alone is son, it can also be said: the Father alone is God, or the Son alone is God, and similarly of the Holy Spirit; or the Father is the only God, the Son is the only God.—To which we say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit is called, and is, one God, and this Trinity together properly is said to be the only God, just as [it is said to be] the only wise one, the only powerful one; but it does not seem that we ought to say by our own words, except when the word of authority supports it: 'the Father alone is God' or 'the Father is the only God.' We say the same of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

2. THAT IT IS NOT SAID: THE FATHER ALONE IS GOD. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, says: "Because we are showing how 'the Father alone' or 'the Son alone' might be said, that opinion must be considered which holds that the only true God is not the Father alone, but Father and Son and Holy Spirit."[1] See, you have it that the Father alone is not to be said to be the only true God.

3. THAT THE FATHER IS NOT GOD ALONE, BUT THE TRINITY. Also in the same: "If one asks whether the Father alone is God, how shall we answer that he is not? Unless perhaps we might say that the Father is indeed God, but he is not God alone; we might say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit is God alone."[2] See, you have here that the Father is not to be called 'God alone.'

4. And some want to take 'alone' here only with regard to the subject; but if it were with regard to the predicate, they grant that the Father is God

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c9 n10.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c9 n10.
[2]Ibid.

alone.—But from the words of Augustine, it appears to be shown that the whole Trinity is properly speaking to be called 'God alone.' And as Augustine says *Against Maximinus*, this Trinity is to be understood when the Apostle says: *Blessed and alone powerful*;[3] and also: *To God, who alone is wise*;[4] and also: *To God, who alone is invisible*.[5] For these are not to be taken as concerning the Father alone, as Maximinus and other heretics contended, but [as applying to] the Trinity,[6] just like the other text: *He alone has immortality*;[7] because "according to right faith, the Trinity is the one and only God, blessed, powerful,"[8] wise, invisible. Hence Augustine, in the same: "Since the one God is the Trinity, let this be the solution to our question: that we understand God alone to be wise, him alone to be powerful, [him alone to be] Father and Son and Holy Spirit, who is the one and only God."[9]

5. Augustine to Maximinus: "For it is not the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, who is God, but the Trinity itself is the one and only God."[10]

Chapter 3 (89)

1. How the Trinity is called God alone, although it is with holy spirits and souls. But it is again asked how we call the Trinity itself 'God alone,' although it is with holy spirits and souls.—To which Augustine responds in *On the Trinity*, book 6, saying as follows: "We call the Trinity God alone, although it is always with holy spirits and souls; but we say 'alone,' because nothing else is God than the Trinity itself. For those [spirits and souls] are not God with it,"[1] nor [is] anything else; but the Trinity alone, and not those or any other things, is God.

2. Although the above were to be said of the Father alone, yet the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be excluded. "And yet," as Augustine says, "although the above were to be said of the Father alone, it does not follow that Son and Holy Spirit would be excluded, because *these three are one*.[2] Similarly, we read in the Apocalypse concerning the Son

[3]1 Tim. 6, 15.
[4]Rom. 16, 27.
[5]1 Tim. 1, 17.
[6]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c11-13; see also *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c6 nn10-11.
[7]1 Tim. 6, 16.
[8]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c12 n2.
[9]Ibid., bk 2 c13 n1.
[10]Ibid.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c7 n9.
[2]1 Jn. 5, 7.

that *he has a name written, which none but he knows*,[3] and yet it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Spirit is separated from him. And when it is said: *No one knows the Father, except the Son*,[4] it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Spirit is separated because they are inseparable."[5] —Sometimes also Father and Son are named, and the Holy Spirit is not, as when Truth, speaking to the Father, says: *That they may know you and Jesus Christ, whom you have sent, to be the one true God*.[6] Augustine says: "Why, then, was he silent concerning the Holy Spirit? Because it follows that wherever one is named, as the Father and the Son, cleaving to one in such great peace, that Peace itself is also to be understood, even though it is not mentioned."[7] And so, whenever one of these is named, the rest are also understood; which occurs in several places of Scripture.

DISTINCTION XXII

Chapter 1 (90)

1. ON THE DIFFERENCE OF THE NAMES WHICH WE USE IN SPEAKING OF GOD. After the above, it seems to us that we must discuss the diversity of names which we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity; afterwards it must be shown in what ways anything is said concerning this Trinity.

2. "And let us especially hold," as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 8, "that there are some names which pertain distinctly to the several persons "which are used only of the single persons; some others signify the unity of essence and these are used of the several persons severally and of all of them in common; but there are other names which are used of God metaphorically and by analogy."[1]—Hence Ambrose, in *On the Trinity*, book 2, says: "In order that faith may shine forth more purely, it seems that a threefold distinction is to be drawn. For there are some names which clearly show a property of the Godhead; and there are some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty; but there are others which are used of God metaphorically and by analogy."[2] Indications of property are: generation, Son, Word, and suchlike; those of eternal unity are: wis-

[3]Apoc. 19, 12.
[4]Mt. 11, 27.
[5]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c13 n1.
[6]Jn. 17, 3.
[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c9 n10.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 n1; but see bk 5 cc8-16.
[2]Ambrose, *De fide*, prol. n2.

dom, power, truth, and suchlike; those of analogy: splendour, letter of the alphabet, mirror, and suchlike.

Chapter 2 (91)

TO THE ABOVE, HE ADDS THAT THERE ARE SOME NAMES WHICH ARE SUITABLE FOR GOD TEMPORALLY AND ARE USED RELATIVELY. To these, it is to be added that, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, book 5, there are also some names which are suitable for God in time and are used relatively to the creature.[1] Some of these are used of all the persons, such as lord, creator, refuge; but some are not used of all, such as granted, given, sent.

Chapter 3 (92)

HE ADDS CONCERNING THE NAME OF TRINITY. Moreover, there is one name which is not used of any person singly, but of all together, that is, trinity. This is not used according to substance, but designates the plurality of persons almost as a collective noun.

Chapter 4 (93)

CONCERNING OTHER NAMES WHICH ARE SUITABLE FOR GOD IN TIME AND ARE NOT USED RELATIVELY. There are also some names which are suitable for God in time, but are not used relatively, such as incarnated, made man, and suchlike.—See how we have distinguished six types of names which we use in speaking of God; now we must treat each of them.

Chapter 5 (94)

1. THAT THOSE NAMES WHICH PROPERLY PERTAIN TO THE SEVERAL PERSONS ARE PROPERLY USED IN A RELATIVE WAY; BUT THOSE WHICH SIGNIFY THE UNITY OF ESSENCE ARE USED IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE AND ARE SAID OF ALL THE PERSONS SINGLY AND IN COMMON, AND ON THE WHOLE ARE TAKEN SINGULARLY, NOT PLURALLY. It is therefore to be known that those names which properly pertain to the several persons are used of them in relation to each other, as Father and Son, and the gift of both, the Holy Spirit; but those which signify the unity of essence are used in an absolute sense. And those which are used in an absolute sense are particularly used according to substance and are said of all the persons jointly, and of each of them singly, and on the whole are taken singularly, not plurally, such as

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c16 n17.

God, good, powerful, great, and suchlike. But those which are used relatively are not used according to substance.

2. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says as follows: "Whatever is said of that most excellent and divine sublimity in relation to itself is said substantially; but whatever is said in relation to something else is said relatively and not substantially. So great is the force of the same substance in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that whatever is said of one of them in relation to the others is to be taken, on the whole, as being in the singular and not in the plural. For we say: the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God: no one doubts that this is said according to substance; yet we do not say that this Trinity is three gods, but one God. In the same way, the Father is said to be great, the Son great, and the Holy Spirit great; yet [there are] not three great ones, but one great one. So also the all-powerful Father, the all-powerful Son, the all-powerful Holy Spirit; yet [there are] not three all-powerful ones, but one all-powerful one. And so whatever is said of God in an absolute sense is similarly said of each of the persons and at the same time of the Trinity itself, not in the plural, but in the singular. And because for God it is not one thing to be and another to be great, but for him to be and to be great is the same thing, therefore, just as we do not say three essences, we do not say three greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness."[1]

3. THAT GOD IS GREAT BY THE SAME GREATNESS WHICH HE IS; SO ALSO OF GOODNESS, AND ALL THINGS WHICH ARE SAID ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE. "For God is not great by a greatness which is not himself, as if he were a partaker of it, otherwise that greatness would be greater than God; but there is nothing greater than God; God is great, then, by that same greatness which he himself is. And so we do not say three greatnesses, but one greatness; nor three greats, but one great; because God is not great by partaking in greatness, but he is great by himself because he is his own greatness. And the same is to be said of the goodness, eternity, and omnipotence of God, and of all other things that can be said of God according to substance, insofar as he is spoken of in regard to himself, and not in a metaphorical sense and by analogy, but properly, if indeed anything can properly be said of him by the mouth of man."[2]

4. See, he has plainly taught that the names which signify the unity of divine majesty and are said of God in an absolute sense, that is, without relationship, are said of all the persons commonly and of each distinctly, and on the whole are taken not in the plural, but in the singular. But those names which pertain to the several persons are said relatively and not

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c8 n9.
[2]Ibid., bk 5 c10 n11.

substantially. "For whatever is said properly of a single person of the Trinity," as Augustine says in the same place, "it is in no way said in respect to that person himself, but in relation to another of the persons or to a creature; and so it is manifest that it is said relatively and not according to substance."[3]

DISTINCTION XXIII

Chapter 1 (95)

1. OF THE NAME OF PERSON: THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS SAID ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE, YET ON THE WHOLE IT IS TAKEN IN THE PLURAL AND NOT IN THE SINGULAR. Something is to be added to the aforegoing: It is true that all names which are used of God according to substance on the whole are used singularly and not plurally of all the persons, as has been shown above.[1] And yet there is one name, namely person, which is used of the several persons according to substance and on the whole is taken in the plural, not in the singular. For we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person: and this is said according to substance. And yet we do not say: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one person, but three persons. And so this name is excepted from the aforesaid rule of the names which are used of God according to substance because, although it is used in an absolute sense and according to substance, yet on the whole it is taken in the plural, not in the singular.

2. AN AUTHORITY [SHOWING] THAT PERSON IS USED IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE AND ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE. Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, shows that person is said according to substance; he says: "It is not one thing for God to be, and another to be a person, but entirely the same thing."[2]—THAT THE FATHER IS NOT FATHER BY HIS VERY BEING. Also: "In this Trinity, when we speak of the person of the Father, we speak of nothing else than the substance of the Father. Consequently, just as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not that by which he is father, but that by which he is, so also the person of the Father is not anything other than the Father himself. It is in respect to himself that he is called person, and not in relation to the Son or the Holy Spirit; in the same way, it is in respect to himself that he is called God, and great, and good, and just, and suchlike. And just as for him it is the same thing to be and to be God, to be great, to be good, so also it is one and the same thing for

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c11 n12.
[1]Dist. 22 c5.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.

him to be and to be a person."[3]—See, you have it expressly that person is said according to substance, so that in the expression 'The Father is a person,' this is the sense: The Father is the divine essence; similarly, in the expressions 'The Son is a person,' 'The Holy Spirit is a person,' that is, the divine essence.

3. WHY FATHER AND SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE NOT CALLED ONE PERSON, AS THEY ARE [CALLED] ONE SUBSTANCE AND ONE GOD. And so here a question arises, which is difficult but not useless, by which it is asked why these three are not called one person, as they are [called] one essence and one God. Augustine treats this question diligently and explains it suitably, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, saying as follows: "Why do we not call these three together one person, as [we do] one substance and one God, and instead we say three persons, even though we do not say three Gods or three essences?"[4]—HE RESOLVES IT. "Because we wish to reserve at least one word to express the meaning of Trinity, lest we should have to be entirely silent, if asked what these three are whom we profess to be three." For as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 5: "when the question is posed 'three what,' human language labours under great poverty. And yet we say 'three persons,' not in order to say that, but so that it should not be passed over in silence."[5] For the eminence of this ineffable thing cannot be explained by this expression. See, he shows for what need persons is used in the plural, namely so that we might answer with this one term to those who ask concerning the three.

Chapter 2 (96)

1. BY WHAT NEED DO THE LATINS SAY THREE PERSONS AND THE GREEKS THREE HYPOSTASES OR SUBSTANCES. It is not the Latin language alone that labours under this need, but the Greek one too, struggling with this same thing, is hemmed in by a poverty of terms. Hence Augustine, explaining what has been said by Greeks and Latins by necessity concerning the ineffable Trinity, says: "In order to speak of ineffable things, that we may talk of them in some way, the Greeks have said: one essence, three substances" (that is, one *usia*, three hypostases: for the Greeks understand the term substance differently from the Latins). "But the Latins say: one essence or substance, three persons, because in our language, namely Latin, essence is not usually taken to mean anything other than substance. And so long as it is understood that what is spoken about remains a mystery, it has been acceptable to speak in this manner, so as to say something

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid., bk 5 c9 n10.

when questioned about what these three are. The true faith pronounces them to be three when it says that the Father is not the Son; and when it says that the Holy Spirit, namely the Gift of God, is not either the Father or the Son."[1]

2. THAT GOD IS MORE TRULY THOUGHT THAN SPOKEN ABOUT, AND HE MORE TRULY IS THAN HE IS THOUGHT ABOUT. "And so, when we are asked what these three or these three things are, we apply ourselves to finding some name by which we may comprehend these three; nor does any such name come to mind because the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the power of ordinary language. For God is more truly thought than spoken about, and he more truly is than he is thought about."[2]

3. "Therefore, since Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three, let us ask what three they are or what they have in common. For they cannot be called three fathers, because the Father alone is a father there [i.e. in the Trinity]; nor three sons, because neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit, is a son there; nor three holy spirits, because the Holy Spirit, in that proper signification by which he is also called Gift of God, is neither Father nor Son. What, then, are the three? If they can be said to be three persons, then being a person is what is common to them."[3] "For assuredly it is because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, that they are said to be three persons."[4] "And assuredly that is why we say three persons, because being a person is common to them."[5]—From the above, it can be plainly understood by what need the Latins say 'three persons,' with person understood according to substance; and so being a person is common to the three.

Chapter 3 (97)

1. WHY WE DO NOT SAY THAT FATHER AND SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE THREE GODS, AS WE SAY THAT THEY ARE THREE PERSONS, ALTHOUGH BEING GOD IS COMMON TO THEM, BECAUSE THE FATHER IS GOD, AND THE SON IS GOD, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GOD. But here the question is asked: since we say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons because being a person is common to them, that is, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, why do we not similarly say 'three gods,' since the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God?—We do so because Scripture contradicts the

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n7.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Ibid., bk 7 c4 n8.
[5]Ibid.

latter; as for the former, although Scripture does not affirm it, neither does it contradict it.

2. QUESTION. Hence Augustine, raising and settling this question, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says as follows: "But if we say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons because being a person is common to them, why do we not also call them three gods? Assuredly, as has been said earlier,[1] it is because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person that they are called three persons. Therefore, since the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, why are they not called three gods?"[2]—See, he has posed the question. Note how he answers by adding: "Perhaps they are not called three gods because Scripture does not say three gods? But neither does the text of Scripture mention three persons anywhere. Or was it lawful to say three persons because of the needs of speech and argument, and if Scripture does not use the expression, neither does it contradict it? But if we were to say three gods, Scripture would contradict it, saying: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God.*"[3,4] Behold the solution of the question, why we say three persons rather than three gods, namely because Scripture does not contradict the former.

Chapter 4 (98)

1. ANOTHER QUESTION: WHY DO WE NOT SAY THREE ESSENCES, AS [WE DO] THREE PERSONS, EVEN THOUGH SCRIPTURE DOES NOT CONTRADICT THIS. But here another question arises, which Augustine adds next, saying: "Why, then, is it not allowed to say three essences, since Scripture, in a similar way, neither asserts this nor contradicts it? But if you say that it is due to the unity of the Trinity that we do not say three essences, but one essence, I ask why, due to the same unity of the Trinity, we do not also say one person, and not three persons. For just as the name of essence is common to them, so that each of them is called essence, so is the term of person common to them."[1]—"What then remains, but that we confess that these terms arose from the necessity for Greeks and Latins to speak against the snares and errors of heretics? And when human weakness strove to express in speech to the senses of men what it holds about God in the secret place of the mind, whether through a pious faith or through any understanding whatsoever, it feared to say three essences, lest any diversity should be

[1]Above, c2 n3.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n8.
[3]Deut. 6, 4.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n8.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n8.

thought to exist in that highest equality. And yet it could not say that the three were not three something: for saying this, Sabellius fell into heresy. And so it asked what it might call the three, and said three persons, or three substances,"[2] according to the Greeks.

2. AS WE SAY THREE PERSONS, SO THE GREEKS SAY THREE SUBSTANCES, WHICH THEY CALL HYPOSTASES, UNDERSTANDING SUBSTANCE DIFFERENTLY THAN WE DO. "For what we say of persons according to our custom, this must be understood of substances according to the custom of the Greeks. For they say three substances and one essence" (that is, three hypostases, one *usia*), "just as we say three persons, one essence or substance."[3] "Although they too, if they wished, as they call three substances three hypostases, could also call three persons three *prosopa*. But they preferred to say the former, perhaps because it is said more aptly in accordance with the custom of their language."[4]

Chapter 5 (99)

1. THAT IN THE TRINITY THERE IS NO DIVERSITY OR SINGLENESS OR SOLITUDE, BUT UNITY AND TRINITY, AND DISTINCTION AND IDENTITY. I believe it has already been sufficiently shown by what need we say three persons; and why not also three gods or essences, namely because Scripture stands in the way on the one hand, and the understanding of diversity on the other. Because in God there is no diversity at all, just as [there is] no singleness or solitude, but unity and trinity.

2. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says: "Human weakness, seeking what it might call the three, said three persons or substances: by which terms, the intention was not to signify diversity, but to deny singleness, that not only unity might be understood in God from his being called one essence, but also trinity from his being called three persons."[1]

3. Hilary, too, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says: "The Lord says: *Whoever has seen me, has also seen the Father*.[2] With these words, an understanding of singleness and aloneness is excluded. Indeed, the passage signifies that God is not solitary, and yet the statement teaches that his nature is undifferentiated. Indeed, the Father is seen in the Son by a united likeness of nature. For the begotten and the begetter are one; they are one, but not one person. And so the Son is neither solitary nor single nor different."[3] —Also

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n9.
[3]Ibid., bk 7 c4 n8.
[4]Ibid., bk 7 c6 n11.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c4 n9.
[2]Jn. 14, 9.
[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 nn38-39.

in the same place: "Just as it is impious to believe that Father and Son are two gods, so it is sacrilegious to claim that Father and Son are a single God." "In these, there is nothing new, nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable."[4]

4. Concerning this, Augustine, too, in his book of *Questions of the Old and the New Law*, says: "God is one, but not single."[5]—Also, Ambrose, in the book *On the Trinity*, says: "Whatever is of one substance cannot be separated, even though it is not single, but one."[6] "That God is said to be one does not in any way exclude the trinity of the divinity; and so what is predicated pertains not to singleness, but to unity."[7]—See, from the above it is shown that we must not confess God to be single, or diverse, or alone, or solitary, because singleness or solitude excludes the plurality of persons, and diversity removes the unity of essence.

5. Diversity brings about the separation of the divinity, singleness does away with the distinction of trinity. And so Ambrose, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, says: "There is no equality where there is diversity or singleness";[8] "neither confusing Father and Son, like the Sabellians; nor severing Father and Son, like the Arians. For Father and Son are distinct, but they are not separate."[9]—Also in the same: "Father and Son are one in divinity; nor is there difference of substance or any diversity there: otherwise how can we say that God is one? For diversity makes several [gods]."[10] And so from the aforegoing it is established that there is no diversity in the Trinity.

6. SOMETIMES THE PERSONS ARE CALLED DIVERSE, THAT IS, DISTINCT. Yet, if at times we find it written: three diverse persons, and suchlike, 'diverse' means 'distinct.'

Chapter 6 (100)

THAT GOD IS NOT TO BE CALLED MANIFOLD. And as in the Trinity there is no diversity, so there is no multiplicity; and so God is not to be called manifold, but threefold and simple. Hence Ambrose, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, says: "In Father and Son, there is no discord, but one divinity; what is one cannot be confused, and what is undifferentiated cannot be manifold."[11] And so God is not manifold.

[4]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n39.
[5]Ambrosiaster, *Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti*, q. 122.
[6]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 5 c3 n46.
[7]Ibid., bk 2 c1 n18.
[8]Ibid., bk 2 c8 n69.
[9]Ibid., bk 2 c3 n33.
[10]Ibid., bk 1 c2 nn18-19.
[11]Ibid., bk 1 c2 n17.

DISTINCTION XXIV

Chapter 1 (101)

1. WHAT IS MEANT BY THESE NAMES: ONE, TWO IN THE MASCULINE OR FEMININE, THREE OR THREE THINGS, THREEFOLD OR TRINITY, PLURAL OR PLURALITY, DISTINCTION OR DISTINCT, WHEN WE USE THEM IN SPEAKING OF GOD. Here it is opportune to inquire diligently, since in the Trinity there is no diversity or singleness, nor multiplicity or solitude, what is meant by these names: namely, one and two in the masculine or feminine, three or three things, plural or plurality, distinct or distinction, when we say: one God, two or three persons, several persons; the persons are distinct; or when we say: distinction of persons, plurality of persons, trinity of persons, and suchlike. For in saying these things, we seem to posit in God numerical quantities and a multitude or multiplicity of things. With the assistance of him of whom we speak, let us now take care to make plainly known what these things mean there.

2. SUCH THINGS ARE SAID MORE TO EXCLUDE WHAT IS NOT IN GOD THAN TO POSIT ANYTHING. If we consider diligently the aforementioned words of our authorities,[1] in order to grasp the meaning of what is said, the use of these words seems to have been introduced more to remove and exclude from the simplicity of the divinity what is not there, than to posit anything.

3. WHAT IS SIGNIFIED BY ONE WHEN WE SAY ONE GOD. For when we say 'one God,' a multitude of gods is excluded, and a numerical quantity is not posited in the divinity, as if to say: God is, and there are not many or several gods. Hence Ambrose, in his book *On the Trinity*, says: "When we say that God is one, unity excludes a number of gods, nor does it posit quantity in God because there is neither number nor quantity there."[2]

4. IN WHAT SENSE IT IS SAID: THE FATHER IS ONE, THE SON IS ONE. Similarly, when it is said 'the Father is one' or 'the Son is one,' and suchlike, the reason for the statement is this: that there are not many Fathers or many Sons; and the same is true of similar expressions.

5. ACCORDING TO WHAT SENSE ARE THE PERSONS SAID TO BE PLURAL. Also, when we say that 'the persons are plural,' we exclude singleness and solitude, but do not posit diversity or multiplicity there; as if to say: we confess the persons [are] without solitude or singleness. Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, says as follows: "God said: *Let us make man in our image and likeness*.[3] I now ask whether you suppose that the only God

[1]Dist. 23 cc5-6.
[2]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c2 n19; see also *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c13 n93.
[3]Gen. 1, 26.

spoke these words to himself, or do you understand that this speech was addressed to another. If you say that he was alone, you are confuted by his own voice saying: *Let us make* and *our*. For his profession of partnership took away the meaning of singleness and solitude, because no partnership can be had by a solitary being. The solitude of a solitary does not allow for *Let us make*, and one would not say *our* to someone alien from oneself."[4] —Attend, O reader, to these words, and see that he signified plurality by the name of partnership; for the profession of partnership is the profession of plurality, which he made by saying *Let us make* and *our*. For each of these is said in the plural. But by this profession of plurality, he did not posit diversity or multitude, but denied solitude and singleness. Therefore, in the same way, when we say several persons or plurality of persons, we exclude an understanding of singleness and solitude.

6. WHAT IS SIGNIFIED BY THE NUMBER THREE, WHEN WE SAY THREE PERSONS. So also, when we say three persons, by the term three we do not posit a numerical quantity in God or any diversity, but we signify that our meaning is to be directed to none other than Father and Son and Holy Spirit, so that the meaning of the statement is this: There are three persons, or Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three, that is, neither the Father alone, nor the Son alone, nor the Father and Son alone are in the divinity, but also the Holy Spirit, and no one else than these. Similarly, it is not only this or that person who is there, or this one and that one, but this, that, and the other, and no one else. And Augustine sufficiently shows that this is the sense in which we must understand this, when he says that by that term "the intention was not to signify diversity, but to deny singleness."[5]

7. WHAT [IS SIGNIFIED] BY THE NUMBER TWO WHEN WE SAY TWO PERSONS, OR FATHER AND SON ARE TWO. Similarly, when we say 'Father and Son are two,' we do not posit a quality of duality there, but mean this: that there is not only the Father, nor only the Son, but Father and Son, and the former is not the latter; and so also about other expressions of this kind.— So also, when we say 'Father and Son are two persons,' we mean this: not that the Father alone is a person, nor the Son alone is a person, but that the Father is a person and the Son is a person, and the former is not the latter.

8. IN WHAT SENSE WE SPEAK OF A DISTINCTION AMONG THE PERSONS OR OF DISTINCT PERSONS. And when we say 'the persons are distinct' or 'there is a distinction among the persons,' we exclude confusion and mixing, and we signify that this person is not that person. And when we add: 'the persons are distinct in their properties' or 'differ in their properties,' we signify that this person is one, and that other person is another in their

[4]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n17.
[5]See above, c5 n2.

properties. And when we say 'one and another,' we do not posit diversity there or otherness, but we exclude the Sabellian confusion.

9. HOW DIFFERENCE IS TO BE TAKEN THERE. So also when we say 'different persons,' or in saying 'there is a difference among the persons,' we reach the same understanding. For there distinction is taken in the same way as difference. And fittingly do we say that there is a difference or distinction there, but not diversity or division or separation.—Hence Ambrose, in *On the Trinity*, book 1: "The Father is not the same as the Son, but there is an express distinction between Father and Son."[6]

10. HOW TRINITY IS TO BE TAKEN THERE. But when the term 'trinity' is used, it seems that what is signified is the same as when we say 'three persons': so that, just as we cannot say: The Father is three persons, or the Son is three persons, so we must not say: The Father is trinity, or the Son is trinity.

11. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION TO THE AFOREGOING. Here it is not to be passed over that, although it was said above that God is not to be confessed to be either single or manifold,[7] and this is confirmed by the authorities of the Saints, Isidore seems to feel the contrary, saying: "We must distinguish between trinity and unity. For unity is simple and single, but trinity manifold and plural, because 'trinity' is the unity of three."[8] See, he says that unity is single, and trinity is manifold and plural.—But to this we say that he took single in the sense in which others take one, and manifold and plural as others say threefold.

DISTINCTION XXV

Chapter 1 (102)

1. WHAT IT MEANS TO SAY, IN THE PLURAL, THREE PERSONS OR TWO PERSONS. Moreover, since this name 'person,' as has been said earlier,[1] is used according to substance, we must consider what the meaning of the term is when it is used in the plural: three persons, or two persons, and when we say: the person of the Father is one thing, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another. For if in these expressions the term person means the same as essence, we seem to confess several essences, and so several gods. But if it does not have the meaning of essence there,

[6]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 1 c2 n16.
[7]Above, n5.
[8]Cf. Isidore, *Etymologiae*, bk 7 c4 nn1, 2, and 8.

[1]Dist. 23 c1.

then there this term means one thing when we say: The Father is a person, the Son is a person; and another when we say: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons; and when we say: the person of the Father is one thing, of the Son another, and suchlike.

2. THAT IT APPEARS TO BE ACCORDING TO ESSENCE TO SAY: THE PERSON OF THE FATHER IS ONE THING, OF THE SON ANOTHER, OR [TO SAY] THREE PERSONS, AS WHEN WE SAY: THE FATHER IS A PERSON, THE SON IS A PERSON. For person, as Augustine says above,[1] is said in respect to self; and for God it is the same to be a person as to be, just as it is the same for him to be as to be God. And so we clearly gather that we are speaking of the divine essence when we say: The Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, an essence. And entirely one and the same thing is signified by the name of 'person,' that is, divine essence, when we say: The Father is a person and the Son is a person, as is signified by the name of 'God' when we say: The Father is God, the Son is God. And so the same thing is also signified when we say: God is God, and God is a person; the divine essence is understood by either name, because each is said according to substance.

3. But when we say: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons, what do we mean by the name of 'person'? Is it essence? This indeed appears to be the case, if we diligently examine the words of Augustine posed above. For he said above, "and so we say three persons because being a person is common to the three"; and also "it is because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, that they are said to be three persons."[2] And so it seems that this name 'person' has the same meaning when we say 'three persons' which it has when we say 'the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person'; because, as Augustine shows, we say the former, that is, 'three persons,' because of the latter, and "because being a person is common to them." And so that which is common to them, that is, to Father and Son and Holy Spirit, appears to be signified by the term 'person' when we say 'three persons.'

4. IT SEEMS THAT IT CAN BE SHOWN IN ANOTHER WAY THAT [THE TERM] IS SAID ACCORDING TO ESSENCE EVEN WHEN IT IS USED IN THE PLURAL. It can also be shown in another way that essence is signified there by the name 'person,' when we say 'three persons.' For as Augustine said above, we said 'three persons' for the need of responding to those who ask three what.[3] And so when they ask 'three what,' it is a suitable answer to say 'three persons.' But when they ask 'three whats,' by 'what' they are asking

[1]Dist. 23 c1 n2.
[2]Dist. 23 c2 n3.
[3]Dist. 23 c2 nn1-2.

about essence: for what the three are is not found to be anything other than essence. And so, if we answer the question rightly, it is necessary that we signify 'essence' when responding: otherwise we do not show what the three are. But if in answering we signify essence, we mean that very essence by the term 'person' in saying 'three persons.'

5. THE OPINION OF SOME WHO BELIEVE THAT ESSENCE IS SIGNIFIED BY THE TERM 'PERSON' WHEN SAYING 'THREE PERSONS.' It seems to some that essence is signified by the term 'person' when saying three persons since, as Augustine says, "and so three persons is said, because being a person is common to them,"[4] so that the meaning is this: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, they are three who have being a person in common, that is, they are three of whom each is a person, that is, an essence.—But according to this sense, how can one say: 'the person of the Father is one thing, that of the Son another?' And furthermore, they wish to understand this in this sense, namely: the Father is one thing and the Son another, but they have being a person in common. And they confirm this by the authority of Augustine, who, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, says: "We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons from the same essence, as if to be an essence there is one thing, to be a person another."[5]—By this authority and the earlier ones, they strive to assert that in the aforesaid expressions the term person signifies essence. But what will they answer to that which the same Augustine says in the book *On Faith*, namely that "the Father is one thing in his person or personally, the Son personally is another, the Holy Spirit personally is another"?[6] For can the Father be one thing personally and the Son another personally, if they are entirely alike in being a person, that is, if person only means essence? And so it seems to us that this can be said more suitably otherwise, in accordance with the authorities of Catholic doctors.

Chapter 2 (103)

1. THAT THIS TERM 'PERSON' IS TAKEN IN A THREEFOLD WAY IN THE TRINITY, AND THIS IS A USEFUL AND CATHOLIC TEACHING CONCERNING PERSON AND PERSONS. And so it is to be known that this term person can bear many meanings, not just one; as Hilary says, in the book *On the Trinity*, "the meaning of words is to be taken from the reasons for speaking, because it is not the thing which is subject to the word, but the word to the

[4]Above, Dist. 23 c2 n3.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n11.
[6]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n5.

thing."[1] Differentiating, then, the reasons for the use of this noun, namely 'person,' we distinguish its meaning. We say that this noun, namely 'person,' is properly used according to substance and signifies essence, as Augustine shows above,[2] when we say: God is a person, the Father is a person.

2. WHAT IS SIGNIFIED WHEN WE SAY THREE PERSONS: NAMELY THREE SUBSISTENCES, OR THREE BEINGS, NOT THREE ESSENCES. But by some need, as Augustine said above,[3] this noun is used in a metaphorical sense, so that we may say in the plural 'three persons' when asked 'three what'; there it does not signify essence, that is, the divine nature which is common to the three, but subsistences, or hypostases, according to the Greeks. For the Greeks, as Augustine said above,[4] take substance, that is, hypostasis, in one sense and we in another. For we say substance for essence or nature; but we say persons as they say substances, that is, hypostases. And so, if we take persons in the same way as they take substances or hypostases, they take hypostases differently than we do substance. Thus we take persons differently from substance. So when we say 'three persons,' we do not, by the term person, signify essence there. What, then, do we say? We say that they are three persons, that is, three subsistences, namely three beings; for which the Greeks say three hypostases.

3. HE SHOWS THAT THE WORDS OF AUGUSTINE AGREE WITH THIS VIEW. And this meaning is supported by the words of Augustine set out above,[5] if they are understood more deeply: "For because the Father is a person," that is, an essence, "and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, so they are called three persons," that is, three subsistences, three beings. For they could not be called subsistences or beings, unless each of them were a person, that is, an essence. "And so, because being a person," that is, essence, "is common to them, so they are rightly called three persons," that is, subsistences or subsistents: so that, just as the essence which is common to them truly and properly is, so those three are understood to be truly and properly subsistences or beings. And so Augustine, differentiating the reasons for the aforesaid, says that "the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, but not from the same essence, lest it be thought that it is one thing there to be a person, another to be an essence."[6] For the three persons, that is, subsistences, are one essence and of one essence; but they are not one person, or of one person, notwithstanding

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n14.
[2]Dist. 23 c1 n2.
[3]Dist. 23 c1 n3.; c2 n1.
[4]Dist. 23 c2 n1.
[5]Dist. 23 c2 n2 and c3 n2.
[6]Above, c1 n5.

that person is sometimes said according to substance: for if we were to say this, there would be confusion in the persons.

4. HERE, HE RESPONDS TO THEIR OBJECTION BY WHICH THEY STRIVE TO PROVE THAT PERSONS ARE TAKEN ACCORDING TO ESSENCE WHEN WE RESPOND ['PERSONS']TO THOSE WHO ASK THREE WHAT. But as to that which they say: 'When it is asked three what, the question is about essence, because what the three are is not found to be anything other than essence'[7]—wishing to induce us by this to understand essence by the term 'person' when we answer three persons—we say as follows: It is indubitably true that no one other thing is to be found there which those three are, except essence: for those three are one thing, that is, divine essence. Hence Truth says: *I and the Father are one.*[8] And yet, when it is asked 'three what,' the question is not about essence, nor does 'what' there refer to essence. But since the Catholic faith professed there to be three, as John says in the canonical Epistle: *There are three who give witness in heaven,*[9] the question arose about what those three might be, that is, whether they be three things, and what three things, and by what name those three things might be signified. And so by the need of speaking in reply, this term 'person' was found, and it was said 'three persons.'

5. WHAT IS CALLED THREE THINGS AND ONE THING. And do not become concerned that we have said 'three things': for in saying this, we have not posited a number of diverse things in the Trinity; but we say 'three things' so that we may confess them to be some one highest thing. Hence Augustine, in *On Christian Doctrine*, book 1, says as follows: "The things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed."[10] "And so the things which are to be enjoyed are Father and Son and Holy Spirit; that same Trinity is the one highest thing and common to those who enjoy it, if it is a thing, and not the cause of all things, if yet it even be a cause. For it is not easy to find a name which is suitable for such an excellence, except that this Trinity is better called 'one God.'"[11] And so, just as they are called three things, and they are one thing, so they are called three subsistences, and they are one substance. See, it has been shown what the meaning is of this term 'person,' when we say 'three persons.'

[7]Above, c1 n5.
[8]Jn. 10, 30.
[9]1 Jn. 5, 7.
[10]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c3 n3.
[11]Ibid., bk 1 c5 n5.

Chapter 3 (104)

1. IN WHAT SENSE WE SAY: THE PERSON OF THE FATHER IS ONE THING, OF THE SON ANOTHER, OF THE HOLY SPIRIT ANOTHER. Now let us examine whether it is for the same reason and cause that we say: The person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another.—This may certainly be understood soundly, so that the sense be as follows: The subsistence or hypostasis of the Father is one thing, the subsistence of the Son is another, that of the Holy Spirit another; and the Father is one subsistence, the Son is another, the Holy Spirit is another.

2. HOW THESE ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD: THE FATHER IS ONE IN HIS PERSON, THE SON IS ANOTHER. Next it is asked whether it is to be taken in the same way when it is said: the Father in his person is one thing, the Son in his person is another, the Holy Spirit in his person is another; or the Father personally is one thing, the Son personally is another, the Holy Spirit personally is another.[1]

3. THAT PERSON IS HERE TAKEN DIFFERENTLY THAN ABOVE; HERE IT IS TAKEN FOR A PROPERTY. To which we say that, although it could be taken in the same sense, yet it is more suitable to alter the interpretation in accordance with the reason for speaking, so that here a property of the person is to be understood by the term person; thus the sense is as follows: The Father in his person or personally is one thing, that is, by his property the Father is other than the Son, and the Son by his property is other than the Father. For it is by the property of Fatherhood that the hypostasis of the Father is distinct from the hypostasis of the Son, and the hypostasis of the Son is differentiated from the Father by the property of Sonship, and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both by the property of being able to proceed.

4. THAT THE TERM MAY BE TAKEN IN THIS SENSE EVEN IN THE EARLIER STATEMENTS. 'Person' may well be taken in this sense even in the earlier statements,[2] where it is said: The person of the Father is one thing, of the Son another, that is, the property by which the Father is Father is one thing, that by which the Son is Son is another, by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit another.—In the same way, some wish to understand properties by the term 'person' in the expression 'three persons'; but it is better that, when we say 'three persons,' we understand it as subsistences or hypostases.

5. HE PRESENTS A SUMMARY OF THE AFOREGOING. From what has been said above, it can be gathered that the term person in the Trinity has a

[1]Above, c1 n5.
[2]Above, n1.

threefold meaning: for it may stand for essence, or it may stand for hypostasis, or it may stand for property.

6. HE SUPPORTS WHAT HE HAS SAID BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SAINTS. We have plainly shown above, from the sayings of Augustine, that the term is used to mean substance, and sometimes signifies essence.[3]—But it needs to be shown from the authorities of the Saints that it is taken for hypostasis and property, lest we seem to have dared to say something on the strength of our own conjectures. Jerome, in his *Exposition of the Catholic Faith to Bishops Alypius and Augustine*, speaks of this in the following terms: "There is no manner of degree in the Trinity, nothing that may be called lower or higher, but the whole divinity is equal in its perfection so that, excepting the terms which indicate a property of the persons, whatever is said of one person can most worthily be understood of the three. In confutation of Arius, we say that the substance of the Trinity is one and the same, and we profess one God in three persons; in rejection of the impiety of Sabellius, we distinguish three distinct persons by property: we do not say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are the same self, but that the person of the Father is one thing, that of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. For we do not only confess the names, but also the properties of the names, that is, the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is, subsistences. And the Father never excludes the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, nor does the Son or the Holy Spirit ever take on the name and person of the Father, but the Father is always Father, and the Son always Son, and the Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit. And so they are one in substance, but they are distinct in persons and names."[4] See, Jerome here plainly says that the properties are persons, and the persons subsistences; hence, what we said becomes manifest, namely that both hypostasis and property are signified by the term 'person.' John of Damascus too says that the persons are hypostases, and he calls them beings, speaking as follows: "In the divinity, we confess one nature and three hypostases, who are truly beings, that is, persons."[5]

DISTINCTION XXVI

Chapter 1 (105)

1. ON THE PROPERTIES OF PERSONS, BUT FIRST ON THIS TERM HYPOSTASIS. It is now necessary that we say something about the properties of persons

[3]Dist. 23 cc1-2.
[4]Actually, Pelagius, *Libellum fidei ad Innocentium papam*, n3.
[5]John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, bk 3 c5.

which we have frequently mentioned in this treatise. But first let us listen to what Jerome has to say concerning this term, namely hypostasis. For he said that poison lurks under this term. But he says this because of the use which the heretics made of the term in order to seduce the simple. They used it for person and essence, so that, whether only one hypostasis or three were spoken of, they might lead the less experienced to an unsuitable conclusion because the term was not then well-known among Catholics, nor was its meaning as well-defined as now. And so Jerome says that this term was not to be used without distinction or explanation, at least in his time, when there was a contention with the heretics. In *On the Catholic Faith, to Pope Damasus*, he wrote as follows: "The bishop of the Arians demands that I, a Roman, use the new term hypostases. We ask what they think the three hypostases mean: three subsistent persons, they say. We respond that this is our belief. They are not satisfied with the meaning, and demand [we use] the term itself, because I know not what manner of poison lurks in its syllables. We cry out: If anyone does not confess three hypostases, that is, three subsistent persons, let him be anathema. But if anyone, understanding hypostasis as *usia*, does not say that there is one hypostasis in three persons, namely, one who affirms three hypostases, and under the cloak of piety strives to assert three natures, he is alien from Christ. Let it suffice for us to say one substance and three perfect and equal persons; let us be silent about three hypostases, if we may. It is not a good sign when discordant meanings are found in the same word. But if you think it right that we should say 'three hypostases' in agreement with their interpretation, we do not refuse. But believe me, poison hides under the honey: *for the angel of Satan transforms himself into the angel of light.*"[1] By these words, he does not say that the term 'hypostasis' is not to be used, but shows that heretics use it perversely; against them caution in distinguishing the meaning was necessary. Otherwise a person who had confessed three hypostases earlier would be contradicting himself.

Chapter 2 (106)

1. ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE PERSONS AND THE RELATIVE NAMES FOR THEM. Let us now look at the properties of the persons, which in Scripture are also frequently called notions or relations. In the book *On Faith to Peter*, Augustine says: "In that holy Trinity (who is sought by us so that it might become more tenaciously rooted in our heart), it is one thing to have generated and another to have been born, and it is another thing to pro-

[1]Jerome, *Epistola 15*, nn3-4.

ceed than to have generated and to have been born; hence, it is manifest that the Father is one thing, the Son is another, the Holy Spirit is another."[1]

2. WHAT IS PROPER TO THE FATHER, WHAT IS PROPER TO THE SON, WHAT IS PROPER TO THE HOLY SPIRIT. "And what is proper to the Father alone is not that he himself was not born, but that he generated the only Son; and what is proper to the Son alone is not that he himself did not generate, but that he was born of the Father's essence; and what is proper to the Holy Spirit is not that he himself was neither born nor did he generate, but that he alone proceeds from Father and Son."[2] See, he briefly set out the three properties of the three persons, of which one is not another. Indeed, he signified this when he said: "it is one thing to have generated and another to have been born, and it is another to proceed," that is, generation is one property or notion, and birth is another, and procession is another; these things, by other names, are called fatherhood and sonship.

3. HERE CONCERNING RELATIVE NAMES WHICH DENOTE THE RELATIONS THEMSELVES. These properties are designated by those names of the persons, namely Father, Son, Holy Spirit, which are relative and are used in relation to each other because they denote relations. They are not accidental to God, but are immutably in the persons themselves from eternity, so that these titles are not only relative, but are also the very relations or notions in the things themselves, namely in the persons.

Chapter 3 (107)

1. THAT NOT EVERYTHING THAT IS SAID OF GOD IS SAID ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE; FOR SOME THINGS ARE SAID ACCORDING TO RELATION, BUT NOTHING ACCORDING TO ACCIDENT. Therefore, it is to be known that not all which is said of God is said according to substance because some things are said according to relation, which is not an accident because it is not capable of change. As Augustine teaches, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, "nothing in God is said according to accident because in him nothing is accidental; but not all that is said is said according to substance. In created and mutable things, what is not said according to substance must of necessity be said according to accident. But in God nothing is said according to accident because in him nothing is capable of change or omission; and yet not everything that is said is said according to substance. For something is said in relation to something else, as Father in relation to Son and Son to Father; which is not an accident because the former is always Father and the latter always Son; and always in the sense that the Son has always

[1]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n6.
[2]Ibid., c2 n7.

been born and never began to be Son. For if he had at some time begun to be Son, or if he ever ceased to be Son, then he would be so called according to accident. And because the Father is not called Father, except because he has a Son, and the Son is not so called, except because he has a Father, these names are not used according to substance, but are said with regard to their mutual relations, and yet not according to accident, because both what is called Father and what is called Son is eternal and incommutable in them."[1]—See, by these words, it is plainly shown that some things are said of God according to substance, some according to relation, but nothing according to accident. It is also shown that the property of the Father is that he have a Son, and the property of the Son is that he have a Father. And so, when he said that what is called Father and what is called Son is 'eternal and incommutable,' he meant it to be understood in this way: that is, the property by which the Father is Father, and the property by which the Son is Son, is eternal and incommutable, because the Father is always Father and the Son is always Son.

2. HILARY DETERMINES THE PROPERTIES OF FATHER AND SON. Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 12, when he describes the properties of the persons, speaks as follows: "If it is always proper to the Father that he is always Father, necessarily it is always proper to the Son that he is always Son. For where there is always a Father, there is also always a Son; and so he who is not always Father did not always generate."[2] Also in the same: "It is manifest that it is proper to him who is born God to be Son."[3]

Chapter 4 (108)

1. WHY IT IS SAID TO BE PROPER TO THE ONLY-BEGOTTEN THAT HE IS SON OF GOD, WHEN MEN ARE ALSO SONS OF GOD. Here it is asked how it is said to be proper to him who is born God that he is Son of God or begotten from God, when men are also called and are sons of God, according to that text: *All sons of the Most High*;[1] and the Lord says to Moses, speaking of the people of Israel: *Israel, my first-born son*.[2]

2. SOLUTION. But the difference is great: for men are sons of God by being made [so], not by the property of birth; but God the Son is Son by the property of origin and the truth of birth, not by being made or adopted. But men exist before they become sons of God: for they are made sons, they are not born sons of God.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c5 n6.
[2]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n23.
[3]Ibid., bk 12 n15.

[1]Ps. 81, 6.
[2]Exod. 4, 22.

3. HE CONFIRMS HIS SOLUTION BY AUTHORITY. CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD THE SON AND HUMAN SONS: BECAUSE HE IS BORN SON, THEY ARE MADE SONS. Hence Hilary, showing that he alone who is born God is Son of God by the property of origin, most clearly distinguishes between him and men as children of God. In *On the Trinity*, book 12, he speaks as follows: "But only the one who is born from him is truly Son to the Father. We also are sons of God, but by being made such. For we were once sons of wrath,[3] but have been made sons of God by adoption rather than by birth. And because whatever is made did not exist before it was made, so also we who were not sons are made such. Earlier we were not sons, but we have been made such by grace; neither born, nor begotten, but purchased. God purchased us for himself, and by this he is said to have begotten; we know that God is said to have begotten sons, [but] never with the sense that [sonship] is their inherent property."[4] "For man is son of God by adoption, not by generation; nor is this [sonship] man's property, but his title; and accordingly, he is not truly a son by this, because neither is he properly said to be born, nor was he always a son. But God the Only-begotten neither was at any time not a son, nor was he anything before he was a son, nor is he anything other than a son. And so, he who is always a son"[5] by the property and truth of being able to be born, is the son of him alone who generated; and only he who generated is his father because, as the one is son by origin, so the other is father by generation.

Chapter 5 (109)

1. THAT MAN IS CALLED SON OF THE TRINITY, AND THE TRINITY CAN BE CALLED THE FATHER OF MEN. But man, who is son of God by being made [so], is son not only of the Father, but of the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is, of the whole Trinity; and the Trinity itself can be called his father.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "The Trinity cannot be called father, except perhaps in a metaphorical sense with respect to the creature, because of their adoption as sons. For that which is written: *Hear, o Israel, the Lord your God, he is one God*,[1] is not to be understood to the exclusion of the Son and the Holy Spirit; we rightly call this one Lord God also our father because he regenerates us by his grace."[2]—Concerning this, Hilary also speaks, in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "By faith,

[3]Cf. Eph. 2, 3.
[4]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 nn12-13.
[5]Ibid., bk 12 n15.

[1]Deut. 6, 4.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c11 n12.

God is father to all to whom he is father: by the same faith, we confess that Jesus Christ is the Son of God."[3]

2. And so it has been shown why it is said to be proper to him who was born God that he is son, namely because he alone is properly called 'born.' Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 3, says: "The Lord, by saying: *Glorify your Son*,[4] asserted that he is Son not only in name, but also in property. We are sons of God, but he is not son in this sense. For he is the true and proper Son: by origin, not adoption; in truth, not title; by birth, not creation."[5]

Chapter 6 (110)

1. THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS PROPERLY CALLED THE GIFT OF GOD, BECAUSE HE IS GIFT BY PROPERTY AS THE SON IS BY BIRTH, AND IN EITHER WAY IT IS RELATIVELY AND ACCORDING TO THE SAME RELATION. The same is also to be said of the Holy Spirit, who is properly called the gift of God, even though there are many other gifts of God; but the Holy Spirit is gift by an immutable and eternal property, just as the Son is Son by property. For he is called gift in the same way that he is called Holy Spirit, and he is spoken of relatively by either name. And it is by the same relation that he is called Holy Spirit and gift, even though the relation itself is not as readily apparent in the name 'Holy Spirit' as in the name 'gift.'—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says as follows: "The Holy Spirit, who is understood to be in the Trinity, but is not the Trinity, insofar as he is properly called Holy Spirit, is so called relatively, since it is in relation to the Father and the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the spirit of the Father and the Son. But this same relation is not apparent in his name; however, it is apparent when he is called *the gift of God*:[1] for he is the gift of the Father and the Son because he proceeds from the Father and the Son."[2]

2. WHAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS. "And so the Holy Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son. And perhaps he is so called, as we have already said, and we are not ashamed to repeat it, because the same name is also suitable for the Father and the Son. For he is properly called what they are jointly called, because both the Father is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; both the Father is holy, and the Son is holy. And so, in order that the communion of both might be signified by a name which is

[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 n30.
[4]Jn. 17, 1.
[5]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 n11.

[1]Acts 8, 20.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c11 n12.

suitable to both, the gift of both is called Holy Spirit."[3]—See, you have why the Holy Spirit is properly called gift, and that he is called gift or Holy Spirit relatively; and that he has a name proper to himself which is jointly suitable for the Father and the Son, but separately. And it is to be known that when the Father or the Son is called 'spirit' or 'holy,' neither is so called relatively, but according to substance.

Chapter 7 (111)

WHETHER THE FATHER OR THE SON OR THE TRINITY ITSELF MAY BE CALLED HOLY SPIRIT. Here it can be asked whether the Father, or the Son, or even the Trinity itself, can be called holy spirit, as [each] is separately called both 'spirit' and 'holy.' Concerning this, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says as follows: "The Trinity can in no way be called son; but it may collectively be called holy spirit, according to what is written, that *God is spirit.*[1] And so, because Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God, and God certainly is holy and God is a spirit, the Trinity can also be called holy spirit. And yet holy spirit is not said there relatively, but according to essence because, properly speaking, the Holy Spirit who is not the Trinity, but is in the Trinity is spoken of relatively."[2]

Chapter 8 (112)

SOME BELIEVE THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS NOT SO CALLED RELATIVE TO FATHER AND SON, BECAUSE THE TERMS DO NOT CORRESPOND RECIPROCALLY; BUT THIS IS FALSE. And yet some believe that the Holy Spirit or gift is not so called relative to the Father and Son. They say: if these terms are used relative to each other, they ought to correspond reciprocally, so that, just as the Father is called 'the Son's Father' and the Son 'the Father's Son,' the Father would be the Holy Spirit's or gift's father, and the Spirit or Gift 'the Father's Spirit or gift.'—But it is not so in all relative terms; for not all things which are said relatively are said in terms which correspond reciprocally. Hence Augustine, shattering the opinion of these people, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "Do not be troubled because we have said that the Holy Spirit, not the Trinity itself, but he who is in the Trinity, is so called relatively, even though there is no reciprocally corresponding term that refers to him. For we say 'Holy Spirit of the Father,' but we do not in turn say 'Father of the Holy Spirit,' lest the Holy Spirit

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c11 n12.

[1]Jn. 4, 24.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c11 n12.

be thought to be his son. Also, we say 'Holy Spirit of the Son,' but we do not say 'Son of the Holy Spirit,' lest the Holy Spirit be thought to be his father. For this happens in many relative terms, that there is no word by which they may reciprocally correspond. Therefore, although we say 'the Gift of the Father and the Son,' we cannot say 'Father of the Gift' or 'Son of the Gift'; but in order that these may reciprocally correspond, we say 'Gift of the giver' and 'giver of the Gift' because in the one case a word in common usage could be found, in the other case it could not."[1] "And so when we say Gift of the giver and giver of the Gift, we speak relatively in reciprocal reference."[2] And yet God was not giver, except in time, while the Holy Spirit is Gift even from eternity.[3]

DISTINCTION XXVII

Chapter 1 (113)

1. WHETHER AUGUSTINE AND HILARY ASCRIBE THE SAME PROPERTIES, AND WHETHER THESE ARE THE ONES WHICH ARE CALLED FATHERHOOD, SONSHIP, PROCESSION. Here it can be asked whether the properties which Hilary ascribed above,[1] namely that the Father is always Father and the Son is always the Son, are the same properties which Augustine distinguished earlier,[2] saying that it is proper to the Father that he begot the Son, and proper to the Son that he is begotten of the Father, and to the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from both, and whether these are the properties which are called fatherhood, sonship, procession.

2. THAT THE PROPERTIES WHICH HILARY AND AUGUSTINE POSIT DO NOT SEEM TO BE THE SAME. It seems that the properties which Hilary posits are not the same as those which Augustine posits. For if they are the same, then it is the same for the Father to be Father and to have begotten the Son: which some entirely grant. But if this is so, then it is suitable for the one for whom it is suitable to be Father to have begotten the Son. And so divine nature, if it is the Father, begot the Son; but if it did not beget, it is not the Father. But who would dare to say either that it begot the Son, or that it is not the Father? But if the divine nature is the Father and did not beget the Son, then it is not the same to say that something is the Father

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c12 n13.
[2]Ibid., bk 5 c11 n12.
[3]Cf. Ibid., bk 5 c16 n17.

[1]Dist. 26 c3 n2.
[2]Dist. 26 c2 n2 (Fulgentius).

and that it begets the Son. And so it does not seem to be one and the same property.

3. RESPONSE IN WHICH HE SHOWS THAT THEY ARE THE SAME PROPERTIES.—HOW THE AFORESAID WORDS OF HILARY ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. To which, without prejudice to anyone, we say that each of them noted the same properties, although in different words. For what Hilary said is to be understood as follows: 'It is proper to the Father that he is always Father,' that is, the property of the Father is that by which he is always Father; but he is always Father because he has always begotten the Son. Similarly, 'it is proper to the Son that he is always Son,' that is, the property of the Son is that by which he is always Son; but he is always Son because he is always begotten. And so the property by which the Father is Father is that he always begot; and this same property is called fatherhood or generation. And the property by which the Son is always Son is that he is always begotten by the Father; and this same property is called sonship, or geniture, or birth, or origin, or ability to be born. Similarly, the property by which the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit or Gift is that he proceeds from both; and this same property is called procession. And the same properties are signified in the statements above.

Chapter 2 (114)

1. THAT IT IS NOT ENTIRELY THE SAME TO SAY THAT SOMETHING IS THE FATHER AND THAT IT HAS GENERATED OR HAS A SON; SIMILARLY OF THE OTHERS. And yet it does not seem to us that it is entirely the same to say that something is the Father and has generated a Son, or that something is the Son and has a Father, or that it is the Holy Spirit and proceeds from both. Otherwise Father would not be the name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but only the name of a property; similarly with Son and Holy Spirit; and so the three persons would not be signified by the three names.

2. THESE NAMES, FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT, DO NOT SIGNIFY ONLY RELATIONS, BUT ALSO THE HYPOSTASES AND ARE [THE NAMES OF] THE HYPOSTASES. And so we say that the name Father does not denote only a relation, but also a hypostasis, that is, it signifies a subsistence; and so also [in the case of] Son and Holy Spirit.

3. THE TERMS OF THE RELATIONS ARE FATHERHOOD, SONSHIP, PROCESSION, AND THEY DO NOT SIGNIFY THE PERSONS. But the terms of the relations, namely fatherhood, sonship, procession, or to generate, to be generated, to proceed, signify only the relations themselves and not the hypostases, or having a Son and having a Father.

4. WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IN SAYING: FATHER IS GOD, OR THE SON IS GOD, OR THE HOLY SPIRIT IS GOD. As, for example, when we say, 'the

Father is God,' by the name Father, we both note the relation and signify the divine hypostasis, so that the meaning is as follows: the Father, that is, he who generated, namely, the hypostasis which has a Son, is God or the divine essence. Similarly, 'the Son,' that is, the hypostasis which is generated or which has a Father, 'is God.' So also 'the Holy Spirit,' that is, the hypostasis proceeding from both, or he who proceeds, 'is God.' But when we posit the names of relations in predicates, we signify only the notions themselves, not the hypostases, as when we say 'God generated,' that is, has a Son, and 'God is generated,' that is, has a Father; and then it must be understood that in the subjects those things which are determined by those properties are the hypostases only, and not the essence.

Chapter 3 (115)

1. THOSE PROPERTIES DETERMINE THE HYPOSTASES, NOT THE SUBSTANCE, THAT IS, THE NATURE. For those several properties are suitable for each of the persons, and the persons are determined by them; and they differ from each other, but are not separated from each other.— Hence John of Damascus says: "The hypostases do not differ from each other according to substance, but according to their characteristic traits, that is, their determining properties; for they are characteristic, that is, determining of the hypostases, and not of the nature; and so they determine the hypostases."[1] —Also: "We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word is intemporally and eternally simple, having all that the Father has, as *homousion* with him, that is, consubstantial with him, different from the paternal hypostasis by the manner and form of birth, but never separate from the paternal hypostasis."[2]

2. HERE THE PROPERTIES ARE PLAINLY DISTINGUISHED. The same [John], more plainly expressing the personal properties, says in the same work: "We recognize a difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in the three properties, that is, paternal, filial, and able to proceed; and also that the same hypostases are indivisible and mutually inseparable and united, and united indeed without confusion; for they are three, although united; distinct, although inseparably." And indeed, each "hypostasis is perfect, and has its own specific property, namely its proper mode of existence; but they are united in substance, and are not removed or separated from the paternal hypostasis."[3] See, here you have distinct those three properties which were signified above[4] in a variety of ways.

[1]John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, bk 3 c6.
[2]Ibid., bk 3 c7.
[3]Ibid., bk 3 c5.
[4]Dist. 26 cc2-3.

3. THAT THERE ARE OTHER NAMES OF THE PERSONS DENOTING THE SAME PROPERTIES, NAMELY BEGOTTEN, BEGETTER, WORD, IMAGE. Here it is not to be passed over that, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are names of the persons and designate personal properties, so there are also other names of the persons, that is, names which signify the same persons and denote their properties, and the same ones as the aforesaid names [signify or denote]; and so [these names] are also used relatively: namely begetter, begotten, word, image.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "It is to be shown that the same thing is signified when we say begotten as when we say son. For therefore a son because begotten, and because a son, certainly begotten."[5] "And as the son is referred to the father, so the begotten to the begetter; and as the father to the son, so the begetter to the begotten."[6]

4. ON THE NAME WORD AND IMAGE. The same [Augustine], in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "The Son alone is taken to be the Word, not the Father and the Son together, as if together they were one word. For he is called word just as he is called image; but Father and Son together are not both image, but the Son alone is image of the Father, just as he is son."[7] The same [Augustine], in *On the Trinity*, book 7: "The Word, insofar as it is wisdom and essence, is the same as the Father; insofar as it is Word, it is not what the Father is, because the Word is not the Father, and word, like son, is said relatively."[8]

5. THAT HE IS NOT CALLED WORD FOR THE SAME REASON AS [HE IS CALLED] WISDOM. Also in the same place: "As son is referred to father, so also the Word, when it is called word, is referred to the one whose word it is. And so he is not called word for the same reason as [he is called] wisdom because he is not called word in respect to himself, but only relative to the one whose word he is, just like son [relative] to father."[9]—THAT HE IS CALLED WORD FOR THE SAME REASON AS [HE IS CALLED] SON. "And so [he is called] son for the same reason as word, and word for the same reason as son, but wisdom for the same reason as essence; and so, because Father and Son are one essence, they are also one wisdom."[10]—Also in the same place: "The Father himself is not word, just as he is not son or image."[11] "For what is more absurd than that he should be called image in

[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c7 n8.
[6]Ibid., bk 5 c6 n7.
[7]Ibid., bk 6 c2 n3.
[8]Ibid., bk 7 c3 n4.
[9]Ibid., bk 7 c2 n3.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Ibid., bk 7 c1 n1.

relation to himself?"[12] The same [Augustine], in book 5: "He is called son relatively; he is also called word and image relatively, and, by all these terms, he is referred to the Father; but the Father is called none of these."[13]

6. HE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZES THE MEANING OF THE AFOREGOING. It has been plainly shown that, as he is called son or begotten relative to the father, so also [he is called] word and image; and that he is called word or image for the same reason as son, that is, he is called word or image on account of the same property or notion as he is called son; but it is not for the same reason as word that he is called wisdom or essence, because he is not called wisdom by the notion by which he is called word, for he is called wisdom according to essence, not according to relation.

Chapter 4 (116)

GENERAL RULE AS TO THE THINGS WHICH THEY ARE CALLED IN RESPECT TO THEMSELVES AND THOSE WHICH THEY ARE CALLED RELATIVELY: FOR WHATEVER THEY ARE CALLED IN RESPECT TO THEMSELVES APPLIES TO BOTH TOGETHER, BUT IT IS NOT SO WITH THE AFORESAID RELATIVE TERMS. And here is to be noticed a general rule as to the things which are said of the Father and Son in respect to themselves and those which are said relatively. As Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "For whatever they are called in respect to themselves, the one is not called without the other, that is, whatever they are called which reveals their substance applies to both of them together. And so the Father is not God without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, but both together are God";[1] but they are not both together father, nor both together son or word or image.

Chapter 5 (117)

1. WHETHER GOD FROM GOD, AND SUCHLIKE, IS SAID ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE. Here it is asked, when we say 'God from God,' 'light from light,' and suchlike, whether they are said according to substance; for it is clear that such things are not said according to relation. But if they are said according to substance, then both together, namely Father and Son, can be called God from God, light from light, according to the above rule.

2. RESPONSE, WHERE NAMES OF SUBSTANCE ARE SOMETIMES SAID TO BE POSITED FOR THE PERSONS. To which we say that, although it is according to substance that God is called light, wisdom, and suchlike, and those

[12]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c1 n2.
[13]Ibid., bk 5 c13 n14.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c2 n3.

terms are never taken relatively, yet they are sometimes taken for relatives, that is, for the persons, but not relatively, so that, when we say 'God generated God,' we posit the former for the Father, the latter for the Son. The same is true when we say 'God from God,' 'light from light.' And also in other expressions, names of essence are often found to be used to indicate the persons, as in saying 'God is born,' 'God is dead,' 'God has suffered,' where the Son alone is signified. And so expressions like 'God from God' and suchlike are understood of the Son alone. Hence Augustine, asking how such expressions are used, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, says: "How can it be said God from God, light from light? For they are not both together God from God, but the Son alone is from God, namely the Father; nor are both together light from light, but the Son alone is from the light which is the Father."[1]

3. THAT 'THAT FROM THAT' ONLY IS SAID ACCORDING TO THE NAME OF SUBSTANCE, NOT ACCORDING TO NAMES OF PERSONS. And it is to be known that 'that from that' is said only according to the names of substance, even though those names do not there signify substance. But 'that from that' is never said according to the same names of persons, such as Word from Word or Son from Son, because names of this kind are not suitable for the different persons. That is what Augustine says, if somewhat obscurely, in the same book, in the following terms: "Only that which they are not both together cannot be said of them: that from that," that is, the only term which we cannot use to show one from one is that which is not suitable for both of them together. "As we cannot say Word from Word, because they are not both together Word, so neither Image from Image, nor Son from Son, because they are not both together Son or Image."[2]

4. THAT NAMES OF SUBSTANCE SOMETIMES STAND FOR THE TRINITY. And as sometimes names of substance signify the persons distinctly, so also sometimes [they signify] the whole Trinity together. Hence Augustine, in the same book, says: "The Father himself is declared by the name of Father; but by the name of God, he, the Son, and the Holy Spirit [are declared], as when we say: *None is good, except God*,[3] because the Trinity is one God."[4]

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c2 n3.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Lk. 18, 19.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c8 n9.

DISTINCTION XXVIII

Chapter 1 (118)

1. THAT NOT ONLY THE THREE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROPERTIES ARE IN THE PERSONS, BUT ALSO OTHERS WHICH ARE SIGNIFIED BY OTHER NAMES, SUCH AS UNBEGOTTEN. Moreover, it needs to be considered that not only the three above-mentioned properties or notions are in the persons, but also others which are denoted by other names. Indeed, even the name 'unbegotten' is said relatively of the Father alone, and it designates a notion other than 'father' or 'begetter.' For it is not the same thing to be father and to be unbegotten, that is, he is not called Father by the notion by which he is called unbegotten. As we have said earlier,[1] he is called Father according to the property of generation, but he is called unbegotten according to the property of innascibility. And so the Father differs from the Son by the authority of generation, and he differs also by the property of innascibility, that is, because he is unbegotten.—FULL EXPLANATION OF UNBEGOTTEN, NAMELY THAT IT IS SAID RELATIVELY, AND THE NOTION BY WHICH HE IS CALLED UNBEGOTTEN IS ONE THING, AND THAT BY WHICH [HE IS CALLED] FATHER ANOTHER. Hence Augustine, distinguishing between the property by which he is called 'father' and that by which he is called 'unbegotten,' in *On the Trinity*, book 5, speaks as follows: "It is not the same to call him unbegotten as to call him Father; for even if he had not generated the Son, nothing would prevent our calling him unbegotten. And if anyone generates a son, he is not for that reason unbegotten, because men who have been generated generate others."[2] Therefore it is not because he is 'unbegotten' that he is called 'father.' Hence, although "both names are applied to God the Father, the notion by which he is thought to be begetter is one thing, and that by which unbegotten another. For he is called begetter in relation to the begotten, that is, to the Son; but when he is called unbegotten, what is asserted is not what he is, but what he is not."[3]

2. HE USES EXAMPLES TO SHOW THIS. "This is to be made clear by examples. In saying unbegotten, what is shown is that he is not son. But begotten and unbegotten are suitably used; for if our language allows us to say son, our customary speech does not allow us to say non-son. And yet there is nothing unintelligible about saying non-son; in the same way, if we say non-begotten instead of saying unbegotten, we are not saying anything different. And so, we ought not to consider what linguistic usage allows or does not allow us to say about things, but that the meaning of the

[1]Dist. 26 cc2-3.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c6 n7.
[3]Ibid.

things themselves is clearly apparent."[4] THAT NON-BEGOTTEN IS AS GOOD AS UNBEGOTTEN, AS ALSO NON-SON. "And so let us say not only unbegotten, but also non-begotten, which is as good. Are we saying anything else than non-son? The negative particle does not bring it about that what is said relatively in its absence is said according to substance by its addition. It only negates that which was asserted in its absence. Just as in other predications, when we say 'he is a man,' we designate substance, therefore, someone who says 'he is not a man,' does not state another kind of predication, but only denies that one. Hence, just as I say 'he is a man' according to substance, so I also deny according to substance when I say 'he is not a man.' And if the term begotten has the same value as the term son, then the term non-begotten has the same value as the term non-son. For we deny relatively in saying non-son; therefore we deny relatively in saying non-begotten. And what does non-begotten mean, if not unbegotten? And so it does not lose the signification of a relative predication by being called unbegotten. For just as begotten is not said in relation to self, but in that he is from a begetter; so being called unbegotten is not said in relation to self, but to show that he is not from a begetter; and yet each is said relatively. But what is asserted relatively does not indicate substance. For although there is a difference between begotten and unbegotten, yet this does not indicate a different substance because, just as son is referred to father and non-son to non-father, so also it is necessary that begotten be referred to begetter and non-begotten to non-begetter."[5]—See, he clearly shows that unbegotten is said relatively and is taken of the Father alone, and the notion by which he is called unbegotten is one thing and that by which father another; and it is as good to say non-begotten and non-son as unbegotten.

Chapter 2 (119)

1. WHETHER, AS THE FATHER ALONE IS CALLED UNBEGOTTEN, HE OUGHT TO BE CALLED NON-BEGOTTEN OR NON-SON. It is therefore usual to ask whether, as the Father alone is called unbegotten, he alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-son, so that not even the Holy Spirit may be called non-son or non-begotten.

2. THE OPINION OF SOME. To some, it seems that the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-son, but the Holy Spirit, just as he is not called unbegotten, so, they say, he is not to be called non-begotten or non-son. The Holy Spirit ought indeed to be said and believed not to be be-

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c7 n8.
[5]Ibid.

gotten or not to be son, but he ought not to be said to be non-begotten or non-son.

3. THE OPINION OF OTHERS. But it seems to others that, although the Holy Spirit cannot be called unbegotten, yet he may be called non-begotten or non-son. As for that which Augustine said above,[1] that it is as good to say non-begotten or non-son as to say unbegotten, they say that he said this to show the etymology of the name, and not by way of predication.

Chapter 3 (120)

WHAT THE PROPERTY IS ACCORDING TO WHICH HE IS CALLED UNBEGOTTEN. But if you wish to know what the property is according to which the Father is called unbegotten, listen to Hilary, who calls it 'innascibility'; in *On the Trinity*, book 4, he speaks as follows: "He is one from one, namely begotten from unbegotten, by the property in each of innascibility and origin. And so, since the Scriptures attest to the meaning of the persons and clearly distinguish between innascibility and birth, God is not to be thought of as being solitary. For a difference or distinction of persons is posited in the Scriptures, but a distinction of nature is posited nowhere."[1]

Chapter 4 (121)

1. THE ARIANS STROVE TO PROVE THAT THE FATHER IS OF ONE SUBSTANCE, THE SON OF ANOTHER, BECAUSE THE FIRST IS UNBEGOTTEN, THE SECOND BEGOTTEN; IN RESPONDING TO THEM, AMBROSE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT FOUND THIS NAME [UNBEGOTTEN] IN THE DIVINE SCRIPTURES. But it is not fitting to pass over in silence that the Arians strove to prove that the Father is of one substance, the Son of another, because the one is called unbegotten and the other begotten, since to be unbegotten is different from being begotten.—Hence Ambrose, in responding to their question, says that he had not found this name, namely, unbegotten, in the divine Scriptures. In *On the Holy Spirit*, book. 4, he speaks as follows: "When certain people once have heard us saying that the Son of God, who is begotten, cannot be unequal to the Father who begets, even though the one is generated and the other generated, because this generation is of nature, they think that they have been silenced in regard to that question; but by a damnable turnaround, they reverse their tracks so as to think that a change is made in the question by changing the wording, saying: How can the unbegotten and the begotten be of the same nature and substance? Therefore, in order to re-

[1]Above, c1 n2.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n33.

spond to the question put to me, first of all I have never found the word unbegotten in the divine Scriptures; I have never read it; I have never heard it. Of what shiftiness are such men, that they accuse us of usurping what is not written and, when we assert what is written, they even object that it is not written? Do they not contradict themselves, and undermine the authority of their own calumny?"[1]

2. WHY AMBROSE WAS UNWILLING TO USE THE NAME UNBEGOTTEN, NAMELY BECAUSE OF THE HERETICS. Note, o reader, that Ambrose was unwilling to use this term 'unbegotten' because of the heretics. And so it is necessary for us, because of the snares of calumniators, to pass over in silence some things which can be safely entrusted to Catholic and pious readers.

3. A MOST USEFUL RULE, NAMELY THAT THERE ARE SOME THINGS WHICH AT TIMES WE CAN USE, AND AT OTHER TIMES WE CAN RELIGIOUSLY PASS OVER IN SILENCE. For there are some things which are not of such authority and religious import that we must always confess and accept them submissively; indeed, they may sometimes be passed over in silence. And yet they are not of such unreasonableness that we cannot freely use them, when it is opportune to do so.

Chapter 5 (122)

1. WHETHER IT IS DIFFERENT TO BE FATHER AND TO BE SON. Moreover, since it has been said above that it is one thing to say unbegotten and another to say father, and that begotten is different from unbegotten,[1] it is usual to ask whether it is different or the same to be father and to be son.

2. RESPONSE, IN WHICH HE SAYS THAT IT IS DIFFERENT TO BE FATHER AND TO BE SON, BUT NOT FOR THE FATHER TO BE AND FOR THE SON TO BE. To which we say that, in the same sense in which we say that begotten and unbegotten are different and that it is not the same to say begotten and unbegotten, it can be said that it is not the same, but different, to be Father and to be Son or to be Holy Spirit because the Father is a not father by the same notion that the Son is a son or the Holy Spirit is a holy spirit. And so, in this sense, we grant that it is one thing to be Father, and it is another thing to be Son, because the notion by which the Father is a father is one thing and that by which the Son is a son is another. But if you transpose to say: It is one thing for the Father to be, another for the Son to be, the meaning is changed, and so it is not granted. For the sense is as if it were said: It is one thing by which the Father is, no longer father, but is; it is

[1]Rather, Ambrose, *De incarnationis dominicae sacramento*, c8 nn79-80.
[1]In c1.

another thing by which the Son is, no longer son, but is; which is entirely false. For the Father is by that by which the Father is God, that is, by essence or nature. Moreover, the Son is God by that by which the Father is God; and so the Son is by that by which the Father is. And so it is the same for the Father to be and for the Son to be; but it is not the same to be a father and to be a son.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "Although it is different to be father and to be son, yet the substance is not different, because this statement is not made according to substance, but according to relation: nevertheless, this relation is not an accident because it is not changeable."[2] See, he says that it is different to be father and to be son. This must be taken according to the above-stated reason, namely that the notion by which he is father is one thing, and that by which he is son is another; for it is not according to essence, but according to relation, that the Father is called a father and the Son a son.

Chapter 6 (123)

1. HOW WISDOM IS SAID TO BE BEGOTTEN OR BORN, WHETHER ACCORDING TO RELATION OR ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE. It is also to be known that, just as the Son alone is called 'word' or 'image,' so he alone is also called 'born or begotten wisdom'; so it is asked whether this is said relatively; and if relatively, then whether according to the same relation by which he is called 'word' or 'image.'—Concerning this, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, speaks as follows: "When we say 'word,' let us take it as if we were saying 'wisdom that is born,' so that it is both Son and image. When these two words are used, that is, 'born wisdom,' in one of them, namely 'born,' let word and image and Son be understood, and do not let essence be expressed in all these names because they are said relatively. But in the other term, which is 'wisdom,' let essence too be designated because it is spoken also in respect to itself. For wisdom is itself wise, and it is the same for it to be and to be wise; hence Father and Son together are one wisdom because one essence."[1]

2. HOW THE WORDS OF AUGUSTINE CITED ABOVE ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. Beware, reader, how you understand what Augustine says here. For he seems to say that, in saying 'born wisdom,' 'wisdom' in this phrase signifies essence, and 'born' denotes relation. But if this is so, we are compelled to say that the divine essence is born, which is incompatible with what has been said earlier.[2]—But to this we say that in the one word,

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c5 n6.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c2 n3.
[2]Dist. 5.

that is, in 'born,' the same notion is understood which is denoted by saying 'word' and 'image'; but in the other word, namely 'wisdom,' essence is designated, that is, it is shown that the Son is essence because wisdom is said according to essence. And so, in saying 'born wisdom,' it is understood that he who is born is essence. And yet 'wisdom' there does not stand for essence, but for hypostasis: (ATTEND DILIGENTLY!) so that, just as when we say Word or Son, the hypostasis with its property is understood, so also when we say 'born wisdom' let the same be understood, that is, the begotten hypostasis. And so it is with attentive deliberation that he says that the expressions Word and 'born wisdom' are to be understood to be the same, that is, the same relation and the same hypostasis in which that property inheres. And this supports what we said above,[3] namely that, in saying Father or Son or Holy Spirit, not only those properties are signified as when we say fatherhood, sonship, but also the hypostases with their properties.

Chapter 7 (124)

THAT IMAGE IS SOMETIMES SAID ACCORDING TO ESSENCE. It is also necessary to understand that, although it has been said above[1] that image, like word and son, is said relatively of the Son, yet sometimes it is found to be said according to substance. Hence Augustine, in the book *On Faith*, says that "essentially, the Trinity's divinity" and the image, in which man was made, "is one."[2]—Hilary too, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, speaks as follows: "Man is made in their common image. There is no discrepancy of name and no difference of nature: for the form in which man was created is one."[3] From these, it is shown that sometimes image is understood as essence, and then it is said in respect to itself and not relatively.

DISTINCTION XXIX

Chapter 1 (125)

1. ON BEGINNING: THAT IT IS SAID RELATIVELY AND DENOTES A MANIFOLD RELATION. There is also another name denoting a manifold relation, namely beginning. For beginning is always said with respect to something. And the Father is called beginning, the Son beginning, the Holy Spirit begin-

[3]Dist. 27 c2 nn2-3.

[1]Dist. 27 c3 nn3-6.
[2]Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum*, c1 n5.
[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 n8.

ning, but differently; indeed, the Father is called beginning in respect to the Son and Holy Spirit.

2. HOW THE FATHER IS CALLED THE BEGINNING OF THE WHOLE DEITY. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, says: "The Father is the beginning of the whole divinity or, if it is better said, of the whole deity," because he is from no one. "For he does not have [anyone] from whom he is or from whom he proceeds";[1] but from him, both the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds. And so he is not called the beginning of the whole deity because he is the beginning of his own, or the divine, essence, but because he is the beginning of the Son and the Holy Spirit, in each of whom is the whole divinity.

3. HOW AND IN RELATION TO WHAT THE SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT, AND EVEN THE TRINITY IS CALLED BEGINNING. The Son [is so called] in relation to the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit is not called beginning, except in relation to creatures, in relation to which both Father and Son are also called beginning. And the Trinity itself, together and each person [of it], is called the beginning of creatures. "And so the Father is the beginning without beginning, the Son the beginning from beginning, the Holy Spirit the beginning from both,"[2] that is, from the Father and the Son.

Chapter 2 (126)

1. THAT THE FATHER IS THE BEGINNING FROM ETERNITY, AND SO IS THE SON, BUT NOT THE HOLY SPIRIT; RATHER HE BEGAN TO BE A BEGINNING [IN TIME]. And the Father is the Son's beginning from eternity, and Father and Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit, because the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit from both. But the Holy Spirit is not a beginning from eternity, but he began to be such, because he is only called beginning with respect to creatures. And since creatures had the beginning of their being [in time], so the Holy Spirit began to be their beginning. In the same way, the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit began to be the one beginning of creatures, because creatures began to be from the Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

2. HOW THESE THREE ARE THE ONE BEGINNING OF THE CREATURE. And these three are not called three beginnings, but the one beginning of all creatures, because they are the beginning of things in one and the same way. For things are not from the Father in one way, and from the Son in another, but entirely in the same way. And so the Apostle, understanding

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 c20 nn29 and 28.
[2]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c17 n4.

this Trinity to be the one beginning of things, says: *From him and through him and in him are all things.*[1]

3. HOW IT IS TO BE TAKEN THAT ALL THINGS ARE FROM GOD. "But when we hear that all things are from God," as Augustine says, *On the Nature of the Good*, "we must understand by this all natures and all things which are naturally. For sins are not from him; they do not preserve, but undermine, nature and are born from the will of sinners."[2] And so the Father, with the Son and the Holy Spirit, is the one beginning of all things which naturally are, and began to be this beginning [in time]."

4. THAT IT IS FROM ETERNITY [THAT THE FATHER IS] THE BEGINNING OF THE SON, AND FATHER AND SON OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. But it is from eternity that the Father is the beginning of the Son by generation, and that Father and Son are the one beginning of the Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, speaks as follows: "The Father is relatively so called, and he is also relatively called beginning; but he is called Father in respect to the Son and beginning in respect to all things which are from him. The Son is also called beginning. For when it was said to him: *Who are you?*, he answered: *I am the beginning, who now speak to you.*[3] But is he, then, the beginning of the Father? No, indeed, but rather he wished to show himself to be the creator, when he said that he was the beginning, just as the Father too is the beginning of the creature, because all things are from him. But when we call the Father beginning and the Son beginning, we do not assert two beginnings of the creature, because Father and Son together are one beginning in respect to the creature, as one creator."[4]

5. HERE HE ADDS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, THAT HE TOO IS THE BEGINNING. "If anything which remains in itself and generates or works something is a beginning in relation to the thing which it generates or makes, we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit can also rightly be called beginning. We do not except him from the title of creator; for it is written of him that he works,[5] and yet he works while remaining in himself: for he does not change or turn into any of the things which he works. And so the Holy Spirit, with the Father and the Son, is one beginning with respect to the creature, not two or three beginnings."[6] See, Augustine plainly shows that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are the one beginning of created things, that is, they are the beginning in one and the same way. He also sufficiently reveals

[1]Rom. 11, 36.
[2]Augustine, *De natura boni*, c28.
[3]Jn. 8, 25.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c13 n14.
[5]Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 11.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c13 n14.

what that way is, namely because they work all things, and since these three work together, they are said to be one beginning.

Chapter 3

1. HERE HE SHOWS HOW THE FATHER IS THE BEGINNING OF THE SON, AND BOTH HE AND THE SON [ARE] THE BEGINNING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. Immediately next in the same book, he shows how the Father is called beginning in respect to the Son, and he and the Son [are called beginning] in respect to the Holy Spirit. He says that the Father is the beginning of the Son because he generated him, and Father and Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit proceeds or is given by both. He says as follows: "If the one who generates is the beginning in respect to that which he generates, the Father is the beginning in respect to the Son because he generated him. But whether the Father is also the beginning in respect to the Holy Spirit, because it is said: *He proceeds from the Father*,[1] this is not a small question. In effect, if this is so, he will be the beginning not only of a thing which he generates or makes, but also of one which he gives and which proceeds from him. And so, if what is given or what proceeds has its beginning from the one from whom he is given or proceeds, it must be professed that Father and Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit, and not two beginnings. But as Father and Son are called one creator and one lord relative to the creature, so also [they are called] one beginning relative to the Holy Spirit; but in relation to the creature, Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one beginning, just as [they are] one creator and one lord."[2]

2. FROM THESE WORDS, IT IS GATHERED THAT THE FATHER IS THE BEGINNING OF THE SON BY THAT BY WHICH HE IS FATHER, NAMELY BY GENERATION, AND THAT HE IS ALSO THE AUTHOR OF THE SON BY THE SAME. See, you have that the Father is called the beginning of the Son because he generated him: and so he is called the beginning of the Son by the same notion by which he is father, that is, generation. It is according to this that he is also called the author of the Son. Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 4, says: "By the very fact that he is called Father, he is shown to be the author of him whom he generated. The name which he bears reveals that he does not come from another, and teaches from whom it is that he who was generated has his existence."[3]—NOTE HOW HE SAYS THAT THE SON IS NOT FROM THE BEGINNING, BUT FROM THE ONE WITHOUT BEGINNING. —"The Church knows one God without birth; she knows the only-begotten

[1]Jn. 15, 26.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c14 n15.
[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n9.

Son of God. She confesses the Father, free from any beginning; she confesses also the Son's origin from the beginning: not that he is from the beginning, but that he is from the one without beginning; not that he was born by himself, but that he was born from eternity, from him who is from no one, namely, that he took his birth from the Father's eternity. Our profession of faith is here made public, but the reason for our profession has not yet been put forth";[4] and so it is to be enquired, namely how his statement is to be understood that the Son's origin is from the beginning, and that he is not from the beginning, but from the one without beginning.

3. HE REVEALS IN WHAT SENSE THAT STATEMENT WAS MADE. By adding this, he determined how he understood 'beginning' in the assertion that the Son's origin is from the beginning. It is as if he had said: Do not understand the Son's origin to be from the beginning as if the Son himself has a beginning, but that he is from the one without beginning, that is, from the Father, from whom are all things. For although the Son is the beginning from the beginning, yet it is not to be granted that the Son has a beginning. And although the Son is the beginning from the beginning, and the Father is the beginning not from a beginning, a beginning from a beginning is not a beginning without a beginning, just as the Son is not the Father. And yet they are not two beginnings, but one, just as the Father and the Son are not two creators, but one creator.[5]

Chapter 4 (128)

1. SINCE FATHER AND SON ARE THE ONE BEGINNING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, IT IS ASKED WHETHER [THEY ARE SO] BY THE SAME NOTION. But the Father and the Son are the one beginning not only of the creatures, as has been said above,[1] but also of the Holy Spirit. And so it is usual to ask whether the Father and the Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit by the same notion, or whether there is some notion by which the Father is called the beginning of the Holy Spirit, and another notion by which the Son is called such —RESPONSE. To which we say: since both Father and Son are called the beginning of the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit proceeds or is given from both, nor does he proceed or is given in a different way by the Father than by the Son, it may rightly be understood that the Father and the Son are called the beginning of the Holy Spirit by the same relation or notion.

[4]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 4 n6.
[5]Cf. Augustine, above, c1 n3.

[1]Above, c2.

2. IT IS ASKED WHAT THE NOTION IS BY WHICH FATHER AND SON ARE CALLED THE BEGINNING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. But if it is asked what that notion is which is there denoted by 'beginning,' we do not have a name for it; it is not fatherhood itself or sonship, but rather some notion common to Father and Son, by which Father and Son are the one beginning of the Holy Spirit from eternity. But as has been said above,[2] the Father or the Son is called giver in time, as the Holy Spirit is called granted or given.

DISTINCTION XXX

Chapter 1 (129)

1. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE SAID OF GOD IN TIME AND RELATIVELY, ACCORDING TO AN ACCIDENT WHICH BEFALLS CREATURES, BUT NOT GOD. For there are some things which are said of God in time and which are fitting for him in time without any change on his part. These are said relatively, according to an accident which does not befall God, but which befalls creatures, such as creator, lord, refuge, giver or granted, and suchlike. —Of these, Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says as follows: "The Creator is so called relative to the creature, as lord to slave."[1] Also: "Do not be troubled that the Holy Spirit, although coeternal with the Father and the Son, yet is called something in time, as we have called him given. For the Spirit is eternally gift, but he is given in time. And if a lord is not so called except when he begins to have a slave, this title too is relative to God in time. For the creature of which he is the lord is not eternal; and so he is not lord from eternity, lest we be compelled to say that the creature also is eternal. Indeed, he would not be lord eternally, if the creature were not eternally in servitude. For just as there cannot be a slave who does not have a lord, so there cannot be a lord who does not have a slave."[2]

2. OPINION THAT HE IS NOT LORD IN TIME BECAUSE HE IS LORD OF TIME, WHICH IS NOT [BEGUN] IN TIME. But here someone will say that this title of lord does not pertain to God in time, because he is lord not only of things which had their beginning in time, but also of that thing which did not begin in time, that is, of time itself. Time did not begin in time because time did not exist before it began; and so he did not begin to be lord in time.— RESPONSE. To this it may be said that, although he did not begin to be lord of time in time, yet he began to be lord of time, because time did not al-

[2]Dist. 18 c2.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c13 n14.
[2]Ibid., bk 5 c16 n17.

ways exist. And he began to be lord of man himself in time. Concerning this, Augustine, in the same book, immediately next, says as follows: "And if there is anyone who says that God alone is eternal, and that the ages are not eternal, because they are subject to variations and changes, but that the ages nevertheless did not begin in time (because time did not exist before the ages began, and consequently it was not in time that God began to be lord, because he was lord of the ages themselves, which did not begin in time): what will he say regarding man, who was made in time, and of whom God was not the lord before man had begun to be? Certainly, it befell God in time to be lord of man; and that all controversy may be removed, [we say that] it was in time that God began to be your lord and mine, since we have only now begun to be."[3]

3. How it is to be understood that nothing is said of God according to accident, and what relative accidents are. "How, then, shall we maintain that nothing is said of God according to accident? Unless because nothing befalls his nature that may cause it to change: so that those things which happen with some change of the things of which they are said are relative accidents, as a friend is relatively so called. For he does not begin to be a friend, except when he has already begun to love, and so some change of the will happens for him to be called a friend."[4]

4. By an analogy, he shows that God, without change on his part, can be called what he was not called before, just as a coin is called a price. "When a coin is called a price, it is so called relatively; and yet, it has not changed when it has begun to be a price, nor when it is called a pledge and suchlike. But if a coin can be spoken of relatively with no change in itself so frequently that neither when it begins, nor when it ceases, to be called [a price] does anything change in its nature or in the form by which it is a coin: how much more easily ought we to accept of God's immutable substance that something be said of it relatively in relation to the creature, so that, although it begins to be said in time, yet it should not be thought to be something which has happened to the very substance of God, but only to the creature in relation to which it is said."[5]

5. That God is called refuge relatively in time, without any change on his part. "Also, how is God called *our refuge*:[6] for God is called our refuge relatively; for it is in relation to us, and he then becomes our refuge when we seek refuge in him. Does anything come to be in his nature, then, which was not there before we sought refuge in him? And so

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c16 n17.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ps. 17, 3; 30, 4; 31, 7. etc.

it is in us, who are made better by seeking refuge in him, that a certain change happens; but there is no change in him."[7]

6. THAT HE IS ALSO CALLED [OUR] FATHER RELATIVELY. "Similarly, he also begins to be our father when we are regenerated by the grace of him, who *gave* us *the power to become children of God.*[8] And so our substance is changed for the better when we become his sons; at the same time, he begins to be our father, but without any change in his substance. And so it is clear that that which God begins to be called in time, which he was not called before, is said relatively, yet not according to an accident of God that might have happened to him, but plainly according to an accident of the thing in relation to which God begins to be called something relatively."[9]

7. HE BRIEFLY CONDENSES THE MEANING OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE. From these comments, it is plainly shown that some things are said of God in time relative to creatures, without change of the deity but not without change of the creature; and so the accident is in the creature, not in the Creator. And the name by which the creature is called relative to the Creator is relative, and it denotes the relation which is in the creature itself; the name by which the Creator is called relative to the creature is also relative, but it denotes no relation which is in the Creator.

Chapter 2 (130)

HERE THAT QUESTION IS RESOLVED BY WHICH IT WAS ASKED WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT IS CALLED GIVEN RELATIVE TO HIMSELF, SINCE HE GIVES HIMSELF. Here can be solved the question posed above,[1] where it was asked: since the Holy Spirit is called granted or given ("for that which is given is referred both to him who gives and to him to whom it is given"[2]), and since the Holy Spirit gives himself, whether it is said relatively to himself when he is said to be given or granted.—SOLUTION. In response to this question, we say that the Holy Spirit is called granted or given relative both to the giver and to the one to whom he is given. For the giver or donor is the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit. And yet we do not say that the Holy Spirit is referred to himself, but the name of 'given' or 'granted' is referred both to the giver and to the recipient, because nothing can be called given, unless it is given by someone and to someone. But when the Holy Spirit is said to be, or to have been, given by himself, this

[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c16 n17.
[8]Jn. 1, 12.
[9]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c16 n17.

[1]Dist. 18 c6.
[2]As Augustine says, above, Dist. 18 c4 n2.

is said relative to the one to whom he is given, and it is a relative term, and a change happens in the one to whom he is given, and not in the giver.

DISTINCTION XXXI

Chapter 1 (131)

IN WHAT WAY THE SON IS CALLED EQUAL TO, AND SAID TO BE LIKE, THE FATHER, WHETHER ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE, OR ACCORDING TO RELATION. Moreover, since the three persons are coequal to each other, it is necessary to consider whether this is said relatively or according to substance, and if relatively, whether this equality is to be considered according to relation or according to essence; then, what this equality itself is.—HE TEACHES. To which we say that, just as nothing is similar to itself (for, as Hilary says, "likeness is not to one's own self"[1]), so also nothing is said to be equal to itself; and so it follows that, like similar, so equal is said relatively. Therefore the Son is called equal relative to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both.—And yet the Son is equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both, because of the highest simplicity and unity of essence; and so the Son is equal to the Father according to substance, not according to relation. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 5, says: "We ask according to what the Son is equal to the Father. The equality of the Son to the Father is not according to that which is said in respect to the Father; and so it remains that he be equal according to that which is said in respect to himself. But whatever is said in respect to himself is said according to substance; and so it remains that he is equal according to substance. Therefore the substance of both is the same."[2] Also, in book 6: "It is enough to see that the Son is in no way equal to the Father, if he is found to be unequal in anything, namely that which pertains to signifying his substance; and so the Son is equal to the Father in all things, and is of the same substance."[3] "The Holy Spirit is also equal, and equal in all things, because of the highest simplicity of that substance."[4] From these words, it is made very clear that the Son is equal to the Father according to substance, and the Holy Spirit to both; and only the name is relative.

2. WHAT THE EQUALITY IS. And so the equality of Father and Son is not a relation or notion, but a lack of disparity because of the unity of nature.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 n23.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 5 c6 n7.
[3]Ibid., bk 6 c4 n6.
[4]Ibid., bk 6 c5 n7.

3. HERE, HOW HE IS CALLED LIKE AND WHAT LIKENESS IS. We say the same also concerning like and likeness. For when the Son is said to be like the Father, this is said relatively, but he is like the Father because of the unity of essence, and so only the name is relative; but the likeness is lack of difference.[5]

4. IT SEEMS TO SOME THAT, BY THE NAME 'EQUALITY' OR 'LIKENESS,' THERE IS NOT THE ASSERTION OF SOMETHING, BUT ITS REMOVAL. Hence it seems to some, not unlearnedly, that by the name 'equality' or 'likeness,' there is not the assertion of something, but its removal. Thus, the Son is called equal to the Father by this reason: because he is neither greater nor lesser than him, and this because of unity of essence. Also, he is said to be like [the Father] because he is neither different, nor alien, nor in any way dissimilar, and this because of the simplicity of essence. Therefore it is not because the Son is begotten of the Father that he is equal or unequal to the Father, or like or unlike him, but he is equal to, and like, him according to substance.

Chapter 2 (132)

1. ON THE SENTENCE OF ST. HILARY BY WHICH HE SHOWS THE PROPERTIES OF THE PERSONS IN THE TRINITY. Nor should we here pass over that the illustrious Hilary, in ascribing the properties of the persons, says that eternity is in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift.[1]

2. AUGUSTINE. ON HILARY'S SAYING: ETERNITY IS IN THE FATHER, FORM IN THE IMAGE, USE IN THE GIFT. AUGUSTINE HERE TEACHES IN WHAT SENSE THOSE WORDS OF HILARY ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD, AND FIRST WHY ETERNITY IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FATHER. These are words of such difficulty that Augustine laboured mightily at understanding and explaining them, as he shows in *On the Trinity*, book 6, saying: "One author, wishing to intimate in a very few words what is proper to the persons in the Trinity, said: 'Eternity is in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift.' And because he was a man who enjoyed not a little authority in the explanation of the Scriptures and the assertion of the faith—for it was Hilary who included this in his books—I have, insofar as I am able, searched the hidden meaning of these words, that is, of Father and Image and Gift, of eternity, form, and use. I do not believe that he meant anything more by the word eternity (PAY ATTENTION) than that the Father does not have a father from whom he is; but the Son is from the Father in such a way that he is and that he is

[5]Cf. Hilary, *De synodis*, n73.

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 n1.

coeternal with him."[2]—HERE WHY FORM IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE IMAGE. "For if an image perfectly renders that whose image it is, then the image is compared to that [of which it is the image], and not the latter to its image. In this image, he mentioned form, I believe, because of its beauty: for there is in it such suitable proportion and supreme equality and supreme likeness, that it differs in nothing and is in no respect unequal and in no part dissimilar, but entirely corresponds, to him whose image it is. In it is the first and highest life, for which it is not one thing to live and another to be, but they are the same; and also the first and highest intellect, for whom it is not one thing to live and another to understand, but one and the same thing, as though the perfect word to which nothing is lacking, and a sort of art of the all-powerful and wise God, filled with incommutable reasons of living beings; and all are one in it, as it itself is one from the One, with whom it is one. In it, God knows all things, which he has made through it."[3]—HERE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, WHY HE IS CALLED USE. "There is also a certain ineffable embrace of Father and Image which is not without enjoyment, without charity, without joy. And it is this love, delight, felicity or blessedness, if it may worthily be named by human speech at all, which he has, in brief, called use. And in the Trinity, this is the Holy Spirit, not begotten, but the sweetness of the begetter and the begotten, who fills with the abundance of his graces all creatures, in proportion to their ability to receive them. And so those three seem to be mutually determined by each other and are infinite in themselves. Whoever sees this, even if *in part* or *through a glass darkly*,[4] let him rejoice in knowing God and let him give thanks. As for the one who does not see it, let him strive by piety toward seeing it, and not misrepresent it blindly, because God is one, and yet Trinity."[5]

3. THAT NOT ONLY THOSE WORDS OF HILARY, BUT ALSO THEIR EXPLANATION BY AUGUSTINE IS VERY OBSCURE. See, you have how the aforesaid words of Hilary are to be taken. But they are of such depth that human sense can hardly understand them, even with the help of exposition. Indeed, the very explanation which Augustine put forth here contains much difficulty and ambiguity.

4. THAT THE PROPERTIES OF THE THREE PERSONS ARE NOT DIFFERENTIATED THERE ACCORDING TO THIS EXPOSITION. For according to the aforementioned exposition, the properties of the three persons set out earlier[6] are not differentiated there, but the hypostases themselves are shown to be

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n11.
[3]Ibid.
[4]Cf. 1 Cor. 13, 12.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 nn11-12.
[6]Dist. 26 cc2-3, or here, above, n1.

distinct from one another.—THAT BY THE NAME OF ETERNITY THAT NOTION IS SIGNIFIED THERE WHICH IS DENOTED BY UNBEGOTTEN. But by the name of eternity, that same property seems to be signified which is denoted by the term 'unbegotten.'

5. IN WHAT SENSE HE SAID: IF AN IMAGE PERFECTLY RENDERS, ETC. But let us see what it is that he says: "If an image perfectly renders that whose image it is, then the image is compared to that [of which it is the image], and not the latter to its image."[7] For he seems to say that the Son, who is the image of the Father, is compared to the Father, not the Father to the Son, even though in Scripture the Son is said to be equal to the Father and the Father to the Son. But the Son has this from the Father, that he be equal to him; the Father does not have this from the Son. And yet the Son is fully and perfectly equal to the Father, that is, the image [is equal] to him whose image it is.

6. Hilary, in the book *On the Synod*: "An image has a form which does not differ from that of the one whose image it is. For no one is an image of his own self, but an image must necessarily show forth the one whose image it is. And so the image is the formed and indistinguishable likeness of one thing made equal to another. And so what the Father is, the Son is also, because the Son is the image of the Father; and because he is image, in order to be image, he must have in himself the form, nature, and essence of his original in view of the fact that he is image."[8]

7. WHY HILARY IS SAID TO HAVE ASCRIBED WHAT IS PROPER TO THE PERSONS IN THE AFORESAID WORDS, EVEN THOUGH THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT EXPRESSED THERE. And Hilary is said to have ascribed what is proper to the persons in the aforesaid words,[9] because he set out the relative names of the persons, namely of the Father, Image, and Gift, which are said of the persons relatively and denote the properties by which the persons are distinguished. For the Holy Spirit is named as relatively when called 'gift' as when 'grant.' And yet, according to the aforesaid exposition of Augustine, Hilary did not signify the properties themselves by another three names, except by the name alone of 'eternity.' And by this it was not fatherhood itself, but that notion by which the Father is called 'unbegotten,' that [Hilary] wished to be understood.

8. Hilary, in the book *On the Synod*: "If anyone says that the Son is incapable of being born and without beginning, as if by saying that there are two without beginning, and two incapable of birth, and two unborn, he makes two gods, let him be anathema. For the Son is the head who is the

[7]Augustine, above, n2.
[8]Hilary, *De synodis*, n13 .
[9]Above, n1.

beginning of all things; but the head who is the beginning of Christ is God. For it is in this way that we refer all things through the Son to the one who is without beginning and is the beginning of all things. It is most impious to profess that the Son is incapable of birth. For there will not then be one God, because the nature of the one God incapable of birth requires that we predicate that God is one. Therefore, since God is one, there cannot be two who are incapable of birth: God is one (although both the Father is God and the Son of God is God) because innascibility pertains to one only; but the Son is God because he was born from that essence which cannot be born. For the Son is the head of all, but the head of the Son is God; and all things are referred to the one God by this step and this confession, since everything takes its beginning from him, since he is himself the beginning."[10]—The same [Hilary] in the same: "The will of God has given substance to all creatures, but a perfect birth gave a nature to the Son from a substance which is impassible and not born. For all created things are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born from God, subsists even as God is. A nature did not bring forth a nature unlike itself, but the one begotten from the substance of God assumed an essence according to the origin of his nature, not like the creatures of the will."[11]

9. THAT AUGUSTINE NOTES THE SAME DISTINCTION OF PERSONS IN SOME OTHER WORDS WITHOUT AN EXPOSITION OF THE THREE PROPERTIES. It is also necessary for it to be known that Augustine, wishing to show the distinction of the same three persons, but without referring to those three properties mentioned above, in *On Christian Doctrine*, book 1, says as follows: "In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality; and those three things are all one because of the Father, all equal because of the Son, and all joined together because of the Holy Spirit. And so Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and each of them severally, is God, and all together one God; and each of them severally is a full substance, and all together one substance. The Father is neither the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; the Son is neither the Father, nor the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is neither the Father, nor the Son; but the Father alone is Father; the Son alone is Son; the Holy Spirit alone is Holy Spirit. The same eternity is in the three, the same incommutability, the same majesty, the same power."[12] In these words, the distinction of the three persons is plainly indicated.

[10]Hilary, *De synodis*, nn59-60.
[11]Ibid., n58.
[12]Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c5 n5.

Chapter 3 (133)

WHY UNITY IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FATHER AND EQUALITY TO THE SON. But many are troubled that he attributes unity to the Father and equality to the Son. For since unity is said according to substance, it is not in the Father alone, but also in the Son and in the Holy Spirit; and the equality of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one. So why is unity attributed to the Father and equality to the Son?—Perhaps unity is attributed to the Father by Augustine for the same reason that eternity is attributed to the same by Hilary, namely because the Father is in such a way that he is not from another, and because he generated the Son, one God with himself, and the Spirit proceeds from him, one God with him. And so unity is said to be in the Father because there is nothing else from which it may be; indeed, it is not from anyone else, nor is there anything or anyone from him from eternity which is not one with him. For the Son and the Holy Spirit are one with the Father; hence Truth says: *I and the Father are one.*[1]

Chapter 4 (134)

1. WHY FATHER AND SON ARE CALLED ONE THING OR ONE GOD, BUT NOT [SIMPLY] ONE: BECAUSE THINGS OF THE SAME NATURE CAN RIGHTLY BE SAID TO BE ONE THING SIMPLY OR WITH QUALIFICATION, BUT THINGS OF A DIVERSE NATURE CANNOT BE CALLED ONE WITHOUT SPECIFYING ONE WHAT. Here it is necessary to say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are rightly said to be one thing, and one God, but not [simply] one. For two or more things can rightly be said to be one thing, if they are of one essence and their nature is the same. But one, simply, whether in the masculine or the feminine, cannot be said of diverse things without specifying one what: with this addition, it can rightly be said of things both of the same and of diverse substance.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 6, says as follows: "I do not know whether in the Scriptures one ever finds the words, they are one, applied to things of diverse nature. But if there are several things of the same nature and these have diverse sentiments, they are not one insofar as they have diverse sentiments. And so if something is called one without specification of one what, and several things are called one, then the same nature and essence is signified, without difference or disagreement."[1]—HE POSES AN EXAMPLE. "Hence Paul and Apollo, who were both men and shared the same sentiments, are said to be one in the words: *The one who plants and the one who waters are one.*[2] But when

[1]Jn. 10, 30.

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c3 n4.
[2]1 Cor. 3, 8.

one what is specified, it may be that something is signified to have become one out of several things, although they differed in nature; just as soul and body cannot at all be called one (for what is so different?) without adding or understanding one what, that is, one man. Hence the Apostle says: *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit*;[3] he did not say *is one* or *are one*, but added *spirit*. For the spirit of man and the spirit of God are different in nature, but in their joining the spirit of man becomes one spirit with God,"[4] because he becomes a sharer in the truth of God's blessedness. Therefore, if it can be rightly said of those who are of different substance that they are *one spirit*, how much more rightly are they who are of one substance said to be one God. "And so the Father and the Son are one, assuredly according to the unity of substance, and one God."[5]

2. ON THE HERESY OF ARIUS. By this is condemned the Arian heresy, which, as Augustine says in the book *On Heresies*, "denies that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are of one and the same substance and nature or, to say it more plainly, essence, which is what the Greeks call '*usia*,' but [they say] that the Son is a creature."[6]— ON THE HERESY OF SABELLIUS. And also the Sabellian heresy, which, as Augustine says in the same book, claimed "Christ to be entirely the same as Father and Holy Spirit," so that the trinity is one of names, without substance of persons.[7]—As Augustine says, *On John*: "Truth crushes both plagues, saying: *I and the Father are one*.[8] Hear and note both *one* and *are*, and you shall be free from both Charybdis and Scylla. Because he said *one*, he frees you from Arius; because he said *are*, he frees you from Sabellius. If *one*, therefore not different; if *are*, therefore both Father and Son; for he would not say *are* of one, nor *one* of different substances. And so let the Sabellians blush, who say that the Father is the same as the Son, confusing the persons; and also those who are called Patripassians, because they say that the Father suffered. But the Arians say that the Father is one thing, the Son another, and not one substance, but two: the Father greater, the Son lesser. o Catholic, do not say this. And so steer the middle course; avoid both dangerous sides, and say: The Father is father, and the Son is son; the Father is one, the Son is another, but not something else, indeed the very same thing, because God is one."[9] See, it has been shown why unity is said to be in the Father, even though those three are one thing.

[3]1 Cor. 6, 17.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c3 n4.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Augustine, *De haeresibus*, n49.
[7]Ibid., nn36 and 41.
[8]Jn. 10, 30.
[9]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 36 nn8-9.

3. Hilary, in the book *On the Synod*: "Our faith seems perhaps to have spoken less than clearly about the likeness without difference of Father and Son, when it declared of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit that in these names was signified the substance and order and glory proper to each of those named, so that they are three in substance, but one in consonance. And so the assembled synod of the Saints wished to crush that impiety which, through the number of names, avoided the truth concerning Father and Son and Holy Spirit, holding that, since there was no personal cause for each of the names, the threefold invocation achieved union under a false use of these names, and that the Father alone is one and has the name of both Holy Spirit and Son. And so they affirmed three substances, teaching that they are persons subsistent through their substances, without separating the substance of Father and Son by the diversity of their dissimilar essence. For saying that 'they are three in substance, but one in consonance' is no lie because, as the Spirit, that is, the Paraclete, is also named, it is fitting that a unity of consonance should be asserted, rather than a unity of essence through likeness of substance."[10]—The same [Hilary] in the same: "Since we confess God the Father and proclaim Christ to be the Son of God, and between these two [truthful] assertions lies the irreligious confession of two gods, they, who do not differ in nature or in name, cannot be other than one in essence since the name of their essence can only be one. For the religious [assertion of the] unity of the name, grounded in the essence of an identical nature, did not take away the person constituted of the born essence so that the one and singular substance of God is understood by the unity of the name, since the one name of each essence, that is, the one God, is predicated because of the identical substance of the undifferentiated nature in each."[11]

Chapter 5 (135)

WHY EQUALITY IS SAID TO BE IN THE SON, EVEN THOUGH THE EQUALITY OF THE THREE IS ONE. Now let us see why equality is said to be in the Son,[1] even though the equality of the three is one and the highest.—Perhaps this is said because the Son is begotten by the Father equal to his begetter, and to the Gift who proceeds from both, and so those three are said to be equal because of the Son. For the Son has it from the Father that he be equal to him and to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit has it from both that he be equal to both. But we say these things without intending an arrogant asser-

[10]Hilary, *De synodis*, nn31-32.
[11]Ibid., nn41-42.

[1]Above, in c2

tion and without prejudice to a better understanding; in the opening up of such recondite matters, we prefer to hear those who are more expert than to instill something in others.

Chapter 6 (136)

WHY THE CONCORD OR JOINING OF THE TWO IS SAID TO BE IN THE HOLY SPIRIT. The concord of the two and the joining of all through him is said to be in the Holy Spirit; this will be easier for us to understand, if we recall to mind what was said above.[1] For we have said above, in accordance with the authorities of the Saints, that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father. And so the Holy Spirit is rightly called the joining or concord of Father and Son, and through him all things are joined.—Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "The Spirit of both is a certain consubstantial communion of Father and Son."[2] The same, in book 7: "The Holy Spirit is the highest charity, joining both together, and also us from below."[3]

DISTINCTION XXXII

Chapter 1 (137)

1. WHETHER THE FATHER OR THE SON LOVES BY MEANS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, SINCE FOR GOD TO LOVE IS THE SAME AS TO BE. Here arises a question which follows from what is said above. For it has been said above,[1] and it has been shown by the authorities of the Saints, that the Holy Spirit is the communion of Father and Son, and the love by which Father and Son love each other. And so it is asked whether the Father or the Son loves through the Holy Spirit or by means of the Holy Spirit.—It seems entirely fitting to assert this according to the authorities set out above, by which it is shown that it is the Holy Spirit "by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and, in turn, loves his begetter."[2]—But on the contrary: If the Father, or the Son, is said to love through the Holy Spirit, he seems to have being through the Holy Spirit, because for God it is not one thing to be and another to love, but the same thing, because, as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, "whatever appears to be said according to quali-

[1]Dist. 10.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c27 n50.
[3]Ibid., bk 7 c3 n6.

[1]Above, in c6; more fully in Dist. 10.
[2]These are the words of Augustine, below, at the beginning of n3.

ties," such as good, great, immortal, wise, loving, and suchlike, "in that simple nature is to be understood according to essence."[3] And so, if the Father or the Son loves through the Holy Spirit, he appears to have being through the same Spirit; nor does he love only by means of his essence, but also by means of the Gift.

2. THIS QUESTION IS INSOLUBLE BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND THE AUTHORITIES DISAGREE WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT IT. Because this question is an extremely deep one, we shall limit our answer to that which Augustine seems to signify, namely that Father and Son love each other and preserve their unity not only by means of their essence, but also by means of their own Gift. And although this has been said earlier,[4] yet I am not reluctant to repeat it because it is so useful.

3. HE PLAINLY SAYS THAT FATHER AND SON LOVE EACH OTHER AND PRESERVE THEIR PEACE BOTH BY MEANS OF THEIR ESSENCE AND BY MEANS OF THEIR GIFT. And so he says as follows, in *On the Trinity*, book 6: "It is manifest that the one through whom the two are joined is not one of them, through whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and, in turn, loves his begetter. And it is not by participation, but by their essence, and not by the gift of some other superior being, but by their own Gift, that *they preserve the unity of peace*."[5,6] See, he says here that they preserve their unity by their essence and by their own Gift.—The same, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "Who would dare to say that, in that Trinity, the Father does not love himself, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, except through the Holy Spirit?"[7] Here he plainly shows that the Father does not love only through the Holy Spirit; and yet he does not simply say that the Father does not love through the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 2 (138)

1. WHETHER THE FATHER IS WISE BY THE WISDOM WHICH HE GENERATED, JUST AS HE LOVES BY THE LOVE WHICH PROCEEDS FROM HIM. Moreover, it is necessary to investigate with diligence whether the Father is wise by the wisdom which he generated, which is the Son alone.—It seems that this can be proven by analogy: for if he loves by the love which proceeds from him, why would he not also be wise and understand by the wisdom or intelligence which he generated? As Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, what the Apostle wrote seems to press this question where he says:

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c5 n8.
[4]Dist. 10 c2 n5.
[5]Eph. 4, 3.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c5 n7.
[7]Ibid., bk 15 c7 n12.

Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God;[1] and so the question is raised, "whether he is the Father of his wisdom and power in such a way, that he is wise by this wisdom which he generated, and powerful by this power which he generated."[2]

2. HERE HE DETERMINES [THE QUESTION], BY SAYING THAT THE FATHER IS NOT WISE BY THE WISDOM WHICH HE GENERATED. "But far be it that it should be so: because if there [i.e. in God] to be is indeed the same as to be wise, the Father is not wise through the wisdom which he generated; otherwise wisdom would not be from him, but he would be from it. For if the wisdom which he generated is the cause of his being wise, then it is also the cause of his being, which cannot happen, except through its generating or making him. But no one has ever said that wisdom is in any way the begetter or maker of the Father; indeed, what could be more senseless? And so the Father is the very wisdom by which he is wise. But the Son is called the wisdom of the Father and the power of the Father: not because the Father is wise or powerful through him, but because the Son, who is wisdom and power, is from the Father, who is wisdom and power."[3] From these words, it is clear that the Father is not wise by the begotten wisdom, but by his own self, by the unbegotten wisdom.

3. Augustine, in the book of *84 Questions*: "When God is called wise, and he is called wise by a wisdom which it is sacrilegious to believe he might ever have been or could be without, he is not called wise by participation in wisdom, just like a soul which can both be and not be wise, but because he begot that wisdom by which he is called wise."[4]—Pay careful attention, o reader: he calls the Father wise by the begotten wisdom; which stands in opposition to other testimonies. But Augustine corrects this in the book of *Retractations*, saying: "I said concerning the Father, in the book of *84 Questions*, that he begot the wisdom by which he is said to be wise; but I treated this question better in a later book *On the Trinity*."[5]

4. WHETHER THE SON IS WISE BY A BEGOTTEN OR AN UNBEGOTTEN WISDOM. After these matters, it is usual for some to ask whether the Son is wise by a begotten or an unbegotten wisdom. For if he is not wise by a begotten wisdom, then he is not wise by his own self; but if he is wise by a begotten wisdom, then he does not seem to be wise by an unbegotten wisdom, and so he does not seem to be wise from the Father, although he has all things from the Father.[6]—RESPONSE. To which we say that the wis-

[1] 1 Cor. 1, 24.
[2] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c1 n1.
[3] Ibid., bk 7 c1 n2 and c3 n4.
[4] Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 23.
[5] Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c26.
[6] Cf. Jn. 16, 15.

dom of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one, as their essence is one, because in the simplicity of that nature wisdom is essence. And yet the Son alone is begotten wisdom, and the Father is unbegotten wisdom; and begotten wisdom is of unbegotten wisdom, or from unbegotten wisdom. And since there it is the same to be as to be wise, it remains that begotten wisdom is wise from unbegotten wisdom.—And so the Son is not called the wisdom of God as if he alone were intelligent or wise for himself and for the Father and the Holy Spirit because, as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, "if the Son is the only one there who understands both for himself and for the Father and the Holy Spirit, we have returned to the absurdity that the Father is not wise from his own self, but from the Son; then wisdom would not have generated wisdom, but the Father would be said to be wise from the wisdom which he generated. For where there is no intelligence, there can be no wisdom. And so, if the Father himself does not understand for himself, but the Son understands for the Father, surely the Son makes the Father wise. But if for God to be is to be wise and for him essence is the same as wisdom, it is not the Son who has essence from the Father, which is the truth, but rather the Father from the Son, which is most absurd and most false."[7]

5. THE FATHER IS WISE BY THE WISDOM WHICH HE HIMSELF IS; AND THE SON IS BEGOTTEN AND WISE FROM THAT WISDOM: THE FORMER WISDOM IS UBEGOTTEN, THE LATTER BEGOTTEN, AND YET BOTH ONE WISDOM. "And so God the Father is wise by that wisdom of his own which he himself is; and the Son, the Father's wisdom, is wise from the same wisdom which is the Father, from whom the Son is begotten. In the same way, the Father is intelligent by that intelligence of his own which he himself is, since he would not be wise if he were not intelligent. As for the Son, the Father's intelligence, he is begotten from the intelligence which is the Father, from which he also is intelligent."[8]—And so the Father is wisdom, and the Son wisdom, and both one wisdom; but the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom, and the Son alone is begotten wisdom; and yet the Father is not one wisdom and the Son another, but one and the same wisdom. In the same way, the Father is unbegotten God, and the Son is begotten God, and the begotten God is not the unbegotten God: and yet the Father is not one God and the Son another, but both are one God. And yet they are not simply 'one': for the begotten is one, the unbegotten another, but not 'another God,' for indeed both are one thing or one God. In the same way, begotten wisdom is not unbegotten wisdom, but the begotten wisdom is one thing, the unbegotten another; and yet it is not another wisdom, but one and the same wisdom.

[7]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c7 n12.
[8]Ibid.

Chapter 3 (139)

1. WHETHER THE SON IS WISE BY MEANS OF HIMSELF OR THROUGH HIMSELF. From what is said above, it is established that the Son is not wise by himself, nor from himself, but by the Father and from the Father. But it is usual to ask whether the Son is wise by himself or through himself.

2. SOLUTION, ACCORDING TO SOME. Some say that this can be understood in different ways, and so a distinction is to be drawn. When you say that the Son is wise by himself or through himself, if you understand him to be wise by means of his nature and essence, then the understanding is true; but if you understand him to be wise by himself or from himself, then you have exposed your understanding to falsehood.

3. THE DETERMINATION OF SOME OTHERS. But some, simply and without a determination, grant statements like the following: 'The Son is wise through himself, but not by himself or from himself,' and 'The Son is God through himself and he has being through himself, but not by himself or from himself.' They confirm this with the words of Hilary, who, in *On the Trinity*, book 9, says that the Son acts not by himself, but through himself: "O heretic, this is the unity of nature against which you speak: that the Son acts through himself in such a way that he does not act by himself, and that he does not act by himself in such a way that he acts through himself. Understand that the Son acts, and that the Father acts through him. He does not act by himself, since the Father is shown to remain in him;[1] he acts through himself since, in accordance with his birth as Son, he does what is pleasing [to the Father].[2] He would be weak in not acting by himself, if he does not act that way; but it would not be in the unity of nature, if he does not act through himself in the things which he does and in which he is pleasing [to the Father]."[3] And so, they say, the Son acts through himself, but not by himself; in the same way, the Son is to be called wise through himself, but not by himself. Similarly, too, he is said to be, or that he is, God through himself, as they say, but not by himself or from himself.

[1]Cf. Jn. 15, 10.
[2]Cf. Jn. 8, 29.
[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 n48.

Chapter 4 (140)

1. WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE WISDOM OF THE FATHER. After these things, it is usual for some to ask whether there is only one wisdom of the Father.

2. HOW SOME STRIVE TO PROVE THAT THE FATHER'S WISDOM IS NOT ONLY ONE. Some strive to prove that this is not so, in the following way: The Son, they say, is the wisdom begotten of the Father, by which the Father is not wise; and so there is some wisdom of the Father by which he is not wise. But there is also a wisdom of the Father that is unbegotten, and the Father is wise by it; and so there is some wisdom of the Father by which he is wise; and it is not that wisdom of the Father by which the Father is not wise; and so there is not just one wisdom of the Father. Also, unbegotten wisdom is the Father's wisdom, and begotten wisdom is the Father's wisdom; but unbegotten wisdom is not begotten wisdom; and so there is not just one wisdom of the Father.

3. THAT THESE VIEWS, AND OTHERS LIKE THEM, ARE NOT WORTHY OF RESPONSE. We reject such views and others like them as sophistical and far removed from truth and as obvious to all experts in theology, and we declare them unworthy of a response. Yet we add that there is only one wisdom of the Father, but it is not spoken of in only one way. For the wisdom which he generated is called the Father's, and the wisdom by which he is wise is called the Father's. And so the meaning of the term is different. For the former is called the Father's because he generated it, and the latter is called the Father's because he is wise by it. And yet the Father's wisdom is one because the begotten wisdom is the same wisdom as that by which he is wise, whether that by which he is wise is understood to be the Father's person or the Father's essence. The Father's person, which is understood by the expression 'unbegotten wisdom,' and the Son's person, which is understood by the expression 'begotten wisdom,' is one and the same wisdom, which is understood as the divine essence common to the three persons.

Chapter 5 (141)

JUST AS IN THE TRINITY THERE IS THE LOVE WHICH IS THE TRINITY, AND YET THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A LOVE WHICH IS NOT THE TRINITY, BUT THERE ARE NOT FOR THAT REASON TWO LOVES, THE SAME IS THE CASE FOR WISDOM. In the Trinity, there is the love which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, which is the very essence of deity; and yet the Holy Spirit is a love which is not Father or Son, but there are not for that reason two loves in

the Trinity[1]—because the love which the Holy Spirit is properly speaking is the love which is the Trinity, and yet [that love] is not the Trinity. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is the essence which is the Trinity, and yet he is not the Trinity.—In the same way, there is a wisdom in the Trinity which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, which is the divine essence; and yet the Son is a wisdom which is not the Father or the Holy Spirit, but there are not for that reason two wisdoms there, because the wisdom which the Son is properly is the wisdom which is the Trinity, and yet [that wisdom] is not the Trinity, just as the Son is the essence which is the Trinity, and yet he himself is not the Trinity.

Chapter 6 (142)

1. BY THE SAME REASON BY WHICH THE FATHER IS NOT CALLED WISE BY THE WISDOM WHICH HE GENERATED, IT SEEMS THAT IT SHOULD ALSO BE SAID THAT THE FATHER OR THE SON DOES NOT LOVE BY THE LOVE WHICH PROCEEDS FROM BOTH. Moreover, it is to be noted with diligence that, by the same reason by which the Father is not called wise by the wisdom which he generated, it seems that it should not be said that the Father loves the Son, or the Son the Father, by that love which proceeds from both, namely that which the Holy Spirit is, properly speaking. For as it is the same for God to be wise and to be, so it is the same for him to love and to be. And so, just as the Father is not said to be wise by the wisdom which he generated (because, if he were said to be wise by it, then he would be understood to be from it, rather than it from him), so also it seems that it must not be granted that the Father or the Son loves by the love which is the Holy Spirit alone (because, if the Father or the Son loves by it, then the Holy Spirit does not seem to be from the Father and the Son, but the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit, because there to love is the same as to be).—AUGUSTINE, IN *ON THE TRINITY*, BOOK 6. But it has been said above,[1] and it has been confirmed by the authority of Augustine, that in the Trinity "there are three things: one loving him who is from himself, and one loving the one from whom he is, and love itself"; and "[the last] is not one of the two by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and in turn loves his begetter."[2] By these words, it is plainly signified that the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father, by that love which is not either of them, but only the Holy Spirit. And since to love is there the same as to be, how can the Father or the Son be said not to be by that love

[1]See above, Dist. 10 c1.

[1]Dist. 10 c2 n5 and here, above, c1 n3.
[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c5 n7.

by which the one loves the other, since the Father is not said to be wise by the wisdom which he generated, lest he be thought to be by it?

2. THAT THIS QUESTION TOO IS INEXPLICABLE BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS THE WEAKNESS OF MAN. I confess that it is difficult for me to resolve this question, especially as it arises from assertions which appear to be equally reasonable; noticing this, the weakness of my understanding is troubled, desiring more to report from the statements of the Saints than to add to them.—HILARY, IN *ON THE TRINITY*, BOOK 1. Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 1, says: "For the best reader is he who seeks out the meaning of statements from what is said rather than imposing it on them, and reports more than he adds, and does not force that to appear to be found in the statements that he assumed would be in them before he ever read them. Therefore, when our discourse turns to the things of God, let us grant that God knows himself, and let us attend to his words with pious veneration."[3] And so let the pious reader diligently investigate the reason for these words, if perhaps he is able to discover some cause for those words which, when known, may help the question posed above to be explained somewhat.

3. HE SAYS SOMETHING NEVERTHELESS. Without resolving the question, but removing an error, I profess that, in saying 'the Father loves the Son, or the Son the Father, by that love which proceeds from both, which is not one of them, but only the Holy Spirit,' this is not said as if the Father or the Son existed by that love. But by that love, the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father, in such a way that the Father through himself also loves by that love which he himself is, and so does the Son; but not in such a way that the Father, and the Son, does not love through himself, but only through it. Augustine says: "Who would presume to think or assert such things in that Trinity?"[4] But we leave that question to be more fully weighed and resolved by the readers' diligence because we are not equal to the task.

DISTINCTION XXXIII

Chapter 1 (143)

1. WHETHER THE PROPERTIES OF THE PERSONS ARE THE PERSONS THEMSELVES AND GOD, THAT IS, THE DIVINE ESSENCE. After what has been said

[3]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 n18.
[4]See above, c1 n3.

above, it is necessary to consider more deeply and inquire with subtle care whether the properties of the persons, by which the persons themselves are differentiated, are the persons themselves and are God, that is, the divine essence, or whether they are in the persons in such a way that they are not the persons, and so neither are they the divine essence. No one dares to deny that the properties are in the persons, since authority plainly proclaims that "property is in the persons, and unity in the essence."[1] Moreover, with many testimonies of the Saints, we have shown above[2] that the persons are distinguished and determined by properties, and we have described the properties themselves, namely three of them, in their proper terms.

2. THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE THE PERSONS. And so, since the properties themselves by which the persons themselves are determined and differ were from eternity, how could they be if they were not in the persons? and how could they be in them, and not be the persons themselves, without there being multiplicity there?—HE BRIEFLY TOUCHES UPON WHAT WAS SAID EARLIER IN ORDER TO ADD SOMETHING ELSE. Therefore, just as we confess that the properties are in the persons, so also we confess that they are the persons, as we stated above,[3] and as we are not reluctant to call to mind, by the authority of Jerome,[4] who says as follows in the *Exposition of the Faith*: "In rejection of the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three distinct persons by property. For we do not only confess the names, but also the properties of the names, that is, the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is, subsistences." See, he plainly says that the persons are distinguished by their properties and that these very properties are the persons. We have shortened Jerome's text here because we quoted it more fully above.

3. THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE THE DIVINE ESSENCE. In discussing the simplicity of the deity, above,[5] with the authorities of the Saints, namely Augustine, Hilary, Isidore, and Boethius, we have shown clearly that that which God has in himself is wholly God, except that the Father has the Son and is not the Son, and the Son has the Father and is not the Father; and thus that it is in the nature of the three that he who has is that which he has, and all that is in God is one thing and one life. We do not now repeat these things, lest we bore our reader.

4. FROM THE ABOVE, HE CONCLUDES THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE THE PERSONS AND ONE ESSENCE. And so, if there are properties there, each of

[1]Preface of the Most Holy Trinity, *Gelasian Sacramentary*.
[2]In Dist. 26 and 27.
[3]Dist. 25 c3 n6.
[4]Rather, Pelagius, *Libellus fidei*, n3.
[5]Dist. 8 c8.

them is that in whom he is, and all and severally they are one thing and the same life. And so let us profess both that the properties are in the three persons and that they are the persons themselves and the divine essence.

5. BY AUTHORITY, HE SHOWS THAT NATURE IS A PROPERTY. For Hilary shows that the divine nature is also a property, saying in *On the Trinity*, book 7, that the birth of the Son is the nature from which it comes: "The nature of both does not differ: Father and Son are one thing. And so that which is born has this of the mystery, that it embraces in itself the name, and the nature, and the power, because what is born cannot not be that nature from which the Son is born."[6]—The same [Hilary], in book 6: "Birth is a property and it is truth."[7]—The same, in book 7, says that "the birth of nature is to be understood to be in the nature of God."[8]—Above, he also says that "it is proper to the Father that he is always the Father, and proper to the Son that he is always the Son,"[9] meaning that the property of the Father is the Father, and the property of the Son is the Son. By these and several other authorities, it seems to be plainly signified that the property of the Son is the Son, and so also God; the same also for the property of the Father and the property of the Holy Spirit.

6. SOME DENY THIS, NAMELY THAT THE PERSONS AND THE DIVINE NATURE ARE PROPERTIES, AND WHY. But some deny this, admitting that the properties are in the persons, but not that they are the persons themselves. They say that the properties are in the persons or in the divine essence in such a way that they are not internally there as those things are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness, justice, but that the properties are added from the outside. And they seek to prove this to be so with reasons.

7. THEIR FIRST OBJECTION, BY WHICH THEY WISH TO PROVE THAT THE PERSONS ARE NOT PROPERTIES. For if the persons are the properties, they say, then the persons are not differentiated by them.—Against which we say that the persons also differ among themselves, as Jerome says above, speaking of Father and Son and Holy Spirit: "They are one thing in substance, but they are distinguished by persons and names."[10]

8. SECOND [OBJECTION]. But they also add: If the properties themselves are the divine essence, since the three persons do not differ in essence, then they do not differ in properties. For how does the Father differ from the Son in that which he is by divine essence, since they are one in es-

[6]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 7 n21 .
[7]Ibid., bk 6 n40.
[8]Ibid., bk 7 n22.
[9]Dist. 26 c3 n2; from Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 12 n23.
[10]Rather, Pelagius, *Libellus fidei*, n3.

sence?—A RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE, WITH THE SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY. To the new-fangled preachings and human fabrications of such people, I answer with the words of Hilary: "What is being examined is boundless and incomprehensible; it goes beyond what words can bear and what sense can contain; it is ineffable, unreachable, uncontainable. The nature of the thing itself empties words of their meaning; the impenetrable light blinds the mind's contemplation; what is contained by no boundary exceeds the capacity of the intellect. My mind is weak, my intelligence is confused; in my words, though, I will confess not weakness, but silence. It is very dangerous to say more than Heaven permits concerning such great and recondite matters: that we speak of God more than he himself has indicated. The form of the faith is certain: and so we may not add anything, but a limit is to be set to boldness; whatever is sought beyond this is not understood."[11]

9. HOW THE SHAMELESS HERETICS PERSIST, ADDING OTHER THINGS.—THIRD OBJECTION. But the malice of the heretics, "excited by the prompting of diabolical deceitfulness,"[12] does not stop there, but "in a question of such great import"[13] adds: If fatherhood and sonship are in God or in the divine essence, then the same thing is father and son to itself. For insofar as it is fatherhood, it is Father; and insofar as sonship, it is Son. And so, if one and the same thing has fatherhood and sonship in itself, it both generates and is generated.—By saying this, they are drawn into the Sabellian heresy, "extending the Father into the Son, since they propose that he is both Father and Son to himself."[14] But if they deny that in the one essence of God there is fatherhood and sonship, how then do they say that God exists? They make use of these and other shards of arguments to assert their opinion, so that they may slice up the form of truth.

10. RESPONSE AGAINST THIS OBJECTION OF THEIRS, IN WHICH IT IS SAID THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT SAID TO BE IN THE INNERMOST DEPTHS OF GOD'S ESSENCE IN THE SAME WAY AS THEY ARE SAID TO BE IN THE HYPOSTASES. Resisting their boldness and making provision for their ignorance, we will dare to say something on this matter. Fatherhood and sonship are not said to be deep within the divine substance as they are in the hypostases themselves, in which they exist in such a way as to differentiate them, as John of Damascus says: "Characteristic traits (that is, determining properties) pertain to the hypostasis, not to nature: indeed, they determine the hypostasis,"[15] and not the nature. And so, although fatherhood and

[11]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 n5.
[12]Ibid.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Ibid., bk 2 n4.
[15]John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, bk 3 c6.

sonship are the divine essence, since they do not determine it, it cannot be said that the divine essence both generates and is generated, or that the same thing is father and son to itself. For a property determines the person in such a way that by this property a hypostasis is the begetter, and by that property another hypostasis is the begotten; and so it is not the same one who generates and is generated, but one generates another.

Chapter 2 (144)

1. IT IS ASKED HOW THE PROPERTIES CAN BE IN THE [DIVINE] NATURE WITHOUT DETERMINING IT. But perhaps you might ask, as these properties cannot be in persons without determining them, how they can be in the divine essence without determining it.—Here too, I answer you with Hilary: "I do not know, and I do not ask; and yet I will be consoled. The archangels do not know, the angels have not heard, the ages do not contain it, the Prophet did not perceive it, the Apostle did not inquire into it, the Son himself did not reveal it. And so let sorrowful complaints cease. Let no man believe that he can understand by his own intelligence the mystery of generation. And yet it is to be simply understood that he is Father and Son" and Holy Spirit. "Verbal understanding rests within this bound: the Son is from the Father, the only-begotten from the unbegotten, the offspring from the parent, living one from living one; the divine nature is not one thing in the one and another in the other, because they are one thing." Believing this, "begin, advance, persist; and although I know that you will not reach the goal, yet I will rejoice in your progress. For one who pursues infinite things with piety, even though he never attains his end, yet makes progress by the attempt. But do not enter into that secret, nor throw yourself into the mystery of that inconceivable birth, presuming to reach a full understanding of these things; but understand that they are incomprehensible."[1] By these and many other testimonies, we are clearly shown that it is not at all lawful for us to search into the majesty,[2] to impose bounds on power, to circumscribe the infinite within limits.

2. BY WHAT AUTHORITIES THE OPPONENTS DEFEND THEIR OPINION, NAMELY THAT THE PROPERTY OF THE FATHER OR THE SON IS NOT GOD. And yet, spurred on by a spirit of impatience, they still do not desist, but strive to defend their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints. By these, they wish to show that the property by which the Father is the Father, and the property by which the Son is the Son, is not God. To this end, they adduce the words of Augustine, commenting on that phrase of

[1]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 2 nn9-11.
[2]Cf. Prov. 25, 27.

the Psalm: *And there is no substance*,[3] and saying as follows: "God is some substance. Hence also in the Catholic faith we are made so firm as to say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are of one substance. What is 'of one substance'? Whatever the Father is because he is God, that the Son is, and that the Holy Spirit. As to his being the Father, he is not that in virtue of that by which he is. For he is not called Father in respect to himself, but in respect to the Son; but in respect to himself, he is called God. And so by that by which he is, or that he is, God, he is substance. And because the Son is of the same substance, undoubtedly the Son is also God. But because Father it is not [the name] of a substance, but is referred to the Son, we do not say that the Son is the Father in the same way as we say that the Son is God."[4]

3. HOW THEY TWIST THE WORDS OF AUGUSTINE TO THEIR OWN DEPRAVED SENSE. By these words, they say it is meant that the property of the Father or the property of the Son is not God or the divine essence. For when he says: 'By that by which he is God, he is substance, but that he is Father is not of substance,' they say that he plainly shows that that by which he is God is substance, but that by which he is Father is not substance.—Also, when he says: 'Father is not that which he is,' he shows that he is not Father by that which is substance. For he did not simply say: 'Father is not that which is,' but he says: 'Insofar as he is Father, he is not that which is,' meaning: that by which he is Father is not that by which he is, that is, essence. Expounding these words in this way, they make their fictions seem true to the simple and the unwary.

4. THAT THOSE WORDS ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD OTHERWISE THAN THEY SAY. But we say that these words are to be understood otherwise. For by saying: 'By that by which he is God, he is substance, but that he is Father is not of substance,' he wished it to be understood that he is God by essence and he is substance by divinity. For he is substance by that by which he is God; and conversely: his deity is the same as his substance, and his substance as his deity. But 'that he is Father is not of substance,' that is, it is not by that by which he is Father that he is substance, because he is Father by the property of generation, and it is not by this that he is substance; and yet Augustine did not deny that this property is substance. In this sense is to be understood also his other statement: 'Insofar as he is Father, he is not that which is,' that is, he is not Father by that which, or by which, he is, that is, by essence or notion.

5. THEY ALSO USE SOME OTHER WORDS OF AUGUSTINE TO FIRM UP WHAT THEY SAY, NAMELY THAT THE PROPERTIES OF THE PERSONS ARE NOT

[3]Ps. 68, 3.
[4]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 68, 3, sermon 1, n5.

THE SUBSTANCE OF GOD. They also insist vehemently on those words of Augustine cited above, namely: "The Word, insofar as he is wisdom and essence, is the same as the Father; insofar as he is the Word, he is not the same as the Father."[5] They say: if the Word is not the same as the Father insofar as he is the Word, then that by which he is the Word is not that which the Father is; and so the property by which he is the Word is not that which the Father is; and so it is not the divine essence.—RESPONSE. To which we say that, although he is not that which the Father is insofar as he is the Word, yet that property by which he is the Word is that which the Father is, that is, the divine essence, but it is not the Father's hypostasis.

DISTINCTION XXXIV

Chapter 1 (145)

1. THE OPINION OF SOME WHO SAY THAT PERSON AND ESSENCE OR NATURE ARE NOT THE SAME, AND THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE FATHER, OF THE SON, AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT CANNOT BE THE SAME. To what has been said above must be added that some men of perverse sense have fallen into such insanity as to say that God's nature and person or hypostasis are not the same, saying that Father and Son cannot be the same essence without confusion of persons. For if, they say, the same essence which is the Father is also the Son, then the same is father and son to himself. If you say that this thing is the Father, then seek another which you call the Son. But if you have not sought another, and have said it is the same, then the same one generated and was generated. From these arguments and others like them, they distinguish between nature and person so that they do not accept the one and simple nature of the deity as being three persons.

2. HE CITES AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT WHICH SEEMS TO SUPPORT THEIR VIEW. And they strive to defend their view by the testimony of Hilary, who, in *On the Trinity*, book 7, asks whether the Apostle, naming *the spirit of God* and *the spirit of Christ*, meant the same thing by both expressions. Hilary says as follows: "The preacher to the nations, wishing to show the unity of nature in Father and Son, says: *The Spirit of God is in you: but if one does not have the spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Christ. But if the spirit of him who raised Christ*, etc.[1] We are all spiritual, if the spirit of God is in us. But this spirit of God is also the spirit of

[5]Dist. 27 c3 n4.

[1]Rom. 8, 9-11.

Christ. And when the spirit of Christ is in us, the spirit of him who raised Christ is in us. And when the spirit of him who raised Christ is in us, the spirit of Christ is also in us; and yet the spirit which is in us cannot but be God's. And so distinguish, o heretic, the spirit of Christ from the spirit of God, and the spirit of Christ, raised from the dead, from the spirit of God who raises Christ from the dead: since the spirit of Christ which lives in us is the spirit of God; and the spirit of Christ raised from the dead is the spirit of God who alone raises Christ from the dead. And now I ask whether you hold that 'spirit of God' signifies nature or a thing of nature. For nature is not the same as a thing of nature, just as a man is not the same as that which is of a man, and as fire is not the same as that which is of fire. In the same way, God is not the same as that which is of God."[2]

3. HERE HE SHOWS WHAT SENSE THEY DRAW FROM THOSE WORDS. By reason of this statement, the aforesaid heretics taught that the nature and the person of God are not the same, asserting that the nature of God is not three persons. They understand 'thing of nature,' in Hilary's words above, as person, and the term 'nature' as the divine nature. And so they say that Hilary asked the heretic whether he thought that 'nature' or 'a thing of nature' was signified by 'spirit of God' so as to show that a distinction is to be drawn between nature and a thing of nature, that is, the person.

4. THAT THE PASSAGE OF SCRIPTURE ITSELF STANDS IN THEIR WAY, AND HOW THE ABOVE ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A THING OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE FATHER AND THE SON, AND IS THAT VERY NATURE. They say this because they do not understand the passage of Scripture with pious diligence; if we consider it, we can see in what sense Hilary spoke the above. For he subsequently shows, in a nearby text,[3] that, sometimes the Father is signified by 'spirit of God,' as when it is said: *The Spirit of the Lord is over me*;[4] sometimes the Son is signified, as when he says: *In the spirit of God, I cast out demons*,[5] demonstrating that he casts out demons by the power of his nature; sometimes the Holy Spirit [is signified], as in the text: *I will pour out my spirit over all flesh*,[6] which he says had been fulfilled when the Apostles, at the sending of the Spirit, spoke in all the languages.[7]

5. HE CITES SOME WORDS OF HILARY BY WHICH THE MEANING OF THE ABOVE IS CLARIFIED. Next, he plainly shows why he had made this distinction, and that the same *spirit* was meant in the above words of the Apostle,

[2]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 nn21-22.
[3]Ibid., bk 8 n25.
[4]Is. 61, 1.
[5]Mt. 12, 28.
[6]Acts 2, 17; Joel 2, 28.
[7]Cf. Acts 2, 3-21.

and that he is a thing of the same nature as the Father and the Son. He says as follows: "And these things have been demonstrated so that, in whatever direction heretical falsehood turned, it was hemmed in by the bounds of truth. For Christ lives in us, and if he does, so does God; and when *the spirit of Christ* lives in us, no other spirit lives in us than *the spirit of God.*[8] For if it is understood that Christ is in us through the Holy Spirit, it must be acknowledged that, as the latter is *the spirit of God*, so is he also *the spirit of Christ.* And since through God's nature that very nature lives in us, we believe that the nature of the Son is not different from that of the Father, since the Holy Spirit, who is *spirit of Christ* and *spirit of God*, is demonstrated to be a thing of one [and the same] nature. And so now I ask how they are not one thing from nature. The Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father, is sent by the Son,[9] and receives from the Son. But all things that the Father has are the Son's;[10] and so he who receives from him is *the spirit of God* and the same is *the spirit of Christ.* He is a thing of the nature of the Son, but the same thing is also of the nature of the Father. He is both the spirit of God who raises Christ from the dead, but he is also the spirit of Christ raised from the dead. If it is possible to show that the spirit which belongs to God is not also the spirit which belongs to Christ, then the nature of Christ differs in some way from the nature of God so as not to be the same."[11] "And so *the spirit of God* is in us, and *the spirit of Christ* is in us; and when the spirit of Christ indwells, the spirit of God indwells. And as what is God's is Christ's, and what is Christ's is God's, Christ cannot be anything different from what God is. And so Christ is God, one spirit with God, according to the text: *I and the Father are one.*[12] In which Truth teaches that there is a unity of nature, and not the solitude of union."[13] See, if you consider these words diligently, you find that the Holy Spirit is called a thing of the nature of the Father and Son, and he is also called the nature of God, where it is said: "Through God's nature, that very nature lives in us," if Christ is in us through the Holy Spirit.

6. HE DISCUSSES THE WORDS ABOVE, AND TEACHES THAT WE MUST NOT DRAW THE [SAME] DISTINCTIONS IN THE TRINITY THAT WE DO IN CREATURES. And so we must not draw the [same] distinction between nature and a thing of nature in the Trinity as we do in created things. As Hilary says: "There is no comparison between earthly realities and God; and if some examples of such comparisons are occasionally brought forth, let no

[8]Cf. Rom. 8, 9-11.
[9]Cf. Jn. 15, 26.
[10]Cf. Jn. 16, 14-15.
[11]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 n26.
[12]Jn. 10, 30.
[13]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 nn27-28.

one think that they bear in themselves a perfect rendering of the idea":[14] "for we must not speak of God in a human sense."[15]

7. THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF CREATED THINGS THAT HE SAID: FOR NATURE IS NOT THE SAME, ETC. And so it is with regard to the nature of created things that he says: "For nature is not the same as a thing of nature,"[16] adducing examples concerning such creatures. He then shows that it is erroneous to measure the Creator by the measure of creatures, adding: "And according to this, God is not the same as that which is of God";[17] as if he were saying: If you consider the Creator in terms suitable for creatures, you are compelled to profess that God is not the same as that which is of God. But to say this is impious because the Spirit of God is God and the Son of God is God.

8. THAT GOD IS NOT DIFFERENT THAN THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE HIS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY ARE IN HIM: FOR THERE ARE SOME THINGS OF HIS WHICH ARE IN HIM, AND OTHERS WHICH ARE NOT. As he adds in that same series of texts, these things which are said of God are not to be taken in corporal ways. He thereby renders void the opinion of those who hold that God is one thing and that which is of God another, and that the nature of God is one thing and a thing of nature another, as is the case with creatures. He plainly teaches that God is not one thing and those things which are his so as to be in him another, saying as follows: "A man, or something similar, when he is in one place, will not be in another place, because what is in one place is contained in that place where its bodily form is, so that he who is somewhere cannot be everywhere. But God is a living force of infinite power that is present everywhere and absent nowhere; he manifests all of himself through his distinctive qualities and reveals that his distinctive qualities are none other than himself: so that where these qualities are present, he may be understood to be through them. But let it not be believed that God, like material things, ceases to be everywhere when he is in one place; since through his qualities, he does not cease to be present everywhere, for the qualities which are his are nothing else than what he himself is. And these things have been said so that we might understand the meaning of nature."[18]—By these words he plainly signifies, if only you will understand, o heretic, that the divine nature is not different than things which are his so as to be in him, and through them he is in all things of his which are not in him.—AUGUSTINE. For indeed, there are also things of his which are not in him, that is, all creatures; and there

[14]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 n19.
[15]Ibid., bk 8 n14.
[16]See above, n2.
[17]See above, n2.
[18]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 n24.

are things of his which are in him, such as the three persons, which are of the same nature and are the same nature, as we confirmed above by the witness of Augustine saying: "three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence, but not from the same essence, lest essence be understood to be one thing, person another."[19]

9. THAT THERE IS SOME DISTINCTION IN THE MODE OF UNDERSTANDING WHEN WE SAY HYPOSTASIS AND WHEN WE SAY ESSENCE. Yet we do not deny that a distinction is to be drawn according to the mode of understanding when we say hypostasis and when we say essence, because what is common to the three is signified in the latter, but not in the former. And yet hypostasis is essence, and vice versa. And so let us profess that the three persons are one and the same according to essence, but differing in properties.—Hence Augustine, on the aforementioned passage of the Psalm, says: "You ask what the Father is; the answer: God. You ask what the Son is; the answer: God. You ask what the Father and the Son is; the answer: God. If asked about each of the persons, answer 'God.' If asked about both, do not answer 'gods,' but 'God.' It is not so with men. For such is the unity of substance there, that it allows equality without admitting plurality. And so, if it is said to you: 'when you say that the Son is what the Father is, then the Son is in fact the Father,' answer: I told you that the Son is what the Father is according to substance, not according to that which is said in reference to something else. For in reference to himself, he is called God; in reference to the Father he is called Son; and conversely, the Father is called God in reference to himself; in reference to the Son, he is called Father. What is called Father in reference to the Son is not the Son; what is called Son in reference to the Father is not the Father; what is called Father in reference to himself, Son in reference to himself, this is Father and Son, that is, God."[20]

Chapter 2 (146)

WHETHER WE MAY SAY ONE GOD OF THREE PERSONS, OR THREE PERSONS OF ONE GOD, IN THE SAME WAY AS WE SAY ONE ESSENCE OF THREE PERSONS AND THREE PERSONS OF ONE ESSENCE. Here is to be considered, since God is the divine essence, and the one God is said to be three persons in the same way as the one essence is said to be the three persons, whether we may say 'one God of three persons,' or 'three persons of one God,' just as rightly as we say 'one essence of three persons' and 'three persons of one essence.'—In these expressions, we are to emulate the

[19]See above, Dist. 25 c1 n5.
[20]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 68, 3, sermon 1, n5.

usage of Scripture, where we frequently find expressions such as these:[21] 'the essence of the three is one' and 'there are three persons of one essence.' But we have never read 'one God of three persons,' or 'three persons of one God.' And I believe that the holy doctors have avoided this, lest it should be taken in reference to divine persons as it is taken when something like this is said of creatures. For we find it said: *The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*[22] and *God of every creature*,[23] which is said entirely because of the principle of creation, or the privilege of grace, and the subjection or servitude of the creature. Therefore, since there is nothing created, or subservient, or in subjection in the Trinity, faith has not admitted such a manner of speech regarding the Trinity. And so too, conversely, it is not said of God's essence that it is the essence of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or of any creature, lest we seem to confuse the nature of Creator and creature.

Chapter 3 (147)

THAT ALTHOUGH POWER, WISDOM, GOODNESS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE, YET IN SCRIPTURE THESE NAMES ARE SOMETIMES REFERRED TO THE PERSONS DISTINCTLY. From the above,[1] it is established that, like essence, so also power, wisdom, goodness are said of God according to substance. Moreover those things which are said of God according to substance are equally suitable for all three persons. For the power, wisdom, goodness of Father and Son and Holy Spirit is one; and these three are the same power, the same wisdom, the same goodness. From this, it becomes clear that in the Trinity is the highest perfection. For if power, or wisdom, or goodness were to be lacking there, it would not be the highest good; but because there is perfect power, infinite wisdom, unbounded goodness there, rightly do we assert and believe it to be the highest good. And although in God power, wisdom, goodness is entirely one and the same thing, yet in sacred Scripture these names are frequently referred to the persons distinctly, so that power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit. It is not unprofitable to ask why this is done.

[21]By Scripture, Lombard here means the writings of the holy Fathers; see, e.g., Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 1 c2 n4; c4 n7; Bk 7 c6 n11.
[22]Exod. 3, 6.
[23]Judith 9, 17.

[1]Dist. 22 c5.

Chapter 4 (148)

1. WHY THIS IS DONE, NAMELY THAT POWER IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE FATHER, WISDOM TO THE SON. Therefore the prudence of sacred speech took care to do this lest we measure the immensity of God by a likeness to the creature. For holy Scripture said that the Father is God, and the Son too is God. Man heard this, who had seen a human father, but had not seen God the Father; and he began to think that the same was true in the Creator as he had seen in creatures, from whom these names are applied in a metaphorical sense to the Creator. In creatures, the father is earlier than the son, and the son is later than the father; and it is usual to note a failing [of power] in the father as a result of age, and an imperfect understanding in the son as a result of youth. And so Scripture attempts to remedy this by saying that the Father is powerful, lest he be thought to be older than the Son, and so less powerful; and that the Son is wise, lest he be thought to be younger than the Father, and so less wise.

2. WHY GOODNESS [IS ATTRIBUTED] TO THE HOLY SPIRIT. God is also called Spirit, and God is said to have a spirit;[1] and this seemed almost a term of proud haughtiness, and human conscience, on account of a perceived strictness and cruelty, feared to approach God. And so Scripture tempered its speech, calling the Spirit good,[2] lest he who was gentle should be thought to be cruel. It is not that the Father is alone powerful or more powerful, and the Son alone wise or wiser, and the Holy Spirit alone good or of greater goodness. For the power, wisdom, benignity of the three is one, just as their essence is one; and so, just as the Son is called 'homousios,' that is, consubstantial with the Father, so too he is called coomnipotent.

Chapter 5 (149)

1. ON THIS TERM, HOMOUSION, WHERE [ITS USAGE] IS CONFIRMED AND WHAT IT MEANS. And here we must not pass over what Augustine, in *Against Maximinus*, book 2, says about this term 'homousion,' which Latin writers frequently use: "Father and Son are of one and the same substance. This is that 'homousion' which was confirmed at the Council of Nicaea against the Arian heretics, by the Catholic Fathers, with the authority of truth. Afterwards, at the Council of Rimini, heretical impiety, under the heretical Emperor Constantius, attempted to overturn it. Because the word was new, it was not understood as well as it ought to have been; even

[1]Cf. Jn. 4, 24; Gen. 1, 2; Job 33, 4; Wis. 1, 7; Is. 11, 2; I Cor. 2, 11, etc.
[2]Cf. Wis. 1, 6; Ps. 142, 10.

though it was the ancient faith which had produced it, a great number [of Fathers] were deceived by the wiles of a smaller number. But a little later, when the liberty of the Catholic faith was restored, after the meaning of the word had been properly understood, the term 'homousion' was defended and spread far and wide by the soundness of the Catholic faith. For what is 'homousion,' except 'of one and the same substance'? What is, I say, 'homousion,' except *I and the Father are one*?[1] Therefore the term is not to be avoided [as if it were] among *the new profane forms of speech*."[2,3]

2. CONCERNING THE NAMES WHICH ARE SAID OF GOD IN A METAPHORICAL SENSE AND BY ANALOGY. Moreover, it is to be understood that, in setting out the distinction of names, among the other things which have been diligently discussed above,[4] we said that some names are said of God in a metaphorical sense and by analogy, such as mirror, splendor, letter of the alphabet, figure, and suchlike.[5] Concerning these, I briefly present to the pious reader what I think, so that, after considering the reason for the analogy, he take its meaning from the causes for using the terms,[6] but in a Catholic sense.

3. HE SAYS THAT HE HAS TAUGHT NOTHING WORTHY OF THE EXCELLENCE OF THE INEFFABLE TRINITY, AND HE IS ABOUT TO MOVE ON TO OTHER THINGS. We have already said many things concerning the mystery of the most high and ineffable Unity and Trinity; yet we profess that we have taught nothing worthy of its ineffability, but have simply professed that knowledge of it is too wonderful for us, and we are unable to grasp it.[7]

DISTINCTION XXXV

Chapters 1-6 (150-155)

1. CONCERNING SOME THINGS WHICH ARE SAID OF GOD ACCORDING TO SUBSTANCE, WHICH REQUIRE SPECIAL TREATMENT, NAMELY CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE AND FOREKNOWLEDGE, PROVIDENCE AND DISPOSITION, PREDESTINATION, WILL, AND POWER. Although we have discussed above[1] and said many things concerning those things which are predicated jointly of

[1]Jn. 10, 30.
[2]1 Tim. 6, 20.
[3]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c14 n3.
[4]In Dist. 22-34.
[5]Dist. 22 c1 n2.
[6]According to Hilary; see above, Dist. 25 c2 n1.
[7]Cf. Ps. 138, 6.

[1]Dist. 8-9, 19-20, 22-34.

God according to substance, yet some of them require special treatment. Now we must treat these, namely, knowledge, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, predestination, will, and power.

2. THAT ALTHOUGH GOD'S WISDOM IS ONE, YET IT IS GIVEN SEVERAL NAMES BECAUSE OF THE VARYING STATES OF THINGS. And so it is to be known that God's wisdom or knowledge, although it is one and simple, yet it is given several different names because of the varying states of things and their different effects. For it is called not only knowledge, but also foreknowledge or foresight, disposition, predestination and providence.—And foreknowledge or foresight concerns only future things, but all of them, namely good and evil ones; disposition concerns things that are to be done; predestination concerns all who are to be saved, as well as the good things by which these are freed in this life and will be crowned in the future.—For God, from all eternity, predestined men to good things by electing [them], and he predestined by preparing good things for them. The Apostle shows that God predestined men, saying: *He predestined those whom he foreknew would become moulded into the image of his Son*;[2] and elsewhere: *He elected us before the foundation of the world to be saints and spotless*.[3] The prophet Isaias shows that God prepared good things for them, saying: *The eye has not seen, o God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who love*, or *who wait for, you*.[4] And so from eternity, he has predestined some to be good and blessed, that is, he elected them to be good and blessed, and he predestined, that is, prepared good things for them.—Providence is concerned with governance, and it seems to be taken entirely in the same way as disposition; and yet sometimes providence is taken for foreknowledge.—Wisdom or knowledge, however, concerns all things: namely good and evil, and present, past, and future, and not only temporal things, but also eternal ones. For God does not know these temporal things so as to lose knowledge of himself, but he alone knows himself perfectly, by comparison with whose knowledge, the knowledge of every creature is imperfect.

Chapter 7 (156)

1. WHETHER KNOWLEDGE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE OR DISPOSITION OR PREDESTINATION COULD HAVE BEEN IN GOD, IF THERE HAD BEEN NO FUTURE THINGS. Here it needs to be considered whether knowledge or foreknowledge or disposition or predestination could have been in God, if there had been no future things. For since "foreknowledge concerns future things,

[2]Rom. 8, 29.
[3]Eph. 1, 4.
[4]Is. 64, 4; also 1 Cor. 2, 9.

and disposition concerns things to be made, and predestination concerns those to be saved," if there were no future things, if God were not going to make anything or to save anyone, it does not seem that there could have been foreknowledge or disposition or predestination in God. For God was able not to foreknow the future; he was able not to create anything, or not to save anyone; and so it was possible for foreknowledge or disposition or predestination not to be in God.

2. OBJECTION AGAINST. Some make the following objection to this: If it was possible for God's foreknowledge not to be in God from eternity, then it was also possible for it not to be [at all]; but if it was possible for it not to be, since God's foreknowledge is his knowledge, and his knowledge is his essence, then it was possible for that which is divine essence not to be from eternity. They make the same objection concerning both disposition and predestination, which is the divine essence.

3. ANOTHER OBJECTION. They also add some other objections, saying as follows: If God was able not to foreknow certain things, since for God to foreknow is the same as to know, and to know the same as to be, then God was able not to be. Also, since it is the same thing for God to foreknow and to be God, if he was able not to foreknow, then he was able not to be God. But he was able not to foreknow, if he was able not to foreknow anything; but he was able not to foreknow anything, because he was able not to make anything.

4. RESPONSE: THAT FOREKNOWLEDGE AND DISPOSITION AND PREDESTINATION ARE SAID RELATIVE TO FUTURE THINGS, OR TO THINGS TO BE MADE. In regard to this, in accordance with our little share of intelligence, we say as follows: foreknowledge and disposition or predestination seem to be said with regard to something. Just as Creator is said relative to the creature, so also foreknowledge or foreknower is said with reference to future things, and disposition to things to be made, and predestination to things to be saved. And yet Creator is said relatively so as not to signify essence; but foreknowledge or foreknower is said in respect to future things, and it designates essence. The same also [is true regarding] disposition and predestination.

5. And so, in saying 'if there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge in God, or God would not be foreknower,' because the cause for speaking there differs, it is necessary to distinguish the reason for speaking. Therefore when you say: 'if there were no future things, there would be no foreknowledge in God, or he would not be foreknower,' if you note the cause for saying this, namely that there would be nothing subject to his knowledge whereby it might be called foreknowledge or he foreknower: since each of these is said in regard to future things, the understanding is true. But if you say it in the sense that the knowledge by which he foreknows future things is not in him, or that God

is not someone defined who is the foreknower of future things, this is a false understanding.

6. Those other expressions are to be determined in a similar way: 'it was possible for God's foreknowledge not to be, or he was able not to be foreknower' and 'God was able not to foreknow anything,' that is, it could be that there would be no future things subject to his knowledge, and so he could not be called 'foreknower' or [be said] 'to foreknow,' or his knowledge [be called] foreknowledge. And yet neither he nor his knowledge would be less thereby, but it would not be possible to say 'foreknower' or 'to foreknow' or 'foreknowledge,' if there were no future things that would be subject to his knowledge. The case is similar with disposition and predestination or providence; for these, as it has been said,[1] are referred to temporal things and concern only temporal things.

Chapter 8 (157)

THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ONLY OF TEMPORAL THINGS, BUT ALSO OF ETERNAL ONES. But knowledge or wisdom is not only of temporal things, but also of eternal ones; and so, even if there were no future things, yet there would be in God the same knowledge as there is now, nor would it be less than now, nor is it greater than it would be. Therefore from eternity, God knew eternity and all that was going to be, and he knew it immutably. He also knows past or future things no less well than present ones. And by his eternal and immutable wisdom, he knows all things that are known. As Ambrose says: "For all measure of supernal and earthly knowledge is in him, because his boundless knowledge contains all wisdom and knowledge."[1]

Chapter 9 (158)

1. WHY ALL THINGS ARE SAID TO BE IN GOD, AND THAT WHAT IS MADE IS LIFE IN HIM. For that reason, all things are said to be in God, and to have been in him from eternity. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis*, says: "These visible things did not have being before they were made. How, then, were they known to God, since they were not? And again: how would he have made things which were not known to him? For he did not make anything which he did not know. And so he made things which he knew, and he knew things which were not yet made. Therefore before these things were made, they were and were not: they were in God's knowledge, they were

[1]Here above, cc1-6.

[1]I.e, Ambrosiaster, on Col. 2, 3.

not in their own nature. But I do not dare to say that they became known to God himself when he made them in any other way than that by which he knew them in order to make them, *with whom there is no transmutation and no shadow of change*."[1,2] See, you have here that these visible things were in God's knowledge before they were made. And so it is in this sense that all things are said to be in God, and all *that is made* is said to be *life in him*:[3] not in the sense that the Creator is the creature, or that these temporal things are in God essentially, but because they are always in his knowledge, which is life.

2. THAT FOR THE SAME REASON ALL THINGS ARE SAID TO BE PRESENT TO HIM. It is for this reason also that all things are said to be present to him, not only those which are, but also those which have been and those which will be, in accordance with that text: *Who calls those things which are not, as well as those which are*.[4] For as Ambrose says, in the book *On the Trinity*, he knows the things which are not in the same way as those which are.[5] And it is for this reason that all things are said to be in him or before him, or to be present to him. Hence Augustine, on that place of the Psalm: *And the beauty of the field is with me*,[6] says: "He says, *with me*, because before God nothing is past and nothing is future. All future things are with him, and those which have already passed are not taken away from him. All things are with him by a certain ineffable cognition of God's wisdom."[7] See, here Augustine reveals in what sense are to be understood phrases such as: 'all things are present to God,' 'all things are in God,' or 'with God,' or 'before God,' or 'life in him,' because the ineffable cognition of all things is in him.

DISTINCTION XXXVI

Chapter 1 (159)

1. WHETHER IT IS TO BE GRANTED THAT ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD'S ESSENCE OR IN GOD THROUGH ESSENCE, AS ALL THINGS ARE SAID TO BE IN GOD'S COGNITION OR PRESENCE. It is usual to ask here, since all things are said to be in God's cognition or presence, or in God through cognition,

[1]James 1, 17.
[2]Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 5 c18 n36.
[3]Cf. Jn. 1, 3-4.
[4]Rom. 4, 17.
[5]Ambrose, *De fide*, bk 5 c16 n198.
[6]Ps. 49, 11.
[7]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 49, 11, n18.

and his cognition or presence is the divine essence, whether it is to be granted that all things are in the divine essence or in God through essence.

2. RESPONSE. To which we say that God's cognition is certainly his essence, and his presence, in which are all things, is his cognition; and yet, not all things which are in his presence or cognition should be said to be in his essence. For if this were said, these things would be understood to be of the same essence with him. For that is said to be in God through essence which is the divine essence, which is God. And so God has before himself, in his presence, things which he does not have in his nature.—Hence Augustine, *On the Words of the Apostle*, speaks as follows: "*He elected us before the foundation of the world*:[1] Who is sufficient to explain this? They are elected who are not, and he who elects does not err, nor does he elect in vain. Yet he elects and holds as elected those whom he will create in order to elect; whom he has before himself, not in his nature, but in his presence."[2] They did not yet exist, to whom the promise was made, but they too were promised, to whom the promise was made.—See, he plainly says here that, before [the creation of] the world, God has the elect before himself, not in his nature, but in his presence; and yet his presence is not other than his nature, because his presence is his knowledge. But perhaps reference is made to the elect when he says 'in his nature,' that is, in their nature. For he had them before himself from eternity, not in the nature of his own, that is their nature, because they did not yet exist, but in his presence, because he knew them as if they already existed.

Chapter 2 (160)

1. WHETHER EVIL THINGS OUGHT TO BE SAID TO BE IN GOD, AS ALL GOOD THINGS ARE, BECAUSE BOTH ARE IN HIS COGNITION AND PRESENCE: FOR HE KNOWS ALL THINGS. After the above, it is asked: since all things are said to be in God not by the essence of nature, but by the cognition of knowledge, and God knows good and evil things, whether it is simply to be granted that evil things are in God, or that they are in God through cognition.—For God knows and has always known all things, both good and evil, even before they were done, and he had foreknowledge from eternity of those things that would be. And so, as we have said that all good things are in God through the presence of cognition, by the same reason it should be said that all evil things are in him, since he always knew them and they were present to him through cognition. For God had foreknowledge from eternity of some who would be evil; as Augustine says, he foreknew their

[1]Eph. 1, 4.
[2]Augustine, *Sermo 26*, c4 n4.

malice, but did not prepare it.[1] And so, since he knows the sins of all, is it not to be understood that these are included in that general expression by which the Apostle says that all things are in God? He says: *From him, and through him, and in him are all things.*[2]

2. WHAT THINGS ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE IN GOD. But who, short of being insane, would say that evil things are in God? For those things are understood to be in God which are *from him* and *through him*; but those things are *through him* and *from him* whose author he is. And yet he is the author of good things alone; and so only good things are *from him* or *through him*; thus it follows that only good things are *in him.*

3. THAT GOD DOES NOT KNOW EVIL THINGS ENTIRELY IN THE SAME WAY AS GOOD ONES, BECAUSE [HE KNOWS] THE EVIL ONES ONLY THROUGH KNOWLEDGE, BUT THE GOOD ONES ALSO THROUGH APPROBATION AND GOOD PLEASURE. And so evil things are not in God because, although he knows them, yet he does not know them entirely as he knows good ones. He knows evil things as if from far away, as the Prophet says: *And from far away, he knows high things*,[3] that is, pride. And elsewhere, speaking to God, he says of evil people: *With your hidden things, their belly is filled.*[4] Augustine, expounding this, says: "The hidden things are sins which are hidden from the light of your truth."[5] But how are sins hidden from the light of divine truth, since they are known by God? For if he did not know them, how could he pass judgement on them and condemn those who are evil because of them? Elsewhere, the Prophet says: *Because neither from the East, nor from the West*[6] is he absent. Expounding this, Cassiodorus says: "God is absent neither from those who are good nor from those who are evil, but he is present to all and knows all."[7]

4. And so God knows both good and evil things through knowledge; but he knows good things also through approbation and good pleasure, but not the evil ones. Hence Cassiodorus, commenting on the Psalm, says: "Sins are hidden from God because he does not know them, that is, he does not approve them."[8] It was in this sense that Augustine said that they are hidden from the light of God. In the book *To Helvidius*, he also implied that God's cognition is to be understood in various ways, saying: "If you refer to knowledge, God is not ignorant of anyone or anything; and

[1]Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c10 n19.
[2]Rom. 11, 36.
[3]Ps. 137, 6.
[4]Ps. 16, 14.
[5]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on ps. 16, n13.
[6]Ps. 74, 7.
[7]Cassiodorus, *In Psalterium*, on ps. 74, 7.
[8]Ibid., on ps. 16, 16.

yet, at the Judgment, he shall say to some: *I know you not*;[9] but this expression indicates disapproval of them."[10]—See, God is said not to know those things which he does not approve, which do not please him. And so what we said is clearly true, namely that God knows good things in some way in which he does not know evil things. He knows both equally and in the same way as regards knowledge, but he knows good things also by approbation and good pleasure.

5. HERE HE MAKES CLEAR WHY ONLY GOOD THINGS ARE SAID TO BE IN GOD, AND NOT EVIL ONES. And so it is that good things alone are said to be in God, and not evil ones, and the former are said to be near, the latter far from him: because, although some things are said to be in God through the presence of cognition, and God knows good and evil things, yet he knows the evil ones only through knowledge; but he knows the good ones not only through knowledge, but also through approbation and good pleasure. And because of such cognition, some things are said to be in God, namely because he knows them in such a way that he also approves them and they please him, that is, he knows them so as to be their author.

Chapter 3 (161)

THAT IT IS THE SAME FOR ALL THINGS TO BE FROM GOD AND THROUGH HIM AND IN HIM. Moreover, if we consider it diligently, it seems to be the same for all things to be from God and through him and in him. Hence Ambrose, in *On the Holy Spirit*, book 2: "As to these three: *From him, and through him, and in him are all things*,[1] we have said above that they are one thing. In saying that all things are *through him*, has he denied that all things are *in him*? All these have the same force, namely *in him* and *with him* and *through him*; in them, one and the same thing is understood, not a contrary."[2] See, you have it that it is in the same sense that Scripture says that all things are *in him* and *through him* and *from him* or *with him*. —Since therefore all things are said to be from God or through him for this reason: not only because he knows them, but also because he is their author, it follows that, by this same reason, they should be said to be in God, namely because he knows them and is their author. It is said that *in him we live and move and have our being*[3] because it is with him as our author that we are and move and live. Since therefore he is the author only of the good, only good things are justly said to be *in him*, as *from him* or

[9]Mt. 7, 23; Lk. 13, 27.
[10]Augustine, *Epistola 169 (Ad Evodium)*, c1 n2.

[1]Rom. 11, 36.
[2]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 3 c11 n84.
[3]Acts 17, 28.

through him.—And so, although all things, namely good and evil ones, are in his cognition and presence, yet only the good ones, whose author he is, are said to be in him. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, says: "When we hear that all things are *from God* and *through him* and *in him*, we must understand all natures, and all things which naturally are. But sins are not from him because they do not preserve nature, but corrupt it, because they are born from the will of sinners."[4] Here it is plainly said that in the general expression good things alone are contained.

Chapter 4 (162)

THAT ALL THINGS ARE FROM THE FATHER, AND THROUGH THE FATHER, AND IN THE FATHER; AND THE SAME IS TO BE SAID OF THE SON AND HOLY SPIRIT, ALTHOUGH A DISTINCTION IS MADE BECAUSE OF THE PERSONS. Moreover, it is to be known that, although a distinction of persons is indicated there by saying *from him, through him, in him*, yet all things are from the Father and through the Father and in the Father; it is to be similarly taken of the Son and Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Trinity,* says: "We are not to take indiscriminately what the Apostle says: *From him and through him and in him*,"[5,6] "saying *from him* for the Father, *through him* for the Son, *in him* for the Holy Spirit."[7] But attend vigilantly lest, because he meant the Father to be understood in saying *from him*, you understand all things to be from the Father in such a way that you deny all things to be from the Son or from the Holy Spirit. Although it can correctly be said that all things are from the Father and through the Father and in the Father, it is to be similarly understood both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 5 (163)

1. THAT NOT ALL THINGS WHICH ARE FROM GOD ARE ALSO OF HIM, BUT THE CONVERSE IS TRUE. Here it is also to be added that not all things which are said to be *from God* are also to be said to be *of him*. For as Augustine says in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, "*from him* does not signify the same thing as *of him*. For what is *of him* can be said to be *from him*; but not all which is *from him* can be said to be *of him*, because it is not of his substance. For heaven and earth are *from him* because he made them; but they are not *of him* because they are not of his substance. It is as

[4]Augustine, *De natura boni*, c28.
[5]Rom. 11, 36.
[6]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n12.
[7]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c23 n5.

if a man generates a son and builds a house: the son is from him, and the house is also from him; but the son is of him, and the house of earth and wood,"[1] not of his own self.

2. HE SUMMARIZES WHAT HAS BEEN SAID. In the above, it has been made clear that all things, namely good and evil ones, are in God's cognition and presence, but evil things are not there in every way as good ones; and that only good things are in God as *from him* and *through him*, not the evil ones, and it has been set out in what sense these things are to be taken; and the fact that something is from him does not necessarily make it proper to say that it is *of him*, but all things are said to be *from him* which are from him as their author.

DISTINCTION XXXVII

Chapter 1 (164)

1. IN WHAT WAYS GOD IS SAID TO BE IN THINGS. And because it has been in part shown how all things are said to be in God, it seems good to add here in what ways God is said to be in things, if only the human mind is worthily able to ponder this even in part, or the tongue has sufficient eloquence.

2. THAT GOD IS IN EACH THING BY ESSENCE, POWER, PRESENCE, AND IN THE SAINTS BY GRACE, AND IN THE MAN CHRIST BY UNION. And so it is to be known that God, existing ever unchangeably in himself, by presence, power, and essence is in every nature or essence without limitation of himself, and in every place without being bounded, and in every time without change. And moreover he exists more excellently in holy spirits and souls, namely indwelling through grace; and most excellently in the man Christ, *in whom the fullness of the divinity dwells corporally*, as the Apostle says.[1] For in him God dwelt not by the grace of adoption, but by the grace of union.

3. HE CONFIRMS IT TO BE SO BY AUTHORITIES. Lest some presume to accuse these statements of falsehood because they exceed the capacity of human understanding, they seem to me to require the support of the authorities of the Saints. Blessed Gregory, commenting on the Song of Songs, says: "Although God is present in all things in a general way by presence, power, substance, yet he is said to be present in an intimate way

[1]Augustine, *De natura boni*, c27.

[1]Col. 2, 9.

through grace in those who contemplate the wonder of God's works with more acuity and faithfulness."[2]

4. Concerning this same matter, Augustine says to Dardanus, in the book *On the Presence of God*: "Since God is an incorporeal and unchangeable living nature, remaining in eternal stability in his own self, he is entirely present in all things, and entirely in each of them. But those in whom he dwells receive him according to the diversity of their capacity, some more, some less, whom he builds into a temple most beloved to himself by the grace of his goodness."[3]—Hilary too, in *On the Trinity*, book 8, teaches most plainly that God is everywhere, saying: "The God of infinite power, the living force which is present everywhere and absent nowhere, manifests all of himself through his things, so that where his things are, there also he is understood to be. But do not believe that God, in the manner of bodily things, when he is in one place is not also everywhere, since he does not cease to be also in all things."[4]

5. Ambrose too, in *On the Holy Spirit*, book 1, proves that the Holy Spirit is not a creature because he is everywhere, which is proper to the divinity. He says as follows: "Since every creature is bounded by the certain limits of its own nature, how would anyone dare to call the Holy Spirit a creature, who does not have a circumscribed and determined power, who is always in all things and everywhere? which is entirely proper to divinity and lordship."[5]—The same, in the same place: "It is the Lord's to fill everything, who says: *I fill heaven and earth.*[6] If it is the Lord who fills heaven and earth, then who can adjudge the Holy Spirit to be without a share of lordship and divine power, who filled the world[7] and, what is more, filled Jesus,[8] redeemer of the whole world?"[9] From these and several other authorities, it is plainly shown that God is in every creature by essence, presence, and power.

Chapter 2 (165)

1. THAT HE NOT ONLY IS IN THE SAINTS, BUT ALSO DWELLS [IN THEM], WHO DOES NOT DWELL EVERYWHERE THAT HE IS. But in the saints, in whom he is by grace, he also dwells. For he does not dwell everywhere that he is; but where he dwells, he is. He dwells in the good alone, who

[2]Ordinary gloss on Song of Songs, 5, 17.
[3]Augustine, *Epistola 187*, c6 n19.
[4]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 8 n24.
[5]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 1 c7 n81.
[6]Jer. 23, 24.
[7]Cf. Wis. 1, 7.
[8]Cf. Lk. 4, 1.
[9]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 1 c7 n86.

are his temple and his seat.—Hence the Lord says through Isaias: *Heaven is my seat, and earth the stool of my feet*:[1] because God dwells and reigns in the elect, who are *heaven* and who obey his will with devotion; but by the strictness of his judgment, he treads upon the evil ones, who are *earth*. Hence also, in the book of Wisdom, the soul of the just is called the throne of wisdom,[2] because he is more especially in the just than in other things, in all of which he is nevertheless entirely present.

2. As Augustine says in his letter to Jerome, *On the Origin of the Soul*, the soul "is entirely and simultaneously in all the parts of the body, nor is it less in the lesser ones and more in the greater ones, but it works more intensely in some, less so in others, although it exists essentially in the several parts of the body."[3] In the same way, God, although he is essentially and entirely in all, is nonetheless said to be more fully in those in whom he dwells, that is, in whom he is in such a way that he makes them his temple.—And such ones are already with him in part, and [will be with him] perfectly in [heavenly] beatitude; but the evil ones, although they are in a place where he is, who is absent nowhere, yet they are not with him. Hence Augustine, *On John*: "It was not enough to say: *Where I am, there they also are*, but he added *with me*,[4] because the unhappy ones can also be where he is, who is absent nowhere; but the blessed alone are with him, because they are not blessed except from him."[5] They are with him who enjoy him and see him as he is; but the evil ones are with him as the sightless are with the light. Nor are the good ones with him now in such a way as to see him directly, although they are in some manner with him through faith.

3. IF YOU WISH TO UNDERSTAND HOW HE DWELLS, RE-EXAMINE WHAT WAS SAID OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. As to how God dwells in the good, you will be able to understand it somewhat from what was said above, in the discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit in time.[6] There, if only partially—*for in part we know and in part we prophesy*[7]—, it is explained how the Holy Spirit dwells in us, who does not indwell without the Father and the Son.

[1]Is. 66, 1.
[2]Wis. 7, 27; 9, 10; 10, 16.
[3]Augustine, *Epistola 166*, c2 n4.
[4]Jn. 17, 14.
[5]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 111 nn2-3.
[6]Dist. 14.
[7]1 Cor. 13, 9.

Chapter 3 (166)

1. WHERE WAS GOD, OR WHERE DID HE DWELL, BEFORE THERE WAS A CREATURE. If you ask where God dwelled before there were saints, we say that he dwelled in himself. Hence Augustine, *Against Maximinus*, says: "God dwells in his temple,"[1] namely in the saints, "who are now the temple of God by walking according to faith, and who will sometime be the temple of God even in actuality, as even now the Angels are the temple of God. But someone says: Before God had made heaven and earth, before he had made the saints, where did he dwell? He dwelled in himself: he dwells in you and is in himself. Therefore the saints are not the house of God in such a way that, if the house is taken away, God falls. Instead, God dwells in the saints in such a way that, if he should depart, they fall."[2]

2. HERE HE TEACHES BRIEFLY MANY THINGS WHICH CONFIRM WHAT IS SAID ABOVE. It is also to be known that, as Augustine says in the book *To Dardanus*, "it is only with great foolishness that it can be said that the Holy Spirit does not have a place in our body, which our soul has filled in its entirety. It is even more foolish to say that the Trinity is impeded by lack of space in one place, so that Father and Son and Holy Spirit cannot be in another place at the same time. Indeed, what is much more to be wondered at is that, although God is everywhere in his entirety, yet he does not dwell in all. Who, except someone who is wholly ignorant of the inseparability of the Trinity, would dare to consider that the Father or the Son may dwell in anyone in whom the Holy Spirit does not dwell; or the Holy Spirit in anyone in whom the Father and the Son do not dwell? And so it is to be professed that God is everywhere by the presence of the divinity, but not everywhere by the grace of indwelling. It is because of this dwelling that we do not say *Our Father* who art everywhere, although this is also true, but *who art in heaven*,"[3,4] that is, in the saints, in whom he is in some more excellent way.

3. THAT GOD DWELLS IN SOME WHO DO NOT KNOW HIM YET, AND DOES NOT DWELL IN SOME WHO KNOW HIM. "It is also to be wondered at," as Augustine says in the same, "that God dwells in some who do not know him yet, and not in others who do know him. For they do not belong to God's temple who, although they know God, do not give glory to him as God.[5] To the temple of God belong the children sanctified by Christ's sacrament and rewarded with the Holy Spirit, who are not yet able to

[1]Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, bk 2 c21 n1.
[2]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 122, 1, n4.
[3]Cf. Mt. 6, 9.
[4]Augustine, *Epistola 187*, cc4-5, nn15-16.
[5]Cf. Rom. 1, 21.

know God. And so the former could not have him whom they were able to know, the latter were able to have him before they could know him. But most blessed are those for whom to have God is the same as to know him."[6] Here, Augustine reveals somewhat how God lives in someone, that is, how he is possessed, namely when he is in someone in such a way that he is known and loved by that person.

4. IT CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY HUMAN SENSE HOW GOD IS EVERYWHERE IN HIS ENTIRETY THROUGH ESSENCE. From what is said above, it is manifest that God is everywhere in his entirety through essence, and he dwells in the saints through grace. And although it has been shown above,[7] if weakly, by what reason he is said to dwell in some people, an orderly progression would require that we also set out how he is present everywhere in his entirety through essence, if the sublimity and immensity of this subject were not wholly beyond the understanding of the human mind. For as Chrysostom says, in *On the Epistle to the Hebrews*, "as we understand many things about God which we are almost entirely unable to utter, so also we say many things which we are not capable of understanding. For example, we know and say that God is everywhere; but we do not grasp by our intellect how he is everywhere. Also, we know that there is some incorporeal power which is the cause of all good things; but we are entirely ignorant of how or what it is."[8]

5. THE OPINION OF SOME, WHO PRESUME TO SHOW HOW GOD IS EVERYWHERE THROUGH ESSENCE, POWER, PRESENCE. But some people, presuming to measure immensity by their own intellect, have taught that the following is to be understood: that God is said to be everywhere through essence not because God's essence is strictly speaking in every place and in every creature, but because all nature and all that naturally is, in whatever place it may be, and every place in which it is, has its being through God.—The same people also say that God is said to be everywhere through power or presence because all places and all the things which are in them are present to him, nor does he cease to work something in them. Indeed, the places themselves, and everything which is in them, unless he conserves them, cannot endure. And so God is said to be in them through substance, as they say, because it is by the power of his own substance that he makes the places and all the things which are in them exist.—But although these things are true which they assert in explaining the meaning of the above, yet we must believe that in those words by which it is said that God is

[6]Augustine, *Epistola 187*, c6 n21.
[7]Above, in c2.
[8]John Chrysostom, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, hom. 2 n1.

everywhere through essence, more is contained which a living man is not able to comprehend.

Chapter 4 (167)

1. THAT GOD, ALTHOUGH HE IS PRESENT IN ALL THINGS, YET IS NOT POLLUTED BY THE UNCLEANNESS OF THINGS. It is also usual for them to ask how God can be substantially present in all things, and not be touched by the pollutions of bodily uncleanness.—But this question is so frivolous as not to be worthy of an answer, since even a created spirit cannot be defiled by the uncleanness of a body, even a leprous one, or however much polluted a one.—HE DEMONSTRATES BY ANALOGIES AND THROUGH A LESSER EXAMPLE. The sun also, without polluting itself, pours out its rays over bodies and places, and not only over clean ones, but also over unclean ones and those which stink with decay, at whose touch man and some other things become corrupted. But the rays of the sun remain unpolluted and uncontaminated by touching them.[1] And so it is not to be wondered at if the divine essence, which is wholly simple and unchangeable, fills all places and is present essentially in all creatures, and yet is not contaminated or touched by the uncleanness of any thing.— Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, says: "Although all things which he has fashioned are in God, yet those who sin do not pollute him; for even of his wisdom, which *reaches from end to end mightily*,[2] it is said: *She touches all things by her purity, and nothing polluted enters into her.*"[3,4]

2. Augustine, *On the Christian Struggle*: "Some fear what cannot happen, namely that the truth and substance of God be polluted by human flesh. And yet they declare that the visible sun spreads its rays over all offal and uncleanness, keeping those rays both clean and pure. But if clean visible things can be touched by unclean visible things without being polluted, how much more so the invisible and unchangeable Truth."[5]

3. BY [AN ARGUMENT FROM] INCONVENIENCE, HE SHOWS THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE. Finally, let them answer what they would rather assert about God: whether that he is nowhere by essence, or that he is everywhere, or that he is in some places in such a way that he is not everywhere. But who would dare to say that the divine essence is nowhere, or that it is in some places, but not everywhere? For if it is in some places, but not everywhere, then it is local. And so, that which contains all and

[1]Cf. Augustine, *De agone christiano*, c18 n20.
[2]Cf. Wis. 8, 1.
[3]Wis. 7, 24-25.
[4]Augustine, *De natura boni*, c29.
[5]Augustine, *De agone christiano*, c18 n20.

penetrates all, is entirely everywhere; it cannot be divided because of its simplicity, nor contaminated because of its purity, nor be bounded in any way because of its immensity. Hence Augustine: "God is everywhere, whom we approach not in places, but by our actions."[6]

Chapter 5 (168)

THAT GOD, ALTHOUGH HE IS IN EVERY PLACE AND TIME, YET IS NEITHER LOCAL NOR CIRCUMSCRIBABLE, NOR IS HE MOVED IN PLACE OR TIME. And although the divine nature is truly and essentially in every place and in every time, yet it is not moved through places or times, and it is neither local nor temporal. It is not local because it is entirely uncircumscribed by place, because it is not in some place in such a way that it may not be in another, nor does it have a dimension like a body, to which a beginning, middle, and end is assigned in space, or a front and a back, right and left, above and below, "which separates off neighbouring things by the interposition of itself."[1]

Chapter 6 (169)

1. IN WHAT WAYS SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE LOCAL OR CIRCUMSCRIBABLE. In Scripture, something is said to be local or circumscribable, and vice versa, in these two ways: namely, either because it has the dimension of depth, height, and width and separates [itself] in space, like a body; or because it is defined and determined by place since, when it is somewhere, it is not found everywhere. This latter applies not only to a body, but also to any created spirit.

2. ON THE CREATED SPIRIT: THAT IN ONE WAY IT IS NEITHER LOCAL NOR CIRCUMSCRIBABLE, AND IN ANOTHER WAY IT IS [BOTH]; BUT THE BODY IS ENTIRELY LOCAL AND CIRCUMSCRIBABLE, AND GOD IS ENTIRELY UNLOCAL AND UNCIRCUMSCRIBABLE. And so each body is entirely local; but a created spirit is local in one way and not local in some other way. It is said to be local because it is bounded by a definition of place since, when it is entirely present in one place, it is not found elsewhere; but it is not local in the sense of taking on a dimension that separates [itself] off in space.

3. And so the divine essence alone is entirely unlocal and uncircumscribable, which is neither moved in places in any way (namely by a finite boundedness or by taking on a dimension), nor in times (namely by affect

[6]Cf. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 34, 14, sermon 2, n6; see also *De Trinitate*, bk 7 c6 n12; *De doctrina christiana*, bk 1 c10 n10.

[1]Abelard, *Theologia 'Scholarium,'* III.

or thought). For it is in these two ways, namely in place or time, that change occurs to the creature, which is not the case with the Creator.—Hence Augustine, *On Genesis*, says: "The omnipotent God, ever the same in unchangeable eternity, will, and truth, moves the spiritual creature through time; he also moves the bodily creature through time and place, so as to administer by this motion the natures which he has fashioned. (THAT GOD IS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE, AND MORE ANCIENT AND NEWER THAN ALL THINGS.) Therefore, since he does this, we must not think that his substance, which is God, is mutable in times and places, or mobile through times and places. For he is inside each thing, because all things are in him; and he is outside each thing, because he is above all things; and he is more ancient than all things because he is before all things; and he is newer than all things, because after all things he is the same,"[1] namely after the beginnings of all things.—See, it is here plainly shown that God is not moved or changed in places or times; and the spiritual creature is moved through time, but the bodily one both through time and place.

Chapter 7 (170)

1. WHAT IT MEANS TO CHANGE ACCORDING TO TIME. But to change through time is to become different according to the interior or exterior qualities which are in the very thing that is changed, as when it undergoes a vicissitude of joy, suffering, knowledge, forgetfulness, or a change of form or of some other exterior quality. For this change which happens according to time is a change of qualities which happens in the bodily or spiritual creature, and so it is called time.

2. THE OPINION OF SOME WHO SAY THAT CREATED SPIRITS ARE NOT MOVED IN PLACE AND ARE NOT LOCAL. As to change of place, however, a great debate occurs among researchers. For there are some who say that no spirit can at all be changed in place, and they wish to remove place entirely from every spirit. For they assert that place consists exclusively in dimension and circumscription; and they say that that alone is local, or is in a place, which takes on dimension and separates [itself] off in place. —THEY SAY THAT AUGUSTINE'S WORDS ABOVE SUPPORT THEIR VIEW. And they say that such was the view of Augustine, who attributed to the spiritual creature only change of time, but change of place and time to the bodily creature.

3. HERE A RESPONSE IS MADE TO THEM. But as we said above,[1] a thing is said to be local or circumscribable in two ways, namely either because it

[1]Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 8 c26 n48.

[1]Above, c6 n1.

receives dimension and separates [itself] off, or because it is defined by a boundary of place; both of these fit the bodily creature, but only one fits the spiritual creature. For as we said above,[2] the bodily creature is local or circumscribable in such a way that it is bounded by a definition of place, and separates [itself] off by taking on dimension. But a spiritual creature is only bounded by a definition of place, since it is somewhere in such a way that it is not somewhere else; but it does not take on dimension, nor does it separate [itself] off in place because, if many spirits were here, they would not crowd the place so that it would contain fewer bodies. And so Augustine attributes change of place to a body, not to a spirit, because although a spirit moves from place to place, yet in such a way that it is not circumscribed by dimensions so as to separate [itself] off from its surroundings by the interposition of itself, as happens with a body.

Chapter 8 (171)

CONCLUSION FROM THE AFOREGOING: THAT CREATED SPIRITS ARE IN SOME WAY LOCAL AND CIRCUMSCRIBABLE, BUT THE SPIRIT OF GOD IS ENTIRELY UNCIRCUMSCRIBABLE. And so created spirits are in a place, and they pass from place to place, and are in some way local and circumscribable; but not in every way as bodily creatures are. But the uncreated Spirit, who is God, is in a place and in every place, but is entirely unlocal and uncircumscribable.—Hence Bede, *On Luke*, says: "When Angels come to us, they so perform their ministry outwardly in such a way that they still remain before God interiorly by contemplation; for although an Angel is a circumscribed spirit, yet the most high spirit, which is God, is uncircumscribed, within whom the Angel goes wherever he is sent."[1] See, here it is said that an angelic spirit is circumscribed, but that the spirit which is God is uncircumscribed.—Elsewhere, Ambrose too, showing the distance between a created spirit and the uncreated spirit, says that the Seraphim pass from place to place. In the book, *On the Trinity*, he speaks as follows: "Isaias said: *For one of the Seraphim was sent to me.*[2] And the Holy Spirit is also said to be sent,[3] but the Seraph to one person, the Spirit to all. The Seraph is sent to minister; the Spirit works a mystery. The Seraph passes from place to place: for he does not fill all places, but is himself filled by the Spirit."[4] Here it is plainly shown that the Angels are in some way local.

[2]Above, c6 n2.

[1]Bede, *Homiliae*, bk 1 c1 (on Lk. 1, 19).
[2]Is. 6, 6.
[3]Cf. Jn. 16, 7; Gal. 4, 6.
[4]Ambrose, *De Spiritu sancto*, bk 1 cc10-11, nn115-116.

Chapter 9 (172)

1. REPEATING WHAT WAS SAID ABOVE, HE CONFIRMS WITH AUTHORITIES THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE WITHOUT LOCAL MOTION. And so let us profess that the divine nature, because of its immensity, is never absent, and it alone is entirely unlocal and uncircumscribable and is bound by no place, but *reaches from end to end.*[1] And yet it does not do so by spatial magnitude or local motion, but by the immensity and immobility of its essence. —Hence Augustine, *To Dardanus*, says: "We do not hold that God is diffused through everything as if by a spatial magnitude, as earth, or our light, is diffused. It is more like the case of two wise men, one of whom is larger in body than the other, but is not wiser; their wisdom is one, neither larger in the larger man, nor smaller in the smaller man, nor less in one than in two. So also God, ruling and containing the world without effort, is entirely in heaven, entirely on earth, entirely in both, and he is contained by no place, but is entirely and everywhere in himself."[2]—The same [Augustine] also says, [in commenting] on the Psalm: "It pertains to the Word of God not to be in part, but to be everywhere through his own self. For this is the wisdom of God which *reaches from end to end mightily*,[3] and yet not by local motion, but by its own immobility, as if a rocky mass fills some place, and it is said that it reaches from end to end of that place, although it does abandon one place by occupying another. And so that Word and that wisdom has no local motion: it is solid and everywhere."[4] From what is said above, it is made known that God is everywhere through essence in such a way that he neither is diffused through great space, nor occupies one place after having left another, because he has no local motion.

2. And so Augustine, wishing to thoroughly remove all local motion and local circumscription from God's purity, says that all things are in him rather than that he is anywhere, and that he is not a place who is in no place. In the book of *84 Questions*, he says as follows: "God is not anywhere. Whatever is anywhere is contained in a place; what is contained in a place is a body. But God is not a body; and so he is not anywhere. And yet, because he is, and he is not in a place, all things are in him rather than he anywhere; and yet not in him in such a way that he is a place. For a place is in a space which is occupied by the length and breadth and height of a body; God is no such thing. And so all things are in him, and he is not a place and is not in a place. Nonetheless God's temple is called

[1]Wis. 8, 1.
[2]Augustine, *Epistola 187*, c4 nn11 and 14.
[3]Wis. 8, 1.
[4]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 147, 15, n22.

God's place, but improperly, not in the sense that he is contained by it. Nothing is better understood to be God's temple than a clean soul."[5]—See, he says that God is not in a place. But it is to be understood that God is not in a place locally, namely because he has neither circumscription nor local motion.

3. OBJECTION BY WHICH IT SEEMS TO BE PROVED THAT GOD IS CHANGED BY LOCATION. But to this, some usually make the following objection: Every day, creatures are made which did not exist before, and God is in them, but he was not in them before; it follows that he is where he was not before, and so he seems to be mutable.—RESPONSE. But although every day he begins to be in creatures in which he was not before, because they did not exist, yet this happens without change on his part, just as he began to be in the world which he made, and yet without change. Similarly, without change on his part, he also ceases to be in things in which he was before; he does not at that time cease to be in the place, but the place ceases to be.

4. EPILOGUE, WHERE HE EXPLAINS THE REASON FOR ENGAGING IN THE ABOVE DISPUTATION. It seems to have been already sufficiently demonstrated how all things are said to be in God and God in all things. We took up this discussion almost incidentally[6] because the topic about which our discussion was occupied seemed to demand it. For we were speaking about the knowledge or wisdom of God, and when we taught that God knows all things, it was asked whether it is by the cognition that God has of all things that all things are said to be in God, or by some other reason by which Scripture might say this. And so the occasion of this question brought us to the above disputation.

DISTINCTION XXXVIII

Chapter 1 (173)

1. HERE HE RETURNS TO HIS PURPOSE, REPEATING WHAT WAS SAID ABOVE IN ORDER TO ADD OTHER THINGS. And so now, returning to our purpose, let us continue what we had begun. It was said above that God's foreknowledge is only of future things, but of all of them, both good and evil.[1] But knowledge or wisdom is not only of future things, but of present and

[5]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 20.
[6]In Dist. 36 cc1-2.

[1]Dist. 35 cc1-6.

future ones; and not only of temporal things, but also of eternal ones, because God knows his own self.

2. QUESTION WHETHER KNOWLEDGE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE IS THE CAUSE OF THINGS, OR THINGS ARE THE CAUSE OF FOREKNOWLEDGE. Here arises a question which is not to be ignored, namely whether knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of things, or things are the cause of God's knowledge or foreknowledge.

3. WHY KNOWLEDGE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE SEEMS [TO BE] THE CAUSE OF THINGS. For it seems that God's foreknowledge is the cause of things subject to it and necessitates their coming into being because there would not be any future things if God had not foreknown them, and they cannot not come to pass once God has foreknown them. But if it is impossible for them not to come to pass because they have been foreknown, then the very foreknowledge by which they have been foreknown appears to be the cause of their coming to pass. But it is impossible for them not to occur once they have been foreknown because, if they were not to happen after being foreknown, God's foreknowledge would be fallible. But God's foreknowledge is infallible, and so it is impossible for them not to happen after being foreknown. Hence it follows that foreknowledge appears to be the cause of those things which have been foreknown. This very same thing is also said of knowledge, namely that, because God knows some things, they are.

4. HE SETS OUT AUTHORITIES WHICH APPEAR TO ASSERT THIS. Augustine appears to support this view, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, where he says as follows: "God did not know these things from some point in time, but he knew beforehand without any beginning all things that would pass in time and, among these, he even knows that which we will seek from him, when we will seek it, and whose requests and as to which things he will grant or not grant. He does not know all his creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, because they are, but they are because he knows them. For he was not ignorant of what he would create. It was because he knew that he created, and not because he had created that he knew. And he does not know things that have been created any differently from those that are yet to be created. For nothing was added to his wisdom from them, but with all these things existing when and as they ought, his wisdom remained as it was. Hence in Ecclesiasticus: *Before they were created, all things were known to him; and the same also after they were completed.*"[2,3] See, by these words, Augustine seems to indicate that God's knowledge or foreknowledge is the cause of the things which are made, since he says that they are because God

[2]Eccli. 23, 29.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c13 n22.

knows them.—He also seems to say the same in book 6: "Although the ages pass and succeed each other, nothing passes or succeeds God's knowledge, in which he knows all things which he has made through it. For created things are not known by God because they have been made; it is rather the case that they have been made because they are immutably known by him."[4] And here too, he appears to signify that God's knowledge is the cause of the things which are made, saying 'God does not know them because they have been made, but they are made because God knows them.' And so God's knowledge or foreknowledge appears to be the cause of the things which it knows.

5. HE SHOWS THE ANOMALIES THAT WOULD ENSUE, IF KNOWLEDGE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE WERE TO BE TERMED THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THEM. But if this is so, then it is the cause of all evils, since all evil things are known and foreknown by God; which is far from the truth. For if God's knowledge or foreknowledge were the cause of evils, God would assuredly be the author of evils, which is entirely false; and so God's knowledge or foreknowledge is not the cause of all things subject to it.

6. THAT FUTURE THINGS ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OR FOREKNOWLEDGE. And future things too are not the cause of God's foreknowledge: for although there would not be future things unless they were foreknown by God, yet they are not foreknown because they are future. For if this were so, then the cause of that which is eternal would be something alien and different from it, and the Creator's foreknowledge would be dependent on creatures and something created would be the cause of something uncreated.

7. THE FOLLOWING SEEMS CONTRARY TO THE AFOREGOING. And yet Origen, *On the Epistle to the Romans*, says: "It is not because a thing will be that God knows it will be; but because it will be, it is known to God before it happens."[5] This seems to contradict the above words of Augustine. For here it seems to signify that future things are the causes of foreknowledge; but there that foreknowledge is the cause of future things.

8. WHAT IS TO BE HELD FROM THE AFOREGOING, WITH A DETERMINATION OF THE AUTHORITIES. And so, wishing to remove this apparent contradiction from our midst, we say that future things are not at all the cause of God's foreknowledge or of God's knowledge, and they are not foreknown or known because they are, will be, or have been made. We expound what Origen says as follows: 'Because it will be, it is known by God before it happens,' that is, that which will be is known by God before it happens,

[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 6 c10 n11.
[5]Origen, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, bk 7 n8, on Rom. 8, 30.

and it would not be known if it were not to be: no cause is signified there, except that without which it could not be.—We also say that God's knowledge or foreknowledge is not the cause of things which happen, except in the sense that they do not happen without it; yet only if we mean by knowledge awareness alone. But if under the name of knowledge is included also good pleasure and disposition, then it may rightly be called the cause of things which God makes. For as was said above,[6] it is in these two ways that God's cognition or knowledge is taken, namely as awareness alone, or as awareness and good pleasure. Perhaps Augustine took it in this sense, when he said: "And so they are because he knows,"[7] that is, because it pleased the knower and because he knowingly disposed [that they should be]. And this meaning is supported by that statement because Augustine there treats only of good things, that is, of creatures, among the things that God makes; he knows all of these not only by his knowledge, but also by his good pleasure and disposition. And so God's cognition is there taken as signifying not only God's awareness, but also his good pleasure.

9. As for evil things, however, God knows and foreknows them before they happen, but by awareness alone, not by good pleasure. For God foreknows and foretells even those things which he will not do himself, as he knew and foretold the faithlessness of the Jews, but did not himself cause it. It is not because he foreknew it that he compelled them to the sin of faithlessness; nor would he have foreknown or foretold their evils, unless they were going to make them their own. Hence Augustine, *On John*, says: "God, knower of the future, through the Prophet foretold the faithlessness of the Jews, but he did not cause it." And he would not have foreknown their evils, unless they made them their own: "For God does not compel anyone to sin merely because he foreknows the future sins of men: for he foreknew the sins [were] theirs, not his own. And so, if those sins of theirs which he foreknew are not theirs, he did not foreknow true things. But because his foreknowledge is infallible, without doubt it is not anyone else, but they themselves who sin, [and] whom God foreknew that they would sin. And so, if they had wished to do good and not evil, they would not be foreseen to be going to do evil by him who knows what each person will do."[8]—If we consider them diligently, these words plainly show that God's foreknowledge is not the cause of the evils which he foreknows, because he does not foreknow them as if he were going to do them, or as if they were his, but as belonging to those who will do them or make them

[6]Dist. 26 c2 nn4-5.
[7]Above, n4.
[8]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 53 n4; cf. Jn. 12, 38 and Is. 53, 1.

their own. And so he foreknew those evils by awareness alone, not by the good pleasure of authorship. From this, it is given to be understood that God conversely foreknows good things as his own, as those things which he will do, so that in foreknowing them his awareness and good pleasure of authorship have joined together.

Chapter 2 (174)

1. OBJECTION TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE, THAT GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE IS INFALLIBLE. But against what has been said above,[1] namely that God's foreknowledge is infallible, it is usual for some to make the following objection: God foreknew that such a person would lecture, or some such thing; but it is possible that this person will not lecture; and so it may be otherwise than God foreknew; it follows that God's foreknowledge is fallible.—Which is entirely false. It is certainly possible for something not to happen, and yet it had been foreseen to happen; nevertheless, God's foreknowledge is infallible because, if a thing were not going to happen, it would not be foreknown by God as happening.

2. But they press their question further, saying: A thing can either happen otherwise than God foreknew, or not otherwise. If not otherwise, then all things happen by necessity; but if otherwise, then God's foreknowledge is fallible or changeable. But a thing can happen otherwise, because it can happen otherwise than it does; but it happens as it was foreknown; it follows that it can happen otherwise than is foreknown.—RESPONSE. To this we say that that phrase can bear different meanings, namely 'it can happen otherwise than God foreknew,' and similar ones: like, 'it is possible for what God foreknew not to be,' and 'it is impossible for what God foreknew not to be,' and 'it is impossible for all things that happen not to be foreknown,' and suchlike. For these expressions can be understood conjunctively, so that a condition is implicit, and disjunctively. For if you understand as follows: 'It cannot happen otherwise than God foreknew,' that is, both cannot be true at the same time, namely that what God had foreknown would happen happens otherwise, then your understanding is true. But if you understand it disjunctively, so that you say that a thing cannot happen otherwise than it does, [and] how God foreknew it would, then this is false. For a thing can happen otherwise than it does, and yet God foreknew that it would happen in this way.—Determine in a similar way the other phrases as well, namely 'it is impossible for a thing not to happen which God foreknew, or as God foreknew it': if you understand it conjunctively, you speak the truth; if disjunctively, then falsely.—So also that other phrase, 'it is impossible for all that happens not to be

[1]Above, c1 n3.

foreknown,' that is, both cannot be true at the same time, namely that it should happen and not be foreknown: this meaning is true. But if you say that God could not foreknow all that happens, this is false. For he could have made it not happen, and so it would not be foreknown.

DISTINCTION XXXIX

Chapter 1 (175)

1. WHETHER GOD'S KNOWLEDGE CAN BE INCREASED OR DIMINISHED, OR BE CHANGED IN ANY WAY: FOR IT SEEMS THAT EITHER ANSWER CAN BE PROVED. Moreover, it is usual to ask whether God's knowledge can be increased or diminished: for it seems that either answer can be proved. That divine knowledge can be increased or changed is proved in this way: that God is capable of knowing what he in no way knows. For there is a person who is not going to lecture today, and yet it can be that he lecture today: for he is capable of lecturing today. But nothing is capable of being done which cannot be known by God. It follows that God is able to know that this person is going to lecture today; and thus he is able to know something which he does not know; and so it follows that his knowledge can be increased or changed.—It seems that the same knowledge can also be diminished. For there is a person who is going to lecture today, whom God knows to be about to lecture; but it can be that he does not lecture; it follows that God is able not to know this person will lecture. And so he is able not to know something which he knows; it follows that his knowledge can be diminished or changed.

2. RESPONSE AND DETERMINATION. To which we say that God's knowledge is entirely unchangeable, and it can be neither increased nor diminished. Indeed, as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15, "God's knowledge is his wisdom itself, and his wisdom is the very essence or substance of God; because in the wonderful simplicity of his nature, it is not one thing to be wise and another to be, but to be wise is the same as to be."[1] Therefore "the Word knows all things that the Father knows; but for him to know, as to be, is from the Father. For to be and to know is there one thing. And so for the Father, just as to be is not from the Son, so neither is to know. Hence the Father, as if uttering himself, generated a Word equal to himself in all things. For he would not have uttered himself wholly and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in his Word than in himself. It follows that this Word is entirely what the Father is, and yet

[1]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c13 n22.

he is not the Father, because the one is the Son, and the other is the Father. And so the Father and the Son know mutually, but the one by generating, the other by being born. And each of them sees simultaneously all things which are in their knowledge, in their wisdom, in their essence, not piecemeal or one at a time, as if turning the gaze from here to there, and then from there to here, or from one object to another, so as not to be able to see some things, except by not seeing others; but each sees simultaneously all things, of which there is none which he does not always see"[2] and know. And so his knowledge can neither be lost, nor changed.—"But our knowledge is capable of being lost and acquired, because to be is not the same for us as to know. Therefore, as our knowledge is unlike God's knowledge, so our word, which is born from our knowledge, is unlike that Word which is from the Father who is knowledge."[3]

3. From this authority, it is clearly shown that God's knowledge is entirely unchangeable, just as God's very essence is entirely unchangeable; and that the Father and the Son, with the Holy Spirit, know and see all things simultaneously. And so, just as the divine essence cannot be increased or diminished, in the same way the divine knowledge cannot be. And yet it is granted that he is able to know what he does not know, and that he is able not to know what he knows; because something which is not can be subject to his knowledge, and something which is can be not subject, without change in the knowledge itself.

Chapter 2 (176)

1. OBJECTION: WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW OR FOREKNOW SOMETHING NEWLY OR IN TIME. Here, some make the following objection: If God can know or foreknow something which he never knew or foreknew, then it follows that he can know or foreknow something in time.

2. To which we say: God can know or foreknow all that he is able to do, and he is able to do what he will never do; and so he is able to know or foreknow that which he will never do, and that which neither is, nor was. And he neither knows or knew that thing, nor foreknows or foreknew it, because his knowledge is not of anything other than things which are or were or will be; and his foreknowledge is only of future things. And although he can know or foreknow what never is nor will be, yet he cannot know or foreknow something in time. He can certainly know or foreknow what never is nor will be, and that is neither known or foreknown from eternity; and yet he cannot begin to know or foreknow that thing; but he can know or foreknow it now in such a way as he is able to have known or

[2]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c14 n23.
[3]Ibid., bk 15 c13 n22.

foreknown it from eternity. For if you say that he can now know or foreknow what he did not know or foreknow from eternity, that is, in such a way that he had not known or foreknown it from eternity, as if both could be true simultaneously, this is false. But if you say that he can now know or foreknow what he did not know or foreknow from eternity, that is, that he has the power of knowing and foreknowing something from eternity and now, and yet the thing foreknown neither is, nor will be, this is true. And so he cannot know or foreknow something newly or in time, just as he cannot will something newly or in time; and yet he can will what he has not previously willed.

Chapter 3 (177)

WHETHER GOD CAN KNOW MORE THINGS THAN HE KNOWS. Also, it is said by some that God can know more things than he knows, because he can know all things which he knows, and he is able to make other things which will never be, and he can know them: for he cannot make things which are unknown. But if the things which now are were, and he made some others which are not and will not be, and he were to know all those, assuredly he would know more things than he now knows. And yet his knowledge cannot be increased, because all this can be done without change in knowledge. Therefore it is established that God's knowledge is entirely unchangeable, and cannot be increased or diminished, but the things subject to it can be.

Chapter 4 (178)

1. AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION TO THAT SENTENCE IN WHICH IT WAS SAID ABOVE THAT GOD ALWAYS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY KNOWS ALL THINGS. As to what was said above,[1] namely that God always and simultaneously sees all things, it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says in his *Exposition on Habacuc*: "It is absurd to bring God's majesty down to this, that he knows each moment how many gnats are born and how many die, what the population of lice and flies is, and how many fish swim in the sea, and such things. Let us not be such fatuous flatterers of God that, as we thrust his providence even into the lowest things, we should cause injury to ourselves, saying that the providence of irrational and rational creatures is the same."[2] Here Jerome appears to say that God does not have a knowledge or providence of those very small things; if this is so, then he does not know all things always and simultaneously.

[1]See the text of Augustine, above, c1 n2.
[2]Jerome, *Expositio in Habacuc*, bk 1 c1 vers. 13-14.

2. HOW THE ABOVE WORDS OF JEROME ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. And we know that Jerome's statement is made in the sense of denying that God knows those things individually or particularly. Neither does he know those things at different moments in time, as at various moments some of them die and some of them begin. Nor does he provide for those and other irrational creatures, as he does for rational ones. As the Apostle says: *For does God have a care for the oxen?*[3] And as God does not have a care for the oxen, so neither does he for other irrational creatures. And yet Scripture says that God's *care is for all things*.[4] And so he has providence and care universally for all the things which he made, so that each of them should have what is owed to, and suitable for, it. But he has special providence and care for rational creatures, concerning whom he handed down precepts, and he prescribed a law of right living for them and promised them rewards. He does not have such providence and care for irrational creatures. And so the Apostle says that *God does not have a care for the oxen*. And yet he provides for and takes care of all, that is, he governs all things, *who makes his sun to rise* and gives rain for all.[5] And God knows how great the population of lice, gnats, flies, and fishes is, and how many are born and die; but he does not know this at each single moment, but he knows all things simultaneously and always. Neither does he know so as to have the same providence for irrational and rational creatures, that is, that he provide in entirely the same way for irrational and rational creatures. For he gave the precepts to rational creatures, and he delegated Angels to watch over them.

3. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE AFOREGOING WITH THE ADDITION OF SOME OTHER MATTERS. And so God knows simultaneously and unchangeably all things that were, are, and will be, both good and evil; he also foreknows all future things, both good and evil.

4. WHAT PREDESTINATION IS AND IN WHAT IT DIFFERS FROM FOREKNOWLEDGE. But predestination is about the goods of salvation and about the men to be saved. For as Augustine says, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*, "predestination is the preparation of grace, which cannot be without foreknowledge; but there can be foreknowledge without predestination. For God foreknew by predestination all the things which he would do; but God also foreknew all the things which he would not do, that is, all evil things."[6] He predestined those whom he elected, but he reprobated the rest, that is, he foreknew that they would sin to eternal death.

[3]1 Cor. 9, 9.
[4]Wis. 12, 13.
[5]Cf. Mt. 5, 45.
[6]Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c10 n19.

DISTINCTION XL

Chapter 1 (179)

1. WHETHER ANY OF THE PREDESTINED MAY BE DAMNED OR ANY OF THE REPROBATED BE SAVED. It seems that none of the predestined may be damned, and none of the reprobated be saved. Hence Augustine, in the book *On Correction and Grace*, says: "It is said in the Apocalypse: *Hold fast to what you have, lest another take your crown.*[1] If another will not receive it, unless this one were to lose it, the number of the elect is certain,"[2] that is, it cannot be increased or diminished.

2. OBJECTION. But some who strive to prove that the number of the elect may be increased or diminished object to this as follows: God is able not to grant grace to those to whom he grants it, and he can take it away from those from whom he does not take it away; if he were to do this, they would be certainly damned. And these could be damned, who nevertheless shall be saved; therefore the number of the elect is capable of being diminished. So also it could be increased, because grace might be granted to those to whom it is not, by which they would be saved; and so they might be saved by receiving grace, who nevertheless will be damned without it; therefore the number of the elect is capable of being increased.

3. RESPONSE. We respond to them that the reason it is said, and it is true, that the number of the elect cannot be increased or diminished is that both cannot be true at the same time: namely that anyone should be saved and not be predestined, or that anyone should be predestined and be damned. For an understanding of the implicit condition reveals truth in the statement and impossibility in reality. But if it is simply understood, the impossibility is not admitted, as when we say: 'One predestined can or cannot be damned' and 'One reprobated can be saved.' For in these and other sentences of this type, the meaning of the statement is to be determined from the reason for speaking. And indeed, one meaning will be expressed if these statements are taken conjunctively, and another if disjunctively, as was examined above in discussing foreknowledge.[3] For if, when you say, 'One predestined cannot be damned,' you understand it as follows: that is, it cannot be that he be predestined and damned, you speak the truth, because you understand them conjunctively; but it is false if you do so disjunctively, as if you understand that this person whom I say to be predestined cannot be damned. For he could have been not predestined, and so he would be damned.

[1]Apoc. 3, 11.
[2]Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c13 n39.
[3]Dist. 38 c2 n2.

4. HOW THEY FOLLOW UP ON THEIR QUESTION. And yet they continue to press and, arguing on the basis of conjunction, they proceed as follows: It cannot be that anyone should be predestined and be damned. Both of these cannot be true simultaneously, but one of them cannot not be; namely, that such a person not be predestined; for he was predestined from eternity, and he cannot now not be predestined. Therefore since it is impossible that both be true simultaneously, and it is impossible for one not to be true, it seems that the other cannot be, namely, that he be damned. If this is so, then it cannot be true that he will not be saved.

5. SOLUTION, ON WHICH HE WOULD RATHER HEAR OTHERS THAN TEACH. On the solution to this question, I would prefer to hear others than to teach. Yet we say that a question similar to the one on foreknowledge can be brought forward; and so we make the same response both here and there, saying that we must determine that on which this whole question rests, namely 'it is impossible for one of them not to be true,' namely that he is not now predestined: for he was predestined from eternity. For a distinction is to be made when he says: 'he cannot now not be predestined' or 'it cannot now be true that he is not predestined.' The latter can be understood both conjunctively and disjunctively. For it cannot be true that he was predestined from eternity and now he is not predestined, nor can it be true simultaneously that he is predestined and he is not predestined; but yet it could be true from eternity that he was not predestined, and he could have been not predestined from eternity. And as from eternity God was able not to predestine him, so it is granted by some that even now God is able not to have predestined him from eternity. And so God is able not to have predestined him; therefore, that person is able not to have been predestined. But if he had not been predestined, he would not be predestined; and so he is able now not to be predestined. They say the same about foreknowledge and the foreknown. They do not at all grant it in the actions or operations of God and men. For from the fact that something is done or said, they do not grant that it is able not to be or not to have been done; indeed, it is impossible that what is done or said should not be or not have been, referring its possibility or impossibility to the nature of an existent thing. But when we deal with God's foreknowledge or predestination, its possibility or impossibility is referred to the power of God, which was and is ever the same, because predestination, foreknowledge, power is one thing in God.

Chapter 2 (180)

1. WHAT GOD'S REPROBATION IS AND IN WHAT SUBJECTS IT IS CONSIDERED, AND WHAT THE EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION IS. Predestination is the preparation of grace, that is, divine election, by which God elected whom

he willed *before the foundation of the world*, as the Apostle says.[1] Conversely, reprobation is to be understood as the foreknowledge of the iniquity of some and the preparation of their damnation.—HERE IS STATED WHAT THE EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION IS. For the effect of predestination is that grace by which we are justified in the present and are assisted to live rightly and to persevere in the good, and also the grace by which we are blessed in the future. HERE [IS STATED] ACCORDING TO WHAT REPROBATION IS CONSIDERED. Similarly, God's reprobation, by which he has reprobated some from eternity by not electing them, is considered according to two things, of which he foreknows one, but does not prepare it, that is, iniquity; the other he foreknows and prepares, namely eternal punishment.—Hence Augustine, *To Prosper and Hilary*, says: "This rule is to be held without breach, that sinners are foreknown to be in their sin, and not prepared, but their punishment is prepared."[2] As Augustine says, in the book *On the Good of Perseverance*: "For God in his foreknowledge prepared his good things for those whom he willed; and undoubtedly he foreknew that he would grant them to whomever he grants them."[3] As Fulgentius says: "God also prepared the eternal fire for the evil ones, for those whom he justly and assuredly prepared to suffer torments, yet he did not prepare them to commit sins. For God prepared what divine equity would render, not what human iniquity would allow. For as he prepared the saints for the reception of justice, he did not prepare sinners for the loss of justice, because he was never the preparer of depravity."[4]—AUGUSTINE IN THE BOOK, *ON THE GOOD OF PERSEVERANCE*. And so God's predestination properly speaking "is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits by which all those who are freed are most assuredly freed."[5] Similarly, God's reprobation is the foreknowledge of boundless malice in some and the preparation of punishment without end.

2. THAT OBDURACY IS IN SOME WAY THE EFFECT OF REPROBATION. And as the effect of predestination is the conferral of grace, so the effect of eternal reprobation seems to be in some way obduracy.

3. HOW GOD IS SAID TO MAKE OBDURATE. As Augustine says, *To Sixtus*: "God does not make obdurate by imparting malice, but by not imparting grace," since they are not worthy of it. "For those to whom it is not imparted are neither worthy, nor deserving, of it; rather, they are worthy and deserving of its not being imparted."[6] Hence the Apostle says: *God shows*

[1]Eph. 1, 4.
[2]Ps.-Augustine, *Hypognosticon*, 6 c6 n8.
[3]Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, c17 n41.
[4]Fulgentius, *Ad Monimum*, 1 cc23 and 25.
[5]Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, c14 n35.
[6]Augustine, *Epistola 194*, c3 n14.

mercy on whom he will, and he hardens the hearts of whom he will:[7] by mercy meaning predestination, and especially the effect of predestination, that is, the conferral of grace; and by obduracy, the privation of grace.— For as Augustine says, *To Simplicianus*, it is not to be understood that God so hardens hearts, "as if to compel anyone to sin, but he only does not grant to some sinners the mercy of his justification, and on account of this he is said to make obdurate because he does not have mercy on them, not because he impels them to sin. And he does not have mercy on those to whom, by an equity which is most hidden and most removed from human understanding, he judges that grace shall not be offered";[8] "the Apostle does not explain that equity, but expresses his wonder at it, when he says: *How deep is the wealth of God's wisdom and knowledge!*"[9,10]

DISTINCTION XLI

Chapter 1 (181)

1. WHETHER THERE IS ANY DESERVING OF OBDURACY OR MERCY. AUGUSTINE, IN THE BOOK *TO SIXTUS*. But if "we seek a deserving of obduracy and mercy, we find the deserving of obduracy; but we do not find a deserving of mercy, because there is no" deserving of mercy "lest grace be made empty, if it is not given freely, but is rendered for merits."[1]— Augustine, *Against Julian*: "He has mercy according to freely given grace, but he hardens according to the judgment which is rendered for merits."[2] "And so it is given to be understood that, as God's reprobation is to not will mercy, so for God to make obdurate is to not to have mercy: not that anything is inflicted by him by which man is made worse, but only that that is not granted by which he may become better."[3]

2. HERE HE SUMMARIZES THE ABOVE IN ORDER TO ADD SOME OTHER THINGS. From these, it is plainly shown what the Apostle understood to be mercy, and what obduracy;[4] and that no merit elicits mercy, but obduracy is not without deserving. And by the word 'mercy,' predestination is here understood, and especially the effect of predestination; but by 'ob-

[7]Rom. 9, 18.
[8]Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, 1 q. 2 n16.
[9]Rom. 11, 33.
[10]Augustine, *Epistola 194 (Ad Sixtum)*, c2 n5.

[1]Augustine, *Epistola 194*, c3 n14.
[2]Augustine, *Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem opus imperfectum*, 1 n141.
[3]Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, 1 q. 2 n15.
[4]Rom. 9, 18.

duracy' is understood not God's eternal reprobation itself, which does not result from deserving, but the privation or subtraction of grace, which is in some way the effect of reprobation. Yet, sometimes reprobation is understood as obduracy, just as predestination is taken for its effect, which is the grace conferred, for the grace which is conferred is the effect of predestination.—And so, since no actions are deserving of the grace which is conferred on man for his justification, much less can there be any actions deserving of that very predestination by which God elects those whom he will from eternity. Similarly, [there are no actions deserving] of the reprobation by which he foreknew from eternity that certain people would be evil and damnable.

3. HE PROPOSES THE EXAMPLE OF JACOB AND ESAU, SAYING THAT GOD NEITHER ELECTED THE ONE, NOR REPROBATED THE OTHER BECAUSE OF MERITS. Just as he elected Jacob and reprobated Esau,[5] which was not because of the merits which they then had, because they had none, since they did not even exist. Neither was it because of future merits that he foresaw that he either elected the one, or reprobated the other.

Chapter 2 (182)

1. THE OPINION OF SOME, WHICH AUGUSTINE HELD FOR A WHILE, BUT WHICH HE AFTERWARDS RETRACTED. But some have held the opinion that God elected Jacob because he foreknew that he would be such as to believe in him and serve him. Augustine, in the book of *Retractations*, says that he shared this opinion for a time;—there, he shows plainly that, if Jacob had been elected because of his future merits, then his election would no longer be from grace: and so he was not elected by God because of what he was going to become, but he became such because of his election.—Augustine says as follows: "In discussing what God had elected in the one who was not yet born, to whom he said that his elder brother would serve him, and what in that same elder brother, whom he reprobated while he too was not yet born, I began to think about it in such a way that I said: 'And so God did not, in his foreknowledge, elect the works of any man, which he himself would give, but, in his foreknowledge, he elected faith, and he elected the one whom he foreknew would believe in him, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit so that, by working good things, he would also obtain eternal life.'"[1]

2. HE EXPLAINS THE MEANING OF THE ABOVE. See, here he plainly says that God elected Jacob not because of works, but because of the faith by

[5]Cf. Malach. 1, 2-3; also, Rom. 9, 13.

[1]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c23 n2.

which God foreknew that he would believe.—AUGUSTINE'S RETRACTION IN THE SAME. But because there is merit in faith, as also in works, Augustine retracted this, saying: "I had not yet more diligently inquired, nor yet discovered, what the election of grace is, concerning which the Apostle says: *The remnants shall be saved by the election of grace.*[2] This is not at all grace, if it proceeds from merit, so that what is given not according to grace, but according to merit, is rendered for merits rather than [freely] given. Immediately afterwards, I said: 'For the same Apostle says: *The same God who works all things in all*;[3] but nowhere is it said: God believes all things in all'; and next I added: 'And so, what we believe is ours, but whatever good we do is his who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe.' Assuredly, I would not have said this, if I had already known that even faith itself is found among the gifts of God which are given in the same Spirit. And so each is ours because of the free choice of the will, and each is given through the Spirit of faith and charity.—And I said, a little afterwards: 'For it is ours to believe and will, but it is his to give to those who believe and will the faculty of doing good works through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured forth in our hearts.'[4] And this is indeed true, but by the same rule, each of them is also his, because he himself prepares the will; and each of them is ours because neither happens unless we will it."[5] And so even the merit of faith comes from God's mercy. Therefore it is not because of faith or any merits that God has elected some from eternity or has conferred his grace of justification in time, but he has elected by his freely given goodness that they should be good. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints*: "It was not because he foreknew that we would be such that he elected us, but in order that we should be such by the very election of his grace, by which *he granted us favour in his beloved Son.*"[6,7]

3. THAT THIS SEEMS CONTRARY TO WHAT AUGUSTINE SAYS ELSEWHERE. But these words seem to be opposed to what Augustine says on that text of the prophet Malachias: *I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau*:[8] "*He has mercy on whom he wills and he hardens whom he wills.*[9] But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, because although sinners formed one mass on account of universal sin, yet there is some difference among them. And so something precedes

[2]Rom. 11, 5.
[3]1 Cor. 12, 6.
[4]Cf. Rom. 5, 5.
[5]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c23 nn2-3.
[6]Eph. 1, 6.
[7]Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c19 n38.
[8]Malach. 1, 2-3.
[9]Rom. 9, 18.

in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, yet they are made worthy of justification; and also in other sinners something precedes by which they are worthy of being crushed."[10] See, here Augustine seems to say that the very will of God, by which he elects some and reprobates others, comes from merits, but most hidden ones; that is, that it is because of merits that he willed to elect some and to reprobate others; and because of merits that the grace of justification is conferred on some, but not on others, and so the latter are crushed.

4. IT CAN BE SAID THAT HE RETRACTED THIS. But it is not known what Augustine meant by this, unless perhaps it might be said that he meant that what we have said above was retracted. For in the same text he next adds some other things as well,[11] which he clearly retracts in the book of *Retractations*;[12] and this will be manifest to anyone reading both works. And so it is plausible that he also retracted this in what is said above.

5. THE STATEMENT MAY ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE FOLLOWING SENSE. But it may also be understood to have been said in the following sense: not that anyone is predestined because of merits or deserves the grace of justification, but that some are not so evil as to deserve that grace should not be bestowed on them. For no one can deserve God's grace by which he is justified; but he can deserve that it should not be conferred on him and that he be entirely cast out. Indeed, some have reached such a depth of iniquity that they deserve this and are worthy of this; but others live in such a way that, although they may not deserve the grace of justification, yet they do not deserve to be entirely rejected and that grace be taken away from them. That is why Augustine said that 'in some sinners something precedes by which they are worthy of justification, and in others by which they are worthy of being crushed.' But this is frivolous.

6. THE FALSE OPINION OF SOME WHO DISCUSS THE HIDDEN THINGS OF GOD IN A CARNAL WAY. AUGUSTINE, *ON THE WORDS OF THE APOSTLE*. "But many people, seeking to plumb the depths and wishing to scale the inscrutable height of God's judgments in accordance with the conjectures of their own hearts, became lost in vain tales. They said that souls sin in heaven above, and are assigned to bodies as they have deserved by their sins, and are, as it were, jailed in the prisons of which they are worthy. Such ones went after their own thoughts[13] and, wishing to dispute concerning the depth of God, were cast into the depths, saying that souls had lived in heaven before and had done some good or evil there, and have been cast into earthly bodies as they have deserved. But the Catholic

[10]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 68 n4.
[11]Ibid., q. 68 n5.
[12]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c26.
[13]Cf. Jer. 18, 12.

faith rejects this, because of the clear assertion of the Apostle, in which he says: *Since they had not yet been born, they had done nothing good or evil*,"[14] etc.;[15] "and so a faithful ignorance is better than a presumptuous knowledge."[16]

7. FROM THE AFOREGOING SECTIONS, HE CONCLUDES HIS ARGUMENT CONCERNING PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION, NAMELY, THAT THEY ARE NOT FROM MERITS. And so God elected whom he willed by a freely given mercy, not because they would be faithful in the future, but so that they might be faithful; and he gave grace to them not because they were faithful, but that they might become so.—Augustine, in the book of *Retractations*: "For the Apostle says: *I have obtained mercy so that I might be faithful*;[17] he does not say: *because I was faithful.* Mercy is indeed given to a faithful man, but it is given even earlier so that he might be faithful."[18] Similarly, too, God reprobated whom he willed, not because of their eventual deserving which he foresaw, "and yet by a most rightful truth which is far from our understanding."[19]

8. QUESTION. But it is asked whether, as it is said that he elected some so that they might become good and faithful, must it also be granted that he reprobated some that they might become evil and faithless and hardened to sin.—RESPONSE. This is not at all to be granted: for reprobation is not the cause of evil in the same way as predestination is the cause of good; neither does obduracy make a man evil in the same way as mercy makes him good.

Chapter 3 (183)

1. WHETHER WHAT GOD ONCE KNOWS OR FOREKNOWS HE ALWAYS KNOWS AND FOREKNOWS AND ALWAYS KNEW AND FOREKNEW. Moreover, it needs to be considered whether all things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and knew and foreknows and foreknew, or whether he knew or foreknew once what he no longer knows or foreknows.

2. HE ANSWERS FIRST REGARDING FOREKNOWLEDGE, SAYING THAT GOD DOES NOT FOREKNOW FOREVER WHAT HE ONCE FOREKNEW. We answer first regarding foreknowledge, saying that God foreknew many things which he does not now foreknow. For since his foreknowledge concerns only future things, from the moment that those future things become

[14]Rom. 9, 11.
[15]Augustine, *Sermo 165,* c5 n6.
[16]Augustine, *Sermo 27*, c3 n4 .
[17]1 Cor. 7, 25.
[18]Augustine, *Retractationes*, bk 1 c23 n4.
[19]Cf. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, 1 q2 n16.

present or past, they cease to be subject to God's foreknowledge; but they are always subject to his knowledge. And so God foreknew from eternity all things that would be, and he does not cease to foreknow them until they cease to be future. And when he ceases to foreknow some things which he foreknew before, he does not know them less than he knew them before. For it is not from a lack in his knowledge that we say that he foreknew some things at some time which he does not foreknow now, but by reason of the term 'foreknowledge': for to foreknow is to know something before it happens; and so God cannot be said to foreknow anything other than future things.

3. HERE REGARDING KNOWLEDGE, SAYING THAT GOD ALWAYS KNOWS WHAT HE KNOWS AT ANY TIME. But we say otherwise concerning knowledge. For God always knows all things that he knows at any time: for he always had, has, and will have all knowledge that he has at any time.

4. OBJECTION. But the following objection is made to this: He once knew that this man was going to be born, who is now born; he does not know now that he is going to be born; and so he knew something which he does not know now. Also, he knew that the world was going to be created; he does not know now that it is going to be created; and so he knew something which he does not now know. And an infinite number of other such examples could be adduced.—HE RESOLVES IT. But to this we say that he knows the same even now about this man's birth and the world's creation as he knew before they happened, although it is necessary to express this knowledge of his then and now by different terms. For what was then future is now past; and so the words must be changed to designate this. Similarly, when we speak at different times, we sometimes designate the same day by the adverb 'tomorrow,' when it is still to come; sometimes we call it 'today,' when it is the present; sometimes we call it 'yesterday,' when it is past. And so, before the world was created, God knew it would be created; after its creation, he knows it has been created. And yet this is not to know different things, but entirely the same thing about the world's creation. Similarly, the ancient Fathers [of the Old Testament] believed that Christ would be born and would die, but we believe that he has already been born and died; and yet they and we do not believe different things, but the same. "For," as Augustine says, "the times have changed," and so the words have changed, "but not the faith."[1] And so let us hold without a doubt that God always knows all things which he knows at any time.

[1]Augustine, *In Ioannem*, tr. 45 n9.

DISTINCTION XLII

Chapter 1 (184)

ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD: WHERE FIRST IT IS CONSIDERED WHY HE IS CALLED OMNIPOTENT. Now we must treat of God's omnipotence: where the first consideration which occurs is how God is truly called omnipotent: whether because he can do all things, or because he can only do all things that he wills.—That God can do all things is proved by several authorities. For as Augustine says in the book, *Questions of the Old and New Law*: "God can certainly do all things, but he only does those which are in accordance with his truth and justice."[1] The same in the same: "God could do all things at once, but reason," that is, his will, "forbade it."[2] He no doubt called his will reason there because God's will is reasonable and most equitable. And so it is to be professed that God can do all things.

Chapter 2 (185)

1. HOW GOD CAN BE SAID TO BE ABLE TO DO ALL THINGS, SINCE WE CAN DO MANY THINGS WHICH HE CANNOT DO. But it is asked how he may be said to be able to do all things, since we can do some things which he is not able to do: for he cannot walk, speak, and suchlike, which are entirely alien from the nature of the divinity because an incorporeal and simple substance cannot at all have the organs for these things.—RESPONSE. I believe it is to be answered to them that such actions, namely walking and speaking and suchlike, are not alien from the power of God, but pertain to it. For although God cannot have these actions in himself (for he cannot walk or speak and suchlike), yet he can work them in creatures: he makes man walk and speak and suchlike. And so nothing is taken away from divine power through such actions because almighty God can do even these things.

2. OBJECTION CONCERNING OTHER MATTERS. But there are some other things which God cannot at all do, like sins: for he cannot lie and he cannot sin.—HE RESOLVES IT. But nothing is taken away or derogated from God's omnipotence in any way by this, if he is said to be unable to sin, because this would not be a matter of power, but of weakness: for if he could do this, he would not be omnipotent. Therefore, the fact that he cannot do such things is not to be ascribed to powerlessness, but to power. Hence Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 15: "It is a great

[1]I.e., Ambrosiaster, *Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti*, q. 97.
[2]Ibid., q. 106.

power of God that he cannot lie."[3] For there are some faculties which are to be attributed to power in some things, but not at all in others; and what is praiseworthy in some is reprehensible in others. And so God is not less powerful by being unable to sin, because one who can do so is not at all omnipotent.

3. AN OBJECTION CONCERNING SOME FURTHER MATTERS. There are also some other things which God cannot do; and so it seems that he cannot do all things, for he cannot die or be mistaken.—Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Creed*: "Almighty God cannot die, cannot be mistaken, cannot become miserable, cannot be defeated. But far be it that the omnipotent one be able to do these and suchlike things!"[4] For if he could be subject to such passions and defects, he would not at all be omnipotent, and so he is shown to be omnipotent because these things cannot touch him; but he can work such things in others.

Chapter 3 (186)

1. THAT GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE IS CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO TWO [ASPECTS]. To those who consider it diligently, his omnipotence appears here according to two [aspects], namely that he does all that he wills, and that he suffers nothing at all. God is most truly said to be omnipotent according to either [aspect] because there is nothing which is able to corrupt him so that he suffer, nor anything that can impede his action. And so it is manifest that God can suffer nothing and is able to do all things, except for those alone by which his dignity would be harmed, or that would derogate from his excellence; yet he is not less omnipotent because of this: for to be able to do this would not be power, but lack of power. And so let no one presume to say that God is powerless in any way, for he can do all things which it pertains to power to be able to do; and so he is truly called omnipotent.

2. IT IS HANDED DOWN BY SOME AUTHORITIES THAT HE IS CALLED OMNIPOTENT BECAUSE HE CAN DO WHATEVER HE WILLS. And yet it is handed down by some authorities that God is truly called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills. Hence Augustine, in the *Enchiridion*: "For he is not truly called omnipotent for any other reason than because he can do whatever he wills, nor is the carrying out of his almighty will impeded by the will of any creature whatsoever."[1]—The same [Augustine] in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*: "God cannot do unjust things because he is

[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 15 c15 n24.
[4]Augustine, *Sermo 214*, n4.

[1]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c96.

the highest justice and goodness. Indeed, he is omnipotent not because he can do all things, but because he can accomplish whatever he wills, so that nothing can stand in the way of the achievement of his will, or impede it in any way at all."[2]—John Chrysostom, in a homily *On the Exposition of the Creed*, says: "He is called omnipotent because his power cannot find what it cannot do; as the Prophet says: *He made all things that he willed*;[3] it follows that he is omnipotent [in the sense] that he can do all things that he wills."[4] Hence the Apostle says: *Who shall resist his will?*[5] By these authorities, it appears to be shown that God is called omnipotent only by the fact that he can do all that he wills, not because he can do all things.

3. DETERMINATION OF THE ABOVE AUTHORITIES. But to this, it can be said that Augustine, when he says: 'He is not called omnipotent because he can do all things,' etc., took 'all things' so broadly and generally as to include even evil things, which God neither wills to, nor can, do. And so he did not deny that God can do all things which it is fitting for him to be able to do.—Similarly, when he says: 'For he is not truly called omnipotent for any other reason than because he can do whatever he wills,' he does not deny that he can also do those things which he does not will. But against those who said that God willed many things which he was not able to do, Augustine affirms that he can do whatever he wills, and it is from this, and not for some other reason, that he is called truly omnipotent, because he can do whatever he wills.

4. HOW IT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: HE CAN DO WHATEVER HE WILLS. But beware how you understand: 'he can do whatever he wills,' whether as whatever he wills himself to be able to do, or whatever he wills to do, or whatever he wills to be done. For if you say that he is called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills himself to be able to do, then Peter can now similarly be called omnipotent, or any of the blessed Saints, because he can do whatever he wills himself to be able to do, and he can do whatever he wills to do. For he does not will to do other than what he does, nor to be able to do other than what he is able to do. But he cannot do whatever he wills to be done: for he wills that those who are to be saved be saved, and yet he is not able to save them. But God can do whatever he wills to be done. For if he wills something to be done by himself, he can do it by himself, and does it by himself; just as, because he willed it, he made heaven and earth by himself. But if he wills something to be done through a creature, he also works through it: just as he makes

[2]This text does not occur in *De spiritu et littera*.
[3]Ps. 113, 11.
[4]Actually, John Mediocris, *Sermo 27*.
[5]Rom. 9, 19.

houses and suchlike artificial things through men. And so God is powerful from himself and through himself; but a man or Angel, however blessed, is not powerful from himself and through himself.

5. OBJECTION. But perhaps you will say: Neither the Son of God nor the Holy Spirit is powerful from himself, but the Father alone. For he is powerful from himself who is from himself; but the Son, because he is not from himself, but from the Father, is not powerful from himself but from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both.—HE RESOLVES IT. To which we say that, although the Son is not powerful from himself and does not work from himself, yet he is powerful and works through himself, as is also true of the Holy Spirit. Hence Hilary, in *On the Trinity*, book 9, says: "O heretic, this unity of nature, against which you speak, is such that the Son acts through himself so as not to act from himself, and he does not act from himself so as to act through himself."[6] But he is said to act and be powerful through himself because he has the same natural power as the Father, by which he is powerful and works; but because he has it from the Father and not from himself, therefore he is said to be powerful and act from the Father and not from himself. But a man or Angel has a freely given power by which he is powerful.

6. HERE IT IS FULLY SHOWN WHY GOD IS CALLED OMNIPOTENT. And so God the Trinity is truly and properly called omnipotent because through himself, that is, by his natural power, he is able to do whatever he wills to be done, and whatever he wills himself to be able to do. For he wills nothing to be done which he cannot do through himself or through a creature; and he wills himself to be able to do nothing which he cannot do. And all that he wills to be done, he wills himself to be able to do; but he does not will to be done all that he wills himself to be able to do. For if he willed it, it would be done, because nothing can resist his will.

DISTINCTION XLIII

Chapter 1 (187)

1. THE OPINION OF SOME WHO SAY THAT GOD IS ABLE TO DO NOTHING OTHER THAN WHAT HE DOES. But there are some who, glorying in their own intellect, have attempted to encompass God's power within a limit. For when they say: 'God is able to do thus far and no more,' what is this, other than to enclose and restrict under a limit his power, which is infinite? For they say: God is not able to do other than what he does, nor can

[6]Hilary, *De Trinitate*, bk 9 n48.

he do it better than he does, nor can he omit any of the things which he does. They strive to fortify this opinion of theirs with plausible arguments and imagined causes and even by the witnesses of sacred authorities. (THEIR FIRST REASON.) They say: God is not able to do anything other than what it is good and just to do. But it is not just and good for him to do other than what he does. For if there is something just and good for him to do other than what he does, then he does not do all that it is just and good for him to do. But who would dare to say this?—SECOND REASON. They also add: He cannot do anything other than what his justice requires; but his justice does not require that he do anything other than what he does; and so he cannot do anything other than what he does. The very same justice requires that he not do what he does not do; but he cannot do [anything] against his justice; and so he cannot do any of the things which he leaves undone.

2. RESPONSE TO THE FIRST STATEMENT. But we respond to them by disclosing the double meaning of the words and by explaining what they have left unexplained, as follows: 'God is not able to do anything other than what is good and just,' that is, he cannot do anything other than what, if he were to do it, would be just and good, and this is true. But he is able to do many things which are neither good nor just, because they neither are nor will be, nor are they or will they be well done, because they shall never be done.—RESPONSE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN THE SECOND PLACE. Also, as to that which was proposed in the second place: 'He cannot do anything other than what his justice requires, and he cannot do that which his justice requires that it not be done,' we say that the term 'requires' is neither fittingly said, nor properly understood, in regard to God. And there is a double sense in those phrases.—For if you understand: 'He cannot do anything other than his justice requires,' that is, anything other than his just will wills, you speak falsely. For by God's own justice, a most equitable will is understood, as Augustine understands those words of the Lord speaking to Lot in Genesis: *I can do nothing until you enter there.*[1] He expounds them as follows: "He said that he was not able to do what he, without a doubt, was able to do through his power, but not through his justice";[2] as if to say: he was indeed able, but he did not will it, and that will was just.—But if, by these words, you understand that he is not able to do anything other than what, if it were done, would be consistent with his justice, you speak truly.—Similarly distinguish that phrase: 'He cannot do that which his justice requires that he not do': that is, he is not able to do that which he, who is the highest justice, does not will to do, then this is false. But if you under-

[1]Gen. 19, 22.
[2]Augustine, *Contra Gaudentium*, bk 1 c30 n35.

stand by these words that he cannot do that which cannot be in accordance with his justice, you speak truly.

3. THEIR THIRD REASON. They also add some other things, saying: God cannot do other than what he ought; but he ought not to do anything other than what he does. For if he ought to do other things, then he does not do all that he ought; but if he does all that he ought, and cannot do other than what he ought, then he cannot do other than what he does.—Also, either he ought to leave undone what he does not do, or he ought not to do so. If he ought not to, then he does not rightly leave it undone; but if he ought to so leave it, then he ought not do it. But if he ought not to do it, then it is neither suitable nor necessary that he do it; and if it is neither suitable nor necessary that he do it, then he cannot do it. And so he cannot do other than what he does. Nor can he leave what he does undone so as not to do it, because he ought to do it; and whatever he ought to do, he cannot leave undone.—RESPONSE. But, it seems to me, this word 'ought' is poisoned. For it bears a manifold and complex meaning. Nor does it properly apply to God, who is not our debtor, except perhaps from his own promise; but we are his debtors from what we have done. So that the poison may be drawn, distinguish the word's meaning: 'God cannot do other than what he ought,' that is, other than what he wills, is false: for in this sense he could be said to owe something because he wills it. But if we say: 'He cannot do other than what he ought,' that is, he cannot do other than what, if he were to do it, would be truly suitable for him to do, this is true.

4. THEIR FOURTH REASON. They continue further, saying: He does, or leaves undone, nothing, except by the very best and reasonable of causes, although that may be hidden from us, according to which it is necessary for him to do or leave undone whatever he does or leaves undone. For there is a reason in him by which he does some things and leaves others undone; this reason is eternal and everlasting, apart from which he cannot do or leave anything undone. And so long as that reason remains, he cannot leave undone what he does, nor do what he leaves undone; and so he cannot do other than what he does.—RESPONSE. To this too, we respond by determining the ambiguity of the phrase. For the statement: 'There is a reason or very best of causes in God by which he does all that he does and leaves undone what he leaves undone,' is a true one, because in him the will is most equitable and most right by which he does and leaves undone what he wills, against which he cannot do anything, nor can he do anything apart from it. And he would not do anything at all against it, or apart from it, if he were to leave undone what he does, or do what he leaves undone, but so long as the same reason and cause remained, he could do some things and leave the others undone. For although the reason is in him by which he does some things and leaves others undone, nevertheless he

can, in accordance with the same reason, leave undone the things which he does and do what he leaves undone.

5. THEY PRESS THEIR QUESTION FURTHER. But they add: There is reason for him to do what he does and not other things; and he cannot do other than what there is reason for him to do; and so he cannot do other than what he does. Also, there is reason for him to leave undone what he leaves undone; and he cannot not leave undone what there is reason for him to so leave; and so he cannot not leave undone what he so leaves.—RESPONSE. To this too, we say that the phrases are ambiguous and so in need of determination. For if, in saying: 'He cannot do other than what there is reason for him to do,' you understand that he cannot do other than what is reasonable and what, if it were done, would be reasonable, then the sense is true. But if you understand that he cannot do different reasonable and good things, other than the ones which he wills and does, then the understanding is false.

6. ANOTHER REASON OF THEIRS. They also add something else, saying: If God can do other than what he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow; and if he can do what he did not foreknow, then he can work without foreknowledge, because he does all that he foreknew that he would do, and he does not do anything which he did not foreknow. And if it is impossible for anything to be done apart from his foreknowledge, then it is necessary that all that is foreknown be done; and so it is not possible by any reason for anything other than what is done to be done; and so nothing other than what is done can be done by God.—THIS QUESTION IS EASILY DETERMINED FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE. But this question on foreknowledge can be easily determined by what was said above in the treatment of foreknowledge.[3]

7. THEY USE AUTHORITIES TO ASSERT THEIR OPINION. But these searchers, who *undid their searches by their searching*,[4] put forth the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says, in the book *On the Creed*: "This alone God cannot do: what he does not will."[5] By which it appears that he cannot do other than what he wills. But he does not will other than what he does; and so it seems that he cannot do other than what he does.—HOW THE AUTHORITY IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD. But that text is to be understood as follows: 'That alone God cannot do: what he does not will,' namely [does not will] himself to be able to do.

8. AUGUSTINE. The same, in the *Confessions*, book 8, speaking to God, says: "Nor are you compelled unwilling to anything, because your will is

[3]Dist. 38-39.
[4]Ps. 63, 7.
[5]Augustine, *Sermo 214*, n3.

not greater than your power; but it would be greater if you were greater than yourself."[6] From this, it appears that God is not able to do more than he wills, just as he does not will to do more than he is able to do. For just as his will is not greater than his power, so also his power is not greater than his will; and so, just as he does not will to do more things than he is able to do, so they say that he is not able to do more things than he wills. —Response. But to this we say that his will is not greater than his power, nor his power than his will, because his power and his will is one and the same thing, namely God himself, who would be greater than himself if his will were greater than his power, or his power than his will. Nor is it denied by this authority that God is able to do more things than he wills, because more things are subject to his power than to his will. And so let us profess that God can do many things which he does not will, and can leave undone many things which he does.

9. HE CONFIRMS BY AUTHORITIES THAT GOD CAN DO MORE THINGS THAN HE DOES. In order that this may be held more certainly and firmly, let us assert with the testimonies of Scripture that God is able to do more things than he does. Truth itself, according to Matthew, says: *Or do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will give me immediately more than twelve legions of Angels?*[7] From these words, it is patently indicated both that the Son was able to ask what he did not ask, and the Father could provide what he did not provide. And so each of them was able to do what he did not do.—Augustine also says in the *Enchiridion*: "The will of the Almighty is able to do many things which it neither wills nor does. For it could have caused twelve legions of Angels to fight against those who seized Christ."[8]—Also in the same: "Why were miracles not worked in the presence of those who would have repented,[9] if they had been done? And why were they worked in the presence of those men who were not going to believe? What is now hidden will not be hidden then. And certainly it was not unjustly that God did not will them to be saved, although they could have been saved if he had willed it. Then it will be seen in the clearest light of wisdom what the faith of the pious now holds before it can be seen with manifest knowledge: how certain and immutable and most efficacious is the will of God, which can do many things and does not will them, but does not will anything which it cannot do."[10]—The same [Augustine], in the book, *On Nature and Grace*: "The Lord raised Lazarus in the body.[11]

[6]Augustine, *Confessiones*, bk 7 c4 n6.
[7]Mt. 26, 53.
[8]Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c95.
[9]Cf. Mt. 11, 21.
[10]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c95.
[11]Cf. Jn. 11, 43-44.

Is it to be said that he could not raise Judas in the mind? Certainly he could, but he did not will it."[12] By these authorities and many others, it is plainly taught that God is able to do many things which he does not will.

10. THAT GOD IS ABLE TO WILL AND TO DO OTHER THINGS THAN WHAT HE WILLS AND DOES WITHOUT MUTABILITY OF HIS POWER OR WILL. This can also be proved by reason. For God does not will to justify all men, and yet who doubts that he is able to do it? And so God is able to do other than what he does; and yet, if he were to do something different, he would be no different himself. And he is able to will other than what he wills, and yet his will cannot in any way be different, or new, or mutable. For although he is able to will what he never willed, yet he cannot will newly or by a new will, but only by an everlasting one; for he is able to will what he is able to have willed from eternity. For he has the power of willing both now and from eternity; and yet, what he does not will now, he did not will from eternity.

DISTINCTION XLIV

Chapter 1 (188)

1. WHETHER GOD CAN DO ANYTHING BETTER THAN HE DOES. Now it remains to be discussed whether God can do anything better than he does.

2. THEY SAY THAT HE CANNOT. For those same searchers usually say that God cannot do the things he does better [than he does] because, if he were able to do so and did not, he would be envious and not most highly good. And they strive to establish this by analogy. For Augustine says, in the book of *84 Questions*: "God could not generate someone better than himself, for there is nothing better than God; and so he was obliged to generate his equal. For if he willed and could not, then he is weak; if he could and did not will, he is envious. From which we conclude that he generated the Son as his equal."[1] By analogy, they wish to say that, if God is able to do a thing better than he does, he is envious.—But the assumption of this analogy does not hold because he generated the Son from his own substance; that is why, if he had been able to generate an equal and did not do so, he would be envious. But other things, which he does not make from his own substance, he can make them better.

3. THE QUESTION BY WHICH THEY BOX THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER. But here I beseech them to answer why they say that any thing, or even

[12]Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, c7 n8.

[1]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 50.

the whole universe of things, which represents an even greater achievement, cannot be better than it is: either because it is already most highly good, so that no perfection of good whatsoever is lacking from it; or because it is not capable of receiving the greater good which is lacking from it. But if it is said to be most highly good so that no perfection of good is lacking from it, then the creature is to equal the Creator. But if it cannot be better because it is not capable of receiving the greater good which is lacking from it, then this inability itself is a mark of deficiency and not completion; and it can be better, if it is made capable of a better good, which he can do who made it. And so God can make a thing better than he does. Hence Augustine, *On Genesis*: "God could have made man such that he would have been neither able nor willing to sin; and if he had made him such, who doubts that he would have been better?"[2] From the above, it is established that God can also do other things than he does, and that he can do those which he does better than he does.

4. WHETHER HE CAN DO WHAT HE DOES IN ANOTHER OR BETTER WAY. After these matters, it is to be considered whether he can do the things which he does in another or better way than he does.—RESPONSE. If the mode of operation is referred to the wisdom of the maker, then it cannot be other or better. For he cannot do anything differently or better than he does, that is, by another wisdom or by a greater wisdom: for he can do nothing more wisely than he does. But if the mode is referred to the thing itself which God does, we say that there can be another and better way. And according to this, it can be granted that he can do the things which he does better and differently than he does, because he can grant to some a better way of existing, and to others a different one. Hence Augustine, in *On the Trinity*, book 13, says that a different mode for our salvation was possible for God, who can do all things; but none other was more suitable for the healing of our misery.[3] And so God can do some of the things that he does in another and better way, some in another and equally good way, or some even in a less good way than he does: but only if the way is referred to the quality of the work, that is, of the creature, and not to the wisdom of the Creator.

Chapter 2 (189)

1. WHETHER GOD CAN ALWAYS DO WHAT HE WAS ONCE ABLE TO DO. Moreover, it is usual to ask whether God can always do what he was once able to do. This does not seem to be the case to some, who say: God was able to become incarnate, he was able to die and rise again, and other

[2]Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, XI c7 n9.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 13 c10 n13.

such things, which now he cannot do. And so he was able to do what he cannot now do, therefore he had a power which he now does not have: hence it seems that his power is diminished.

2. RESPONSE: JUST AS HE ALWAYS KNOWS WHAT HE ONCE KNEW, AND ALWAYS WILLS [WHAT HE ONCE WILLED], SO HE CAN ALWAYS DO WHAT HE WAS ONCE ABLE TO DO. To which we say that, just as he always knows all the things which he at some time knew, and he always wills what he at some time willed, and he never loses any knowledge or changes the will which he once had, so he can always do all things that he was at some time able to do, and is never deprived of any power of his. Therefore he is not deprived of the power of becoming incarnate or rising again, although he cannot now become incarnate and rise again. For just as he was once able to become incarnate, so he is now able to have been incarnate; in which the power of the same thing is shown.

3. For as he once knew that he would rise again, even now he knows that he has risen again; it is not a different knowledge to have once known that, and now know this, but entirely the same. And just as he once willed to rise again, now [he wills] to have risen again; in which is expressed the will of the same thing. Similarly, he was once able to be born and to rise again; and now he is able to have been born and have risen again; and it is the power of the same thing. For if he were now able to be born and rise again, it would not be the same power. For verbs of different tenses, spoken at different times and with the addition of different adverbs, have the same meaning, as speaking in the present we say: He is able to lecture today; but tomorrow we will say: He is able to have lectured, or he was able to lecture yesterday; where the power of the same thing is shown. But if in speaking at different times, we use verbs of the same tense and the same adverbs, saying today: He is able to lecture today; and saying tomorrow: He is able to lecture today, we say that he is able to do not the same thing, but different ones.

4. And so let us profess that God is always able to do whatever he once could, that is, to have all that power which he once had, and the power of that entire thing which he once had; but he is not always able to do all that which he was at some time able to do: yet he can do or have done what he could at some time do. Similarly, whatever he wills he willed, that is, he even now has the whole will which he once had, and he even now has the will of whatever thing he once had; and yet he does not will to be or to be done all that at some time he willed to be or to be done, but he wills it to have been or to have been done. The same is to be said of God's knowledge.

DISTINCTION XLV

Chapter 1 (190)

ON THE WILL OF GOD, WHICH IS CALLED THE ONE AND ETERNAL ESSENCE OF GOD, AND ON ITS SIGNS. We must now say something about God's will, so far as the weakness of our understanding allows. And it is to be known that God's will or willingness is said according to essence. For it is not one thing for him to will and another to be, but entirely the same thing. And just as it is the same for him to be good and to be God, so it is the same for him to be willing and to be God: indeed, the will by which he is always willing is not an affect or a motion, which cannot be in God, but the divine *usia*, by which he is willing, is God, and suchlike.

Chapter 2 (191)

1. THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS THE SAME FOR GOD TO WILL AND TO BE, YET GOD CANNOT BE SAID TO BE ALL THINGS WHICH HE WILLS. And although it is the same for God to will and to be, yet it is not to be said that God is all things which he wills.

2. THE OBJECTION OF SOME. Some, not understanding rightly of God's will, object to us, saying: if it is the same for God to will and to be, then when we say that God wills all the things which he does, we say that he is all the things that he does; otherwise the same thing is not signified there by that verb [i.e. 'to will'] as is signified by the verb 'to be' when it is said of God. And if it is so, then the verb 'to will' is not always said of God according to essence. But if at times it is not said according to essence, how then is it said of God? For it is never said relatively.

3. A RESPONSE CONTAINING A FULL SOLUTION. To which we say that, although it is entirely the same for God to will and to be, yet he cannot be said to be all the things which he wills; just as it is the same for God to be and to know, yet he cannot be said to be all things in the same way as he is said to know all things.

Chapter 3 (192)

WHAT THE SENSE IS OF THESE WORDS: GOD KNOWS OR GOD WILLS; ALSO, GOD KNOWS ALL THINGS OR WILLS SOME THING, AND WHAT IS PREDICATED OF GOD BY THESE EXPRESSIONS. And wherever God is said to know or to be one who knows, and to will or to be one who wills, these things are said of him according to essence. For in saying: God knows or God wills, or God is one who knows or who wills, the divine essence is predicated and pronounced to be God. But when we add: all things, or some thing,

or some things, and say: God knows all things, or wills some thing or things, the divine essence is predicated not simply and absolutely, but in such a way that all things are shown to be subject to that knowledge, which is that very essence; and that some thing or things are said to be subject to that will, which is that same essence. So the sense is as follows: God knows all things, that is, he is God, to whose knowledge, which is his essence, all things are subject; similarly: God wills these or those things, that is, he is God, to whose will, which is his very self, these or those things are subject. For God is said to be one who wills, or to will, according to essence, whose will is his eternal and immutable essence, although the things which are subject to it change and pass away. This will cannot be unjust or evil, because it is God.

Chapter 4 (193)

1. THAT GOD'S WILL IS THE MOST HIGHLY GOOD CAUSE OF ALL THINGS THAT NATURALLY ARE, AND NO CAUSE FOR IT IS TO BE SOUGHT BECAUSE, BEING ETERNAL, IT HAS NONE. And so this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are, or were, or will be made; and it is preceded by no cause because it is eternal. And so no cause for it is to be sought.

2. HERE HE SAYS WHY ITS CAUSE IS NOT TO BE SOUGHT. For one who seeks its cause seeks something which is greater than it, although there is nothing greater than it. Hence Augustine, in the book of *84 Questions*: "One who asks why God willed to make the world seeks a cause of God's will. But any efficient cause is greater than that which is made; nothing, however, is greater than God's will; and so its cause is not to be sought."[1] The same, in the book *Against the Manichees*: "If any should say: Why did it please God to make heaven and earth? it is to be answered to them who wish to know God's will, and who seek to know the causes and will of God, that God's will is itself the cause of all things that are. For if the will has a cause, then there is something which precedes God's will: which it is iniquitous to believe. And so to one who says: Why did God make heaven and earth? it is to be answered: because he willed it. For God's will is the cause of heaven and earth, and so God's will is greater than heaven and earth. As for the one who says: 'why did he will to make heaven and earth?' he seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found. And so let human boldness restrain itself within its bounds, and not seek that which is not, lest it fail to find that

[1]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 28.

which is."[2] See, by these authorities it is plainly indicated that there is no cause of God's will, and so none is to be sought.

3. THAT GOD'S WILL IS THE FIRST AND HIGHEST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS. "And so the will of God," as Augustine says, in *On the Trinity*, book 3, "is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing is made which does not proceed from the interior and intelligible hall of the most high Emperor according to an ineffable justice."[3] "For where does the wisdom of the omnipotent God not work what it wills, which *reaches from end to end mightily, and sweetly disposes all things*?"[4,5] And not only those things which do not allow for "wonder because of their accustomed continuity,"[6] but also those which seem wonderful because of their rarity and unusual occurrence, "as are the eclipses of sun and moon, and earthquakes, and the births of monstrous animals, and things similar to these; none of which occurs, except by God's will, but this is not clear to many people. And so it pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute them also to other causes, since they were entirely unable to see that cause which is above all others, namely the will of God."[7] And so nothing but "God's will is the first cause of health, illness, rewards and punishments, graces and retributions."[8] This alone is the cause from which all that is has arisen, and it itself has not arisen, but is eternal.

Chapter 5 (194)

1. IN WHAT WAYS GOD'S WILL IS TAKEN IN SCRIPTURE. Here, we must not pass over the fact that sacred Scripture was accustomed to speak of God's will in various ways; and it is not God's will which is different, but the expressions concerning it are different, because Scripture understands different things by the term will.

2. WHAT GOD'S WILL IS TRULY AND PROPERLY CALLED, AND IT IS CALLED GOOD PLEASURE. For God's will is truly and properly called that which is in him and is his essence; and this is one, and it admits neither multiplicity nor change, and it cannot be unfulfilled. Concerning it, the Prophet said: *The Lord made all things that he willed.*[1] And the Apostle: *Who shall resist his will?*[2] And elsewhere: *So that you may test*

[2]Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, bk 1 c2 n4.
[3]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 c4 n9.
[4]Wis. 8, 1.
[5]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 3 c1 n6.
[6]Ibid., bk 3 c2 n7.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ibid., bk 3 c3 n8 and c4 n9.

[1]Ps. 113, 11.
[2]Rom. 9, 19.

what is God's will, good, pleasing, and perfect.[3] And this will is rightly called the good pleasure or disposition of God.

Chapter 6 (195)

1. THAT BY A FIGURE OF SPEECH GOD'S WILL IS CALLED PRECEPT, PROHIBITION, COUNSEL, PERMISSION, OPERATION, AND SO SCRIPTURE SAYS IN THE PLURAL: WILLS. But at times, according to some figure of speech, that is called God's will which is not his will properly speaking, as precept, prohibition, counsel, and permission, and operation. And so Scripture sometimes says in the plural: wills of God. Hence the Prophet: *Great are the works of the Lord, perfect according to all his wills.*[1] Although there is only one will of God, which is he himself, yet it says 'wills' in the plural, because God's will is understood in various ways and for different things, as was said earlier.[2] So also the same Prophet, because of the many effects of mercy and justice, says in the plural: *I shall sing the mercies of the Lord for all eternity*;[3] and elsewhere: *The justices of the Lord are right, rejoicing the hearts*;[4] and yet in God there is only one mercy and one justice, and mercy is the same as justice, namely the divine *usia*.

2. WHY PRECEPT AND PROHIBITION AND COUNSEL ARE CALLED THE WILL OF GOD. But although precept and prohibition and counsel are three things, yet each of them is called 'the will of God' because they are signs of the divine will. In the same way, the signs of anger are called anger, and the signs of love are termed love. And God is said to be angry, and yet there is no anger in him; but the external signs alone, by which he is shown to be angry, are called his anger. And this is a figure of speech according to which what is said is not false; but the truth which is spoken is shadowed under the cloud of the trope. And according to these tropes, there are said to be different wills of God, because different things are named by the trope 'will of God.'

3. WHERE THE WILL OF GOD IS TAKEN FOR PRECEPT AND COUNSEL. The will can be taken for God's precept and counsel there: *Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven*;[5] and there: *Whoever does the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother and sister and mother.*[6] And many

[3]Rom. 12, 2.

[1]Ps. 110, 2.
[2]Above, c5 n1.
[3]Ps. 88, 2.
[4]Ps. 18, 9.
[5]Mt. 6, 10.
[6]Mt. 12, 50.

things are also done against this will. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Spirit and the Letter*, says: "Infidels act against God's will when they do not believe his Gospel."[7]

Chapter 7 (196)

1. THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL THAT MEN DO ALL THINGS WHICH HE COMMANDS, OR NOT DO ALL THAT HE PROHIBITS. Although those three are called God's will by virtue of the fact that they are signs of the divine will, yet it is not to be understood that God wills all to be done which he commanded to any man, or that all that he prohibited not be done. For he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son,[1] and yet he did not will it; and so he did not command it so that it might be done, but so that Abraham's faith might be tested. And in the Gospel he commanded the one who had been healed not to tell anyone,[2] but the man proceeded to shout it everywhere, understanding that God did not forbid it because he did not want his work to be broadcast, but in order to provide the man with an example of refusing human praise.

2. ON PERMISSION AND OPERATION, WHERE THEY ARE CALLED GOD'S WILL. God's permission and operation are also called God's will; Augustine shows how in the *Enchiridion*, saying: "Nothing happens, unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen, or by doing it himself. And it is not to be doubted that God does well even when allowing to be done whatever is done evilly: for he does not allow this without a just judgment, and assuredly all that is just is good."[3]—See, here you have manifestly that God's operation or permission is called his will, when he says 'nothing happens, unless the Almighty wills it to happen,' where he includes all things, both good and evil, which are done. And so he plainly distinguishes in what way he said God to will, lest God be understood to will good and evil things by the same reason, adding: 'either by allowing it to happen': and he says this with regard to evil things, 'or by doing it himself': this with regard to good things. For he allows evil things to be done, but does not do them; but he himself does good things. And so Augustine said that 'he wills' because God willingly allows evil things, and willingly works good things; and because of this, permission and operation are called 'the will of God.'

3. FIVE THINGS ARE SET OUT ABOVE WHICH ARE SAID ACCORDING TO A FIGURE OF SPEECH, AND SO LET THE READER EVERYWHERE DISTINGUISH

[7]Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, c33 n58.

[1]Cf. Gen. 22, 2-12.
[2]Cf. Mk. 1, 44.
[3]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cc95-96.

WHERE WILL IS TAKEN FOR EACH OF THEM. Therefore five things are set out above which are called 'the will of God' according to a figure of speech, because they are signs of the divine will, which is one and immutable, namely God's good pleasure. And so let the reader diligently distinguish, where Scripture makes mention of the will of God, according to what sense it ought to be taken, namely whether for God's good pleasure, or for some sign of it. For much discretion is to be exercised in the recognition of the divine will, because God's good pleasure is his will, and a sign of his good pleasure is called his will. But his good pleasure is eternal, while a sign of his good pleasure is not. And his good pleasure is consonant with the effects of things, and the same effects of things are not discordant with his good pleasure: for all that he wills by his good pleasure to be done is done; and all that he wishes not to be done is by no means done. But it is not the same with the signs, because God commands many to do things which they do not do, and he forbids what they do not avoid, and he counsels what they do not fulfil.

DISTINCTION XLVI

Chapter 1 (197)

THERE SEEM TO BE SOME OBSTACLES TO THAT SENTENCE BY WHICH IT IS SAID THAT GOD'S WILL, WHICH IS GOD HIMSELF, CAN NEVER BE MADE VOID. Here a question arises. For it was said above,[1] and it was strengthened by authorities, that the will of God, which is God himself and is called his good pleasure, cannot be made void, because by that will *he made whatever he willed, in heaven and on earth*;[2] and the Apostle attests that *nothing resists*[3] it.—AUGUSTINE IN THE *ENCHIRIDION*: "And so it is asked how what the Apostle says of the Lord: *Who wills all men to be saved*[4] is to be taken. For since not all are saved, but many are damned, it seems that what God wills to be done is not done, namely because human will impedes the will of God. In the Gospel, the Lord chastises the impious city, saying: *How often did I will to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks, and you did not will it*.[5] Such statements are made as if the will of God were overcome by the will of men, and the most powerful was not able to do what he willed because the weakest stood in

[1]Dist. 45 c5 n2.
[2]Ps. 113, 11.
[3]Rom. 9, 19.
[4]1 Tim. 2, 4.
[5]Mt. 23, 37.

the way with their refusal. Where then is that omnipotence by which, according to the Prophet, *he did whatever he willed, in heaven and on earth*? And how is it that, according to the Apostle, *nothing resists his will*, if he willed to gather the children of Jerusalem and did not do it?"[6] These statements very much seem to contradict what was said earlier.

Chapter 2 (198)

1. SOLUTION: HOW THAT TEXT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: I WILLED TO GATHER [YOUR CHILDREN], AND YOU DID NOT WILL IT. But let us hear the solution; and first, let us see how what the Lord says is to be taken. Augustine, resolving the above question, says in the *Enchiridion*: "For that is not said in the sense that God willed to gather the children of Jerusalem, and what he willed was not done because she did not will it; but rather, she did not will that her children be gathered by him, but despite her refusal, he gathered as many of her children as he willed: because *in heaven and on earth*, it is not the case that he willed some things and did them, and willed others and did not do them, but *he did whatever he willed*";[7] so that the following is the sense: "*How often did I will to gather your children, and you did not will it*, that is, as often as I gathered them, I did so by my always efficacious will and against your will."[8] See, it has been made evident that those words of the Lord are not discordant with what was said earlier.

2. HOW THAT TEXT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD: WHO WILLS ALL MEN TO BE SAVED. Now it remains to see how also the aforementioned words of the Apostle, who, speaking of God, says: *He wills all men to be saved*,[9] do not contradict what was said earlier. Because of these words, many have strayed from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But that text is not to be understood to have been spoken in that sense, as if God had willed some to be saved and they are not saved. —AUGUSTINE IN THE *ENCHIRIDION*: "Who will be so impiously silly as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men into good, whichever, whenever, and wherever he should will it?"[10] "For that which is said in the Psalm, *He did whatever he willed*,[11] is not at all true if he willed some things and did not do them; and what is even more unworthy, that he did not do them because the will of man stood in the way of the Almighty doing what he willed."[12]

[6]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c97.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ordinary gloss on Mt. 23, 37.
[9]1 Tim. 2, 4.
[10]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c98.
[11]Cf. Ps. 113, 11. .
[12]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c95.

3. And so, "when we hear and read in the sacred texts that he wills all men to be saved, we must not therefore take anything away from the all-powerful will of God, but we must understand that text thus: *He wills all men to be saved*,[13] as if it said that no man is saved except whom he wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom he does not will to be saved, but that there is none who is saved except whom he wills to be saved. And so we must pray that he will it, because it must necessarily be done if he willed it."[14] For it is not to be believed that the Almighty willed anything to be done which is not done.—IN THE SAME WAY IS ALSO TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT TEXT: HE ENLIGHTENS EVERY MAN WHO COMES INTO THIS WORLD. "In the same way is also understood that text: *He enlightens every man who comes into this world*:[15] not that there is no man who is not enlightened, but that none is enlightened except by him. This can also be understood in another way, so long as we are not compelled to believe that the Almighty willed anything to be done and it was not done. Setting aside all ambiguities, if, as Truth itself sings out, *he did whatever he willed, in heaven and on earth*,[16] then he certainly did not will to do anything which he has not done."[17] From these words, it is plainly shown that God, by that will which he himself is, does not will anything to be done which is not done, nor anything not to be done which is done.

Chapter 3 (199)

1. WHETHER EVIL THINGS ARE DONE BY GOD'S WILL OR AGAINST HIS WILL. Therefore, since it is settled that all good things which happen do so by his will, and they would not at all be done if he did not will that they should be, it is rightly usual to ask whether all evil things too that are done, that is, sins, are done by God's will or against his will.

2. THAT DIFFERENT THINGS ARE SAID ABOUT THIS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE. SOME SAY THAT GOD WILLS EVIL THINGS TO BE OR TO BE DONE, OTHERS NOT. On this topic, different people feel differently and are found to contradict each other. For some say that God wills evil things to be or to be done, and yet does not will evil; but others say that he does not even will evil things to be or to be done. But both sides agree on this, that they both profess that God does not will evil things. And both rely on reasons and authorities to defend their assertion.

[13]1 Tim. 2, 4.
[14]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c103.
[15]Jn. 1, 9.
[16]Ps. 113, 11.
[17]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c103.

3. WHY SOME SAY THAT GOD WILLS EVIL THINGS TO BE OR TO BE DONE. Those who say that God wills evil things to be or to be done defend their view in the following ways.

4. FIRST REASON OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT GOD WILLS EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE. For if, they say, he did not will evil things to be or to be done, they would in no way be or be done. For if he wills them not to be or be done, and cannot bring it about, namely that they not be or be done, something resists his will and power. And he is not omnipotent because he is not able to do all that he wills, but powerless, even as we are, who at times are not able to achieve what we will. But because he is omnipotent and not powerless in regard to anything, it is certain that evil things could not be or be done, except by his will. For how would it be possible for any evil to be done by anyone, if God does not wish it and is unwilling, since it is written: *Who shall resist his will?*[1]

5. SECOND. Above, Augustine also said: "Because it must necessarily be done, if he willed it."[2] But he wills evil things either to be done, or not to be done; if he wills them not to be done, they are not done; but they are done, therefore he wills them to be done.

6. THIRD. Also, it is a good thing for evil things to be or be done, otherwise the most high good would not allow them to be done. Hence Augustine says, in the *Enchiridion*: "Although those things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, yet the fact that not only good things, but also evil ones, exist is good. For if it were not a good thing that evil things should also exist, they would in no way be allowed to be by the omnipotent good, for whom it is undoubtedly as easy to do what he wills as it is not to allow to be what he does not will. Unless we believe this, our confession is endangered by which we confess to believe in the Father almighty."[3]—See, here you have it plainly that it is good for evil things to exist; for God is the author of every good, who wills every good that is to be. And so, since it is good for evil things to be or be done, he also wills that evil things be or be done. Those who say that God wills evil things to be or be done use these and other similar reasons and authorities.

7. HERE HE SETS FORTH THE REASONS OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT EVIL THINGS ARE NOT DONE BY THE WILL OF GOD. But those who say that evil things do not exist or are not done by the will of God respond to the aforegoing arguments by saying that God neither wills evil things to be done, nor wills them not to be done or is unwilling that they be done, but only that he does not will them to be done.

[1]Rom. 9, 19.
[2]See above, c2 n3.
[3]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c96.

8. WHY IT IS NOT TRUE THAT GOD WILLS EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE. For if he were to will them to be or be done, then he would certainly cause them to be or be done, and so he would be the author of evils. But he is not the author of evils, as the authorities of the Saints attest; and so evil things are not done by his will.

9. HERE WHY IT IS NOT TRUE THAT GOD WILLS EVIL THINGS NOT TO BE DONE, OR IS UNWILLING THAT THEY BE DONE. Also, if God were unwilling that evil things be done, or if he willed them not to be done, and yet they were done, he would not be omnipotent, since his will would be impeded by the working of human will. And so they do not grant that God wills evil things to be done, lest he be understood as the author of evils; nor do they grant that he wills evil things not to be done, or is unwilling that they be done, lest he seem to be powerless.

10. THAT IT IS TRUE THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE. But they say that he does not will evil things to be done, only so that he should be shown to be not the author, but the permitter of evils. Hence the Evangelist too, in showing that God is the author of all goods, says: *All things are made through him*,[4] but then he immediately denies that he is the author of evils, saying: *And without him is made nothing*, that is, sin. He did not say that it was made through him, or while he was unwilling or did not wish it, but only *without him*, that is, without his will, because sin is not done by his will.

11. THAT EVIL THINGS ARE NOT DONE WITH GOD WILLING OR UNWILLING, BUT WITH HIM NOT WILLING. And so evil things are not done with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subject to God's will that an evil be done or not done, but that he allows it to be done, because it is good to allow evil things to be done; and he allows it entirely willingly, not willing evil things, but willing to allow that they be done, because evil things are not good, nor is it good for them to be or be done.

Chapter 4 (200)

1. HOW THAT STATEMENT OF AUGUSTINE: 'IT IS GOOD FOR EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE' IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD. As for that which Augustine says, "It is good for evil things to be done, nor would evil things be allowed to be done by the omnipotent good, unless it were good that they should be,"[1] they assert that it was said by reason of the fact that God draws good

[4]Jn. 1, 3.

[1]See above, c3 n6.

things out of the evils which are done; nor would he permit them to be done, unless he were drawing something good out of them.

2. HE CONFIRMS THAT UNDERSTANDING BY ANOTHER AUTHORITY OF THE SAME. Hence Augustine, in the same book the *Enchiridion*, plainly indicating that such is the meaning of the above words, says: "Almighty God, to whom pertains the highest power over things, since he is the highest good, would in no way allow anything evil to be in his works, unless he were so omnipotent and good that he would draw good even out of evil."[2]—Also, in the same: "God judged it better to draw good things out of evil ones, than to allow no evils."[3] And so it was said in this sense, and it is true, that it is good for evil things to be done because, out of the evils which are done, goodness, that is, usefulness, comes to the good, *who, according to his purpose, are called saints*.[4] For such people, as the Apostle says, *all things work together for good*,[5] even evil things, because they are advantageous to them, even as they are disadvantageous to those who do them. So it is that in Scripture an evil is sometimes called a good, as Jerome says, *On Mark*: Judas' evil was a good, namely to us.[6] And if a thing is good for such or such a one, it does not follow that it is simply a good. For a thing is properly and simply a good, if it is good in itself and in the one who does it.

Chapter 5 (201)

FOURFOLD ACCEPTATION OF GOOD. For there is something which is good in itself and for the one to whom it is done, but is not good for the one who does it, as when a poor person is helped, but not for the sake of God. And something is good in itself and for the one who does it, but not for the one to whom it is done, as when truth is preached for the sake of God to one who does not accept it. And there is something which is good in itself, and to the one who does it, and to the one to whom it is done, as when the truth is preached for the sake of God to one who believes it; hence the Apostle: *We are the good odour of God, odour of life to some, odour of death to others*.[1] But there is something else which is not good in itself and harms and damns the one who does it, if he does not repent of it, like evil; and yet it is good for something. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, "all things have been created by the most highly and equally

[2]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c11.
[3]Ibid., c27.
[4]Rom. 8, 28.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Interlinear gloss on Mk. 14, 21, from Pseudo-Jerome.

[1]2 Cor. 2, 15.

and immutably good Trinity, but they have not been created as most highly and equally and immutably good things, and yet they are good even singly. But all together, created things are *very good*,[2] because the admirable beauty of the universe emanates from them as a whole. In that universe, even that which is called evil, when it is well ordered and put in its place, renders good things more eminently agreeable so that they should be more pleasing and praiseworthy by comparison to the evil ones."[3]

Chapter 6 (202)

1. THAT EVILS ARE OF HELP TO ALL: THEIR OWN PROFIT THOSE WHO DO THEM OR THOSE OF OTHERS PROFIT THOSE WHO SUFFER THEM, AT LEAST IF THEY ARE AMONG THE ELECT. From this, it is manifest that some good comes from the evil things which are done, even though good things are more pleasing and praiseworthy. But even to those who do them, sometimes good things come from the evils which they do, if, *according to his purpose, they are called saints*.[1] "For in the case of such people," as Augustine says in the book *On Correction and Grace*, "to such an extent does God work *all things together for good*,[2] that if any of them lose their way and trespass, he makes even this to profit them as a good, because they return humbler and wiser,"[3] like Peter. "Even those evils which the faithful piously bear at the hand of the iniquitous," as Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*, "certainly profit them, either for the removal of sins, or for the exercise and testing of justice, or to demonstrate the misery of this life."[4] And so Job felt the hand of God,[5] and the Apostle felt the sting of Satan;[6] and each of them made progress because each bore the evil well.

2. FROM THE ABOVE, HE CONCLUDES BY SHOWING THAT IT IS EVEN GOOD IN MANY WAYS FOR EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE. And so, if one diligently attends to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that good things come from evil ones, and for that reason it was said that it is a good for evils to be done or to be; not because an evil is a good, or because it is a good for an evil thing to be done. For it is not good for evil to be done by anyone, because it is not good that anyone do evil. For if this were good, certainly God would be its author, who is the author of

[2]Cf. Gen. 1, 31.
[3]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cc10-11.

[1]Rom. 8, 28.
[2] Cf. Ibid.
[3]Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c9 n24.
[4]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, bk 13 c16 n20.
[5]Cf. Job 19, 21.
[6]Cf. 2 Cor. 12, 7.

every good thing. But if God is its author, then it is with him as author that man does evil, and so it is with God as author that man becomes worse. And if it is with him as author that man becomes worse, then it is with God willing that man becomes worse.

3. THAT MAN DOES NOT BECOME WORSE WITH GOD AS AUTHOR. WHAT IT IS TO SAY 'WITH GOD AS AUTHOR,' THAT IS, WITH GOD WILLING. For it is the same to say that something is done with God as author as with God willing. But it is not with God as author that man becomes worse, so neither with God willing, as Augustine plainly concludes by an argument from the lesser case, in the book of *84 Questions*. He says as follows: "It is not with a wise man as author that a man becomes worse: for so great is this fault that it cannot accrue to a wise man. But God is more excellent than any wise man; and so, much less does a man become worse with God as author. For God's will is much more excellent than that of a wise man. But to say with him as author is to say with him willing; and so it is by a failing of the will that a man is made worse. But if this failing is far removed from God's will, as reason teaches, then we must investigate from whom it comes."[7] See, Augustine plainly says here that man is not made worse with God as author or willing, but by a failing of his own will. And so it is not with God as author that evil is done by anyone; and so evils are not done with God willing.

Chapter 7 (203)

1. THAT THE CAUSE BY WHICH MAN IS MADE WORSE IS NOT IN GOD. Afterwards, the same Augustine, asking what the cause is by which man is made worse, asserts that it is not in God. In the same book, he says as follows: "The cause of a man becoming worse is either in himself, or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, then there is no cause. If in another, then either in God, or in some other man, or in that which is neither God nor man. But not in God: for God is the cause only of good things; so either it is in man, or in that which is neither God nor man, or in nothing."[1] From these, it is plainly shown that it is not good that man become worse, because the cause of this thing is not God, who is the cause only of good things. And if it is not good that man become worse, then it is not good that evil be done by him; and so God does not will that evil be done by him.

[7]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 3.

[1]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 4.

2. HE PROVES IN ANOTHER WAY THAT EVIL THINGS ARE NOT DONE WITH GOD AS AUTHOR. Also, it is shown in another way that evil things are not done with God as author, that is, willing, because he is not the cause of tending toward non-being. For to tend toward non-being is evil, but he is not the author of evil. But one who works evil tends toward non-being; and so it is not with God as author that anyone works evil. Therefore it is not good that anyone works evil because God is the author only of the good. Augustine explains this plainly in the same book, saying as follows: "He who is the author of all the things that are, and to whose goodness it pertains that all that is have being, is the cause of the good alone. Therefore he is not the author of evil, and so he is the highest good, in which it is a good not to be deficient in any way, and to be deficient is evil. And so he is not the cause of the deficiency, that is, of tending toward non-being, who is, so to speak, the cause of being, since he is the author of all things that are, and which, insofar as they are, are good."[2] See, you have it plainly that to lack God, who is the highest good, is evil; to do evils is evil; and so it is not with God as author or willing that evil things are done.

3. THE SOPHISTICAL OBJECTION OF SOME, BY WHICH THEY STRIVE TO PROVE THAT IT IS FROM GOD THAT EVIL THINGS ARE DONE. It has already been sufficiently shown that evil things are not done with God as their author. But some, who proceed sophistically, and so are hateful to God,[3] strive to prove that it is from God as author that evil things are done. They argue in this way: it is true that evil things are done; but all that is true is from the truth which is God; and so it is from God that evil things are done. That all truth is from God, they confirm with the authority of Augustine, in the book of *84 Questions*. There, he says as follows: "All that is true is true from the truth; but God is truth; and so all that is true has God as author."[4] But it is true that evil things are done or are; and so it is with God as author that evil things are or are done.

4. RESPONSE, WHERE HE GRANTS THAT ALL THAT IS TRUE IS FROM GOD AND REVEALS THEIR SOPHISTRY. It is easy for us to respond to them, but what they say seems unworthy of response. And indeed, all that is true is from God, as Augustine says. And Ambrose agrees with him; in discussing that saying of the Apostle: *None can say: Lord Jesus, except in the Holy Spirit*,[5] he says that "all that is true, by whomever it is said, is from the Holy Spirit."[6] And since it is true that evil things are done, this truth

[2]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 21.
[3]Cf. Eccli. 37, 23.
[4]Augustine, *De diversis qq. 83*, q. 1.
[5]1 Cor. 12, 3.
[6]I.e., Ambrosiaster, on 1 Cor. 12, 3.

which is expressed by that phrase, namely evil things are done, is from God; but it does not follow from this that it is from God that evil things be done. For if this were to be said, God would be understood to be the author of evils.—BY ANALOGY, HE SHOWS THAT THEIR VIEW IS FALSE. And it is manifestly shown to be false by analogy: God forbids that theft be committed; but it is true that theft is committed; therefore God forbids the truth. It does not follow.

5. HE APPROVES PART OF THE QUESTION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT GOD DOES NOT WILL EVIL THINGS TO BE DONE. Leaving aside this and other similar inanities, and supporting the sounder part in the above question, which is more fully proved by the testimonies of the Saints, let us say that God does not will evil things to be done, and yet he does not will that they not be done, nor is he unwilling that they be done. For all that he wills to be done is done; and all that he wills not to be done is not done. But many things are done which he does not will to be done, such as all evil things.

DISTINCTION XLVII

Chapter 1 (204)

1. THAT THE WILL OF GOD CONCERNING MAN IS ALWAYS FULFILLED, WHITHERSOEVER THE LATTER MAY TURN. Certainly, the will of God is always efficacious, so that all that he wills is done, and nothing is done which he does not will. This will, when it concerns man, is always fulfilled, whithersoever the latter may turn. For, as Augustine says: "Nothing established in free choice overcomes the will of God, even if it acts against his will,"[1] and yet nothing is held to be done against God's will, which is himself, in such a way that what he wills to be done is not done, or what he does not will to be done is done. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*,[2] that will is always fulfilled, either concerning us or by us. It is fulfilled concerning us, and yet we do not fulfil it, when we sin. It is fulfilled by us when we do the good: for we do it because we know that it pleases God. And so God always fulfils his will concerning man because man does nothing as to which God does not work what he wills.— AUGUSTINE, *ON THE PSALM*: "For God does not will that any man sin; but if he has sinned, God wills to spare the penitent that he may live; but as for the one who perseveres in his sins, [God wills] to punish him so that he

[1]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 110 n2.
[2]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cc100-101.

should not, in his contumacy, escape the power of justice."[3] As God prepared some for punishment from eternity, so he prepared others for glory.

2. AUGUSTINE IN THE *ENCHIRIDION*: "And these are *the great works of the Lord, perfect according to all his wills*,[4] and so wisely perfect that when the angelic and human creature sinned, namely doing not what God willed, but what it willed, he fulfilled what he willed through the very will of the creature, by which what the Creator did not will was done. As the highest good, he well uses even evils to the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom in his benignity he predestined to glory. Insofar as they were concerned, these creatures did what God did not will; insofar as God's omnipotence is concerned, they were in no way able to do that. Indeed, by the very fact that they acted against his will, his will concerning them was fulfilled. And so *the great works of the Lord* are indeed *perfect according to all his wills*, so that in a wondrous and ineffable manner even what is done against his will is not done apart from his will. For it would not be done, if he did not allow it; nor does he allow it at all unwillingly, but willingly; nor would he who is good allow evil to be done, if he were not omnipotent and able to draw good out of evil."[5] By these words, it is clearly shown that the eternal will of God concerning man is always fulfilled, even if man acts against God's will.

3. HE ENQUIRES INTO THE MEANING OF THE ABOVE WORDS. But diligent attention must be paid to how it is said above that something is done against God's will, but not apart from it; and how is to be understood the expression: 'Insofar as they were concerned, they did what God did not will; insofar as God's omnipotence is concerned, they were in no way able to do that.' For these words seem to contradict what is said above, where it is stated that nothing resists his will.[6]

4. HE CLARIFIES THE MATTER HERE BY SAYING THAT GOD'S WILL IS TAKEN ABOVE IN DIFFERENT WAYS. But as we said above,[7] God's will is taken in different ways; if this difference in the above words were diligently noted, nothing contradictory would be found there. For where he says 'even what is done against his will is not done apart from his will,' he uses will in different senses. By those words, he did not mean to be understood that very will which is God and is eternal, but its signs, that is, prohibition or precept and permission.

[3]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, Ps. 110, n2.
[4]Ps. 110, 2.
[5]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c100.
[6]Dist. 46 c1.
[7]Dist. 45 cc5-6.

Chapter 2 (205)

1. IN WHAT SENSE SOME THINGS ARE SAID TO BE DONE AGAINST GOD'S WILL, WHICH NEVERTHELESS ARE NOT DONE APART FROM HIS WILL, AND IN WHAT SENSE IT IS TRUE THAT NOTHING IS DONE AGAINST HIS WILL. For many things are done against God's precept or against his prohibition, which nonetheless are not done apart from his permission. Indeed, all evil things are done by his permission, which yet are done apart from his eternal will, as Augustine says on that passage of the Psalm: *That my mouth speak not the works of man.*[1] For he calls the works of men those which are evil, which are done apart from God's will, which is himself, but not apart from his permission, which is not God himself; and yet it is called 'God's will' because God willingly allows evils to be done. They are done against his precept or prohibition, but not against his will which is God himself, unless they be said to be done against it because they are done apart from it: indeed, nothing is done against it in such a way that what he wills to be done is not done, or that what he does not will to be done is done.

2. Augustine noted this clearly in the place where he said: 'Insofar as they were concerned, they did what God did not will; insofar as God's omnipotence is concerned, they were in no way able to do that';[2] as if he were to say: They acted against God's precept, which is called his 'will,' but they did not act against God's omnipotent will, because they were not able to do the one, but were able to do the other; and so, through that which they did against God's will, that is, his precept, his will was done concerning them, that is, his eternal will was fulfilled by which he willed them to be damned.—Hence Gregory on Genesis: "Many fulfil God's will by the very thing by which they strive to change it, and they follow his counsel as they resist it; for whatever results from human ingenuity serves God's disposition."[3] Here it is plainly shown that when evil persons resist God's counsel and precept, which is called 'God's will,' they do what fulfils the very will which is God, and which is called disposition or good pleasure.

3. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, "however strong be the wills of Angels or men, whether good or evil, whether they will what God wills or what he does not, the will of the Almighty is always invincible, which can never be evil, which is just even when it inflicts evil things, and by the very fact that it is just, it is not evil. Therefore the omnipotent

[1]Ps. 16, 4; cf. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 16, 4, n4.
[2]Above, c1 n2.
[3]Gregory, *Moralia*, 6 c18 n28.

God, whether through mercy *he has mercy on whom he will*,[4] or whether through judgment *he hardens whom he will*,[5] neither does anything iniquitously, nor does anything other than willingly, and *he does all things that he wills*."[6,7]

Chapter 3 (206)

IN A SUMMARY WAY, HE RELATES BRIEFLY THE MEANING OF THE ABOVE, ADDING WHY GOD COMMANDS ALL TO DO GOOD AND AVOID EVIL WHEN HE DOES NOT WILL THIS TO BE FULFILLED BY ALL. From what is said above, it is clear that the will of God which is himself is always invincible, nor is it ever made void with regard to anything, but is fulfilled in all things. But his counsel and precept or prohibition are not fulfilled by all those to whom they are given. And he did not command good things to all, or prohibit evil ones, or counsel the very best, in such a way that he willed that the goods which he had commanded be done by all and the evils that he prohibited be avoided by all—for if he had willed it, they would certainly be done, because his will cannot be overcome or impeded in regard to anything by man—but in order to show his justice to men and so that the evil ones should have no excuse; also, so that the good should obtain glory from their obedience, and the evil punishment from their disobedience, as he had prepared for each from eternity. And so he willed those things which he had commanded or prohibited to all to be done or avoided by some, but not by all; and he commanded some things personally, both in the old and the new Law, which he did not will to be done by those to whom he had commanded them, as to Abraham concerning the sacrifice of his son,[1] and to some who had been cured in the Gospel, to whom he commanded that they should not reveal it to anyone.[2]

[4]Rom. 9, 18.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ps. 113, 1.
[7]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c102.

[1]Cf. Gen. 22, 2-22.
[2]Cf. Mk. 1, 44; see above, Dist. 45 c7 n1.

DISTINCTION XLVIII

Chapter 1 (207)

1. THAT AT TIMES MAN BY GOOD WILL WILLS OTHERWISE THAN GOD DOES, AND AT TIMES BY EVIL WILL HE WILLS WHAT GOD WILLS BY GOOD WILL. It is also to be known that at times the will of a man who wills the same as what God wills to be done is evil, and at times the will of a man who wills other than what God wills is good.

2. THAT A MAN'S WILL IS CONSIDERED GOOD ACCORDING TO TWO ASPECTS. For in order that a man's will be good, it is necessary to note what is suitable for him to will, and to what end. For there is such a gap between God's will and human will that in some things it is suitable for God to will one thing and man another. Hence Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*: "At times, a man in his good will wills something which God does not will in his more fully and more certainly good will (for his will can never be evil), just as if a good son were to will his father to live, whom God in his good will wills to die. And again, it can happen that a man may will by an evil will what God wills by a good one: as when an evil son wills his father to die, and God also wills it. Clearly, the first son wills what God does not will, but the second wills the same as God wills; and yet the piety of the first is more consonant with God's good will, even though he wills something different, than the impiety of the one who wills the same thing. For there is a great difference between what is suitable for man and what is suitable for God to will, and to what end each man refers his will as to whether it is approved or disapproved."[1] For a man can will a good which it is not suitable for him to will; and he can will a good which is suitable, but he does not refer it to a right end, and so his will is not good.

Chapter 2 (208)

1. THAT GOD'S GOOD WILL IS FULFILLED BY THE EVIL WILLS OF MEN, AS HAPPENED IN CHRIST'S PASSION, WHERE SOMETHING WAS DONE WHICH GOD WILLED BY A GOOD WILL AND THE JEWS BY AN EVIL ONE; AND YET THEY WILLED SOMETHING WHICH GOD DID NOT WILL. It is also not to be passed over that at times God's good will is fulfilled by the evil will of man, as was done in Christ's crucifixion: God willed him to die by a good will, but the Jews crucified him by an impious will. And the Jews willed by an evil will something that God willed by a good will, namely that

[1]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c101.

Christ should suffer and die; yet they willed something else which God did not will, namely to kill Christ, which was an evil action and a sin. For God did not will the action of the Jews, but he willed the passion of Christ; as Christ says to the Father in the Psalm: *You knew my sitting*,[1] "that is, you willed and approved"[2] my passion: for it pleased you. Indeed, the whole Trinity willed that Christ suffer, yet it did not will that the Jews kill: because the Trinity willed the suffering of Christ, but did not will the guilt of the Jews; yet it was not unwilling that it happen: for if God had been unwilling, it would not have happened.

2. OBJECTION. But the following objection is made to this: If God willed that Christ suffer, he either willed that he suffer at the hands of the Jews, or not. If God willed that Christ not suffer at the hands of the Jews, as he then suffered, then that was done which God willed not to be done. But if he willed that Christ suffer at the hands of the Jews, then he wanted him to be killed by the Jews; and so he willed that the Jews kill him.

3. RESPONSE. In response to this, we say that it is to be simply granted that God willed Christ to suffer and die, because his passion was a good and the cause of our salvation. But in saying: 'He wanted him to suffer at the hands of, or be killed by, the Jews,' here a distinction is to be drawn. For if the following is the sense: He willed him to suffer the passion or crucifixion inflicted by the Jews, then the sense is true. But if it is understood as follows: He willed that the Jews should kill him, then it is false; for God did not will the action of the Jews, which was evil, but he willed the good passion, and this will was fulfilled by the evil wills of the Jews.—Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: "God fulfils some of his wills, which are entirely good, by the evil wills of evil men, as through the ill-willing Jews Christ was killed for us by the good will of the Father. This was such a great good that the Apostle Peter, when he was unwilling for it to happen, was called a satan by him who was killed."[3,4] See, you manifestly have it that the killing of Christ was a great good; and because Peter did not will this good, he was reprimanded.

Chapter 3 (209)

WHETHER IT PLEASED GOOD MEN THAT CHRIST SUFFER AND DIE: IT PLEASED THEM WITH REGARD TO OUR DELIVERANCE, BUT NOT TO HIS SUFFERING. From this follows the solution to the question by which it is usual to ask whether it ought to have pleased holy men that Christ suffer

[1]Ps. 138, 2.
[2]Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, ps. 138, 2.
[3]Cf. Mt. 16, 23.
[4]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c101,

and die. For it ought to have pleased them with regard to our redemption, but not with regard to his suffering. Therefore they willed and deeply desired that Christ die for the deliverance of man and the fulfilment of the divine will, but they did not will it out of delight in his affliction. And so they were gladdened and saddened by the same thing, but they rejoiced for one reason and sorrowed for another. Therefore they willed Christ to die for the redemption of man, and yet, for different causes, their hearts were moved in different senses by his death.

Chapter 4 (210)

1. HOW ONE SHOULD FEEL ABOUT THE SUFFERINGS OF THE SAINTS, WHETHER YOU SHOULD WILL THEM OR NOT. But if it is asked whether the same is to be felt about the sufferings and martyrdoms of the saints, we say that there is a distinct difference between the suffering of the head and that of the members. For Christ's passion is the cause of our salvation, which is not true of the passion of any saint. For we are redeemed by the passion of none but Christ. And yet their sufferings profited not only those who endured them, but also others of the faithful; and yet they are not our redemption: for the passion alone of him who is God and man could achieve this. And so it was his passion that the pious minds of believers willed and desired to happen, as they believed that it would.

2. THAT WE CAN WILL AND NOT WILL THE SUFFERINGS OF THE SAINTS, AND EITHER OF THEM BY A GOOD WILL. But we can will and not will the sufferings of the saints, and either of them by a good will, if we set proper ends before ourselves. For he for whom Paul's passion was pleasing in respect to its end, because he discerned that Paul's prize was increased and prepared by it, seems to have had a good will; and this will agreed with Paul's own will, by which he desired *to be dissolved and be with Christ*.[1] But he who, moved by compassionate pity, willed Paul to avoid his suffering and escape the hands of evil men, also had a good will. — Hence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: "Good seemed the wills of the pious faithful who were unwilling that Paul enter Jerusalem, lest he suffer there the evils which the prophet Agabus had foretold;[2] and yet God willed him to suffer this very thing to announce the faith of Christ and so become a martyr of Christ. And God did not fulfil his good will by the good wills of the Christians, but by the evil ones of the Jews. And so they were more God's own who did not will what he willed than those who

[1]Phil. 1, 23.
[2]Cf. Acts 21, 10-14.

willingly did what he willed, because in their evil will they did the very thing which God willed in his good will."[3]

3. The same was done in the passion of Christ. For what God willed, this also Judas, the Jew, and the devil willed; but they willed it by an evil will, and God by a good one, namely that Christ die. And yet they willed an action which God did not will.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST BOOK ON THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

[3]Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c101.

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